THE COMMONWEALTH STORY

A Course of Selected Reading
by Authorities

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Particular attention is directed to the accompanying Reading Guide by

F. ALEXANDER, M.A.

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THE COMMONWEALTH STORY

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INTRODUCTORY READING GUIDE

BY

PROFESSOR FRED ALEXANDER, M.A.
Professor of Modern History in the University of Western Australia

I. AN UNFINISHED SYMPHONY

WHAT merit is there in a survey of the history of the countries and peoples, once part of the British Empire, now freely associated in a loosely knit Commonwealth of Nations? What motive may inspire either the writer or the reader of this Commonwealth Story?

Why Read History? These questions are part of a wider query: why does anyone bother to write or to read history? The answer must vary with the individual. For some, satisfaction comes chiefly from the discovery of new facts. For others, the interest is mainly biographical, as they sketch or watch the interplay of men and movements on the broad canvases of the past. For another group of readers, history is but a branch of literature and the skill of the historian is judged by his ability to tell his story in terms worthy of the new facts he has discovered, of the men whose characters he has drawn or of the movements which thrust those men into prominence or which they sought to influence and direct. Others again, whether writers or readers of history, search the pattern of the past for guidance in facing present problems, even, perhaps, in predicting the future course of current events.

The story of the Commonwealth of Nations with which this essay is concerned is big enough to cater for all these varying tastes—as the reader may discover for himself. Researchers in a London Public Records Office, or in one of many overseas archives as yet imperfectly explored, are constantly bringing to light new evidence which compels fresh judgments on men and events. Witness the conflict of contemporary and modern opinion on Sir James Stephen, whom Charles Buller and other Colonial Reformers of the eighteen-thirties denounced as that undistinguished mediocrity, "Mr. Mothercountry" of the Colonial Office, but whom more modern scholars have vindicated as "among the greatest of that great series of Civil Servants

which forms one of the chief glories of nineteenth-century England ".

Great Personalities. The Commonwealth Story is also rich in personalities. It brings together in the same causative chain of events the aristocratic liberalism of a Durham, the cold austerity of a Gladstone, the warm faith of a Campbell-Bannerman and the skilful phrases and steering hand of a Balfour. It invites respect and understanding for Oom Paul Kruger no less than his rival Cecil Rhodes ; for Hertzog and Malan as well as Botha and Smuts ; for Imperial Proconsuls and the Gandhis and Nehrus whom they imprisoned. It reveals the physical courage and idealism of individual explorers like the French-Canadian Champlain or the ill-fated Burke and Wills in Australia, of unnamed men, women and children whose rugged endurance on the lonely veld is depicted in the Voortrekker Monument at Pretoria, of the men from two South Pacific Dominions whose exploits at Gallipoli are enshrined in the name " Anzac ". Place must also be found in the Commonwealth Story both for the high moral and intellectual qualities of an Alfred Deakin in the formative years of an Australian federal society and for the lowbrow, egalitarian nationalism of some of Deakin's contemporaries, which was fittingly enough expressed by the obscure Queensland journalist who denounced Imperial Federation as inviting the presence in London of a " toadying, top-hatted delegation bartering away the birthright of our people ".

Readers of historical literature may perhaps complain that the Commonwealth Story has yet to inspire a Gibbon, a Prescott, a Macaulay or a Trevelyan. Be that as it may, the pages of the story themselves contain many memorable passages from the pens of those who helped to make it. These range from the sonorous periods of the eighteenth-century pamphleteer-philosopher Edmund Burke (who preached " conciliation " with the trans-Atlantic colonies) and the more vulgar but telling phrases of his contemporary Paine (whose *Common Sense* helped to turn colonial revolt into American Revolution) down to the biting editorials in John W. Dafoe's *Manitoba Free Press* which helped to shape Canadian nationalism a century and a half later. They include also such documents as the famous Durham Report of 1839 on British North America, which was as readable in form as it was provoking in argument, or the Selborne Memorandum on the Union of South Africa, in 1907, the carefully turned phrases of which owed much to the inspiration of Lionel Curtis and other members of Lord Milner's " kindergarten ".

For the present writer it may be confessed at the outset that the primary attraction of the Commonwealth Story comes from tracing the intricate but fascinating patterns which can be seen winding

through the several stages in the story, wherever the exciting events of the moment occur.

Music while you Read. Some may find it helpful to make comparison between the story of the Commonwealth and the working out of a great musical composition—a symphony for example. The story traces itself through several stages or movements. It has a striking central theme which persists throughout. There is, however, an equally striking second theme. The two are closely interwoven; as they work themselves out, with considerable variations, they lead into some dramatic, even some melodramatic, passages, heavily scored at times for percussion instruments and the brass. There are also some happy, lyrical phrases when the prevailing harmony calls forth sweet melodies from a first violin, with soft murmuring accompaniment from strings and woodwind and only an occasional rumble from bass fiddle or bassoon. As the story progresses further, these quiet periods become less frequent and there is a mass of modernistic discords through which the pattern is less readily discernible. And the work breaks off with both players and audience uncertain of the dénouement. The story of the Commonwealth is, in truth, an unfinished symphony.

II. FIVE MOVEMENTS

Translating the preceding paragraph into more mundane language, it is possible to trace the Commonwealth Story through five periods. The first, which may be labelled the period of "Colonial Dependence", is associated with mercantilist ideas of the subordination of colonies to the requirements of the Mother Country's economic system. It did not give place to that of "Colonial Self-Government" until long after the American War of Independence. The introduction of Colonial self-government is traditionally associated with its major prophet Durham; it owed much to his less well-known son-in-law, Elgin, who first introduced responsible government in Canada in 1846. This period merged almost imperceptibly into a third period of "Dominion Self-Government" when there was more outward evidence of nationalism in the overseas self-governing Empire. World War I found this nascent nationalism of the Dominions already raising some awkward questions concerning trade treaties and legislation on such matters as shipping and immigration which impinged upon centralized Imperial control of foreign affairs. Service on the field of battle, whether in the Middle East, South-West and East Africa, or in France, gave rights of participation in the councils of peace, and the inter-war

years of the twentieth century saw the now internationally accepted Commonwealth working its way through a fourth period which has been called that of " Interdependent Nationhood ". It was a period of definition forced by Canada and South Africa and abetted by the Irish Free State which, as part of the *modus vivendi* of 1922, had acquired the label without the spirit or tradition of Dominion status. The result was the Balfour Report of 1926 with its declaration that Great Britain and the Dominions were " autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of domestic or external affairs though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations ".

The legal counterpart of the Balfour Report, the Statute of Westminster, 1931, was at once the culminating point in this period of Interdependent Nationhood under the Common Crown and the precursor of a new period in the history of the Commonwealth which still defies definition. The aftermath of World War II saw India, Pakistan and Ceylon emerge as Dominions whose future relations with the rest of the Commonwealth were uncertain. Eire, which had been neutral during the War, seemed bent on severing other than treaty relations with the United Kingdom and the remaining Commonwealth members. India was resolved upon a republican constitution. The year 1948 also saw the rise to power in South Africa of Dr. Malan's Afrikaner Nationalists who made no secret of their ultimate commitment to a republican if not also a secessionist programme.

Since 1949 Interdependent Nationhood has remained the most satisfactory label for the post-war Commonwealth but allegiance to a Common Crown has disappeared. Republics have replaced former Dominions, but whereas Eire left the Commonwealth, India, Pakistan and Ceylon elected to combine republican institutions at home with continued membership of the Commonwealth of which the British Sovereign is the titular head and to which Ghana was in 1957 admitted as the first African member other than the Union in the south.[1] The Federation of Malaya was also given independent status in the Commonwealth in 1957. For the older overseas members, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, this abandoning of the legal link of common allegiance was accepted without enthusiasm but has meant no lessening of

[1] In 1953 the self-governing colony of Southern Rhodesia was united with the Protectorates of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland to form a single central African unit, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, but the Federation as such was not recognized as a full member of the Commonwealth, since its self-governing powers remained limited by the overriding authority of the United Kingdom Government in London with respect to the protectorate states of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

the ties of race, sentiment and personal loyalty to a common throne. Such ties have been renewed by successive overseas tours of a reigning Sovereign and her husband, of a United Kingdom Prime Minister—the first to visit Australia and New Zealand while in office—and of Queen Elizabeth the Queen Mother.

III. THE MAIN THEME

The first or dominant theme working through the Commonwealth Story in all its five periods (or " movements " if the symphonic analogy is helpful) may be stated in simple terms: it is the problem of reconciling freedom with unity. The issue has been sharply evident in the twentieth-century history of the Commonwealth as the several overseas members came to feel, in different ways and at different times, that their right to control their own affairs compelled final control over matters such as external trade, defence, or immigration, which affected relations between the Commonwealth and foreign countries. How could the freedom of each part to determine its own policy in such matters (on which different members might have different views) be reconciled with the unity of the Commonwealth as a whole?

Local Freedom. Though the issue was thus more clearly seen in the twentieth century it had been present since the earliest stage in British policy towards overseas colonies. In the first period of Colonial Dependence there was no question that the overseas colonies of settlement were to be subordinate to the interests of the Mother Country. It is nevertheless important to emphasize that there was, from the first, an element of political liberty within the commercially controlled, mercantilist British Empire of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As early as 1619, in the first North American coastal colony of Virginia, an elected legislative assembly was introduced. The element of political liberty was even more strongly evident in the Puritan colonies founded farther north in New England after the landing of the Pilgrim Fathers in 1620. For these Puritans carried their political as well as their religious ideas with them to the New World. And, on the whole, though there were some striking instances of conflict, the English Governments of the seventeenth century and British Governments of the first half of the eighteenth century were content to allow this measure of local freedom to develop in the North American coastal colonies provided it did not interfere with the overriding authority of the government in London, especially in commercial matters.

From the very first, therefore, there was a recognition in British colonial policy that Imperial control must be reconciled with local freedom. But it was less a recognition based on principle than an arrangement necessitated by distance and one which developed naturally out of the political practices which migrating English settlers carried with them to their trans-Atlantic homes. The proof of this came when developing ideas of political liberty in the overseas colonies clashed with the British Government's ideas of control and unity in major matters. This clash was inevitable as long as mercantilist policy persisted in London and as the colonists' ideas of liberty expanded with the growth of their several colonies.

American Independence. No full account of the Commonwealth Story can ignore the exciting causes of the conflict which culminated in the War of Independence from 1776 to 1783. Detached enquiry into these exciting causes will also reveal that not all the mistakes or selfishness were on the British side. For present purposes, however, it is enough to insist that there was an inherent conflict between, on the one hand, the developing ideas of local liberty or the freedom of the part and, on the other, rigid mercantilist insistence that Imperial unity must be maintained by the sole authority of the Government in London. When the unity-liberty theme of the Commonwealth Story came to a head in the second half of the eighteenth century, the result was the loss of the American coastal colonies and their subsequent formation into the United States of America.

Growth of the Second Empire. It seemed for a moment that the shock of defeat might produce basic changes in British colonial policy. A new spirit seemed at work in the ministry of the Younger Pitt in the late 'eighties and early 'nineties. This began to show itself in Pitt's dealings with Ireland and with the old French and the new British colonists in Lower and Upper Canada. These two colonies were united by Pitt's Canada Act of 1791 ; they were given an elected assembly and a system of government which it was hoped would gradually assimilate colonial to British practice.

Such encouraging developments were soon offset by the effects of British involvement in the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. The British Government and the people of the United Kingdom were then to feel the concurrent effects of three great revolutions—the industrial revolution with the application of science to industry and the introduction of the factory system in overcrowded cities ; an agrarian revolution leading to enclosures and rural depopulation ; and the results of the long years of war arising out of the French Revolution. Small wonder that hard-pressed British governments and people of

the early nineteenth century, engrossed with their domestic, political, economic and social problems born of one or other of these three revolutions, had little time or interest to devote to the problem of shaping a new policy for the Empire overseas. Colonists, caught in the reaction so often attendant upon war, complained bitterly in the twenties and thirties of the nineteenth century at the apathy, the indifference and the red tape to which they were subjected in their dealings with the Downing Street bureaucrats and with constantly changing Ministers.

The cause of the colonists was championed by a small group of " Colonial Reformers ", men like Charles Buller, Edmund Gibbon Wakefield, Charles Molesworth, and John Lambton, Earl of Durham, son-in-law of Earl Grey, who was popularly known as " Radical Jack " of the Reform Bill of 1832.

The Durham Report. The Canadian Colonists had, too, an ever-present inspiration and reminder in the physical proximity of the expanding United States. After rebellions had broken out in both Lower and Upper Canada in the mid 'thirties, Durham was sent over to pacify and investigate. He failed in the former task, quarrelled with the Home authorities and returned to England to produce the report on British North America which bears his name.

Though modern historians reject the contemporary gibe that the style of the Durham Report came " from a coxcomb " (Buller), the matter " from a swindler " (Wakefield), and that " the Dictator contributed only six letters " (his name), the influence of Buller and Wakefield was considerable. They had been Durham's lieutenants on the Mission and the Report reflected the new approach of the Colonial Reformers to the vexed question as to how to reconcile the freedom of the part with the unity of the whole. Their answer was to give the colonists responsible government and control over all " local " matters while ensuring Imperial unity by reserving external control on vital matters. These vital matters of Imperial concern Durham limited to four : external trade, defence and foreign relations, the colony's constitution and disposal of waste lands.

Development of Self-government. In this form the period of self-government was introduced to British North America in the later 'forties and was gradually extended throughout the other colonies of settlement. The Colonial Reformers were so satisfied that they had solved the problem of reconciling the freedom of the part with the unity of the whole that they would have given legal definition to the categories " local " and " imperial ". Fortunately, the British distaste for constitutional definition prevented this rigid classification,

which the reformers of the 'forties regarded as a safeguard but which might have become a strait-jacket. Until the Statute of Westminster, 1931, expansion of colonial self-government came through changes in the conventions or practice of inter-Imperial relations and not in the law of an Imperial Constitution.

Some of the changes came quickly. First one and then another of the Durham limitations on colonial self-government fell away before the pressure of overseas nationalism. This nationalism acquired increased negotiating strength with the formation of the Dominion of Canada in 1867, the Commonwealth of Australia in 1901, the Dominion of New Zealand in 1907 and the Union of South Africa in 1909. By the outbreak of World War I, foreign affairs were the only major field of activity in which Dominion self-government restricted the rights of overseas members of what was still described as the self-governing Empire.

The Problem of the Commonwealth. The resultant "Problem of the Commonwealth", as Lionel Curtis dubbed it in his book of that title published in 1916, had been attracting increased attention since the turn of the century. Curtis and his friends sought to solve the problem by Imperial Federation, with a super-parliament and a responsible super-executive, representative of the United Kingdom and the several Dominions, for all Imperial as distinct from local matters. Control of the latter would remain with existing governments and parliaments. Theoretically attractive, the executive and deliberative machinery of Imperial Federation was nevertheless pushed aside in favour of the informal, consultative organization of the Imperial Conference which came to meet every four years from 1907. Representative of governments and not of parliaments, the Imperial Conference produced much exchange of information and some agreed proposals for subsequent action by the governments represented. In 1911 the assembled Ministers were accorded an intimate glimpse of the British Foreign Office's view of the gravely disturbing international situation. A year later, the British Prime Minister (Mr. Asquith) told the British House of Commons that the day would come when the Dominions must be heard "in the determination of the policy and in the direction of Imperial affairs".

That day had not come by August 4, 1914. There had even been a warning from the Canadian Prime Minister, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, that his government had grave doubts about accepting a share in the formulation of an Empire foreign policy which Canada would then be bound to assist in implementing in any part of the world. There was no Empire foreign policy in 1914 other than the foreign policy of the

Government of the United Kingdom. War against Imperial Germany was declared by the British Government in London as the result of a foreign policy for which it had sole responsibility. The fact that the rest of the Empire was automatically involved in the war of 1914–18 was the clearest confirmation of existing limits upon Dominion self-government.

Effects of the War. In the hour of common danger little theoretical discussion was heard of the problem of reconciling unity of the whole with the liberty of the part. The defeatists were drowned by the pæans of praise for the sacrifices made in the common cause. Yet the very wartime zeal of the Dominions gave new point to the claims of some and introduced fresh anomalies into the constitutional structure of inter-Imperial relations. Dominion Ministers sat alongside Mr. Lloyd George's small and powerful War Cabinet. When the Armistice came, Dominion Ministers served as members of the British Empire panel at the Peace Conference at Paris. When the Peace Treaties were ready, Dominion Prime Ministers signed in their own right and, United States doubts notwithstanding, each Dominion became a separate member of the new-born League of Nations.

The first decade of the post-war period thus saw the shaping of inter-Imperial relations—it is scarcely time yet to use the term "intra-Commonwealth"—in a new period for which "Inter-dependent Nationhood" is as good a label as any. But the unity-liberty theme had to be carried further, for the problem of the Commonwealth remained unsolved. The Dominions had emerged from the Peace Conference at Paris with a dual status: they were independent members of the new international organization, the League of Nations, but they remained members of the Commonwealth of Nations in which Dominion Parliaments still remained legally inferior to the Parliament at Westminster. Some Dominions, moreover, showed increasing dissatisfaction with an equality in practice which was not formally recognized in law. The common cause of 1914–18 receded in point of time, and diverging peace-time interests of the several members of the Commonwealth were emphasized by internal developments in certain Dominions. A notable example was the rise to office of General Hertzog in South Africa in 1924. This gave new impetus to the demand for a definition of the post-war position of the Commonwealth.

"*Equal in Status.*" Political definition came at the Imperial Conference of 1926. The carefully phrased declaration associated with the name of Lord Balfour sought to draw a distinction between status and function, between theory and practice. Theoretical equality was conceded to all parts of the self-governing Commonwealth which in turn recognized certain functional arrangements which might continue to

accord special responsibilities to particular parts, notably the Government of the United Kingdom. The Balfour Report was a significant gesture which had an immediate and valuable soothing influence in South Africa and elsewhere, but it had not solved the basic problem as to how functional unity was to be preserved in a crisis if one or more parts persisted in emphasizing equality of status.

The Statute of Westminster. For the rest, the Report of 1926 merely provided a breathing space. It had important sequels in both theory and practice. In point of theory it paved the way for the Statute of Westminster, 1931, which in effect freed the Dominion Parliaments from any subordination to the Parliament at Westminster. Henceforth that Parliament might pass legislation applying to the Dominions only when requested to do so by a particular Dominion whose parliament would need to ratify the legislation in question before it became effective in that Dominion. Lawyers might quibble about the finality of the measure of 1931 by discussing whether the Parliament of the United Kingdom had any constitutional power to bind its successors not to repeal the Statute of Westminster. If there were any real doubt it was removed by the action of the Union of South Africa in passing the Royal Executive Functions and Seals Act and the Status of the Union Act in 1934, by which South Africans sought to ensure their power to enact any measure, if need be an Act of Secession from the Commonwealth.

In practice as well as in theory, the decade which followed the Balfour declaration was disturbing to those who sought to ensure the continued unity of the Commonwealth in vital matters despite the freedom and legal equality of its several self-governing parts. As long as the League of Nations gave some promise of effective restraint upon aggression it was thought that the gravest effects of disunion within the Commonwealth might never arise. Since all States Members of the Commonwealth were also States Members of the League, neutrality of one part of the Commonwealth when other parts were at war was never likely to become a serious danger. By the mid 'thirties, however, after the League had failed over Manchuria, and as neutrality policies were gaining ground in the United States, the problem of the Commonwealth once more became a live issue. Canadian publicists and politicians were torn between their interests and associations in the Commonwealth and in the North American continent respectively. Nor were they uninfluenced by the racial-religious localism of the politically powerful French-Canadian province of Quebec. Canadian neutrality in the next war (now seen by many to be looming on the horizon) became a topic much discussed on both sides of the Pacific no less than of the Atlantic.

The Second World War. Once again the march of events appeared to confound the defeatists. World War II, like World War I, found all Dominions responding to the common cause. Eire's neutrality seemed to be but the exception which proved the rule, since Dominion status had virtually been thrust upon the Irish Free State in 1922 and accepted in the letter without the spirit born of evolutionary tradition.

There were nevertheless some significant differences between 1939 and 1914. Australia and New Zealand, it is true, had accepted the British declaration of war as automatically involving them also in war. But the Canadian and South African parliaments made their independent decisions—that of the Union by a narrow majority involving the replacement of Hertzog as Prime Minister and the return to power of Smuts. And, during the war, even an Australian Government—the Labour Administration led by Mr. John Curtin—pressed its view of the danger in its own local theatre of war to compel the return of Australian troops from the Middle East.

In the aftermath of World War II, therefore, it was natural that the problem of the Commonwealth should reassert itself. It did so in a Commonwealth strikingly changed by both internal and external events. The conditions under which unity might be effective, and the possible extent of practical limits to local liberty, were being thought out in the new environment of the post-war world. The dreadful cost of victory to the United Kingdom and the concentration of so much post-war power in the United States and the Soviet Union made Commonwealth unity without United States co-operation of more limited effect than in the pre-war years, when balance of power rather than concentration of power had influenced much of men's thinking. Yet the very need of United States co-operation and the sharpening of United States-Soviet Union hostility eased the centrifugal pressures from both Canadian and South African sources. Instead of preaching the utmost caution in accepting trans-Atlantic commitments, post-war Canadian statesmen took a leading part in the North Atlantic Pact negotiations which carried Canada (with the United States) into extensive military obligations alongside the United Kingdom and other signatory States. Canadian statesmen, moreover, whether Liberal leaders like M. St. Laurent and his successor, Mr. Lester Pearson, or Conservatives like Mr. Diefenbaker, had come to realize that Uncle Sam could be an even tougher associate than John Bull. Canada's vulnerability to United States capital investment and potential if not actual economic control also underlined the desirability on other grounds for Canada to maintain the Commonwealth connexion as well

as United States friendship and so seek to rotate on an East-West as well as a North-South axis. And even Dr. Malan's Afrikaner Nationalist Government which replaced that of General Smuts after the elections of 1948, and its successor under Mr. Strydom, showed signs of finding a " common cause " with other Commonwealth countries in opposition to Communist Russia even though the republican and apartheid policies of both Malan and Strydom tended to strain the Commonwealth relationship increasingly in the post-war years.

The New Dominions. Paradoxical though it might seem, the threat to Commonwealth unity in action in the post-World War II years came from the latest beneficiaries of the freedom *motif* in the Commonwealth. For when India, with Pakistan and Ceylon, attained full Dominion status in 1947 it was clear that India at least was bent upon a republican constitution which would seemingly destroy the basis of free association based on the 1926–31 acceptance of allegiance to a Common Crown. As late as 1947, some students of Commonwealth affairs were preparing their minds for a severe restriction of the number of full members of the Commonwealth to the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and, possibly, South Africa, while other friendly ex-member Nations remained linked in some form of " external association ". On this basis it was argued that it might be possible to hold Eire as well as other republican associates and perhaps win back Burma which left the Commonwealth in 1947-48. All these nations might thus, as it were, be " in " if not " of " the Commonwealth.

Once more practice forestalled theory. The Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth, including those of India, Pakistan and Ceylon, met in London in April 1949, to consider the Government of India's intention to become a " sovereign independent republic ". The Prime Ministers accepted and recognized " India's continuing membership " of the Commonwealth in accordance with the Government of India's declaration of India's desire " to continue her full membership of the Commonwealth of Nations and her acceptance of the King as the symbol of the free association of its independent member nations and as such as the Head of the Commonwealth ". Whereupon it was resolved :

> " Accordingly the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, Pakistan and Ceylon hereby declare that they remain united as free and equal members of the Commonwealth of Nations, freely co-operating in the pursuit of peace, liberty and progress."

Thus, once again, the unity of the Commonwealth survived even

greater emphasis upon the freedom of its component parts. India did, indeed, announce its determination not to align itself with either the American or the Soviet bloc but Prime Minister Nehru himself deprecated use of the term " neutrality " to describe his country's policy in the post-war world.

IV. THE SUBSIDIARY THEME

The growth of responsible government in overseas colonies and resultant problems in reconciling the liberty of the part with the unity of the whole have so readily been recognized as the dominant theme in the Commonwealth Story that a second important, if subsidiary, theme has been little appreciated until comparatively recent times. The emergence of India, Pakistan and Ceylon as independent nations has emphasized the multi-racial character of the contemporary Commonwealth; it is less frequently recognized that, as far back as the second half of the eighteenth century, the embryo Commonwealth was confronted with the problem of persuading racial, religious and cultural minorities to accept membership of a predominantly British racial community, and *vice versa*. Just as the modern Commonwealth is a *communitas communitatum*, a loosely knit community consisting of the United Kingdom and freely associated overseas communities, so certain parts of the Commonwealth have themselves had to seek the loyalty of self-conscious groups or communities within them.

The French in Canada. The beginnings of this *communitas communitatum* theme are first discernible in Canada after the inspiring leadership of the Elder Pitt and the military successes of Wolfe and Amherst had secured French Canada for Great Britain at the close of the Seven Years War in 1763. A predominantly rural, peasant population of some 60,000 to 65,000 French Canadians, alien in language, race and their Roman Catholic religion, had to be reconciled to the new régime and its handful of English-speaking officials and traders. Confronted by the dual threat of an attempted reconquest by France and the increasing disaffection of the coastal colonies farther south—for the Stamp Act of 1765 arose directly out of the Seven Years War—Lord North's Government in London took the line of least resistance with the French Canadians. Though men like Burke, Pitt and Fox preached Anglicization as the only hope for future progress and prosperity in Canada, the British Government stumbled onto the path which led ultimately to the development of Canada as a multi-racial nation, a community of communities, in which the French Canadians

in the Province of Quebec retained a culture which was distinctively their own but came gradually to accept, and to be accepted into, membership of the larger Canadian society which was predominantly English-speaking and Protestant after loyalists had moved north from the now independent American colonies and migrants had come from the United Kingdom in large numbers.

The *communitas communitatum* theme did not work itself out clearly in Canada until the second half of the nineteenth century. It was at times strangely confused with the self-government theme. During the 'twenties and early 'thirties, French-Canadian nationalists in Quebec worked for their autonomy through the British type of legislative assembly introduced by Pitt's Canada Act of 1791. Ironically enough, the prophet of responsible government in Canada himself urged a reversion to the Anglicization policy which had been pressed upon North by Fox and Burke. After his oft-quoted statement that he had come to Canada expecting a conflict between a government and a people but had found " two nations warring in the bosom of a single state ", Durham had no hesitation in urging the eventual elimination of the distinctively French-Canadian culture.

This part of the recommendations in the Durham Report was never put into effect. As self-government came to British North America, and as its content broadened, Canadians worked out for themselves the problems inherent in a multi-racial society. No Canadian would to-day deny that there have been resulting complications in both domestic and foreign policies, but the detached student will recognize that in no other part of the Commonwealth has the *communitas communitatum* theme expressed itself so strongly and, in more recent times, with such a well-sustained degree of harmony.

South Africa. The theme has been no less strongly present in South African history but, with some exceptional interludes, the notes struck there have been discordant rather than harmonious. The descendants of the original Dutch Calvinists who settled in the Cape, primarily to serve the supply interests of the Dutch East India Company *en route* to and from Java, and who had to assert themselves firmly against their own governing body in Holland, found relations still more difficult with the British governments which assumed control, and with some of the British settlers who arrived after the capture of the Cape from Holland during the Napoleonic Wars. Conflicting ideas on native and other policies were sharpened by the Great Trek of 1835-48. The epic journeys of the Voortrekkers east and north from the Cape, into a virtual no-man's-land where they met Bantu tribes also on the move (in their case southward and westward), added new areas of white

settlement. The hardening conditions of an isolated frontier existence served also to emphasize the differences between the Boer outlook and that of the English South African community which still retained continuing overseas cultural, as well as political and economic, associations. The United Kingdom remained " Home " to a great many English-speaking South Africans, in an emotional as well as a cultural sense which Afrikaans-speaking Europeans had long ceased to feel either for Holland or for the France from which many refugee Huguenots had also come to make their contribution to nineteenth-century Afrikaner society. Conflicting views on economic ways of life which were to be symbolized in the persons of Paul Kruger and Cecil Rhodes added their contribution to the causes which produced many minor incidents and two wars.

It is no part of the purpose of this essay to examine the causes, the course or the results of the South African War of 1899-1902 except in so far as these affected the Commonwealth Story. The early grant of self-government to the defeated Boer Republics of Orange Free State and Transvaal, their fusion with Cape Colony and Natal into the Union of South Africa in 1909 and the prominent parts played by South African statesmen in emphasizing Dominion autonomy, from Botha and Smuts on the one hand to Hertzog and Malan on the other —these are all matters directly related to the unity-liberty theme in the self-governing Commonwealth. Even so, they were closely interwoven with the internal problem of creating a South African community out of the two major European communities, English- and Afrikaans-speaking respectively.

By the end of World War II the English-speakers represented about 40 per cent and the Afrikaans-speakers about 60 per cent of the 2,300,000 Europeans in a Union which also included some 8,000,000 Bantu, nearly a million Cape Coloureds of mixed race and around 250,000 Indians. Though advocates of Anglicization had had their day in South Africa as in Canada, Generals Botha, Smuts and Hertzog all shared the hope that it would be possible to create a South African community which would encourage mutual respect among, while conceding cultural autonomy to, each of the two European communities. The statesmen differed in that Botha and Smuts sought to do this by bringing the two European communities into a single stream of South African political and cultural progress while Hertzog believed firmly in a " two-stream " policy. In his view, each community should retain, cherish and further develop its own distinctive culture and way of life while co-operating with the other community for known political, economic and social purposes.

The political triumph of Hertzog in 1924 and the consequent strengthening of his two-stream policy was qualified by the world-wide economic depression. Smuts' acceptance of the rôle of deputy-leader made possible the Fusion Government of 1933 which lasted until war broke the Hertzog–Smuts partnership in 1939. War also fanned into flame old racial, cultural and even religious suspicions. The Malan Nationalist Opposition was accused of Nazi sympathies and narrow racial and anti-democratic policies. The *communitas communitatum* theme was drowned by the noise of increasing partisanship and by emphasis on the prior claims of special community loyalties which the Malan Nationalists' advent to power after the Union elections of 1948, and their confirmation in office in 1953 and again under Mr. Strydom in 1958, did nothing to abate. A detached observer of the South African scene early in the second half of the century could see few encouraging signs of the emergence of a European South African *communitas communitatum* even if he shut his eyes to the complications presented by the numerically dominant non-Europeans.

Australasia. In the South Pacific Dominions of Australia and New Zealand there was no corresponding problem of evolving a national policy which would command loyalty from diversified European communities. In both Dominions the racial homogeneity of its European people was widely recognized. Its results were even exaggerated. Australia's alleged characteristic of being "98 per cent British" had to face the challenge of a self-imposed assimilation programme following its post-World War II Labour and non-Labour Governments' policy of seeking large numbers of Displaced Persons and other European immigrants of non-British race. New Zealand Labour Governments' independent rôle in inter-Imperial and international diplomacy during the inter-war years had also removed some of the superficial signs of New Zealanders being "more British than the British".

In New Zealand, moreover, the *communitas communitatum* theme expressed itself with peculiar success in shaping the relations between Europeans and Maoris. By the middle of the twentieth century the Maori population of New Zealand had a numerical strength of 110,000 in a total community of just under two millions. Though most members of the one community remained educationally, economically and socially inferior to the other, a relationship of mutual respect had been established with a substantial measure of economic, educational and political equality of opportunity. It thus became possible to classify New Zealand with Canada and to regard both as successful manifestations of the working of the *communitas communitatum* theme even if the record remained less convincing elsewhere in the Commonwealth.

V. TRUSTEESHIP

New Zealand's success in handling relations between its European and Maori communities and the complications of South Africa's European and non-European relations invite attention to yet another theme which has played a prominent part in the Commonwealth Story. The early years of the nineteenth century saw not only the activity of Durham and the Colonial Reformers in challenging British apathy and indifference on colonial matters. Parallel with this was the agitation of the Evangelicals and the Anti-Slavery Movement which was to leave a deep impression on the developing Commonwealth. Persistent pressure by men like Clarkson and Wilberforce led the British Colonial Office to adopt the policy of protecting native interests. This not only conflicted sharply with the nineteenth-century views of colonists overseas—notably in South Africa and in the West Indies—but also laid the foundations of the twentieth-century policy of trusteeship in British non-self-governing territories in Africa and elsewhere. The question gradually emerged—it has yet to be answered—whether the twentieth-century development of the liberty-unity theme, with its increasing emphasis on the freedom of the self-governing Dominions to control their own affairs, could be reconciled with that paramount responsibility for the interests of indigenous coloured populations which United Kingdom governments continued to accept in contiguous or neighbouring territories under their control.

This issue presented itself in its most acute form in the contentious question of the future of the Protectorates of Bechuanaland, Swaziland and Basutoland. Virtually enclaves within the Union of South Africa, these three territories were temporarily retained under British control in 1909 though their eventual transfer to the Union was then clearly contemplated. Continued delay in bringing about this transfer despite recurrent pressure from Union Prime Ministers (from Smuts as well as from Hertzog, Malan and Strydom) emphasized the conflict inherent in the self-governing and trusteeship *motifs* respectively in the Commonwealth Story.

VI. AMERICAN INFLUENCE

The two world wars of the twentieth century which quickened the tempo of the Commonwealth Story and sharpened the issues interwoven in its unity-liberty, inter-racial and trusteeship themes, also

brought into relief the relations between the Commonwealth and the successors of the original trans-Atlantic colonists. As American men and American resources twice ranged themselves alongside those of Commonwealth countries, in 1917-18 and in 1941-45, and as the second post-war period found both Government and people of the United States rejecting isolationist reaction for continued international leadership, it became evident that the future course, as well as the first chapter in the Commonwealth Story, would be closely bound up with the development of the English-speaking peoples of the North American continent south of the Canadian border.

In territorial extent, in racial composition and in resultant civilization, no less than in its immense economic strength and manpower, the twentieth-century United States of America was, however, far removed from the thirteen coastal colonies on the eastern seaboard which had seceded from the first British Empire. The student of the Commonwealth Story who seeks to shape in his mind the possible lines of future association with the United States must needs familiarize himself tc some extent with the basic facts of American history, from the days of Washington and Jefferson to those of the Roosevelts and their successors. He should be on guard, however, lest crude or colourful personalities and astronomical figures of rapid material progress combine with the virility (at times even the scurrility) of domestic political partisanship to blind him to the presence of dominant themes. These themes have not only played a prominent part in shaping the past ; they still continue to affect the present attitude of the American nation in its external relations as well as its internal policies.

One such theme has been examined at some length in the treatment of Frederick Jackson Turner's theory of the American frontier which will be found later on in this Volume. Turner's profoundly influential interpretation of American history shows how successive waves of frontier expansion westward helped to shape American democracy, American individualism and much of the modern American way of life. For good or for ill, the presence and the legacy of an ever-changing western frontier helped the nineteenth-century and even the twentieth-century United States to avoid or to postpone some of the political and social consequences, with which Great Britain and Europe were familiar, of a phenomenal industrial expansion.

Persistent preoccupation with local problems, moreover, helped to explain the isolationist foreign policies of both pre-World War I and pre-World War II periods. Traditional suspicions of imperialism also owed something to anti-British hostility aroused in the eighteenth-century colonial era of American history. Both factors are necessary

to understand the reluctance of United States governments and of a great many Americans to consider more than the most limited *ad-hoc* co-operation with Commonwealth countries in the half-century before the United States entry into the war against Nazi Germany. The same considerations are necessary to understand why American policy in the Far East (where there were fewer psychological survivals of Washingtonian and Jeffersonian non-entanglement programmes) fluctuated violently, from the Spanish-American War of 1898, with its sequel the annexation of the Philippines, down to the largely verbal attacks on Japanese aggression in China during the nineteen-thirties and that commitment of 1944, to withdraw from the Philippines, which also owed much to the presence of competing Cuban sugar and other internal American economic interests.

The new rôle of the United States in world affairs after 1945 was most consistently reflected in its attitude to Europe, whether in the politico-economic commitments of the Marshall Plan or in the military obligations of the Atlantic Pact. It is nevertheless significant for the Commonwealth Story that the testing of the new policy came from across the Pacific in the Korean War. When all the controversies over the conduct of the Korean campaign have been laid, the intervention of the United States will remain as the first clear proof of the readiness of post-war American government and people to take the initiative in shouldering the responsibilities of international leadership. The intensity of feeling in the United States and much of the rancour of the Truman-MacArthur controversy of 1951 also revealed the extent to which characteristics of domestic life, and especially the individualist antagonism to anything savouring of Communism, might be expected to continue to colour the external policies of the United States in the second half of the twentieth century. Despite the later swing of American opinion away from McCarthyism, the strength of ideological resistance to Communism continued to present difficulties in the maintenance of a common front by the United States and some Commonwealth countries in such matters as summit conference negotiations in 1957 and 1958. The old long-standing American suspicion of so-called colonialism also continued to colour and sometimes to complicate very seriously U.S.-Commonwealth relationships in different parts of the world. The Suez crisis of 1956 was a significant illustration of this as well as a reminder that the Commonwealth itself might be deeply divided on a major issue of world politics if customary practices of prior consultation between members were disregarded.

Even in the Pacific, moreover, the sequel to the Korean conflict revealed the extent of differences between, as well as the fact of

co-operation between, the United States and Commonwealth countries. The recognition by both Great Britain and India of the Government of Communist China and their open opposition to certain trends in American politico-military campaigning in Korea and elsewhere had peculiar significance in the post-war Commonwealth of which so many members, old as well as new, had displayed a special interest in the Pacific. Differences became very marked over the situation in Indo-China in 1954 though the eventual emergence of the South-East Asia Treaty Organization did much to hold the United States and the Commonwealth in a measure of continuous co-operation in South-East Asia.

This new importance of the Pacific may fittingly furnish the note on which to end abruptly the as yet unfinished Commonwealth Story. Europe would still remain for many Member States not only the historic cultural centre of the Commonwealth but also the region where the gravest challenge might be levelled against the Commonwealth way of life. Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, however, as well as the new Commonwealth nations in or off the Indian sub-continent, had a very special and a sharpening concern with Nationalist and Communist trends in eastern Asia. Even mid-century Canada was alive to the fact that, in the new atomic age of potential American-Soviet conflict, its geographical position in relation to Alaska and the Aleutian islands might cast it for something like the historic rôle of Belgium in Europe. It is significant for the future of relations between United States and Commonwealth that the South Pacific Dominions of Australia and New Zealand should have negotiated a defensive treaty with the United States in 1951 while public opinion in both Dominions was still sharply divided on the Truman-MacArthur issue and on American rearmament of Japan. Though falling considerably short of the Atlantic Treaty of 1949 this Pacific Pact of 1951, when supplemented by the Manila Treaty of 1954, was a reminder of the strength of Pacific Ocean regionalism within the post-war Commonwealth. Read with the Atlantic Pact, these regional Pacific agreements also indicated the extent to which the future co-operation of Commonwealth and United States might be expected to go in determining the later chapters in that Commonwealth Story of which the first pages had been shaped by the empirical groupings of pioneers, publicists, public officials and politicians on both sides of the Atlantic.

F. ALEXANDER.

April 1958

LEADING QUESTIONS

Who was the first great statesman to foresee the evolution of the Commonwealth out of the British Empire?

Refer to page 12.

What kept the Commonwealth together through the stress and strain of two World Wars?

Page 21.

Why did a little island off the north-west coast of Europe become the centre of a world-wide Empire?

Page 31.

What motives inspired the early colonizations?

Pages 38 *and* 43.

Why did the first British Empire end in disaster?

Pages 74 *and* 94.

How was the second British Empire formed "in a fit of absence of mind"?

Page 98.

How did self-government come to Canada?

Pages 104 *and* 115.

What will be the verdict of history on British rule in India?

Pages 63, 248 *and* 256.

How did the "moving frontier" influence American life? How far can the same theme be applied to Australia?

Pages 136 *and* 146.

How is America influencing the countries of the Commonwealth?

Pages 218 *and* 225.

What is the Commonwealth's contribution to the destiny of mankind?

Page 309.

BOOK I

THE BRITISH OVERSEAS

THE BRITISH OVERSEAS

If this book had been compiled fifty years ago it would, without any hesitation, have been given the title of " The British Empire ". Even thirty years ago that title might well have been the final choice. To-day it is quite unthinkable. There is no British Empire. Instead, there is a Commonwealth of Nations.

Two British Empires have come and gone. The first was lost in the American War of Independence. The second gradually transformed itself by some miraculous alchemy of luck and statesmanship into a new conception, a comity of free and equal nations united only by ties of interest and goodwill. What might have seemed to be a process of disintegration proved to be one of integration into a stronger and more enduring unity.

Although it is no longer possible to speak of a British Empire to-day, it is equally wrong to apply the term " Commonwealth " to the past. So the term " Empire " will frequently occur in the text, and it will be our main task to understand just why " Empire " has given way to " Commonwealth ". It is by no means a case of " the same old firm under a new name ". A fundamental change of nature has made necessary the change of title, and when all the implications of this change have been grasped we shall see more clearly why the first British Empire was lost, and why the second, despite many vital changes and all the vicissitudes of war and of peace, has survived in its new form to become one of the great pillars of security in a free world.

But first of all let us ask, *How was the British Empire established?* Since the second world war it has passed through a period of rapid evolution, so our answer, provided by the late Lord Sankey; will describe its growth from the beginning up to the Statute of Westminster in 1931. His lecture was given before the Royal Society of Arts, and in his masterly summary he illuminates for us the main landmarks of British achievement overseas.

VISCOUNT SANKEY

THE BRITISH EMPIRE: WHAT IS IT?

ALL Empires have from time to time added to their possessions by conquest or annexation, but there are two principal types: first, those who have obtained Empire mainly by conquest, which we may call Military Empires; and second, those who have obtained Empire mainly by colonization, which we may call Political Empires.

Of the former, the most famous in ancient days was that of Alexander; in modern days that of Napoleon. Such Empires rapidly acquire great territories. But they are unstable, they excite enmities, and usually perish with the military genius or dictator who created them. Alexander's lasted fourteen years, Napoleon's ten years only, and France was no bigger at its end than she was at the beginning.

The most famous of the second type—the political ones—was the Roman Empire, founded by Augustus. What he achieved was a policy so reasonable and so well adjusted that it continued for centuries, and its fall left behind it massive foundations upon which men are still building.

To this type the British Empire belongs, and with its area of nearly 14 million square miles, and its population of over 500 million people, is the greatest, not even excepting China, that the world has ever seen. Out of that 14 million square miles only 121 thousand are in Europe. The Empire has been aptly defined as "The name given to the whole aggregate of territory the inhabitants of which, under various forms of Government, are linked together by common ultimate allegiance to the British Crown as their titular sovereign." . . .

In her struggle for existence Great Britain has had to meet three rivals, Spain, France, and Germany. It is convenient to begin the first period of our Empire with the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588; the second with the defeat of the French under Napoleon at Waterloo in 1815; and the third with the defeat of Germany at the end of the first world war in

1918. Each of these victories gave Great Britain one of the most important qualities of Empire—confidence in herself.

As to the first period, in the reign of Queen Elizabeth the reputed wealth of the Indies excited the ambition of our ancestors, and the defeat of the Armada gave encouragement to that spirit of freedom and desire for adventure which was typical of those stirring times. For an island people the sea has irresistible attractions.

Shakespeare described England as " this precious stone set in the silver sea " but also said " Home-keeping youths have ever homely wits ", and entreated the young to see the wonders of the world abroad.

Sir Georgee Savile, Marquis of Halifax (1633-95), in his rough draft of *A New Model at Sea*, says: " It may be said now to England, one thing is necessary: To the question what shall we do to be saved in this world? there is no other answer but this, ' Look to your moat '. We are in an island, confined to it by God Almighty, not as a penalty but a grace, and one of the greatest that can be given to mankind."

From the earliest days wherever Britons went and wherever they settled, Great Britain remained their home. Our first colony was Newfoundland, acquired in 1583, and there followed the Barbados in 1605, the Bermudas in 1609, and the Bahamas in 1666, which came to us by settlement. Jamaica was captured in 1655, and many islands in the West Indies were annexed in the eighteenth century. Although in the wars with the French they changed hands, most of them returned to us at the conclusion of peace.

The eighteenth century saw the acquisition of many of our possessions by conquest. The flowering period of this development was under the leadership of the elder Pitt, afterwards Lord Chatham, during the Seven Years War with France (1756-63). Lord Rosebery has said that no country could afford the costly and splendid luxury of many Chathams, but most of us would prefer Mr. Trevelyan's opinion: " Besides his powers, never perhaps equalled as orator and

leader of Parliament and nation, Pitt possessed in addition the qualities of a great Minister of War. He was a master of world strategy, an adept in the proper combination of Britain's fleets and armies. . . . He chose the right men for commands by land and sea, filled them with his spirit and sent them on the right errands with adequate forces." During this period, France had in India, Dupleix (1697-1763), an outstanding organizer, and in Canada, a skilful, experienced and devoted general in Montcalm (1712-59). Yet Great Britain gained a succession of resounding victories all over the world. Clive won Plassey in 1757, Wolfe took Quebec in 1759, and the results of his victory were assured by the Treaty of Paris in 1763. Amherst shared in the capture of Montreal in 1759; Coote crushed the French under Lally at Wandiwash, near Madras, in 1760.

Pause for a moment to consider those last two years. There were no steam-boats, no telegraphs. Seas rolled, and months passed between the order and the execution.

The population of Great Britain and Ireland was not much over 10,000,000, and yet we were sending expeditions to India, 6284 miles east of London, and to Canada, 2972 miles west, and we were gaining victories on fronts more than 9000 miles apart.

But side by side with conquest, Great Britain began to acquire Empire by settlement. The process went on across seas and continents in both hemispheres. Australia was first visited by an English navigator, William Dampier, in 1688, and subsequently by Captain Cook in 1769; New South Wales was occupied in 1788; Tasmania in 1803. In Canada, Saskatchewan was settled in 1774; Alberta in 1788.

It was during this period that the Empire learned its greatest lesson, when its administration caused us the loss of the American Colonies in 1783. It prompted Burke's speech on Conciliation with America on March 22, 1775: "My hold of the Colonies is in the close affection which grows from common names, from kindred blood, from similar

privileges and equal protection. Those are ties which though light as air are as strong as links of iron. Let the colonists always keep the idea of their civil rights associated with your government. They will cling and grapple to you, and no force under heaven will have power to tear them from their allegiance."

New Zealand, visited by Captain Cook in 1769, was colonized by us in 1825, and British sovereignty proclaimed in 1840.

As to the second period, the victory of Trafalgar in 1805 established from that day onwards our command of the seas, and with her victory at Waterloo Great Britain was again in a position to advance. In 1824 Queensland, and shortly afterwards Western Australia, Victoria, and South Australia were acquired by settlement. In South Africa, the Cape of Good Hope was added to Great Britain in 1814, and Natal proclaimed a colony in 1843.

In the second period, the Report of Lord Durham, Governor-General of Canada, on the affairs of British North America, taught another great lesson. That Report is one of the most celebrated State papers of the British Empire. Published in London on January 31, 1839, it is a very lengthy document occupying 246 closely printed pages of a volume of octavo size, and has become the text-book of the Colonial Reformer. Its contents deal with almost every conceivable topic of Colonial Government: English and French colonists and their differences; the Legislature and the Executive; Royal Prerogative; Finance; Law, including Courts, Judges, Police and Juries; Religion, Protestants and Catholics; Emigration; Population and Colonization.

Wolfe's victory in 1759 had gained for Great Britain a colony inhabited by 60,000 French settlers, with French customs and French law. The Constitutional Act of 1791 had divided the colony into two parts, Upper and Lower Canada. Each colony had a Governor, a popular assembly, and a Legislative Council, nominated by the Crown. The

Executive was independent of the Assembly. The result was strife between the Executive and the Legislature, complicated by the divergence of aims and life of the two provinces.

Durham had two problems to settle, a political dispute between an elected Legislature and a nominated Executive, and a racial dispute between English and French. He recommended the union of the two provinces, and this was accepted by an Act of Parliament in 1840. He further advised that, while Imperial control should be preserved, responsible Government in domestic matters should be granted to the colony. This advice has been followed in New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania, South Australia, Queensland, Western Australia, Cape of Good Hope, and Natal.

His ideal of a Federation was realized when Canada became the first Federal Union in the British Empire on July 2, 1867.

Portions of Africa came early into our hands, but the greater part of that Continent remained as darkest Africa till the European nations began to cast envious eyes upon it, towards the end of the nineteenth century. Speke discovered the Lakes of Tanganyika and Victoria Nyanza in 1856, Livingstone blazed the trail across Eastern Central Africa and died in 1873. Look at a map of Central Africa of those days. It is the blank of an unknown country. Now there are hundreds of towns and villages and hundreds of miles of railways. Nigeria has 20,000,000 inhabitants ; Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika 12,140,000. Between 1884 and 1886 Nigeria was obtained by treaty, conquest, and settlement under Royal Charter, and the territory was transferred to the Crown in 1900. Somaliland was obtained in 1887 ; Bechuanaland in 1895 ; Zululand in 1897 ; British East Africa in 1888 ; Rhodesia between 1888-93, Uganda and Nyasaland were acquired about the same time.

Gradually the inhabitants of distant parts of the Empire began to be entrusted with some measure of self-government. A common head, a central Court of Appeal, trade within the Empire, the British Navy and the Mercantile Marine, were

beginning to draw people together. It was obvious that some joint effort for naval defence should be made, and in 1865 a Colonial Naval Defence Act was passed, empowering the colonies to provide ships of war and seamen for their own defence, and in case of need to place them at the disposal of the British Government for Imperial purposes.

Canada and New South Wales sent contingents to Sudan in 1885, Canada and Australia to the Boer War in 1899-1902.

In 1901 the Committee of Imperial Defence was set up under the British Prime Minister with a Permanent Secretariat. On August 2, 1904, Mr. Balfour, speaking in the House of Commons, said: "One of the great merits of the Defence Committee is that it has no executive authority at all. I am certain that the self-governing colonies will never allow any representative of theirs to come to the Defence Committee if the Defence Committee with that addition had the smallest authority to impose obligations, financial, political, military or naval, on the colonies they represent."

Many of the dependencies contribute towards the cost of their Imperial garrisons and support their own volunteer forces. Many also make voluntary contributions to the cost of Imperial Defence. Take an interesting example. The Gilbert and Ellice Islands are a group of small islands, thousands of miles from London, on the Equator in the mid-western Pacific Ocean. Their area is 166 square miles, with a population of about 230 Europeans and 33,000 Pacific Islanders. In 1937 they sent a gift of £750 towards Imperial Defence.

Just as there were meetings to consider defence, there were meetings concerned with tariffs, communications, trade, and other matters. They began in 1887 and were known as the Colonial Conferences. In 1907 the Colonial Conference received the name of the Imperial Conference, and consisted of the Prime Ministers of the different Dominions on a footing of equality, the British Prime Minister taking the Chair instead of the Colonial Secretary. These Imperial

Conferences have been continued at intervals of four or more years. Their chief value hitherto has been in the establishment of personal contact between leading statesmen and the interchange of opinions on matters affecting the Empire and its various parts.

Since the Statute of Westminster, something more appears to be wanted, and an interesting suggestion has been made that a Conference in the nature of a League Assembly of the British Commonwealth of Nations should be substituted for it. Such an assembly would discuss external affairs and defence, but how far it would be able to frame a general foreign policy, or a policy to be applied to particular situations, and how far it would be possible to make such a policy binding and effective, are questions which remain to be solved.

As to the third period, the Great War with the Germans was the third test of British confidence and endurance.

To some extent it added to our possessions, but chiefly under a system of Mandates, by which parts of the Turkish and of the German Empires, especially Tanganyika and other parts of Africa, were entrusted by the League of Nations under a Mandate to members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

But the Great War also made an alteration in the political structure of the Empire. The movement for self-government received an immense impulse from the fact that all parts of the Empire flocked to the defence of Great Britain.

The Declaration of Lord Balfour at the Imperial Conference of 1926 was a great landmark in the third period. Referring to the Dominions, he said: "They are autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations".

It has been suggested that this was only a diplomatic gesture out of which lawyers have made something which was

never intended. I entirely dissent from this. The Declaration seems to me to be a logical development and outcome of a long and determined course of policy and statesmanship which, if we continue to pursue it, will keep the Empire together and ensure that its members will stand side by side in any great test of its future existence. The Empire consists of men in every stage of political, social, and religious development. But our system of Government will lead to the gradual spread of liberty among people in all parts of our Empire.

In 1929 a committee was appointed to consider the operation of Dominion legislation. It issued a report which was discussed at the Imperial Conference of 1930. The result was the Statute of Westminster, which in effect carried out the spirit and intention of Lord Balfour's Declaration. The Statute received the Royal Assent on December 11, 1931. It refers to the Dominion of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, the Dominion of New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, the Irish Free State, and Newfoundland, and makes the Parliament of each of them supreme in its own area. It further provides that Canada, Australia, and New Zealand shall not have power to amend the Constitutions conferred on them by Imperial Acts, and that none of its general provisions shall apply to those Dominions unless adopted by the Act of Parliament of the Dominion concerned.

In passing from the history of the British Empire, shall we describe it in the words which Mr. Strachey applied to the British Constitution and say that "it is the child of wisdom and chance"? Or shall we adopt the glowing terms of Lord Rosebery in his Rectorial Address to the students of Glasgow University (November 16, 1900): "How marvellous it all is, built not by saints and angels but the work of men's hands, cemented with men's honest blood, and with a world of tears, welded by the best brains of centuries past, not without the taint and reproach incidental to all human work, but constructed on the whole with power and splendid purpose.

Human, and not wholly human, for the most heedless and the most cynical must see the finger of the Divine"?

There we have in brief the story of the Empire, and of the first steps in its evolution into Commonwealth. But who was the first great statesman to forecast this change? *Who first saw the vision of the British Commonwealth of Nations?* Early in 1917 General Smuts came to England for an Imperial War Conference, and at a meeting in the House of Commons he switched the attention of his audience from the immediate problems of the war with Germany to the future of the Empire. Only a few years earlier General Smuts had been fighting with all his skill and courage against the British Empire, and in his opening remarks he referred to the narrow escapes which both he and Lord French had had from being captured by one another. Now he was speaking for the Empire, and speaking as one who had thoroughly grasped the secrets of the Empire's growth and destiny. As Professor Hancock, the Australian historian, so aptly put it: "Our principle of the commonwealth is an English secret, whose clue is contained in the whole of English history. . . . It is current in two meanings which frequently are blended into one: it means the common good, and it means a free community organized on the principle of the common good." Here is the speech in which the title of the "British Commonwealth of Nations" was first put forward as being preferable to "The British Empire".

JAN CHRISTIAAN SMUTS

THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

I AM sure, in the present great struggle now being waged, you will see some cause leading to lasting results. Here you have, from all parts of the British Empire, young men gathering on the battlefields of Europe, and whilst your statesmen keep planning a great scheme of union for the future of the empire my feeling is that very largely the work is already

done. The spirit of comradeship has been born in this campaign on the battlefields of Europe, and many of the men from the various parts of the empire will be far more powerful than any instrument of government that you can elect in the future. I feel sure that in after days, when our successors come to sum up what has happened and draw up a balance-sheet, there will be a good credit balance due to this common feeling of comradeship which will have been built up.

I wish to say a few words to-night on this subject, because I think there is a tendency sometimes to forget certain aspects of the great questions with which we are now confronted. That is one of the reasons why I am glad the Imperial Conference was called at this time, apparently a very opportune moment, and yet the calling of this Conference at this time has already directed attention once more to that other aspect of the whole situation which is so important to us. Remember, it is not only Europe that we have to consider, but also the future of this great commonwealth to which we all belong. It is peculiarly situated; it is scattered over the whole world; it is not a compact territory; it is dependent for its very existence on world-wide communications, which must be maintained or this empire goes to pieces. In the past thirty years you see what has happened. Everywhere upon your communications Germany has settled down; everywhere upon your communications of the whole globe you will find a German colony here and there, and the day would have come when your empire would have been in very great jeopardy from your lines of communication being cut.

If we attach any value to this group of nations which compose the British Empire, then we, in settling peace, will have to look carefully at our future safety and security, and I hope that will be done, and that no arrangement will be made which will jeopardize the very valuable and lasting results which have been attained.

That is the geographical question. There remains the other question—a very difficult question—of the future

constitutional relations and readjustments in the British Empire. At a luncheon given recently by the Empire Parliamentary Association I said, rather cryptically, that I did not think this was a matter in which we should follow precedents, and I hope you will bear with me if I say a few words on that theme, and develop more fully what I meant. I think we are inclined to make mistakes in thinking about this group of nations to which we belong, because too often we think of it merely as one State. The British Empire is much more than a State. I think the very expression " empire " is misleading, because it makes people think as if we are one single entity, one unity, to which that term " empire " can be applied. We are not an empire. Germany is an empire, so was Rome, and so is India, but we are a system of nations, a community of states and of nations far greater than any empire which has ever existed; and by using this ancient expression we really obscure the real fact that we are larger and that our whole position is different, and that we are not one nation, or State, or empire, but we are a whole world by ourselves, consisting of many nations and states, and all sorts of communities under one flag. We are a system of states, not only a static system, a stationary system, but a dynamic system, growing, evolving all the time towards new destinies.

Here you have a kingdom with a number of Crown colonies; besides that you have large protectorates like Egypt, which is an empire in itself, which was one of the greatest empires in the world. Besides that you have great dependencies like India—an empire in itself, one of the oldest civilizations in the world, and we are busy there trying to see how East and West can work together, how the forces that have kept the East going can be worked in conjunction with the ideas we have evolved in Western civilization for enormous problems within that State. But beyond that we come to the so-called dominions, a number of nations and states almost sovereign, almost independent, who govern themselves, who have been evolved on the principles of your constitutional system, now almost

independent states, and who all belong to this group, to this community of nations, which I prefer to call the British commonwealth of nations. Now, you see that no political ideas that were evolved in the past, no nomenclature, will apply to this world which is comprised in the British Empire; any expression, any name which we have found so far for this group has been insufficient, and I think the man who would discover the really appropriate name for this vast system of entities would be doing a great service not only to this country but to constitutional theory.

The question is, how are you going to provide for the future government of this group of nations? It is an entirely new problem. If you want to see how great it is you must take the United States in comparison. There you find what is essential —one nation, not perhaps in the fullest sense, but more and more growing into one; one big State, consisting of subordinate parts, but whatever the nomenclature of the United States constitution, you have one national State over one big, contiguous area. That is the problem presented by the United States, and for which they discovered this federal solution, which means subordinate governments for the subordinate parts, but one national Federal Parliament for the whole.

Compare with that state of facts this enormous system comprised in the British Empire of nations all over the world, some independent, living under diverse conditions, and all growing towards greater nations than they are at present. You can see at once that the solution which has been found practicable in the case of the United States probably never will work under our system. That is what I feel in all the empires of the past, and even in the United States—the effort has been towards forming one nation. All the empires that we have known in the past and that exist to-day are founded on the idea of assimilation, of trying to force different human material through one mould so as to form one nation. Your whole idea and basis is entirely different. You do not want to standardize the nations of the British Empire. You want to develop them

into greater nationhood. These younger communities, the offspring of the mother country, or territories like that of my own people, which have been annexed after various vicissitudes of war—all these you want not to mould on any common pattern, but you want them to develop according to the principles of self-government and freedom and liberty. Therefore your whole basic idea is different from anything that has ever existed before, either in the empires of the past or even in the United States.

I think that this is the fundamental fact which we have to bear in mind—that the British Empire, or the British commonwealth of nations, does not stand for unity, standardization, or assimilation, or denationalization ; but it stands for a fuller, a richer, and more various life among all the nations that compose it. And even nations who have fought against you, like my own, must feel that they and their interests, their language, their religions, and all their cultural interests are as safe and as secure under the British flag as those of the children of your household and your own blood. It is only in proportion as that is realized that you will fulfil the true mission which you have undertaken. Therefore it seems, speaking my own individual opinion, that there is only one solution, that is the solution supplied by our past traditions of freedom, self-government, and the fullest development. We are not going to force common Governments, federal or otherwise, but we are going to extend liberty, freedom, and nationhood more and more in every part of the empire.

The question arises, how are you going to keep this world together if there is going to be all this enormous development towards a more varied and richer life among all its parts ? It seems to me that you have two potent factors that you must rely on for the future. The first is your hereditary kingship. I have seen some speculations recently in the papers of this country upon the position of the kingship of this country ; speculations by people who, I am sure, have never thought of the wider issues that are at stake. You cannot make a republic

in this country. You cannot make a republic of the British commonwealth of nations, because, if you have to elect a president not only in these islands but all over the British Empire, who will be the ruler and representative of all these peoples? You are facing an absolutely insoluble problem. Now, you know the theory of our constitution is that the King is not merely your king, but he is the king of all of us. He represents every part of the whole commonwealth of nations. If his place is to be taken by anybody else, then that somebody will have to be elected by a process which, I think, will pass the wit of man to devise. Therefore let us be thankful for the mercies we have. We have a kingship here which is really not very different from a hereditary republic, and I am sure that more and more in the future the trend will be in that direction, and I shall not be surprised to see the time when our royal princes, instead of getting their consorts among the princelings of Central Europe, will go to the dominions and the outlying portions of the empire.

I think that in the theory of the future of this great empire it is impossible to attach too much importance to this institution which we have existing, and which can be developed, in my opinion, to the greatest uses possible for its future preservation and development. It will, of course, be necessary to go further than that. It is not only the symbol of unity which you have in the royal ruler, but you will have to develop further common institutions.

Everyone admits that it would be necessary to devise better machinery for common consultation than we have had hitherto. So far we have relied upon the Imperial Conference which meets every four years, and which, however useful for the work it has done hitherto, has not, in my opinion, been a complete success. It will be necessary to devise better means for achieving our ends. A certain precedent has been laid down of calling the Prime Ministers and representatives from the Empire of India to the Imperial Cabinet, and we have seen the statement made by Lord Curzon that it is the intention

of the Government to perpetuate that practice in future. Although we have not yet the details of the scheme, and we have to wait for a complete exposition of the subject from his Majesty's Government, yet it is clear that in an institution like that you have a far better instrument of common consultation than you have in the old Imperial Conference, which was called only every four years, and which discussed a number of subjects which were not really of first-rate importance. After all, what you want is to call together the most important statesmen in the empire from time to time—say once a year, or as often as may be found necessary—to discuss matters which concern all parts of the empire in common, and in order that causes of friction and misunderstanding may be removed. A common policy should be laid down to determine the true orientation of our Imperial policy.

Take foreign policy, for instance, on which the fate of the empire may from time to time depend. I think it is highly desirable that at least once a year the most important leaders of the empire should be called together to discuss these matters, and to determine a common policy, which would then be carried out in detail by the various executive Governments of the commonwealth nations. This Imperial Council or Cabinet will not themselves exercise executive functions, but they will lay down the policy which will be carried out by the Governments of the various parts of the empire. A system like that, although it looks small, must in the end lead to very important results and very great changes. You cannot settle a common policy for the whole of the British Empire without changing that policy very considerably from what it has been in the past, because the policy will have to be, for one thing, far simpler. We do not understand diplomatic finesse in other parts of the empire. We go by large principles, and things which can be easily understood by our undeveloped democracies. If your foreign policy is going to rest, not only on the basis of your Cabinet here, but finally on the whole of the British Empire, it will have to be a simpler and more intelligible policy, which

will, I am sure, lead in the end to less friction, and the greater safety of the empire.

Of course, no one will ever dispute the primacy of the Imperial Government in these matters. Whatever changes and developments come about, we shall always look upon the British Government as the senior partner in this concern. When this council is not sitting, the Imperial Government will conduct the foreign affairs of the empire. But it will always be subject to the principles and policy which have been laid down in these common conferences from time to time, and which, I think, will be a simpler and probably, in the long run, a saner and safer policy for the empire as a whole. Naturally it will lead to greater publicity. There is no doubt that, after the catastrophe that has overtaken Europe, nations in future will want to know more about the way their affairs are conducted. And you can understand that, once it is no longer an affair of one Government, but of a large number of Governments who are responsible ultimately to their Parliaments for the action they have taken, you may be sure there will be a great deal more publicity and discussion of foreign affairs than there has ever been.

I am sure that the after-effects of a change like this, although it looks a simple change, are going to be very important, not only for this community of nations, but for the world as a whole. Far too much stress is laid upon the instruments of government. People are inclined to forget that the world is getting more democratic, and that forces which find expression in public opinion are going to be far more powerful in the future than they have been in the past. You will find that you have built up a spirit of comradeship and a common feeling of patriotism, and that the instrument of government will not be the thing that matters so much as the spirit that actuates the whole system in all its parts. That seems to me to be your mission. You talk about an Imperial mission. It seems to me this British Empire has only one mission, and that is a mission for greater liberty and freedom and self-development. Yours is the only system that has ever worked

in history where a large number of nations have been living in unity. Talk about the League of Nations—you are the only league of nations that has ever existed; and if the line that I am sketching here is correct, you are going to be an even greater league of nations in the future; and if you are true to your old traditions of self-government and freedom, and to this vision of your future and your mission, who knows that you may not exercise far greater and more beneficent influence on the history of mankind than you have ever done before?

In the welter of confusion which is probably going to follow the war in Europe you will stand as the one system where liberty to work successfully has kept together divers communities. You may be sure the world such as will be surrounding you in the times that are coming will be very likely to follow your example. You may become the real nucleus for the world-government for the future. There is no doubt that is the way things will go in the future. You have made a successful start; and if you keep on the right track your empire will be a solution of the whole problem.

I hope I have given no offence. When I look round this brilliant gathering, and see before me the most important men in the Government of the United Kingdom, I am rather anxious that we should discuss this matter, which concerns our future so very vitally—a matter which should never be forgotten even in this awful struggle in which all our energies are engaged. Memories of the past keep crowding in upon me. I think of all the difficulties which have surrounded us in the past, and I am truly filled with gratitude for the reception which you have given me, and with gratitude to Time, the great and merciful judge, which has healed many wounds, and gratitude to that Divinity which "shapes our ends, roughhew them how we will". I think of the difficulties that still lie ahead of us, which are going to test all the nations fighting for liberty far more than they have been tested in the past, and I hope and pray that they may all have clearness of vision and purpose, and especially that strength of soul in the coming

days which will be more necessary than strength of arm. I verily believe that we are within reach of priceless and immeasurable good, not only for this United Kingdom and group of nations to which we belong, but also for the whole world. But, of course, it will depend largely upon us whether the great prize is achieved now in the struggle, or whether the world will be doomed to long, weary waiting in the future. The prize is within our grasp, if we have strength, especially the strength of soul, which I hope we shall have, to see this thing through without getting tired of waiting, until victory crowns the efforts of our brave men in the field.

It was the far-sighted South African who first stressed the fact that the states of the Empire formed " a dynamic system, growing, evolving all the time towards new destinies ". *What kept these states together in the tragic and testing days of the two world wars?* It was, as Australia's Premier in 1940 tells us, a harmony of ideals, a uniformity of views on the prime necessity of maintaining individual freedom. Let no one think that all the " dynamics " of our system have come from the Mother Country. The dominions have all played an active part, as we shall see later on in this volume, in the movement, and each has contributed its individual and characteristic share to the growing—material and spiritual—common wealth. Two points made in Mr. Menzies' speech will recur again and again: the first is the remarkable achievement of unity in the whole Commonwealth allied with the independent development of each individual state; and the second is the feeling that the Commonwealth as a whole has a great responsibility to the rest of the world. As it is the most successful by far of all the experiments yet made towards the unity of mankind, this responsibility is bound to increase.

ROBERT GORDON MENZIES

AUSTRALIA: 1788-1940

I HAVE been asked to tell you something about my country, Australia, which on January 26 celebrated the anniversary of White settlement—which is this year 152 years old. I have

accepted the task willingly, because in spite of modern science it is still true that in our various portions of the world we know too little about each other. That there should be some misunderstanding and some want of knowledge of Australia in the rest of the world is, of course, inevitable. Even those who have visited us may well have a wrong impression, because there is a common disposition in all of us to judge other countries according to the standards of our own.

I believe that it has been the major element in the British genius that it has been able to reconcile the unity of an empire with the independent development of the individuality and character of each of its parts. Nothing has more surprised some foreign countries, and probably nothing has more disconcerted Germany in the last few months than the discovery that while Canadians and South Africans and Australians and New Zealanders are all quite different people in one sense, with their own ideas of politics and policy, they are one people on all matters which affect what they believe to be the eternal truths, the importance of justice and fair play, the maintenance of honesty, and of tolerance in international dealings; the application of the real essence of the Christian Faith to the behaviour of nations, as well as to the behaviour of individuals.

In one sense, therefore, and indeed a profound sense, we British peoples are alike. In another sense we are different, and we all take understanding by each other.

Australia is, as I have reminded you, a very young nation. In the foundational years of the last century, it attracted to its shores pastoral settlers, miners, farmers, men of business, men of the professions—each of them drawn by the powerful magnets of wealth or security or adventure—or those other mixed motives which take men out into the unknown.

The results are worth some study. But in the few moments that I have with you I can mention only two factors which I believe you must bear in mind if you are to assess Australia and the Australians accurately.

First, it was no small thing for men and women to tear up

the ancient roots of their families and go over many thousands of miles of sea, and under primitive conditions, to an unknown and mysterious land. The hundreds of thousands who did so could not, as some people fondly imagine, have been the weakest or the worst of their race. They were, in fact, strong and courageous people who took with them all that was best of British fortitude, and bred into the Australian character a boldness and initiative which have had much to do with the internal development of Australia and which are to-day once more being contributed to a common cause in time of war.

Second, much of the migration to Australia in the nineteenth century was contemporaneous with periods of political activity and radical reform in Great Britain and in Europe. It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that Australian democratic politics has almost throughout the history of Australia possessed a liberal and humanitarian character that has produced a real and not merely a theoretical sense of equality among our people: has made Australia a sort of laboratory of practical political science, and has given to us as high a standard of living and of material comfort as exists anywhere in the world.

Those are two elements which I ask you to remember. There is another which I mention in order to correct, if I can, some misapprehension. Because Australia is a vast country, nearly twenty-five times the size of the British Isles, people have become accustomed to talk in generalities about it, and to refer to it as a country of vast open spaces. Now, there could be no greater error than to assume that Australia contains many millions of acres of land which could be closely settled but are not in fact settled because of some exclusive attitude on the part of Australians.

The land in Australia which has a quality and a rainfall which permit it to be cultivated or grazed, is already substantially, though not necessarily intensively, occupied. This does not mean that there is no room in Australia for more people and more production. I look forward to the time when we will have four times our present population. But it does

mean that a mere calculation of area, without other factors, is misleading, and that it is quite false to think that we Australians are content to sit back and hold what we have, and in some petulant way to warn others off.

As the Prime Minister of Australia, I say to you that, proud as we are of our 150 years' growth, we realize quite plainly that our pioneering days are not over: that we all have work to do in our own day and generation, to build up the population and the wealth of Australia, and side by side with them to achieve more and more that mutual tolerance and understanding and strength both of the intellect and of the spirit, which are the marks of a truly civilized people.

In a sentence, when we reach our Anniversary Day, we not only look back with pride: we look forward with determination. And when we look forward, to what goal do we direct our eyes; to what ideal do we aspire? I think that I shall interpret Australia to you if I say that what we seek is a state of life in which happiness and contentment are the lot of the humblest citizen in the land, in which the arts of peace are practised in a spirit of brotherhood; in which the bitterness of war and the cruelties of social and industrial injustice have been abolished; in which the supreme value will have been placed upon the individual soul and the free development of the individual spirit.

Paradoxical as it may seem to the casual observer, it is just because we have that ideal and because you have that ideal that we have gone to war. It is because we believe that unless this war is won, the achievement of that ideal will be postponed for generations, that we have not hesitated to face war. Though we have never had to fight on our own soil, we are not without experience of war, and we have no illusions about it. We know that it is a destructive thing, that it warps the outlook, and tortures the spirit; that it is at best a barbarous instrument, and at worst the momentary triumph of sheer savagery.

But these things we are prepared to face, as the British and the French peoples are prepared to face them—because

we believe that unless international justice and fair play are established and the aggressor put down, all our ideals for our own homelands must be threatened and perhaps indefinitely postponed.

It was cynically said of old times—" Am I my brother's keeper ? " The best and most civilized people in this world have long since answered that question : " Yes."

Australia is in this war because she believes that unless that answer is to be accepted as international truth, our future is a dark and clouded one ; because the truth is mighty and will prevail, we Australians have no doubt, as you have no doubt, that this war will be won and that the future of humanity will yet be made secure.

It is time to begin at the beginning of our story. We have, indeed, in these last two lectures, been perilously near to that very human failing of taking a peep at the last chapter to see if everything turns out right. Perhaps one more little peep might be permitted ? *Is there still this underlying unity in the Commonwealth to-day ?* Sir Anthony Eden thinks so, and in the following talk, given on his return from a tour of the Commonwealth in 1949, he expresses the view that " the British Commonwealth is the only wholly successful experiment in international co-operation that the world has yet seen ". Whether or not that word " wholly " is altogether justified will be a subject for later inquiry.

SIR ANTHONY EDEN

IMPRESSIONS OF MY COMMONWEALTH JOURNEY

TWENTY-FIVE years ago I was lucky enough to have the chance to travel round the world to Canada, New Zealand, and Australia, and back by Ceylon, Aden, and Gibraltar. All these territories formed part of what in those

days we called the British Empire. I have often wanted to repeat that journey. The Prime Minister of New Zealand had been kind enough to urge me more than once to revisit that lovely land. And so when the opportunity came this winter to couple with such a visit a journey to Canada and Australia, I was happy to seize it. But this time I came back via Malaya, India, and Pakistan. . . .

Throughout my travels Commander Noble was my invaluable colleague. We flew together some 40,000 miles in a little over two months. We did not have much time in Malaya, but it was long enough for us to understand what good work is being done there under difficult conditions, by all sections of the community—Malay, Chinese, and British. Planters and tin miners, troops and police, they are all having a pretty tough time. The position is bound to be serious for some time to come, but the forces of law and order grow stronger month by month, and the bandits should be steadily driven back to the more inaccessible parts of the jungle. The cost of living in Malaya is high, even in beer and cinemas, and the troops feel this. They find the climate trying, too, but their morale is very good.

In India and Pakistan we were received with much kindness. Whatever the future holds, I hope and believe that it will be possible to strengthen the friendly understanding that to-day undoubtedly exists with both these new Dominions. In Delhi, I was asked to speak to the Indian Members of Parliament, a memorable experience for any English visitor. They made me feel quite at home. In Pakistan we travelled through the picturesque Khyber Pass up to the Afghan frontier. All was quiet and serene. As I looked back across the Peshawar plain the rich crops promised a good harvest.

In Australia and New Zealand we were able to make a longer stay. There we met and spoke to tens of thousands of people not only in the big meetings, but much more informally on the farms and cattle stations, in factories, on the beaches, at cricket matches. I think I enjoyed the informal contacts most

of all, for our kinsmen down under are very ready to talk about their country and their plans. I remember one day in Sydney I had swum out to a raft, when two young Australians joined me. At first they did not know that I had anything to do with politics and talked away about their hopes for the future, their views of Australia, and the home country from which their parents had come. When they did identify me I was afraid that they might be put out of their stride. But not at all. We just sat there discussing everything from atomic energy to cricket. It is this warm-hearted friendliness which is my first impression as I look back on those strenuous weeks. I heard many complaints while I was in Australia and New Zealand that people from home do not come to see them often enough. There is too much one-way traffic in visits at the present time. Nor do the Dominions know each other as well as they might.

And yet in spite of this physical lack of contact, that family feeling is very real between us. The strongest impression of my whole tour was of our underlying unity. We resemble each other so closely; there are such strong family traits, whether in Toronto, or in Auckland, or in Adelaide. I am going to give you just two examples of what I mean. On the morning that I was leaving Vancouver, I was asked to look in at the University of British Columbia on my way to the aerodrome, to speak to some of the students. I gladly accepted, because it is always stimulating to meet the younger generation. I thought there might be a hundred of them. Instead of that, there were 6000 standing packed in what they call their Armoury, and hundreds more outside. I shall never forget that experience. I have never spoken to a more inspiring audience in my life.

On these occasions, when one is deeply moved, the words do not always come easily. And yet my task should not have been difficult, for what those young people wanted to know was just how things were working out in the Old Country, and what the chances were for future peace and co-operation

between the nations of the world. Many of them had fought alongside some of you. They were wondering, no doubt, what were the chances that those victories would really bring enduring peace.

For my second example, I will now take you to another scene, perhaps 6000 miles away, to Queensland, where we travelled to the lovely country known as the Darling Downs, probably the richest wheat-growing land in the world. We spent the day exploring it, and as the afternoon wore on we were to call at a place called Picnic Point, a little way outside the town of Toowoomba. The view is one of the finest anywhere on earth. The plan was that we would meet there the Mayor of Toowoomba and the Mayor of the neighbouring Warwick, some sixty miles away, which has many links with the Warwick I have the honour to represent in our own Parliament. When we got there we were rather taken aback to find an assembly of some 5000 people and a welcome that would have warmed the heart of a stone. Here, once again, the people of Toowoomba and of Warwick, Queensland, were so like, say, the people of Taunton and of Warwick, England.

I believe from my experience of this journey that the invisible ties that unite the nations of the British Commonwealth are stronger to-day than they were a generation ago. The kinship seems somehow more natural and accepted, more a part of our lives at home and overseas. Or perhaps it is what we have endured together that now holds us so close. That year when we stood alone, we and the sister nations of the Commonwealth : that is a year as fresh in the mind of a citizen of Wellington, or Brisbane, or Winnipeg, as it is for anyone here in London. Although it is true that except for Darwin they were never blitzed themselves, they knew all about it and were sadly troubled. They had confidence that we should win through. They were our comrades-in-arms, and did all they could to help us in every way. To this day you will find any audience in any part of our Commonwealth overseas ready and eager to hear stories about the blitz. I

remember one Sunday afternoon I promised to speak at a chapel in Melbourne. I asked what topics they wanted me to talk about. High up on the list were any memories of 1940, any stories of Mr. Churchill. I was happy to give them both, for I never think of 1940 without imperishable memories of Mr. Churchill.

It is difficult for me to give you a picture in a few minutes of the way of life down under. It is a full and varied life, and the range of opportunity is wide. It is impossible to generalize about climate; I found it almost everywhere abnormal, at least so I was assured. Britain is not the only country where the visitor is told, "Oh, you should have been here last month". But in a country the size of Australia, any intending settler can virtually choose the climate he wishes, from the semi-tropical in the north of Queensland to the contrast of Tasmania, which is more like Normandy or even Scotland. There is wheat-growing country and sheep country and cattle country and forest and bush in plenty and the great desert of the Nullarbor Plain. New Zealand, more compact in size, is perhaps the nearest to us in her natural features. But the thought I want to leave with you is this dominating impression how closely so many of the peoples in all these countries—Canada, New Zealand, or Australia—resemble each other and resemble us; our family likeness is very strong.

What is the lesson from all this for us? Isn't it that in a world so much at odds, where there is stress and strain, and some bad temper too, this British family of ours has a special message to give? We are not bound together by any precise code of rules or by any elaborate constitution. We have our kinship and devoted loyalty to our Sovereign. But for the rest, the bonds are not those of script or of law.

They are natural friendships and affinities, and the stronger for that. We think alike and we have the same traditional faiths and hopes. We believe in government by consent, and that the individual human personality should be encouraged to live and grow. We resemble each other, but we do not

want all to be stamped in the same pattern by command. We wish to live and let live and we do not think that this tolerance is just laziness ; it is born of a respect for the way of life of others. It is in no burst of conceit that we can claim that the British Commonwealth is the only wholly successful experiment in international co-operation that the world has yet seen. I sometimes think that there is a very interesting contrast between this family spirit of the British Empire and the aggressive philosophies of some other countries.

The governments of some countries have evolved a way of life which they seem determined to impose on everyone, like the governess in the *Punch* cartoon dragging the child by the hand and saying, " I brought you out here to enjoy yourself, and enjoy yourself you *shall* ". We in the British Empire have no set philosophy, no doctrine to preach ; we have simply grown up together through weal and woe and we have found that " live and let live " is the essence of family life. Which of these is going to be the real evangelism of the future, which is going to be the true gospel of community life ? Which of these will illuminate or darken the paths our children will have to tread in the future ? I do not know, but I think sometimes that from this family spirit there might grow the sense of brotherhood so that in time we might merge into the wider citizenship of a united world and enjoy a lasting peace.

And meanwhile, the prairies of Canada, the dairy farms of New Zealand, the cattle stations of Australia, all send you the same message ; one of love and loyalty for the old land which so many of them still call home, one of unbroken trust in that British family which has yet leadership to give to a world in need of guidance and of faith.

It is evident, from Sir Anthony Eden's reception in all the countries he visited, that the cohesion and future welfare of the Commonwealth is still a matter of vital interest to all its citizens. So we go back now to the beginning of our story. It is a story well worth telling for its own

sake, but it is a story which must be followed carefully if we are to understand fully how Empire turned to Commonwealth, and if we are to appreciate the importance of the problems which face the Commonwealth in the modern world. The key to the story is perhaps contained in the words of Mackenzie King at the Imperial Conference of 1937: "Continuity through change, progress through development of proved courses and innate tendencies, permanence and flexibility are the distinctive marks of the political institutions which are our common heritage".

How did the British Empire begin? Lord Sankey suggested that the hand of Providence had played its part in the ultimate achievement, but the beginning was much the same as that of any other empire. There was nothing miraculous in its inception, although the British people did have some advantages over their continental rivals. Mr. D. C. Somervell, the well-known historian, and Sponsor for our volume on *Western Civilization*, mentions these in the first chapter of his book, *The British Empire*, from which the following extract is taken.

D. C. SOMERVELL

THE BEGINNINGS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

IT must always seem a very singular fact that an island of moderate size, situated off the north-west coast of Europe, should become, in three hundred years, the centre of an absolutely unique world-wide Empire; that its race and language should dominate the greater part of North America and the whole of Australia: that its citizens should control, for a time, the affairs of a great part of Africa and the whole of the densely populated sub-continent of India, not to mention dozens and scores of lesser provinces, outposts, and islands scattered broadcast over the surface of the earth. One would think that there must have been quite exceptional wisdom in the policy of the government of that island, and quite exceptional virtues in its inhabitants; one would think perhaps, also, that the British people, in their imperial

ventures, and in their competition with the imperial ventures of other folk, must have enjoyed a quite exceptional measure of luck.

There may have been exceptional wisdom, exceptional virtues and exceptional luck. The end of the story rather than the beginning would be the place to form an opinion on those points. In fact, however, the establishment of the British Empire, extraordinary as it must seem, and extraordinary as indeed it is, is very far from being a mystery or a miracle. Many smaller events in history are really much stranger.

One can even imagine a certain type of historian saying that, from the sixteenth century onwards, the establishment of the British Empire was *inevitable*. Such an historian would point to that great event, the Opening of the Seas, the discovery of America and of the sea route to India ; he would say that the peoples of Western Europe possessed certain qualities which made it inevitable that, after the Opening of the Seas, they would acquire dominion over the peoples of all the other continents. Those qualities are not easily defined in a few words, but we know more or less what they are, for they are advantages which still distinguish European men, broadly speaking, from the other races of the earth. The Europeans have inherited them from the Greeks and the Romans, and they have been enriched and sweetened by the practice of the Christian religion. We may call them the spirit of enterprise and adventure, intellectual and physical, the ambition to go forward and improve things, the habit of obeying orders when orders are given, yet of acting without them when no orders are available, a reckless devotion to great causes, an unflinching pursuit of untrodden paths.

Such an historian would say, then, that the domination of the world by the Western European peoples was inevitable, and he would also say that, when those European peoples competed with one another for the prizes of Empire, the British people enjoyed certain definite advantages over all

their neighbours, for the simple reason that they alone lived upon an island. Living on an island they were much less likely than their continental neighbours to be distracted by ambitions of territorial conquest in Europe itself; much less likely also to suffer from the territorial ambitions and military invasions of their neighbours. Again, their insular position had been the chief cause of the development among them of a system of government quite unlike that of any of the Continental peoples, a system which proved peculiarly well adapted to the needs of imperial policy. This is not the place to trace the origin and cause of the rise of the parliamentary constitution in England. Suffice it to say that parliament gave powerful representation to commercial interests, and commercial, much more than military, interests were to provide the motive power which has built modern empires. . . .

Now sea power and commercial adventure led to empire, but were not in themselves empire, the very idea of which involves territorial possession. The conception of the British Empire beyond the seas in this stricter sense is to be found in the petition of certain west-country gentlemen to Queen Elizabeth, in 1574, that she would allow an enterprise for the discovery of certain rich and unknown lands " fatally and it seemeth by Providence reserved for England ". In 1578, after the usual Elizabethan delays, the answer came in the form of a patent granted to Sir Humphrey Gilbert, empowering him to discover and take possession of heathen lands, not enjoyed by any Christian Prince. No geographical limit was imposed upon his undertakings. One-fifth of the gold and silver discovered was reserved for the Crown.

In 1583 Gilbert sailed to Newfoundland and took possession of it in the queen's name, but was drowned on his return voyage. His mantle descended upon Sir Walter Raleigh, who sent out, in 1585, an expedition under Sir Richard Grenville, afterwards the hero of *The Revenge*, to the mainland " between Newfoundland and Florida ". The land where these adventurers tried to make new homes has ever

since borne the name of Virginia, after the Virgin Queen; but, though several expeditions of would-be colonists followed one another in the course of the next few years, no successful settlement was achieved within the limits of Elizabeth's reign. The difficulties and discomforts were intense, and the colonists, being of the gentleman-adventurer type, had no sufficient motive for putting up with them. All was lost save Raleigh's faith that "I shall yet live to see it an English nation".

We talk of "the spacious days of Queen Elizabeth", and her reign is rightly associated with the beginnings of the British Empire. Yet it is curious to reflect that she is the only English sovereign since William the Conqueror who did not enjoy effective possession of an acre of territory outside the British Isles. Calais was lost a few months before her accession; the effective occupation of Virginia began a few years after her death. Very few Englishmen were as yet thinking of colonization in new worlds. It would be safe to say that, in Elizabeth's reign, for every man interested and every pound expended in America there were a hundred men interested and a hundred pounds expended in the conquest and colonization of Ireland.

The hundred and eleven years of the Stuart period (1603-1714) have much less of the glamour of empire about them than the days of the Elizabethan sea-dogs. None the less, it was in the Stuart period that the British Empire was effectively founded. Twelve of the thirteen colonies which ultimately became the United States were established, and their relations with the Mother Country elaborately regulated. The West Indian island colonies became and long remained one of the most important sources of our commercial wealth. Our East India Company outstripped that of the Dutch as the Dutch had previously outstripped the Portuguese, who had been the first in the field. The victories of the Duke of Marlborough were won on the battle-fields of Europe, but the fruits of those victories, garnered in the Treaty of Utrecht, were

colonial possessions and privileges of oceanic commerce, more particularly the ill-famed monopoly of the slave trade with Spanish America. . . .

What were the motives in the minds of the adventurers who undertook, and the statesmen who encouraged and guided, the establishment of the English colonies in America and the West Indies? A large and various collection of motives can be discovered in the official documents and general literature of the period. Some, which were most prominent in the beginning, faded out as the realities of the situation came to be better understood. First and foremost in the beginning was the search for gold. Raleigh himself was inspired by the delusive glamour of Mexico and Peru, and the last tragic episode of his life was the quest of a gold mine on the Orinoco. John Smith, the real founder, in 1608, of the permanent establishment in Virginia, knew better. "Who" he wrote "can desire more content, that hath small means, or but only his merits to advance his fortunes, than to tread and plant the ground he hath purchased by the hazard of his life?"

Another motive which early faded was the thought that an American colony would prove a stage upon the north-west passage to "the Indies". Virginia was conceived as a Cape Colony or an Aden on the route to India!

More solid was the hope that the colonies would prove to be sources of supply of necessary articles which could not be produced in England, and that they would provide markets for the sale of the coarse cloths which were the main articles of English manufacture. Here we have the policy, notably developed once again since the Great War, of Mother Country and colonies co-operating in mutually profitable trade. The goods most desired from the colonies were of two kinds—(i) naval stores, such as timber, cordage, and tar, for which we depended upon our foreign trade with the Baltic countries, a trade easily closed against us in times of war, and (ii) tropical products, such as sugar, spices, and currants. For the second

purpose the West Indian colonies naturally proved far more satisfactory than those on the mainland farther north, and indeed they were more highly valued by general opinion throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Cromwell, our first great imperial statesman, wanted the Puritans of New England to emigrate to his newly conquered island of Jamaica. As late as the wars of the French Revolution, Pitt wasted an immense amount of men and money in conquering and occupying the French West Indian islands. The colonies of the mainland, on the other hand, proved disappointing as producers of both kinds of goods. Virginia early relapsed into a mere tobacco plantation, and serious statesmen viewed the growing popularity of tobacco-smoking in England with the utmost disapproval. It was diverting imperial production from necessities of naval defence to instruments of idle and indeed " beastly " self-indulgence. It was in vain that the Virginia Company tried to bind its settlers to grow corn and wine and silk ; in vain that they exported forty iron-workers from Sussex, and sought to attract vine-growers from France and olive-growers from Italy. Charles I declared that he mistrusted a colony " built upon smoke ", and his minister Cottington said, " We plant tobacco and puritanism only, like fools ". However, even tobacco produced a revenue for the government by way of import duties, and the Exchequer became reconciled to it, even if the Admiralty did not.

Another motive remains to be mentioned, a motive which sounds curiously modern. It was thought that the colonies would provide homes for the surplus population of the Mother Country. It seems strange that the England of those days, with its population of five million, should have found itself over-populated, but the Tudor period had been, for various reasons that lie outside our scope, a time of much economic distress and unemployment, and unemployment is very easily assumed to be the result of over-population. Richard Hakluyt, the historian of the Elizabethan voyages, composing at Raleigh's request an argument in favour of colonization,

makes over-population his first point. "The fry of wandering beggars of England, that grow up idly, and hurtful and burdensome to this realm, may there be unladen, and may people waste countries, to their own more happy state."

The difficulty in Virginia and the West Indies was to secure satisfactory colonists of the labouring class. The transportation of criminals was a fruitful resource, and Cromwell, great imperialist as he was, transported rebels against his government on an appalling scale to Barbados and other colonies. In 1656 he addressed a circular to the Major-Generals, to whom he entrusted the local government of England, ordering them to apprehend dangerous persons, rogues, vagrants, and unemployed persons, and to arrange with merchants for their transportation to the colonies. But transportation did not solve the problem. It was solved by the fatal expedient of the slave trade. This trade had languished for nearly a century after the first experiments of John Hawkins, but in Charles II's reign it was taken up in earnest. An African Company was chartered for the purpose, and colonies, which were simply slave-trading bases, established on the west coast of Africa.

The genuinely "surplus" population for which the colonies provided new homes at need was the great body of those whose consciences would not allow them to conform to the practices of the Church of England. The Pilgrim Fathers in 1620 led the way, a mere handful. It is estimated that 20,000 Puritans followed them in the next twenty years. These religious refugees naturally settled in the northern parts where the climate, not greatly unlike that of England, was suited to the development of democratic communities needing no labour but their own. Such were the New England colonies that grew out of the settlement of the Pilgrim Fathers and maintained for generations their strict and bigoted Puritan traditions. Such also, rather farther south, was Pennsylvania, founded by the Quaker, William Penn, in Charles II's reign. Penn's colony greatly improved upon

New Englander policy in two respects. It allowed complete religious toleration, and it established and maintained friendly relations with the Red Indian tribes. On account, perhaps, of its tolerant policy, Pennsylvania rapidly became what the whole United States is to-day, a " melting-pot " of many nations.

We have had some of the motives for colonization presented to us, and this point may well be pursued farther, for an understanding of the reasons why colonies have been planted will help us to understand the subsequent history and the character of those colonies. *What are the moral motives for colonization?* The Professor of Colonial History at Cambridge will outline these. There has, he says, " been a vast deal of humbug in the business down the centuries " ; but many men, more particularly in the early days, were of Hakluyt's opinion that " this western discovery will be greatly for the enlargement of the gospel of Christ ". In more recent times, as Professor Walker will make clear, there have been other good reasons for the official establishment of protectorates. We have moved a long way from the principles of the old Colonial System which valued colonies solely on the basis of their material contributions, silver or gold, timber or spices, to the wealth of the Mother Country.

E. A. WALKER

MORAL MOTIVES FOR COLONIZATION

IT is outside the scope of this essay to show how the Powers acquired their colonies. It must be sufficient to say that many were planted in vacant or very sparsely peopled lands ; some were secured by treaty, either at the instance of the native ruler or of the incoming Power ; some were annexed at the request of their inhabitants ; some were won by downright invasion ; some were taken over from the original colonizing Power. Of these last, to take British

examples alone, Jamaica, Trinidad, and Ceylon were prizes of war ; Malacca, the Dutch Gold Coast stations, and Albreda on the Gambia were the fruits of exchange ; the Danish Gold Coast stations were bought ; Bombay came to the English Crown in the dowry of a Portuguese princess.

Nor is it possible to examine here in detail the motives that have led men to emigrate. Since, however, these motives indicate something of the pressure that has induced governments to acquire colonies, this much must be said. The most persistent driving force has been the desire to better one's condition. So potent a force has this been that Europeans in the early days, and Asiatics and Africans later on, have been willing to earn a passage to a new land by entering into indenture. Always the quickest means of assembling a population, though not the surest of keeping it, has been to report the presence of gold or precious stones. Ambition to become a landowner has drawn many overseas, from the days when the practically stationary population of Great Britain was " planting " Ireland, North America, and the West Indies simultaneously, to those immediately following the Great War when ex-officers led " a last foray of aristocracy " into the Kenya Highlands. Religion, and more especially religion mixed with politics, has sent settlers out in swarms : English Puritans and Royalists in turn, French Huguenots, German Moravians and Mennonites, German Liberals after the failures of 1848-49, American Mormons, and Zionists in our own day, most of them peoples with the Exodus in their souls seeking a Promised Land. Many folk have gone at all times to join friends ; sailors have jumped their ships ; soldiers have deserted or taken their discharge overseas ; all sorts and conditions have gone to get away from home or the police, or out of sheer curiosity to see what lies beyond the dock-head. Thousands upon thousands have gone because they were sent : Negro slaves, political prisoners, and plain criminals. Some few relatively, moved by the missionary spirit, have gone to minister to such as these or to the native peoples. Many an

official, having served his colony, has decided to end his days there.

The questions that have to be considered here, however, are why governments acquire colonies for emigrants to go to, and how far each has sought to maintain its colonies for the benefit of the metropolitan people, or the colonial peoples, or third parties.

The origins of now famous towns suggest some of the answers to the first of these two questions. New York and Batavia were Dutch trading factories. Montreal was a French mission station. Detroit was a fort guarding a French colonial frontier, and Pittsburg (Fort Duquesne) another. Winnipeg was a fur traders' stockade. Capetown began as a Dutch chartered company's vegetable garden, Durban as a haunt of ivory hunters, Johannesburg as a gold-mining camp, Sydney as a "receptacle" for convicts and the poor of the parish. Many West African towns were once slave-trading depots; but Freetown was a philanthropic settlement for liberated slaves which became, by a poetic justice, the base from which a British squadron hunted down the slavers of all nations.

The motives thus indicated and many more can be grouped under three heads: the moral, the military, and the economic. Moral motives for colonization are three in number: desire for prestige, belief in a civilizing mission, and a sense of decency. These are spiritual matters, like the assurance of salvation, the awareness of nationality, or faith in communism. How far a colonizing people is moved by these considerations depends upon the vigour with which they have been taught to believe them. This vigour has varied from time to time and from class to class; but there is no doubt that many of those who have directed or taken part in the colonizing effort have been moved by them.

The argument from prestige goes back to the beginning, even before Machiavelli had begun to teach the political value of reputation. If Spain and Portugal had colonies, it behoved other Powers to have colonies also. So it has been throughout.

It has ministered to the pride of nationalists to know that their flag flies, that their language is spoken, that their influence is predominant in distant parts of the world.

Belief in a civilizing mission also goes back to the beginning. Pious onlookers, viewing the arrival of the first African slaves in Henry the Navigator's Portugal, "reflected with great pleasure upon the salvation of those souls that before were lost". Presently Columbus was uplifted to think that the Caribs of the newly discovered West Indies would easily be made Christians, and the Portuguese found their way to the East Indies in search of Christians as well as of spices. The idea persisted, and for two hundred years thereafter crowned heads and chartered companies gave the propagation of the Gospel a high place in their list of motives for desiring colonies or commercial spheres. Then, during the nineteenth century, philanthropists and missionaries not only advocated settlement by picked and duly controlled Europeans as one means of imparting Western civilization to tribal peoples, but often called for annexation to restrain unattached white men from showing the natives the worst side of that civilization, and to give them the chance of showing its best side.

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century the civilizing mission came to the front once more as an official motive for colonization. The French and Americans proclaimed their respective missions in word and deed, the British in deed rather than in word as their manner is, the Germans more in word than in deed for lack of opportunity. Nevertheless, Imperial Germany could point with justifiable pride to her scientific achievements and the technical education of the natives in her few colonies. Republican Germany recalled these things and hoped that she might be given a share in the civilizing mission of the West. Was not the burden, she suggested, too heavy for France and Great Britain alone?

There has been a vast deal of humbug in the business down the centuries; the Cross has often been used as cover for disreputable doings and designs. But when all is said, a

mass of sound achievement remains to the credit of those who have believed, as Gregory the Great believed long ago, that the best thing the West could offer to other parts of the world, perhaps the only thing which could justify its domination of Darkest England or Darkest Africa, was its essentially Christian civilization.

The last of the moral motives for the acquisition of colonies has been a sense of decency. Those who condemn the scramble for tropical Africa and the Pacific islands as noxious imperialism should ask themselves what the alternative was. It was certain that these tribal areas were going to be invaded somehow. Nay, they were already being invaded. No government or combination of governments could draw effective sanitary cordons round a continent or the islands of the sea, even if there had still been room in the world for the museum societies that would thus have resulted. Nor could any self-respecting government pass by on the other side while some of its citizens, not always the pick of their race and nation, went in armed with all the resources of civilization to work their will in primitive lands. Experience had shown that, in such a situation, this will would too often be a wicked will. There was nothing for it but to extend rule, either directly or indirectly through chartered companies, over all concerned. This some governments did, often enough at the request of the native peoples themselves. By so doing they at least held out to the natives of those parts the hope that they might one day learn to stand on their own feet.

Professor Walker goes on to talk about military and economic motives for colonization. Military motives fall under three heads: the acquisition of bases or strategic frontiers; the increase of man-power; and the provision of war materials. Economic motives are " the relief of social maladjustments at home and the creation of markets overseas by the export of surplus population "; and the " acquisition of sure sources of raw materials, favourable markets, and secure fields

for investment". *What motives led to the foundation of the first British colony and what was life in it like?*

F. A. Kirkpatrick, a former scholar of Trinity College, Cambridge, answers this question in the following extract from his book on *Colonization and Empire*, and we shall see how greatly the welfare of the settlements was dominated by the motives of the emigrants. Compare his picture of life in Virginia with John Quincy Adams's account of the New England colonies given in our volume on *Western Civilization*. The Virginia colony was *artificial*, farmed by speculators and merchants in England with only their own interests at heart. The New England colonies were *spontaneous*; they were true settlements, made by people whose aim was not to make money but to establish a new society where they could live according to the dictates of their own consciences.

F. A. KIRKPATRICK

THE FIRST BRITISH COLONY

AT the opening of the seventeenth century the British Empire consisted of England and Wales, part of Ireland, and the Channel Islands. The adventurers of Elizabeth's reign had shown the way to success in colonization, but they had not themselves achieved success.

Sir Walter Raleigh had been hampered in his efforts to colonize Virginia by the war against Spain. When that war came to an end, at the accession of James I (1603), there was a chance for more steady and permanent enterprise: people were now free to turn their energies from warlike adventures to peaceful undertakings, and merchants began to look for new ways of employing their capital.

Accordingly, soon after James I's accession we find a company of London merchants applying to the King for leave to plant a Colony in Virginia. Their chief object was commercial; they were ready to spend money on the venture in the hope of making a profit by it. The King was not displeased at the proposed enlargement of the realm, and at the prospect of sharing the profit; so he agreed, reserving to

himself control over the government of the Colony, and also a tax of one-fifth of all gold and silver which might be found. As none was ever found, this tax did not trouble the settlers much! Nor was the royal control a serious matter, for by charters granted a few years later the King really handed over the government of the Colony to the London Company.

On New Year's Day, 1607, a little body of 140 emigrants set sail from the Downs; they were all men, recruited like soldiers, and sent out by the London Company. They sailed in the track of Raleigh and in April 1607 they entered the wide mouth of Chesapeake Bay, passing between two headlands which they named Cape Henry and Cape Charles in honour of the King's two sons. Chesapeake Bay is a great land-locked inlet of the sea, stretching 180 miles northward, and penetrating westward into the land by many smaller bays and estuaries. On a promontory within this bay they fixed their little settlement of Jamestown, so named after the King.

They were delighted with the rich aspect and the mild climate of the country, which seemed to them "to claim the prerogative over the most pleasant places in the world". But as the summer advanced the delusion passed; they awoke and found themselves in the wilderness. They suffered from excessive heat, from pestilence, from the hostility of Indians, and from hunger. One of them writes thus: "Our drink was water, our lodging castles in the air; had we been as free from all sins as we were from gluttony and drunkenness, we might have been canonized as saints". In fact, Englishmen had not yet learned what a Colony meant and what it required; the settlers were not prepared for the daily routine of steady labour which was necessary in order to win a livelihood. Among the emigrants there were only twelve labourers and four carpenters; no less than forty-eight are described as "gentlemen". These were men unaccustomed to labour who had joined the venture in some vague hope of making their fortunes quickly and easily.

The Spanish adventurers had found countries teeming

with gold and silver and why should not Englishmen do the same? So, instead of building houses and sowing corn, they wandered in search of gold and silver, which they expected to find somewhere towards the West.

In the first summer fifty men died and the survivors were disorganized and helpless; the councillors who were supposed to rule the Colony were distracted; there was little government and no order. Virginia was on the point of perishing.

In these troubles the most capable man came to the front and saved the Colony. This was Captain John Smith. The name sounds familiar, somehow; there is not much doubt about his nationality; and we are reminded that, whatever those countries now are, they were in the beginning English. Smith, according to his own account, had already passed through enough adventures in love and war, by sea and land, in all parts of the world, to furnish a hundred sensational books for boys, and he has left us an amusingly boastful account of his doings in Virginia. He describes how he was made prisoner by Indians and saved his life by pulling out his pocket compass and giving the savages a short lecture on geography.

In spite of his tendency to romance, Smith proved a most capable leader. He made the gentlemen work at cutting timber for building houses, he sowed corn for future provision, and obtained a present supply from his Indian allies. For two years he was the life and soul of the Colony.

But in October 1609, Smith, suffering from a wound, returned to England, and the settlers (who were now increased to about 500 by fresh arrivals) sank into a terrible state of disorder and distress. At last, in the summer of 1610, the few survivors, finding starvation before them, embarked in their ships and prepared to abandon the Colony. They had actually fired a farewell salute and were putting out to sea when a ship arrived from England bringing the new governor, Lord Delaware, who stopped them from sailing. The earliest

British Colony was only saved from extinction by a timely accident !

Sir Thomas Dale, who went to Virginia in the following year and ruled as deputy-governor for five years, found the Colony still idle and stagnant : " No corn sowed ; the people at their daily and usual work, bowling in the streets ".

One cannot help asking, " Were these idle people really English colonists ? What is the meaning of these indolent, shiftless ways ? "

The answer is simple. These men had little personal interest in the enterprise and no hope of improving their condition by success ; for they had no separate property. Everything was regarded as forming a common stock. The land was held to be the property of the Company, not of the settlers. The men were expected to work for the Company, not for themselves. Their business was to earn a profit for the London merchants, themselves only receiving a small share. No wonder they were idle. In fact they can hardly be called colonists at all : they were recruits enlisted by the Company. Industrious, orderly people could not be induced to go to Virginia. Many of the first Virginians were the outcasts and failures of English society ; some of them were criminals from the gaols of England.

Dale set to work to cure these evils. He was a severe ruler, punishing all disorders with terrible rigour, but he gave the people an interest in the Colony by granting land to the older settlers. Soon afterwards the communistic system was abandoned, and any free Virginian might own property.

In another way Dale was the founder of Virginian prosperity, for he taught the people to grow tobacco, by which the Colony lived and flourished. This was so profitable that soon tobacco was planted even in the streets of Jamestown, and in the scarcity of coin tobacco was used as money, people paying so many pounds of the weed for whatever they wished to buy. Ever since that time the cultivation of tobacco has been the principal industry of Virginia.

In that same year a great effort was made in England to restore and support the Colony ; it was felt to be a shame that such an enterprise should be allowed to languish in perpetual danger of perishing. Ships were chartered and many hundreds of emigrants were enlisted and sent out.

At the same time a most necessary step was taken. It occurred to the friends of Virginia that they could not establish a permanent State consisting of men only, and so far there were but few women in the Colony. Accordingly, a number of young women were now enlisted and sent out just as the men had been sent out. Any Virginian who wanted a wife must pay 150 pounds of tobacco towards the expense of her voyage. There was such competition for these prizes that the amount was raised to 200 pounds of tobacco, and the Colonial Assembly at Jamestown was obliged to pass a law that no maid should be betrothed to more than one man at the same time.

These three steps—the organization of the tobacco industry, the possession of land by the settlers, and the emigration of women—started the Colony on the upward path. There were still many troubles to be passed through, especially a terrible Indian war in which numbers of the settlers perished, but the Colony was now fixed upon a sounder basis, and from this time progress, although slow, was steady.

The Colonial Assembly has just been mentioned ; this came into existence in 1619 when the London Company authorized their governor to summon deputies to be elected by the colonists. Thus met the first parliament in the British Empire outside the British Isles.

In the last year of James I the London Company was abolished and Virginia passed nominally under the direct control of the Crown, but, in fact, during the reign of Charles I this control was little exercised, and Virginia was mostly left alone to grow and expand in her own way. Free settlers and cultivators spread over the wide, unoccupied lands. During the Puritan domination many English Royalists fled to Virginia,

where they were well received. Thus the population increased, and in 1660, after half a century of life, the Colony contained about 40,000 inhabitants—a respectable number when we consider the small size of ships in those days, the length and cost of the voyage, and the terrible mortality among the earliest settlers.

It needed half a century of intense effort before the success of England's first colony was assured. However, " once the course of colonial adventure had set westward ", as Basil Williams says in his book, *The British Empire*, " Englishmen were not slow to follow it up ". Our second colony, Bermuda, was founded by accident when a relief ship, bound for Jamestown, ran ashore on the island, hitherto unoccupied save by the progeny of some pigs let loose, years before, by Portuguese seamen. Then, in 1623, Thomas Warner, despairing of Guiana, settled in St. Kitts, one of the Leeward Islands, and in 1627 an expedition was sent out from England to Barbados, which had already been formally annexed in 1605.

So, by accident and design, the process of English overseas expansion went on. The Stuart period witnessed the greatest interest in colonization in British history until the reign of Queen Victoria; the Stuart kings valued their plantations in America most highly, and whilst the Mother Country herself was torn by internal dissension, the imposing edifice of the first British Empire was consciously erected. *How did the expansion of the American colonies proceed?* The answer is to be found in Basil Williams's book, from which our next extract is taken. In it we shall see something of the development of the *spontaneous* colonies.

BASIL WILLIAMS

COLONIZATION UNDER THE STUARTS

EARLY in English colonial history the colonists, save in matters affecting all parts of the Empire, acknowledged no authority in the homeland besides the King, and learned to

carry their English tradition of freedom and responsibility to even greater lengths than they had found possible in the England of the early Stuarts.

Nowhere is this result more apparent than in the important colonies, still to be noticed, of New England. Their origin was quite different from that of the other colonies. Here it was not a case of promoters sending out settlers to develop a speculative property, but of settlers going of their own accord to find a home where they could order their lives more according to their own liking. The band that went out in the *Mayflower* in 1620 belonged, for the most part, to a congregation of Puritan farmers and tradesmen, who, twelve years before, had left their village of Scrooby in Lincolnshire to find a more congenial form of worship in Holland. There they had a hard struggle to make a living and found no friendly welcome from the Dutch; so they decided to return to England and try their luck farther afield. From Sir Edwin Sandys, a man of Puritan leanings in the Virginia Company, they obtained leave to settle in the extreme north of the Company's territory, which then extended up to Delaware Bay. The hundred pilgrims who finally ventured to cross the Atlantic sailed from Plymouth in the *Mayflower* on September 6, 1620, and reached Cape Cod two months later. This was farther north than they had intended to go, but the spot pleased them well and they decided to abide at New Plymouth, as they fondly called their landing-place.

In their case no governor had been appointed by the Company or by royal charter; no constitution had been laid down for them. But during the voyage they had themselves made a compact, drawn up in writing on November 11, 1621, at Cape Cod, to this effect: "We, the loyal subjects of our dread soveraigne Lord, King James, having undertaken for the glorie of God and the advancement of the Christian faith and honour of our King and countrie, a voyage to plant the first colonie in the Northerne part of Virginia, doe by these presents solemnly and mutually in the presence of God and

one another, covenant and combine ourselves into a civill body politick . . . [to enact laws] for the generall good of the Colonie, unto which we promise all due submission and obedience". In accord with this, the first approach to a written constitution in English history, they elected William Bradford, one of their own number, as governor, an office which he held for thirty-five years. Their numbers were at first so small that they had no need of a representative assembly: but the whole population, as in the case of the old Greek city states, met at stated town meetings to pass laws and decide on the common interests. Apart from the allegiance which they voluntarily swore to the King, they had less formal ties with England than any others of the early settlers. A terribly hard winter for their first, in which half the small band of a hundred perished, tested their staunchness; after that they never looked back.

The Massachusetts Bay Settlement was an even more direct result of the dissatisfaction with the political and religious state of England. In spite of the grant of the Petition of Right in 1627, the King's power in Church and State seemed an impregnable obstacle to those who had aspirations towards a simpler form of worship and wider secular liberty. As John Winthrop wrote in his arguments for leaving England: "the Church hath noe place lefte to flie into but the wilder-nesse. . . . This Land growes weary of her Inhabitants, soe as man, whoe is the most pretious of all creatures, is here more vile and base than the earth we treade upon, and of less prise among us than an horse or a sheep." . . .

Before sailing, the settlers took the important decision of not only carrying their charter along with them but of making the headquarters of the Company in America instead of London, thus depriving the King of his most effective means of control over their affairs, and assuring to themselves almost unlimited independence. An advance party of the emigrants sailed in 1628; the main body under Winthrop, 900 all told, the largest band of colonists that had yet crossed the sea from

England, started in the spring of 1630 and made the land at Salem, near Boston. From the first this colony at Salem became the rallying point of the discontented Puritans and parliamentarians from England. Within four years the settlement already numbered 4000, and within twelve, at the beginning of the Civil War, it had attained to 16,000. Like the pilgrims of the *Mayflower* at New Plymouth, it was a free and independent community, electing its own governor and officials and making its own laws. But though the majority were free in this respect, they were at least as intolerant in their religious regulations as Laud himself in England. Dissensions soon arose; and several parties of those who could not agree with the rigid tenets of the majority hived off to found separate settlements in Connecticut and Rhode Island.

Charles I and Laud also realized how little hold they had on these pestilent rebels against their own civil and religious system, and set up a new Commission for Plantations to control them. In order to check the flow of malcontents overseas, this Commission forbade anyone to leave the country without licence, and attempted to impose Laud's ecclesiastical authority over New England. But the Commission had no means of enforcing its decisions, and when, in 1638, it required Winthrop to return the Charter for reconsideration of its terms with a view to strengthening the royal control over the colonists' proceedings, he and his associates respectfully declined to part with it. There was no means of coercing them without the exercise of force, which the King was in no position to employ.

Thus, within the first half of the seventeenth century, the greater part of the North American seaboard had been occupied by English colonists. Their rivals in this quarter, besides the Spaniards in Florida and the West Indies, were the French and Dutch. Canada had been explored by Cartier a century earlier, but was first settled by Champlain two years after the English came to Jamestown; while in 1623 the Dutch had founded New Holland, an ailing little colony on the Hudson

River. But in any disputes with those competitors the English settlers more than held their own. . . .

In 1643, on the plea that, owing to the "sad distractions in England", they could no longer hope for the "comfortable fruits of protection" from home, Massachusetts, Plymouth, Connecticut, and Newhaven entered into a confederation for "offence and defence, mutuall advice and succour". This was a virtual repudiation of English jurisdiction and protection, doubtless in anticipation of further claims from the King, should he prove victorious. The confederation did not live long, but it was the first sign of a tendency which gradually led to the revolution of the eighteenth century.

The Commonwealth, however, especially when Cromwell became Protector, was little minded to stand insubordination from the colonies and had the means, in a strong navy, of enforcing its views. The royalist colonies were soon compelled to get rid of their "malignant" governors and to recognize the authority of Parliament; and even the more troublesome New Englanders, though dealt with more tenderly, were made to realize that independence would no more be admitted by their friends now in power at home than by the "man of blood" lately beheaded. Cromwell himself stimulated interest at home in the overseas possessions by his efforts to encourage a fresh stream of emigrants from both Scotland and England to America, by the capture of Jamaica in 1655 and by his vigorous attempt to colonize it and develop its resources. In the same year the New Englanders drove the French out of Acadia, a conquest retained by Cromwell, but again abandoned twelve years later by Charles II. But the Commonwealth's most important measure relating to the colonies was the Navigation Ordinance passed by Parliament in 1651, a measure which, without introducing any new principle, reduced to an effective system the control aimed at over colonial trade and navigation.

The principle of regulating colonial trade in the interests of the mother country was, as we have seen, nothing new.

The Stuarts at the outset had attempted above all things to maintain their hold on the new settlements by commercial ties. They enjoined on the planters, it is true without much success, the cultivation of products, such as naval stores, likely to be useful for English purposes : and at the same time they protected their output of tobacco and other goods by giving them favourable terms or even a monopoly on the English market.

The main object of the Navigation Ordinance was to encourage English trade and shipping and to aim a blow at the great carrying trade of our Dutch rivals : no goods were to be imported into England from the plantations or from any other country outside Europe except on ships owned and manned by English subjects, nor could any European goods be shipped to England or English possessions except on English ships or ships of the country of origin. This ordinance was vehemently objected to by the American colonies. Virginia actually had a commercial treaty of its own with New Holland ; Rhode Island and Connecticut also found their profit in trade with the Dutch ; while Massachusetts declared, in spite of the parliamentary ordinance, that all nations might trade with her. For some time it was almost impossible to make the colonies observe the new regulations ; and it required a display of force by the English fleet and the capture of some Dutch ships found in a New England port before they were brought to obedience.

For nearly two centuries control over the trade of the plantations, inaugurated as a system by this ordinance, remained the guiding principle of England's colonial policy, the only change being in an increasing rigidity of the control. At the Restoration, when most of the parliamentary ordinances were ignored, this one was re-enacted and strengthened. The principle of " enumerated articles "—at first sugar, tobacco, and five others, but subsequently extended—was introduced : none of the articles, the products of the plantations, so enumerated could be exported to any other country but

England. At the same time the colonies were forbidden to import foreign products that had not first been brought to England. Thus in trade matters Parliamentary Acts were for the first time, as distinct from royal orders, made applicable to the colonies: at this time also the policy of treating the whole trade of the empire as a subject of comprehensive regulation was given full scope. The conception underlying the policy is clearly expressed in the preamble to one of Charles II's Acts on trade, where its object is stated to be "for the maintaining a greater correspondence and kindnesse betweene them [England and the plantations] and keepeing them in a firmer dependance upon it".

Clarendon, Charles II's first minister after the Restoration, states in his *Defence*: "Soon after the Restoration I used all the endeavours I could to bring His Majesty to have a great esteem for his Plantations and to encourage their improvement". To do Charles justice, he required little persuasion, for he was in entire sympathy with his subjects in their enthusiasm for the development of trade and in the increased interest they took in the colonies, chiefly as a source of wealth to the mother country. Different as they were, too, in almost every other respect, many of his principal advisers, notably his brother James, Clarendon, Shaftesbury and Albemarle all regarded the administration of the colonies and the tightening of their ties with England as one of the most important functions of government. In the first year of his reign Charles set up a "Council of Forraigne Plantations", which, with various changes of form, was the direct precursor of the modern colonial office. Shaftesbury was its first president and the ablest during the reign: but Charles himself always took a large part in its deliberations and showed a knowledge and sagacity in forming decisions surpassed by none of the members.

The new spirit of sympathy with the interests of the colonies and of keenness to harmonize them with those of England are shown in the directions issued by the King for

the conduct of this Council's business. They were to take stock of all rights claimed by the colonies and keep careful record of all their charters, to require from the governors frequent reports of their affairs, to investigate what lessons were to be learned from foreign methods of colonial government, and in sum, "to applie yourselves to all prudentiall meanes for the rendering these dominions usefull to England and England helpfull to them". The governors appointed by Charles were for the most part efficient; and, after some initial difficulties, the Navigation Acts were generally enforced, except in the case of Massachusetts.

Charles II's reign is also notable for a renewed outburst of colonization. Carolina, to the south of the original colony of Virginia, was planted in 1663, with a constitution drawn up by Shaftesbury's friend, the philosopher John Locke; a constitution providing for an order of nobles termed caciques and landgraves and recognizing the perpetual slavery of white indentured servants, but, it is not surprising to know, never actually put into practice. Three other colonies were also inaugurated owing to the conquest of New Holland from the Dutch. Two of these colonies, New York and New Jersey, were granted to James, Duke of York, in 1664, before they had actually fallen into our hands, while the third, Pennsylvania, forming the hinterland to these colonies and the first English settlement not actually on the sea-board, was granted in 1681 to Charles's Quaker friend, William Penn, in acknowledgment of a debt of £10,000. Thus by the end of Charles's reign the whole of North America between the Alleghany mountains and the seas was under the English Crown, while as successors to the Dutch the English had inherited their alliance with the Five Nations of Iroquois, an alliance of value to them in the forthcoming struggle with the French settlers in Canada.

It is easy to be wise after the event, but there can be no doubt that the New England colonies had very strong leanings to independence

from the start. The Puritans were very different from their southerly cousins, whose main motives for emigration had been mercenary, and this difference was to manifest itself with tragic results in the mid-nineteenth century.

But it is to the struggle with the French, in Canada and in India, that we must now turn. It is important to remember that, although it is with the story of British expansion that we are primarily concerned in this volume, no history of the British Commonwealth would be complete without some knowledge of the overseas activities of the other European Powers.

The eighteenth century may have been the " Age of Reason " but it was also the classical age of Anglo-French colonial rivalry. This rivalry may be said to date from the Second Dutch War (1665-67), at the close of which New York was ceded to the English, and to have reached its culminating point with the Seven Years War which ended in 1763. In India this rivalry was even keener than in North America, and there the result of the conflict hung in the balance throughout the century. In India the question was not so much " Could India be conquered ? " as " *Who* would conquer India ? " Britain or France ? Dupleix or Clive ?

In Canada the position was rather different, because at that time the territory was little valued or coveted by Englishmen. Indeed, it is probably true to say that, had the French not settled there, England would have ignored the " frozen north " altogether. India was obviously valuable for her trade, but Canada was only important because the presence of the French made it so. That Canada was so little regarded is shown by the fact that when, in 1763, the question arose whether Canada or Guadeloupe should be returned to France under the terms of the treaty, it was decided to retain Canada only after long and serious debate.

The French found their colonists as difficult tomanage as the British did theirs—perhaps this explains our reluctance to accept fresh responsibility in North America—but they treated them in rather harsher fashion ; for to Frenchmen colonies were—and still are—conceived of as being territorial extensions of Old France. *How did French colonial policy compare with British ?* The answer is given by Sir Robert Borden, a former Prime Minister of Canada, in a Rhodes Memorial Lecture delivered at Oxford in 1927.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN

FRENCH COLONIZATION IN CANADA

THE purpose of France was to govern and control her colony as a French province. At the very beginning the seigneurial system was established, and in 1712 there were not less than ninety-one seigneuries. The feudal order thus founded in Canada was not merely a system of land tenure. In its social aspect it was intended to reproduce its European prototype. The *censitaire* (as the habitant-tenant was termed) rendered fealty and homage to each new seigneur, and the seigneur, upon entering into possession of his fief, or upon the accession of a sovereign, made obeisance and oath of fealty to the Governor as royal representative. A seigneur in New France was not necessarily of the *noblesse*, although in reward for distinguished service he was sometimes ennobled. In most cases the seigneurs had judicial powers, " the high, the middle, and the low justice ". These judicial prerogatives were seldom exercised except in trifling disputes.

As the rule of primogeniture did not prevail in New France and as it was essential that each farm should have frontage on the river [St. Lawrence], the holdings became exceedingly narrow. After the preliminary severities of pioneer life had been overcome, those who tilled the soil with care lived more comfortably and were in happier circumstances than well-to-do peasants in France. But habitants and *petite noblesse* alike found in the forest, the lake, and the river their true *métier*, in which they were apt scholars ; and efforts were continually exerted to induce attention to agriculture rather than to the fur trade and the attractive forest life. In the first decade of the eighteenth century the cleared land did not exceed 60,000 acres. The habitants were extremely prolific (as they still are) ; Montcalm observed that a soldier of the Carignan regiment had 220 descendants settled in four parishes. The spirit of the Norman stock, as to the proportion of which there has been controversy, was predominant. It is probable

that the Norse strain produced a majority of the great explorers and adventurers, both French and English.

Excessive regulation of matters connected with daily life must have weakened the initiative of the habitant and retarded the development of the country. France undertook to govern her colony by ordinances relating to every conceivable subject of domestic concern; inns, markets, chimney sweeping, quarrelling in church, assignment of pews, the number of horses which each habitant might own, undue subdivision of farms, and other matters of like character were regulated by distant authorities with more zeal than knowledge or wisdom.

During a century and a quarter of actual colonization (1632-1760) France had founded a strong military colony upon the banks of the St. Lawrence. To its development many of her finest spirits gave unstintingly their noblest service. In a purely material aspect there was no inconsiderable achievement. On either side of the St. Lawrence the land was reclaimed from the wilderness, and more than 60,000 colonists held New France for the country of their ancestors. The Church fully vindicated its mission; the character and morals of the people were maintained at a high standard.

The reign of law began. Justice was impartially administered and the principal code of French law came into force. The devotion of the missionaries and the adventurous spirit of the explorers, *voyageurs* and *coureurs de bois* planted the French flag beyond the heart of the continent, and claimed for France a vast western territory of unknown extent, reaching from the head-waters of the St. Lawrence to the mouth of the Mississippi. A chain of forts extended for nearly two thousand miles beyond Quebec, and against the immensely larger population of the adjoining British colonies the French succeeded in holding their own. If the vision of far-seeing men like Frontenac and Talon had been shared by the French Government, and if the distractions of war in Europe had not diverted effort from their purpose, New France might have extended its limits to the mouth of the Hudson, and

France would have secured a hold upon the continent which perhaps could never have been loosened. The hostility of the Five Nations which began when Champlain's aid gave victory to the Hurons, and which was quieted for only relatively brief periods, explains in a measure the restriction of French settlement to the immediate vicinity of the St. Lawrence.

But while New France was being developed to a total population of 60,000, the British colonies to the south had attained a figure more than twenty times as great. In securing influence over the native tribes of America, the French were in many respects superior to the British. Their temperament and personal qualities fitted them admirably for gaining the confidence of the tribesmen. The *coureur de bois* and the missionary followed the Indians to their forest homes and readily adapted themselves to Indian habits and customs. The fervour, the teaching, and the ceremonial of the French missionaries touched the Indian imagination. To the savage the Frenchman seemed to bring sympathy, the Englishman contempt.

The British settlements had their origin not in governmental action but in the spontaneous and unaided effort of liberty-loving people. Those colonists displayed an instinct and adaptability for colonization, for commerce and industry, and for self-government which seemed to be lacking in the French temperament. New France remained little more than a series of military posts, while New England developed rapidly into an agricultural, industrial, and commercial community. British colonization virtually began in 1620, and in 1688 the population of the Atlantic colonies was computed at 200,000; it had increased to half a million in 1721, and twenty years later to a million. In 1760 the white population of the Thirteen Colonies was estimated at nearly 1,400,000 besides a slave population of 300,000. As early as 1640 Massachusetts, Gloucester, and Plymouth, and six other New England towns, were building vessels and sending them loaded with produce and lumber to adjacent colonies, to

Barbados, and to England. In 1676 it was estimated that 730 ships had already been built in Massachusetts.

The New England colonies insisted upon governing themselves. New France was ruled by an autocracy, continually subject to directions from Versailles. In the English colonies initiative was not checked or stifled by vexatious administrative regulations. There was in each colony a representative governing body known by various designations, but everywhere essentially the same thing. It was an assembly of representatives, not of the whole people, but of property owners. Continual claim was made for fuller measure of self-government, and by the close of Queen Anne's reign (1714) the colonial assemblies were, with few exceptions, enforcing their right not merely to levy taxes and determine expenditure, but also to appoint the chief financial officer. After the menace of Quebec had passed in 1760, the development of this spirit, stimulated by the obstinacy of a British king and the unwisdom of his advisers, brought about in sixteen years the Declaration of Independence.

For more than a century Great Britain and France faced each other on the borders of Quebec, along the St. Lawrence and in Acadia, each inspired by an unyielding determination. At first sight the conflict seemed unequal. At the beginning of the period England had little more than one-third the population of France, and at the end of the period less than one-half. France was beyond question the most powerful military nation in Europe. On the other hand the population of New France was insignificant in comparison with that of the English colonies; and the naval power of Britain gradually increased until in the final event, when Pitt placed one-quarter of the British fleet at the disposal of Wolfe, it determined the issue.

I have never been impressed with the view frequently put forward with much emphasis, that during the American Revolution the loyalty of the French population preserved Canada for the British Crown. But, in a very real sense,

French colonization in Acadia and in the St. Lawrence valley did preserve Canada to the British Crown and led to its development as a self-governing nation of the British Commonwealth. The enterprising and aggressive pioneers of New England realized very early the importance of Acadia, the abundant wealth of its natural resources and the immense possibilities of its fisheries. It has indeed been appropriately designated as " New England's Outpost ". The same pioneers continually bent their energies to expansion towards the St. Lawrence valley and the northerly trend of the New York settlements was equally manifest. The French, on the other hand, sought expansion not only to the west but to the south, and French governors had a vision of acquiring, either by cession or conquest, the present site of New York with the intervening territory, so as to secure an available winter port. These opposing tendencies to expansion neutralized each other, and French colonization dominated the St. Lawrence valley. In Acadia after 1713, when it was finally ceded to Great Britain, British colonization made little progress until after the founding of Halifax in 1749.

If France had not occupied the St. Lawrence valley and extended her influence to the far western country, what would have been the ultimate destiny of that immense territory and indeed of all Canada ? British settlements from New England and New York would have occupied the fertile lands on both sides of the St. Lawrence, and would have developed into states possessing powers of self-government analogous to those prevailing in New England or in the Middle States. It cannot be doubted that in this event these states would have been swept into the Revolution of 1776, and the entire territory now included in Canada would have passed under the flag of the Republic. The final issue of Champlain's quest and of France's endeavour was to hold it under the flag of Britain.

The presence of French settlers in Canada had more than one effect on subsequent history. If it prevented the North from joining

forces with the revolting colonies, it also created fresh problems of *communitas communitatum* in the nineteenth century.

But it is time now to turn to that other great arena of Anglo-French colonial rivalry—India. " The clear distinction between the history of India and the history of the colonies must never be forgotten ", says Kirkpatrick in another of his lectures. " Canada has no history apart from Europe. India has a long history almost untouched by Europe . . . the story of India belongs to Asiatic history." Perhaps this explains why few Europeans have ventured to write a history of India : few subjects have been tackled with greater reluctance by historians and few have been more freely misrepresented. " It might have been expected " writes Macaulay at the beginning of his essay on Clive " that every Englishman who takes any interest in any part of history would be curious to know how a handful of his countrymen, separated from their home by an immense ocean, subjugated, in the course of a few years, one of the greatest empires in the world. Yet, unless we greatly err, this subject is, to most readers, not only insipid, but positively distasteful."

The story of British Asiatic expansion begins in 1600, the year when Queen Elizabeth granted the East India Company its first charter. The Company's business was trade, and within a few years, " factories " had been set up at Surat (Bombay), at the mouth of the Hoogli (Calcutta), and at one or two small places on the Coromandel coast (Madras). Thus the triple division of the British Empire in India dates from the beginning. These trading elements gradually became political settlements ; Madras, Calcutta, and Bombay were fortified, and the Company trained its own troops. These measures were deemed necessary not only because the directors were anxious to shake off the supremacy of the native princes with whom they had to treat, but also to defend themselves against the rivalry of similar French, Dutch, and Portuguese companies who were equally covetous of the riches of the East.

The French were our most serious rivals, and until Clive first distinguished himself at Arcot against the might of Dupleix, Governor of the French settlement at Pondicherry, they had the better of the duel. Until the coming of Dupleix neither company aimed at conquest or empire, but the opportunity and the temptation came with the break-up of the Mogul Empire and the consequent chaos which prevailed throughout India.

The rival companies had been compelled by their governments to make peace in 1754, but the real issue remained unsettled. Fearing a

renewal of fighting, Calcutta was fortified against the French. Surajah Dowlah, Viceroy of Bengal, took exception to this and, fearing that the Company was preparing to make war on him, and believing the city to contain a vast amount of treasure, he descended upon it with his army. Most of the Company's men fled in alarm, but those who were left were imprisoned in the notorious " Black Hole of Calcutta ". The subsequent events which led to the Battle of Plassey (1757) and the establishment of British hegemony in Bengal are recounted for us by Macaulay, one of the few historians who have endeavoured to fill in some of the gaps in Indian history.

How did Clive ensure a British victory over the French in India? Clive's methods were not beyond reproach, and in this colourful extract from a long essay Macaulay reveals, once more, that in this life things are neither black nor white but an infinite number of shades of grey. Clive had gone to Calcutta to avenge the " Black Hole "; he was anxious to get to grips with Surajah Dowlah at once, but he had few troops and there was a danger of fresh French offensive action in the south. When our story opens, therefore, we find Clive obliged to parley with his antagonist.

LORD MACAULAY

THE CONSPIRACY AGAINST SURAJAH DOWLAH

CLIVE had commenced operations with his usual vigour. He took Budge-budge, routed the garrison of Fort William, recovered Calcutta, stormed and sacked Hoogli. The Nabob, already disposed to make some concessions to the English, was confirmed in his pacific disposition by these proofs of their power and spirit. He accordingly made overtures to the chiefs of the invading armament, and offered to restore the factory, and to give compensation to those whom he had despoiled.

Clive's profession was war; and he felt that there was something discreditable in an accommodation with Surajah Dowlah. But his power was limited. A committee, chiefly

composed of servants of the Company who had fled from Calcutta, had the principal direction of affairs; and these persons were eager to be restored to their posts and compensated for their losses. The government of Madras, apprised that war had commenced in Europe, and apprehensive of an attack from the French, became impatient for the return of the armament. The promises of the Nabob were large, the chances of a contest doubtful; and Clive consented to treat, though he expressed his regret that things should not be concluded in so glorious a manner as he could have wished.

With this negotiation commences a new chapter in the life of Clive. Hitherto he had been merely a soldier carrying into effect, with eminent ability and valour, the plans of others. Henceforth he is to be chiefly regarded as a statesman; and his military movements are to be considered as subordinate to his political designs. That in his new capacity he displayed great ability, and obtained great success, is unquestionable. But it is also unquestionable that the transactions in which he now began to take a part have left a stain on his moral character.

We can by no means agree with Sir John Malcolm [Clive's devoted biographer], who is obstinately resolved to see nothing but honour and integrity in the conduct of his hero. But we can as little agree with Mill, who has gone so far as to say that Clive was a man "to whom deception, when it suited his purpose, never cost a pang". Clive seems to us to have been constitutionally the very opposite of a knave, bold even to temerity, sincere even to indiscretion, hearty in friendship, open in enmity. Neither in his private life, nor in those parts of his public life in which he had to do with his countrymen, do we find any signs of a propensity to cunning. On the contrary, in all the disputes in which he was engaged as an Englishman against Englishmen, from his boxing-matches at school to those stormy altercations at the India House and in Parliament amidst which his later years were passed, his very faults were those of a high and magnanimous spirit.

The truth seems to have been that he considered Oriental politics as a game in which nothing was unfair. He knew that the standard of morality among the natives of India differed widely from that established in England. He knew that he had to deal with men destitute of what in Europe is called honour, with men who would give any promise without hesitation, and break any promise without shame, with men who would unscrupulously employ corruption, perjury, forgery, to compass their ends. His letters show that the great difference between Asiatic and European morality was constantly in his thoughts. He seems to have imagined, most erroneously in our opinion, that he could effect nothing against such adversaries, if he was content to be bound by ties from which they were free, if he went on telling truth, and hearing none, if he fulfilled, to his own hurt, all his engagements with confederates who never kept an engagement that was not to their advantage. Accordingly this man, in the other parts of his life an honourable English gentleman and a soldier, was no sooner matched against an Indian intriguer, than he became himself an Indian intriguer, and descended, without scruple, to falsehood, to hypocritical caresses, to the substitution of documents, and to the counterfeiting of hands.

The negotiations between the English and the Nabob were carried on chiefly by two agents, Mr. Watts, a servant of the Company, and a Bengalee of the name of Omichund. This Omichund had been one of the wealthiest native merchants resident at Calcutta, and had sustained great losses in consequence of the Nabob's expedition against that place. In the course of his commercial transactions he had seen much of the English, and was peculiarly qualified to serve as a medium of communication between them and a native court. He possessed great influence with his own race, and had in large measure the Hindu talents: quick observation, tact, dexterity, perseverance; and the Hindu vices, servility, greediness, and treachery.

The Nabob promised, retracted, hesitated, evaded. At

one time he advanced with his army in a threatening manner towards Calcutta ; but when he saw the resolute front which the English presented, he fell back in alarm, and consented to make peace with them on their own terms. The treaty was no sooner concluded than he formed new designs against them. He intrigued with the French authorities at Chandernagore. He invited Bussy to march from the Deccan to the Hoogli, and to drive the English out of Bengal. All this was well known to Clive and Watson. They determined accordingly to strike a decisive blow, and to attack Chandernagore, before the force there could be strengthened by new arrivals either from the south of India, or from Europe. Watson directed the expedition by water, Clive by land. The success of the combined movements was rapid and complete. The fort, the garrison, the artillery, the military stores, all fell into the hands of the English. Near five hundred European troops were among the prisoners.

The Nabob had feared and hated the English, even while he was still able to oppose to them their French rivals. The French were now vanquished ; and he began to regard the English with still greater fear and still greater hatred. His weak and unprincipled mind oscillated between servility and insolence. One day he sent a large sum to Calcutta, as part of the compensation due for the wrongs which he had committed. The next day he sent a present of jewels to Bussy, exhorting that distinguished officer to hasten to protect Bengal " against Clive, the daring in war, on whom " says his Highness " may all bad fortune attend ". He ordered his army to march against the English. He countermanded his orders. He tore Clive's letters. He then sent answers in the most florid language of compliment. He ordered Watts out of his presence, and threatened to impale him. He again sent for Watts, and begged pardon for the insult. In the meantime, his wretched maladministration, his folly, his dissolute manners, and his love of the lowest company, had disgusted all classes of his subjects, soldiers, traders, civil functionaries,

the proud and ostentatious Mahommedans, the timid, supple, and parsimonious Hindus. A formidable confederacy was formed against him, in which were included Roydullub, the minister of finance, Mir Jaffir, the principal commander of the troops, and Jugget Seit, the richest banker in India. The plot was confided to the English agents, and a communication was opened between the malcontents at Moorshedabad and the committee at Calcutta.

In the committee there was much hesitation; but Clive's voice was given in favour of the conspirators, and his vigour and firmness bore down all opposition. It was determined that the English should lend their powerful assistance to depose Surajah Dowlah, and to place Mir Jaffir on the throne of Bengal. In return, Mir Jaffir promised ample compensation to the Company and its servants, and a liberal donative to the army, the navy, and the committee. The odious vices of Surajah Dowlah, the wrongs which the English had suffered at his hands, the dangers to which our trade must have been exposed, had he continued to reign, appear to us fully to justify the resolution of deposing him. But nothing can justify the dissimulation which Clive stooped to practise. He wrote to Surajah Dowlah in terms so affectionate that they for a time lulled that weak prince into perfect security. The same courier who carried this "soothing letter", as Clive calls it, to the Nabob, carried to Mr. Watts a letter in the following terms: "Tell Mir Jaffir to fear nothing. I will join him with five thousand men who never turned their backs. Assure him I will march night and day to his assistance, and stand by him as long as I have a man left."

It was impossible that a plot which had so many ramifications should long remain entirely concealed. Enough reached the ears of the Nabob to arouse his suspicions. But he was soon quieted by the fictions and artifices which the inventive genius of Omichund produced with miraculous readiness. All was going well—the plot was nearly ripe—when Clive learned

that Omichund was likely to play false. The artful Bengalee had been promised a liberal compensation for all that he had lost at Calcutta. But this would not satisfy him. His services had been great. He held the thread of the whole intrigue. By one word breathed in the ear of Surajah Dowlah, he could undo all that he had done. The lives of Watts, of Mir Jaffir, of all the conspirators, were at his mercy; and he determined to take advantage of his situation and to make his own terms. He demanded three hundred thousand pounds sterling as the price of his secrecy and of his assistance. The committee, incensed by the treachery and appalled by the danger, knew not what course to take. But Clive was more than Omichund's match in Omichund's own arts. The man, he said, was a villain. Any artifice which would defeat such knavery was justifiable. The best course would be to promise what was asked. Omichund would soon be at their mercy; and then they might punish him by withholding from him, not only the bribe which he now demanded, but also the compensation which all the other sufferers of Calcutta were to receive.

His advice was taken. But how was the wary and sagacious Hindu to be deceived? He had demanded that an article touching his claims should be inserted in the treaty between Mir Jaffir and the English, and he would not be satisfied unless he saw it with his own eyes. Clive had an expedient ready. Two treaties were drawn up, one on white paper, the other on red, the former real, the latter fictitious. In the former Omichund's name was not mentioned; the latter, which was to be shown to him, contained a stipulation in his favour.

But another difficulty arose. Admiral Watson had scruples about signing the red treaty. Omichund's vigilance and acuteness were such that the absence of so important a name would probably awaken his suspicions. But Clive was not a man to do anything by halves. We almost blush to write it. He forged Admiral Watson's name.

All was now ready for action. Mr. Watts fled secretly from Moorshedabad. Clive put his troops in motion, and wrote to the Nabob in a tone very different from that of his previous letters. He set forth all the wrongs which the British had suffered, offered to submit the points in dispute to the arbitration of Mir Jaffir, and concluded by announcing that, as the rains were about to set in, he and his men would do themselves the honour of waiting on his Highness for an answer.

Surajah Dowlah instantly assembled his whole force, and marched to encounter the English. It had been agreed that Mir Jaffir should separate himself from the Nabob, and carry over his division to Clive. But, as the decisive moment approached, the fears of the conspirator overpowered his ambition. Clive had advanced to Cossimbuzar; the Nabob lay with a mighty power a few miles off at Plassey; and still Mir Jaffir delayed to fulfil his engagements, and returned evasive answers to the earnest remonstrances of the English general.

Clive was in a painfully anxious situation. He could place no confidence in the sincerity or in the courage of his confederate; and, whatever confidence he might place in his own military talents, and in the valour and discipline of his troops, it was no light thing to engage an army twenty times as numerous as his own. Before him lay a river over which it was easy to advance, but over which, if things went ill, not one of his little band would ever return. On this occasion, for the first and for the last time, his dauntless spirit, during a few hours, shrank from the fearful responsibility of making a decision. He called a council of war. The majority pronounced against fighting; and Clive declared his concurrence with the majority. Long afterwards he said that he had never called but one council of war, and that, if he had taken the advice of that council, the British would never have been masters of Bengal. But scarcely had the meeting broken up when he was himself again. He retired alone under the

shade of some trees, and passed near an hour there in thought. He came back determined to put everything to the hazard, and gave orders that all should be in readiness for passing the river on the morrow.

The river was passed ; and at the close of a toilsome day's march, the army, long after sunset, took up its quarters in a grove of mango-trees near Plassey, within a mile of the enemy. Clive was unable to sleep ; he heard, through the whole night, the sound of drums and cymbals from the vast camp of the Nabob. It is not strange that even his stout heart should now and then have sunk, when he reflected against what odds, and for what a prize, he was in a few hours to contend.

Nor was the rest of Surajah Dowlah more peaceful. His mind, at once weak and stormy, was distracted by wild and horrible apprehensions. Appalled by the greatness and nearness of the crisis, distrusting his captains, dreading every one who approached him, dreading to be left alone, he sat gloomily in his tent, haunted, a Greek poet would have said, by the furies of those who had cursed him with their last breath in the Black Hole.

The day broke, the day which was to decide the fate of India. At sunrise the army of the Nabob, pouring through many openings of the camp, began to move towards the grove where the English lay. Forty thousand infantry, armed with firelocks, pikes, swords, bows and arrows, covered the plain. They were accompanied by fifty pieces of ordnance of the largest size, each tugged by a long team of white oxen, and each pushed on from behind by an elephant. Some smaller guns, under the direction of a few French auxiliaries, were perhaps more formidable. The cavalry were fifteen thousand, drawn, not from the effeminate population of Bengal, but from the bolder race which inhabits the northern provinces ; and the practised eye of Clive could perceive that both the men and the horses were more powerful than those of the Carnatic. The force which he had to oppose to this great multitude consisted of only three thousand men. But

GIRLS COLLE

of these nearly a thousand were English ; and all were led by English officers, and trained in the English discipline. . . .

The battle commenced with a cannonade in which the artillery of the Nabob did scarcely any execution, while the few field-pieces of the English produced great effect. Several of the most distinguished officers in Surajah Dowlah's service fell. Disorder began to spread through his ranks. His own terror increased every moment. One of the conspirators urged on him the expediency of retreating. The insidious advice, agreeing as it did with what his own terrors suggested, was readily received. He ordered his army to fall back, and this order decided his fate. Clive snatched the moment, and ordered his troops to advance. The confused and dispirited multitude gave way before the onset of disciplined valour. No mob attacked by regular soldiers was ever more completely routed. The little band of Frenchmen who alone ventured to confront the English, were swept down by the stream of fugitives. In an hour the forces of Surajah Dowlah were dispersed, never to reassemble. Only five hundred of the vanquished were slain. But their camp, their guns, their baggage, innumerable waggons, innumerable cattle, remained in the power of the conquerors. With the loss of twenty-two soldiers killed and fifty wounded, Clive had scattered an army of near sixty thousand men, and subdued an empire larger and more populous than Great Britain.

The victory at Plassey marked the real foundation of the British Empire in India. Surajah Dowlah was deposed and Mir Jaffir set up in his stead : Omichund was informed of the trick, whereupon, in Macaulay's words, he " fell back insensible into the arms of his attendants. He revived : but his mind was irreparably ruined." He died not long afterwards. Still more important, the French claim to supremacy was demolished : the victory of Sir Eyre Coote at Wandewash, three years later, put an end to French pretensions in India for all time.

" With the elimination of the French power from India " writes Pandit Nehru in his remarkable book, *The Discovery of India*, " three contestants for supremacy remained—the Maratha confederacy, Haider Ali in the south, and the British. In spite of their victory at Plassey and their spreading out over Bengal and Bihar, few, if any, people in India then looked upon the British as a dominant power destined to rule over the whole of India. An observer would still have given first place to the Marathas, who sprawled all over western and central India right up to Delhi and whose courage and fighting qualities were well known. Haider Ali and Tipu Sultan were formidable adversaries, who inflicted a severe defeat on the British and came near to breaking the power of the East India Company. But they were confined to the south and did not directly affect the fortunes of India as a whole."

Few subjects are more debatable than the history of the British in India and, not unnaturally perhaps, Pandit Nehru's version of the story differs considerably from Macaulay's. Written whilst he was held prisoner in Ahmadnagar Fort in 1944, Nehru's book is coloured with resentment against the British: thus he ascribes the famine which ravaged Bengal and Bihar in 1770 to their presence. British rule, he says, had " an unsavoury beginning and something of that bitter taste has clung to it ever since ".

That a terrible period of misgovernment (or rather *lack* of government) took place after Plassey is undeniable, but Macaulay is probably nearer the truth than Pandit Nehru when he attributes the famine to drought. The trouble was, as Macaulay says, that the Company's servants, who were grossly underpaid, " might still be called factors, junior merchants, senior merchants, but they were in truth proconsuls, propraetors, procurators of extensive regions ". Nor was this state of affairs remedied until the Crown was prepared to assume British sovereignty in the three Indian Presidencies, and was willing to accept the responsibilities of government accordingly. The Regulating Act of 1774, which appointed a Governor-General and nominated a Council of 31, closes the first chapter of British expansion in India on a more promising note.

But, Nehru says, " British accounts of India's history . . . are bitterly resented ", so let us leave the last word with him. " Looking back over this period " he writes " it almost seems that the British succeeded in dominating India by a succession of fortuitous circumstances and lucky flukes. With remarkably little effort, considering the

glittering prize, they won a great empire and enormous wealth, which helped to make them the leading power in the world. It seems easy for a slight turn in events to have taken place which would have dashed their hopes and ended their ambitions. They were defeated on many occasions—by Haider Ali and Tipu, by the Marathas, by the Sikhs, and by the Gurkhas. A little less of good fortune and they might have lost their foothold in India, or at the most held on to certain territories only.

"And yet a closer scrutiny reveals, in the circumstances then existing, a certain inevitability in what happened. Good fortune there certainly was, but there must be an ability to profit by good fortune. India was then in a fluid and disorganized state following the break-up of the Mogul Empire; for many centuries it had not been so weak and helpless. Organized power having broken down, the field was left open to adventurers and new claimants for dominion. Among these adventurers and claimants, the British, and the British alone at the time, possessed many of the qualities necessary for success. Their major disadvantage was that they were foreigners coming from a far country. Yet that very disadvantage worked in their favour, for no one took them very seriously or considered them as possible contestants for the sovereignty of India. It is extraordinary how this delusion lasted till long after Plassey, and their functioning in formal matters as the agents of the shadow Emperor at Delhi helped to further this false impression. The plunder that they carried away from Bengal and their peculiar methods of trade led to the belief that these foreigners were out for money and treasure and not so much for dominion; that they were a temporary though painful infliction, rather like Timur or Nadir Shah, who came and plundered and went back to his homelands."

Meanwhile what was happening in America? The expulsion of the French from Canada and the Spanish from Florida had relieved the colonists of two dangerous neighbours. But at the same time it had reduced their dependence upon the Mother Country. Their security had been ensured by British arms and British money, and so long as the danger had threatened they had been prepared to render assistance. But they did not see why they should be made to help defray the cost of the fighting once the war was over. Why should they be taxed by a parliament three thousand miles away in which they were not represented? Who could not see the dangerous nature of such a precedent? "But why shouldn't you?" was the inevitable, and not wholly unreasonable, British reply. "How can you expect Englishmen to foot a bill the benefit of which is not theirs?"

What were the causes of the War of American Independence? The immediate cause was the taxation deadlock, but the underlying causes were fundamental: the short-sightedness of the Old Colonial System, the essentially selfish nature of the Mercantilist mentality, the geographical difficulties involved in governing colonies so far distant from London and, not least, the intransigent nature of George III combined with the weakness of his ministers. In brief, it may be said that the war was due to the fact that Britain had not yet succeeded in solving the problem of how to reconcile the freedom of the part with the unity of the Empire as a whole. But let us ask H. A. L. Fisher to sum up the causes of the war for us; this extract comes from his *History of Europe*, one of the happiest history books ever written.

H. A. L. FISHER

THE WAR OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE

OF all the European settlements in the new world, the thirteen English colonies in North America enjoyed the largest measure of liberty. Though they were subject to the British Crown and Parliament, they were in effect allowed to manage their own affairs with little interference from Westminster, save in one particular. Imperial trade was subject to regulation conceived to be in the mutual interest of the mother country and its colonial daughters. "Economic planning" on the grand scale is never likely to be successful over a tract of time, and the old English colonial system furnishes a good example of the friction which may be generated by a well-meant endeavour to regulate the commercial and industrial life of scattered communities from a distant centre. The colonies were forbidden to start factories which might compete with the industries of the mother country. They were compelled to ship their exports in British or colonial vessels manned to the extent of two-thirds by British or colonial crews, and in respect of a long list of enumerated articles, including many of their staple products,

were constrained to discharge their cargoes in English ports. On the other hand, Englishmen were forbidden to smoke tobacco grown elsewhere than in America or Bermuda, and bounties were paid to the lumbermen of New England to encourage the industry in naval stores.

At the stage of economic development which had been reached by the English colonies at the beginning of George III's reign these regulations were not felt to be seriously burdensome. The time was not yet ripe for colonial factory development, and, so long as the colonists were prepared to allow the mother country to provide them with manufactured goods, it was no hardship to ship raw produce to English ports and to obtain in exchange the products of English factories.

There was, however, one restriction which caused the greatest irritation. If the piety of New England was founded on the Bible, its prosperity was not a little dependent on rum. The Molasses Act of 1733, by virtually prohibiting the importation of French-grown sugar, molasses, and rum, in the interests of the British plantations, struck a blow at the New England distilleries which, but for the enormous success of colonial smuggling, might have been sufficient in itself to produce a rupture. It is a singular reflection that had it not been for the activity of the bootleggers of the eighteenth century the primary impulsion which led to the foundation of the American republic might have been a restriction imposed by the port-drinking legislators at Westminster on the American trade in rum with the native Indians.

The rift came over direct taxation. The English have always quarrelled over money, and the English colonists in America (for the Irish element was then negligible) who resisted Grenville's stamp tax were faithful to the habits of their ancestors. On the old familiar fighting-ground, "No taxation without representation", they protested against an impost which, though small in itself, was large in relation to their parsimonious budgets. It was an English issue dividing men of English race on either side of the Atlantic. America

had its Tories or loyalists, England its Americans or Whigs. The three greatest British statesmen of the time, Chatham, Burke, and Fox, were opposed to the coercion of the colonies, and in their opinion supported by a substantial section of the British middle class. So domestic was the complexion of the quarrel in its early stages that officers of the king's army and navy could, without social stigma, resign their commissions rather than bear arms against their kith and kin across the ocean.

American historians now recognize that there was more substance in the English case than their predecessors had been generally willing to allow. The future of North America was not yet secure. There was always danger from the Indians. There might, given European complications, be a renewed attack from France and Spain. A colonial defence force, somehow provided, seemed to be a reasonable insurance against incalculable risks. Such a course the colonies, out of mutual jealousies, had hitherto been unable to finance, and there was no reason to think that an attempt which had failed in 1754, when the French danger was at its height, would succeed ten years later when the French had been decisively driven from the field. Was it, then, outrageous that the British Parliament in the exercise of its sovereign rights should impose a tax upon the colonists to be spent in the colonies upon an army exclusively designed for colonial defence?

The easy-going, pleasure-loving legislators of the British upper class, suddenly confronted with the strange problem of governing distant empires, were ill qualified to understand the rough democracy which across the Atlantic waste still cherished with fervour the ideals of the Cromwellian age. Even more serious, seeing that he had made himself master of Cabinet and Parliament, was the incomprehension of the king. In view of the violent outcry occasioned by Grenville's taxes, the most ordinary prudence counselled their abandonment and the surrender of any prospect of supplies from the colonies other than those which might be freely voted by the colonial assemblies. To George III, however, there was only one way

to deal with mutinous colonists, the way of force. He would make no concession on the point of principle. The withdrawal of the stamp tax in 1765 was flanked by a parliamentary declaration that Britain had full right to tax her colonies, and a number of trifling duties on glass, lead, paper, and tea imposed (1767) by Charles Townshend, more for the purpose of illustrating a principle than of bringing in a substantial revenue, fanned the flame of colonial discontent to fever height. Even when it was clearly shown that the new taxes cost far more to collect than they were worth and were fast driving Massachusetts to rebellion, the king declined to surrender the point of dogma. By a majority of one vote the Cabinet of Lord North, while abandoning the other Townshend taxes, decided to retain the duty upon tea. It would be difficult to conceive an act of greater folly. At the utmost the duty was estimated to yield £16,000 a year; and the ministry, in order to conciliate public opinion, had expressly declared (May 1769) that they did not propose to levy any further taxes upon America for the purpose of raising a revenue. The reply of the Americans was a war signal. On December 16, 1773, a body of men disguised as Mohawk Indians boarded three ships in Boston harbour and threw their whole cargo of tea into the water. The British Cabinet retaliated by closing the port of Boston, by remodelling the Charter of Massachusetts, and by an act enabling prisoners indicted on capital charges in that state to be sent for trial, should it appear that they could not be fairly tried in the province, to some other colony or to Great Britain.

The colonies rallied round Massachusetts in its resistance to these punitive measures. A solemn League and Covenant was formed binding the subscribers to abstain from commercial intercourse with Great Britain until their hated orders had been repealed. On September 5, 1774, delegates of twelve States met in Congress in Philadelphia to concert measures of resistance against the British Crown. Each side speculated upon the weakness and division of the other.

The British conduct of the war was no less unfortunate than the policy which had made war inevitable. There was in the colonies an important body of opinion actively favourable to the maintenance of the British connexion, while an even greater number of colonists were indifferent or uncertain. To conciliate these friendly or wavering colonial minds, to respect the property of every friendly American, and wherever possible to enlist the help of American loyalists in the tasks of civil government should have been a prime object of British policy. Nothing of the kind was done. While the Indians, whose support had most unhappily been invoked by the British, alienated every frontiersman with their excesses, the army of Lord Howe, largely composed of Hessians and Hanoverians, pillaged indifferently the houses of friend and foe. It is a sufficient commentary upon their deplorable conduct that during the whole course of the war no more than 2500 loyalist volunteers were enlisted in the British ranks.

Nevertheless, had not France and Spain entered the lists on the American side, the colonists might have lost the war. Even the genius of George Washington, by far the greatest man on either side, was unable to protect the American revolution from a series of crushing defeats. Long Island, Trenton, Brandywine were black days in the military annals of the " Sons of Liberty ". There is nothing wonderful here. The American state was in the making. In Philadelphia, the capital of the young federation, where everything was raw and experimental, and state sense, state loyalty, and state cohesion had still to be created, the civilians could give no lessons to the soldiers. It was Washington, and he alone, who, in the camp of Valley Forge, amid the dire hardships of a bitter winter, brought back a severely shaken and ill-provisioned army to a sense of disciplined efficiency and once more made of it an instrument of victory. So little was the revolution the work of a convinced and united people that at no time in the war did the army of Washington exceed twenty thousand men.

On October 17, 1777, an English army under General Burgoyne, advancing southwards on New York, was forced to capitulate at Saratoga. Stirred by this thunderclap, which sounded round the world, monarchical France, in a wild mood of jealousy, revenge, and enthusiasm, entered on a war for the establishment of an American republic. . . .

The fact that the emancipation of the American colonies was effected with the help of France and Spain made an enormous difference to the sentiment with which the struggle was regarded on either side of the Atlantic. The American war ceased to be a domestic and became an international quarrel. The colonists had appealed to the foreign enemies of England and secured their help. The colonial revolt, originally regarded as a small domestic quarrel, had widened out into a formidable coalition which taxed the resources of Great Britain in every quarter of the globe. . . . Chatham was not the only British friend of the American cause who, when the aid of foreign powers was invoked by the insurgents, felt with a passionate intensity that henceforth there could be no word of surrender.

War is the parent of illusions. The French idealized without understanding the liberty and equality of a slave-owning republic. The Americans regarded the French, from whom they were widely separated in all fundamental points of character and temperament, as paladins of chivalry nearer to them and more congenial than the cross-grained English from whom the colonists had derived their race, their language, their literature, and their constitution. Another illusion was fraught with graver consequences. The defeat of England in the colonial war engendered a general belief that the history of the English was wound up.

The tragedy of this conflict lay not so much in the separation of the American colonies—for this was almost certainly inevitable sooner or later—but in the way in which it was achieved. The war bred a lot of

ill-feeling, feeling which flared up, to the discomfiture of both sides, throughout the nineteenth century and which, even now, has not been wholly resolved. Britain has had few more persistent critics of her colonial policy than the United States.

But, if there was ill-feeling, a good deal of sympathy for the other side was shown on both Atlantic shores as well. In America, it is estimated that no less than 60,000 United Empire Loyalists went into exile during the years 1775 to 1787; in England, Chatham, Burke, and Fox voiced the opinions of an untold number of Englishmen who sympathized with the American cause. Readers of our volume on *Western Civilization* will remember Burke's passionate protest against the treatment of the colonists. Chatham agreed with Burke on most points, but he was desperately anxious to maintain the allegiance of the colonies to the Crown. *How did Chatham try to preserve the first British Empire?*

EARL OF CHATHAM

CONCILIATION WITH THE AMERICAN COLONIES

I RISE, my lords, to declare my sentiments on this most solemn and serious subject. It has imposed a load upon my mind which, I fear, nothing can remove, but which impels me to endeavour its alleviation by a free and unreserved communication of my sentiments. . . .

You cannot, I venture to say it, you cannot conquer America. Your armies in the last war effected everything that could be effected, and what was it? It cost a numerous army, under the command of a most able general, now a noble lord in this House, a long, laborious campaign to expel 5000 Frenchmen from French America. My lords, you cannot conquer America. What is your present situation there? We do not know the worst; but we know that in three campaigns we have done nothing and suffered much. Besides the sufferings, perhaps total loss, of the Northern force, the best appointed army that ever took the field, commanded by Sir William

Howe, has retired from the American lines. He was obliged to relinquish his attempt and with great delay and danger to adopt a new and distant plan of operation. We shall soon know, and in any event have reason to lament, what may have happened since. As to conquest, therefore, my lords, I repeat it is impossible.

You may swell every expense and every effort still more extravagantly; pile and accumulate every assistance you can buy or borrow; traffic and barter with every little pitiful German prince that sells and sends his subjects to the shambles of a foreign prince; your efforts are for ever vain and impotent: doubly so from this mercenary aid on which you rely. For it irritates to an incurable resentment the minds of your enemies—to overrun them with the mercenary sons of rapine and plunder; devoting them and their possessions to the rapacity of hired cruelty! If I were an American, as I am an Englishman, while a foreign troop was landed in my country I never would lay down my arms—never—never—never!

Your own army is infected with the contagion of these illiberal allies. The spirit of plunder and of rapine is gone forth among them. I know it, and notwithstanding what the noble earl, who moved the address, has given as his opinion of our American army, I know from authentic information, and the most experienced officers, that our discipline is deeply wounded. Whilst this is notoriously our sinking situation, America grows and flourishes; whilst our strength and discipline are lowered, hers are rising and improving.

But, my lords, who is the man that in addition to these disgraces and mischiefs of our army has dared to authorize and associate to our arms the tomahawk and scalping-knife of the savage, to call into civilized alliance the wild and inhuman savage of the woods; to delegate to the merciless Indian the defence of disputed rights, and to wage the horrors of his barbarous war against our brethren? My lords, these enormities cry aloud for redress and punishment. Unless

thoroughly done away, it will be a stain on the national character. It is a violation of the constitution. I believe it is against law. It is not the least of our national misfortunes, that the strength and character of our army are thus impaired. Infected with the mercenary spirit of robbery and rapine, familiarized with the horrid scenes of savage cruelty, it can no longer boast of the noble and generous principles which dignify a soldier ; no longer sympathize with the dignity of the royal banner nor feel the pride, pomp, and circumstance of glorious war, " that make ambition virtue ! " What makes ambition virtue ?—the sense of honour. But is the sense of honour consistent with a spirit of plunder or the practice of murder ? Can it flow from mercenary motives, or can it prompt to cruel deeds ? Beside these murderers and plunderers, let me ask our ministers, What other allies have they acquired ? What other powers have they associated to their cause ? Have they entered into an alliance with the king of the gypsies ? Nothing, my lords, is too low or too ludicrous to be consistent with their counsels.

The independent views of America have been stated and asserted as the foundation of this address. My lords, no man wishes for the due dependence of America on this country more than I do. To preserve it and not confirm that state of independence into which your measures hitherto have driven them is the object which we ought to unite in attaining. The Americans contending for their rights against arbitrary exactions I love and admire. It is the struggle of free and virtuous patriots ; but contending for independency and total disconnexion from England, as an Englishman, I cannot wish them success.

For, in a due constitutional dependency, including the ancient supremacy of this country in regulating their commerce and navigation, consists the mutual happiness and prosperity both of England and America. She derived assistance and protection from us ; and we reaped from her the most important advantages. She was indeed the fountain of our

wealth, the nerve of our strength, the nursery and basis of our naval power.

It is our duty, therefore, my lords, if we wish to save our country, most seriously to endeavour the recovery of these most beneficial subjects ; and in this perilous crisis, perhaps the present moment may be the only one in which we can hope for success. For in their negotiations with France they have, or think they have, reason to complain : though it be notorious that they have received from that power important supplies and assistance of various kinds, yet it is certain they expected it in a more decisive and immediate degree.

America is in ill humour with France on some points that have not entirely answered her expectations. Let us wisely take advantage of every possible moment of reconciliation. Besides, the natural disposition of America herself still leans towards England ; to the old habits of connexion and mutual interest that united both countries. This was the established sentiment of all the continent ; and still, my lords, in the great and principal part, the sound part of America, the wise and affectionate disposition prevails ; and there is a very considerable part of America yet sound—the middle and the southern provinces. Some parts may be factious and blind to their true interests ; but if we express a wise and benevolent disposition to communicate with them those immutable rights of Nature, and those constitutional liberties to which they are equally entitled with ourselves ; by a conduct so just and humane we shall confirm the favourable and conciliate the adverse. I say, my lords, the rights and liberties to which they are equally entitled with ourselves but no more.

I would participate to them every enjoyment and freedom which the colonizing subjects of a free State can possess, or wish to possess, and I do not see why they should not enjoy every fundamental right in their property, and every original substantial liberty, which Devonshire or Surrey, or the county I live in, or any other county in England, can claim ; reserving always, as the sacred right of the mother country, the

due constitutional dependency of the colonies. The inherent supremacy of the State in regulating and protecting the navigation and commerce of all her subjects is necessary for the mutual benefit and preservation of every part, to constitute and preserve the prosperous arrangement of the whole empire.

The sound parts of America, of which I have spoken, must be sensible to these great truths and of their real interests. America is not in that state of desperate and contemptible rebellion which this country has been deluded to believe. It is not a wild and lawless banditti, who, having nothing to lose, might hope to snatch something from public convulsions. Many of their leaders and great men have a great stake in this great contest. The gentleman who conducts their armies, I am told, has an estate of £4000 or £5000 a year, and when I consider these things I cannot but lament the inconsiderate violence of our penal acts, our declarations of treason and rebellion, with all the fatal effects of attainder and confiscation.

As to the disposition of foreign powers, which is asserted to be pacific and friendly, let us judge, my lords, rather by their actions and the nature of things, than by interested assertions. The uniform assistance supplied to America by France suggests a different conclusion. The most important interests of France, in aggrandizing and enriching herself with what she most wants, supplies of every naval store from America, must inspire her with different sentiments. The extraordinary preparations of the house of Bourbon, by land and by sea, from Dunkirk to the Straits, equally ready and willing to overwhelm these defenceless islands, should rouse us to a sense of their real disposition, and our own danger. Not 5000 troops in England !—hardly 3000 in Ireland ! What can we oppose to the combined force of our enemies ? Scarcely twenty ships of the line fully or sufficiently manned, that any admiral's reputation would permit him to take the command of. The river of Lisbon in the possession of our enemies ! The seas swept by American privateers ! Our Channel trade torn to pieces by them ! In this complicated crisis of danger, weak-

ness at home and calamity abroad, terrified and insulted by the neighbouring powers, unable to act in America, or acting only to be destroyed, where is the man with the forehead to promise or hope for success in such a situation or from perseverance in the measures that have driven us to it? Who has the forehead to do so? Where is that man? I should be glad to see his face.

You cannot conciliate America by your present measures. You cannot subdue her by your present, or by any measures. What, then, can you do? You cannot conquer; you cannot gain; but you can address; you can lull the fears and anxieties of the moment into an ignorance of the danger that should produce them. But, my lords, the time demands the language of truth. We must not now apply the flattering unction of servile compliance or blind complaisance. In a just and necessary war to maintain the rights or honour of my country, I would strip the shirt from my back to support it. But in such a war as this, unjust in its principle, impracticable in its means, and ruinous in its consequences, I would not contribute a single effort, nor a single shilling. I do not call for vengeance on the heads of those who have been guilty; I only recommend to them to make their retreat. Let them walk off; and let them make haste, or they may be assured that speedy and condign punishment will overtake them.

My lords, I have submitted to you, with the freedom and truth which I think my duty, my sentiments on your present awful situation. I have laid before you the ruin of your power, the disgrace of your reputation, the pollution of your discipline, the contamination of your morals, the complication of calamities, foreign and domestic, that overwhelm your sinking country. Your dearest interests, your own liberties, the constitution itself, totters to the foundation. All this disgraceful danger, this multitude of misery, is the monstrous offspring of this unnatural war. We have been deceived and deluded too long. Let us now stop short. This is the crisis—the only crisis of time and situation, to give us a possibility of escape from

the fatal effects of our delusions. But if, in an obstinate and infatuated perseverance in folly, we slavishly echo the peremptory words this day presented to us, nothing can save this devoted country from complete and final ruin. We madly rush into multiplied miseries and " confusion worse confounded ".

Is it possible, can it be believed, that ministers are yet blind to this impending destruction ? I did hope that instead of this false and empty vanity, this overweening pride, engendering high conceits and presumptuous imaginations, that ministers would have humbled themselves in their errors, would have confessed and retracted them, and by an active, though a late repentance, have endeavoured to redeem them. But, my lords, since they had neither sagacity to foresee, nor justice nor humanity to shun, these oppressive calamities, since not even severe experience can make them feel, nor the imminent ruin of their country awaken them from their stupefaction, the guardian care of Parliament must interpose.

I shall therefore, my lords, propose to you an amendment to the address to his Majesty, to be inserted immediately after the first two paragraphs of congratulation on the birth of a princess, to recommend an immediate cessation of hostilities and the commencement of a treaty to restore peace and liberty to America, strength and happiness to England, security and permanent prosperity to both countries. This, my lords, is yet in our power ; and let not the wisdom and justice of your lordships neglect the happy and perhaps the only opportunity. By the establishment of irrevocable law, founded on mutual rights, and ascertained by treaty, these glorious enjoyments may be firmly perpetuated. And let me repeat to your lordships, that the strong bias of America, at least of the wise and sounder parts of it, naturally inclines to this happy and constitutional reconnexion with you. Notwithstanding the temporary intrigues with France, we may still be assured of their ancient and confirmed partiality o us. America and

France cannot be congenial. There is something decisive and confirmed in the honest American that will not assimilate to the futility and levity of Frenchmen.

My lords, to encourage and confirm that innate inclination to this country, founded on every principle of affection, as well as a consideration of interest; to restore that favourable disposition into a permanent and powerful reunion with this country; to revive the mutual strength of the empire; again to awe the house of Bourbon, instead of meanly truckling, as our present calamities compel us, to every insult of French caprice and Spanish punctilio; to re-establish our commerce; to reassert our rights and our honour; to confirm our interests, and renew our glories for ever, a consummation most devoutly to be endeavoured! and which, I trust, may yet arise from reconciliation with America; I have the honour of submitting to you the following amendment, which I move to be inserted after the first two paragraphs of the address:

> "And that this house does most humbly advise and supplicate his Majesty, to be pleased to cause the most speedy and effectual measures to be taken for restoring peace in America: and that no time may be lost in proposing an immediate cessation of hostilities there, in order to the opening of a treaty for the final settlement of the tranquillity of these invaluable provinces, by a removal of the unhappy causes of this ruinous civil war; and by a just and adequate security against the return of the like calamities in times to come. And this house desires to offer the most dutiful assurances to his Majesty, that it will in due time, cheerfully co-operate with the magnanimity and tender goodness of his Majesty, for the preservation of his people, by such explicit and most solemn declarations, and provisions of fundamental and irrevocable laws, as may be judged necessary for the ascertaining and fixing for ever the respective rights of Great Britain and her colonies."

Six months later Chatham was dead and it was left to his celebrated son, William Pitt, to apply, if he could, the lessons of the American Revolution. Chatham himself never understood the real state of feeling in America. He imagined that the colonies might be brought back to their former allegiance to the British Government, and he had no wish to see the extensive dominion of Old England rent in twain and the independence of America realized. Englishmen, for all their political sagacity, had not yet learnt the principle of Commonwealth. The inevitable result, then, was the loss of an Empire.

Although peace was not ratified with America until 1783, the war virtually came to an end with the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown in 1781. It seemed at first as though the shock of defeat might produce changes in British colonial policy, and certainly Pitt showed that he had a better understanding of what was wanted than his father, but, as Seeley put it in one of his famous lectures on the expansion of England, "We had not learnt from experience wisdom, but only despair. We saw that under that system [the Old Colonial system] we could not permanently keep our colonies, but, instead of inferring that the system must be changed, we only inferred that sooner or later the colonies must be lost." In spite of the Canada Act of 1791, in spite of the new empire which was arising in the East, Englishmen had little faith in their future as colonizers; despair and disillusionment gave way to indifference. What, men asked, is the good of colonies? And it was not until well into the nineteenth century that this mood was shaken off and the lessons of defeat began to be applied. *Why did Britain's first Empire end in disaster?* It was from a proper understanding of the answer that the principle of Commonwealth was evolved.

SIR J. R. SEELEY

THE OLD COLONIAL SYSTEM

WHAT is the good of colonies? That question implies that we think of a colony, not as part of our state, but as a possession belonging to it. For we should think it absurd to raise such a question about a recognized part of the body politic. Whoever thought of inquiring whether Kent or Cornwall rendered any sufficient return for the money which we

lay out upon them, whether those counties were worth keeping? The tie that holds together the parts of a nation-state is of another kind; it is not composed of considerations of profit and loss, but is analogous to the family bond. The same tie would hold a nation to its colonies, if colonies were regarded as simply an extension of the nation. If Greater Britain in the full sense of the phrase really existed, Canada and Australia would be to us as Kent and Cornwall. But if once we cease to regard a colony in this way, if we consider that the emigrants, who have gone forth from us, have ceased to belong to our community, then we must form some other conception of their relation to us.

And this must either be the old Greek conception which treats them as grown-up children who have married and settled at a distance, so that the family bond has dissolved away by the mere necessity of circumstances, or if the connexion is maintained as the modern states insisted on maintaining it, it must change its character. It must rest on interest. The question must be asked, What is the good of the colony? and it must be answered by some proof that the colony, considered as a piece of property, or as an investment of public money, pays.

Now this may be a very good basis for the union of two countries, provided the benefit received from the union is mutual. In this case it constitutes a federation, and there are many instances in which, without any tie of kindred, countries have been held together in such a union simply by the sense of a common interest. Such would be the case of our own Empire, if not only we ourselves felt that our colonies paid—that is, that we reaped some advantage from them we should cease to reap if they became independent—but also the colonies felt that the mother country paid, and that they gained something by the connexion with it. And in the present day it is quite easy to imagine such a sense of common interest existing between us and even the remotest of our colonies, because in the present day distance has been almost

abolished by steam and electricity. But in the first ages after the discovery of the New World such a common interest was less possible. The Atlantic Ocean was then, for practical purposes, a far deeper and wider gulf, across which any reciprocal exchange of services could not easily take place. And so the old colonial system in general had not the character of an equal federation.

It is the custom to describe the old colonies as sacrificed to the mother country. We must be careful not to admit that statement without qualification. It is supposed, for instance, that the revolt of our own American colonies was provoked by the selfish treatment of the mother country, which shackled their trade without rendering them any benefit in return for these restraints. This is far from being true. Between England and the American colonies there was a real interchange of services. England gave defence in return for trade privileges. In the middle of the eighteenth century, at the time when the American quarrel began, it was perhaps rather the colonies than the mother country that had fallen into arrear. We had been involved in two great wars mainly by our colonies, and the final breach was provoked not so much by the pressure of England upon the colonies as by that of the colonies upon England. If we imposed taxes upon them, it was to meet the debt which we had incurred in their behalf, and we saw with not unnatural bitterness that we had ourselves enabled our colonies to do without us, by destroying, for their interest, the French power in North America.

Still it was true of the old colonial system in general that it placed the colony in the position, not so much of a state in federation, as of a conquered state. Some theory of the kind is evidently implied in the language which is commonly used. We speak of the colonial *possessions* of England or of Spain. Now in what sense can one population be spoken of as the possession of another population? The expression almost seems to imply slavery, and at any rate it is utterly inappropriate if it merely means that the one population is subject

to the same government as the other. At the bottom of it certainly was the idea that the colony was an estate which was to be worked for the benefit of the mother country.

The relation of Spain to its colonies had become a type which other states kept before their eyes. A native population reduced to serfdom, in some parts reduced to compulsory labour by *caciques* turned into state officials, in other parts exterminated by overwork and then replaced by negroes, an imperious mother country drawing from the colony a steady revenue, and ruling it through an artful mechanism of division, by which the settlers were held in check by the priesthood and by a serf-population treated paternally that it might be available for that purpose: such was the typical colonial system. It was wholly unfit to be a model to such a colony as New England, which paid no revenue, where there were neither subject Indians nor mines of gold and silver. Nevertheless, governments could not afford to forget the precedent of profitable colonies, and I find Charles II appealing to it in 1663. It became an established principle that a colony was a possession.

Now it is essentially barbaric that one community should be treated as the property of another and the fruits of its industry confiscated, not in return for benefits conferred, but by some absolute right whether of conquest or otherwise. Even where such a relation rests avowedly upon conquest, it is too immoral to last long, except in a barbarous state of manners. . . .

It is barbaric to apply such a theory to colonies, for it is to treat one's own countrymen, those with whom we have no concern at all except on the ground of kindred, as if they were conquered enemies, or rather in a way in which a civilized nation cannot treat even conquered enemies. And probably even in the old colonial system such a theory was not consciously and deliberately adopted. But since in the sixteenth century there was no scruple in applying it to conquered dependencies, and since the colonies of Spain were in a

certain sense conquered dependencies, we can understand that unconsciously, unintentionally, the barbaric principle crept into her colonial system, and that it lurked there and poisoned it in later times. We can understand, too, how the example of Spain and the precedents set by her influenced the other European states, Holland, France, and England, which entered the career of colonization a century later.

In the case of some of these states, for example France, the result of this theory was that the mother country exercised an iron authority over her colonies. In Canada the French settlers were subject to a multitude of rigid regulations, from which they would have been free if they had remained in France. Nothing of the kind certainly can be said of the English colonies. They were subject to certain fixed restrictions in the matter of trade, but apart from these they were absolutely free. Carrying their nationality with them, they claimed everywhere the rights of Englishmen. It has been observed that the old colonial system admitted no such thing as the modern Crown Colony, in which Englishmen are governed administratively without representative assemblies. In the old system assemblies were not formally instituted, but grew up of themselves, because it was the nature of Englishmen to assemble. Thus the old historian of the colonies, Hutchinson, writes under the year 1619, " This year a House of Burgesses *broke out* in Virginia ". And assuredly the Home Government in those times did not sin by too much interference. So completely were the colonies left to themselves that some of them, especially those of New England, were from the very beginning for most practical purposes independent states. As early as 1665, only forty years after the first settlement and a hundred years before the Declaration of Independence, I find that Massachusetts did not regard itself as practically subject to England. " They say " writes a Commissioner " that so long as they pay the fifth of all gold and silver, according to the terms of the Charter, they are not obliged to the King but by civility."

Thus our old colonial system was not practically at all tyrannous, and, when the breach came, the grievances of which the Americans complained, though perfectly real, were smaller than ever before or since led to such mighty consequences. The misfortune of that system was not that it interfered too much, but that such interference as it admitted was of an invidious kind. It claimed very little, but what it did claim was unjust. It gave unbounded liberty except in one department, namely trade, and in that department it interfered to fine the colonists for the benefit of the home traders.

Now this was to put the mother country in a false position. It put her forward as claiming to treat the colonies as a possession, as an estate to be worked for the benefit of those Englishmen who remained at home. No claim could be more invidious. If it was not quite the claim that a master makes upon a slave, it was at least similar to that which an absentee landlord makes upon tenants in whom he takes no further interest, and yet even the absentee landlord, if he gives nothing else, does at least give the use of land which was really his own. But what—a Massachusetts colonist might say—has England given to us that she should have a perpetual mortgage on our industry? The Charter of James I allowed us the use of lands which James I never saw and which did not belong to him—lands too which, without any Charter, we might perhaps have occupied for ourselves without opposition.

Thus this old system was an irrational jumble of two opposite conceptions. It claimed to rule the colonists because they were Englishmen and brothers, and yet it ruled them as if they were conquered Indians. And again while it treated them as conquered people, it gave them so much liberty that they could easily rebel.

It is not very difficult perhaps to understand how the English, after once adopting this strange hybrid conception of colonies, may have retained it, and may never have seen their way to a better conception. In the then condition of the

world, if the English had thought of reforming their colonial system, their most natural course would have been to cast off the colonies altogether. For the analogy of grown-up sons and daughters applies very properly to the case of colonies when they are so remote from the mother country that they have come to have wholly different interests. All practical union, and therefore all authority on the part of the mother country, fall into abeyance in these circumstances, and the Greek system is then most appropriate, which gives complete independence to the colony, but binds it in perpetual alliance.

Now in the seventeenth century our colonies were, at least in ordinary times, practically too remote for union. This is so true that the difficulty is rather to understand how the secession of New England can have been delayed so long ; but I imagine the retarding cause was the growth of the French power in North America towards the end of the seventeenth century. After the great colonial struggle of France and England had fairly begun, the colonies were drawn somewhat nearer to us than before, and we can imagine that if Canada had not been conquered from the French in 1759, and if the struggle with France instead of coming to an end had grown more intense, the colonies would have issued no Declaration of Independence, and our connexion with them might have been put on a better footing instead of being dissolved. As it was, the need of union was at first not felt ; it was then felt strongly for a time, and then, by a sudden deliverance, all pressure was removed, so that the thought of a reformed colonial system gave way at once to the dream of independence.

In these circumstances the old colonial system would naturally be retained as long as possible by the mother country, because it was dangerous to touch it, because the least alteration would snap the tie that held the colonies altogether. The invidious rights were doggedly maintained simply because they existed, and because no alteration for the better was thought possible.

BOOK II

THE SECOND BRITISH EMPIRE

RAMSAY MUIR

THE SECOND BRITISH EMPIRE

AFTER the American Revolution, the continental peoples of Europe abandoned the ambitions of overseas empire. They had come to the conclusion that colonies were not worth the cost and trouble of founding and nurturing them. " Colonies are like fruits ", said Turgot : " they cling to the mother tree only until they are ripe." Moreover, Europe was soon to be plunged into the turmoil of the French Revolutionary wars, followed by the series of revolutions which filled the first half of the nineteenth century, and by the wars of nationality which occupied the years from 1850 to 1880.

During this century of European preoccupation, two remarkable developments took place. In the first place, the thirteen American colonies grew into a mighty domain, stretching from ocean to ocean. They purchased Louisiana and its French inhabitants from Napoleon. They conquered a vast region from Mexico. And an endless stream of pioneers poured out over the almost empty plains and across the mountains to the distant shores of the Pacific. It cannot be said that, in this remarkable achievement, much tenderness was shown for the rights of the aboriginal inhabitants. Not only in their dealings with the Red Indians, but in their dealings with the Negro population, who did not gain their freedom until 1865, the United States were not exempt from the difficulties which have faced other peoples in their relations with backward peoples. Nevertheless, the conquest of this vast and rich territory was a tremendous achievement.

In the second place, Britain, already the unchallenged mistress of the seas, was left without a rival in the colonial sphere. Although she shared the prevalent view that colonies were not worth acquiring, and shrank, with a burdened exchequer, from assuming new responsibilities, she nevertheless acquired during this century of uncontested expansion

a vast new empire, the Second British Empire. It was an empire of continents and sub-continents, India, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, linked together by innumerable islands and calling-stations, such as Malta, Aden, St. Helena, Mauritius, Singapore, and Hong Kong.

It may seem incredible, but it is true, that this gigantic empire was not acquired by deliberate design, or a consistently pursued ambition. It was almost the result of a series of accidents. In Seeley's phrase, it was acquired "in a fit of absence of mind". What is more, its acquisition did not involve serious warfare, after 1763, except in India.

The character of the Second British Empire was determined mainly by certain developments in the home country.

The first of these was the great religious and humanitarian movement, which began with the preaching of the Wesleys in the middle of the eighteenth century, and dominated the life and thought of the British people throughout this period. In particular, this movement brought about a transformation in the British attitude towards the backward peoples, which had a profound effect upon the development of the empire.

The first sign of this new spirit was afforded in 1763, when, having acquired from France the whole of the vast plains between the Alleghanies and the Mississippi, Britain laid it down that no purchases of land from the Indians should be valid unless they were concluded in the presence of a Government officer. Designed for the protection of the Indians against fraud, this ordinance was very unpopular among the colonists, and was one of the minor contributory causes of their revolt.

Then came, in 1772, a remarkable judgment by the Chief Justice of the King's Bench, Lord Mansfield, which declared that slavery was an institution so abominable that it could only exist where it was upheld by positive law; and that, as there was no such law in England, a man could not be a slave on English soil. This judgment would have been unthinkable at any earlier date; it could only have been made in a country

where the tide of opinion was turning strongly against slavery. It preceded by some years the noble assertion of the American Declaration of Independence, that all men are born free and equal; but slavery, being supported by "positive law", continued to exist in the United States for nearly a century.

In 1787 a group of Evangelicals and Quakers started in England an agitation for the prohibition of the slave-trade. In only twenty years, such was the power of the humanitarian movement, they succeeded in persuading the British people and Parliament to destroy the most lucrative line of trade then existing; and the slave-trade was prohibited in 1807. Thenceforward the British Government laboured, in international conferences and otherwise, to persuade other Governments to join in this crusade; and the British navy was employed to put a stop to the slave-trade on all the seas of the world, at a cost which has been estimated at £50,000,000.

The religious movement also led, in the last years of the eighteenth century and the first years of the nineteenth, to an extraordinary outburst of missionary activity; the Protestants, unlike the Catholics, had hitherto shown little interest in the conversion of the heathen. Soon an army of missionaries, supported by the contributions of churchgoers, were at work in India, in China, in Africa, in the isles of the Pacific, and among the slaves in the West Indian and other colonies. The reports of these missionaries, sent home to their supporters, created a new sympathy for the backward peoples; and as, during this period, politicians dared not disregard the opinion of the churches, the result was a change in colonial policy of momentous importance.

The first, and the most remarkable, effect of this change of attitude, was that in 1833 the British Parliament—still burdened by the load of debt left by the Napoleonic Wars—voted the great sum (for those days) of £20,000,000 to purchase the freedom of every slave in the British Empire. This enforced emancipation almost ruined the West Indies, and aroused bitter resentment in South Africa. But it brought to

an end a shameful evil—a generation before the same result was achieved in America at the cost of a terrible civil war.

The emancipation of the slaves was not the only result of the missionary movement. The missionaries, working amid barbarism, were eager to see their flocks brought under civilized administration, and protected against the often unscrupulous exploitation of traders. Chieftains and tribes, in Africa and the Pacific, having learnt to regard Britain as the representative of justice and civilization, often petitioned to be brought under British protection; and although these petitions were almost always refused, because the British Government shrank from adding to its colossal responsibility, the pressure towards the expansion of imperial dominion was unceasing.

A second great change which was taking place in Britain, and which had an immense effect in bringing about the expansion of the empire, was the growth of the industrial revolution. For two generations Britain enjoyed almost a monopoly of the new methods of machine-production. These gave to her an inexhaustible supply of cheap goods, which found ready markets in every part of the world, among primitive as well as among civilized peoples. British shipping grew by leaps and bounds, until it exceeded in volume the shipping of the rest of the world; British ships were to be seen on every sea and in every harbour, and British traders were active in every land. They wanted civilized government to make their markets secure. Here was another source of pressure towards the expansion of the empire.

In yet another way the industrial revolution facilitated the growth of the empire. It led to an extremely rapid increase of population. Population seemed to be growing more rapidly than the means of subsistence, and outlets had to be found for the surplus. It was found in emigration on a vast scale. Many of the emigrants turned towards the United States, and made possible the rapid settlement of the West. But many were provided for by schemes of assisted emigration to British

territories, and by "systematic colonization" on the lines worked out by Edward Gibbon Wakefield and the "Radical Imperialists" of the 1830's. The settlement of British emigrants in Canada and South Africa, and still more in the antipodean regions of Australia and New Zealand, where, without these schemes, the obstacle of distance could scarcely have been overcome, was largely due to this movement.

Finally, when in 1846 Britain (in her own interests) adopted the policy of Free Trade, and threw open her markets to the whole world, she pursued the same methods in all her dependencies. This meant that the other trading nations had no serious grievance against the extension of her empire, for every territory she acquired was a territory brought under civilized government and thrown open to their trade. It implied also that the other European nations were permitted and even invited to co-operate in the development of these vast lands, to send settlers who would be able to live in freedom, and to increase the traffic of these lands with the rest of the world.

The factors in imperial growth which we have hitherto mentioned—the missionary and humanitarian movements, the industrial revolution, the outflowing of surplus population, and the free admission of men, goods and capital from all countries—showed their main effects in the nineteenth century. But, earlier than this, the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon had given an immense stimulus to imperial expansion.

Napoleon's dreams of Empire in India, and the combination of Indian States against Britain which his agents organized, forced on the establishment of British supremacy in India, in spite of the unwillingness of the home authorities. And when Holland passed under the dominion of Napoleon, her oversea possessions were exposed to attack by the British navy. During the war, Britain occupied Java, Ceylon, and Cape Colony—then a modest settlement; she kept Ceylon, as a natural appendage of India; as for South Africa—a vital calling station on the way to India—it was retained, but financial arrangements were made with Holland which

practically amounted to the payment of £6,000,000 for that colony and for British Guiana. This is one of the very rare examples of a victor paying the vanquished for his conquest.

We have set forth the main reasons which explain the amazing creation of the Second British Empire during a single century. But it is necessary to look at this astonishing achievement a little more closely.

After the American Revolution, the more far-sighted British statesmen, such as Pitt and Fox (and, later, Durham and Elgin) were faced with the problem of preventing the surviving colonies from following the example of the lost thirteen. The problem was complicated by the fact that Britain itself was in a state of political evolution. Its government was still decidedly " aristocratic ", but democratic ideas were beginning to circulate, with a popularity which increased rapidly until the excesses of the French Revolution produced a long period of reaction. The Americans had given themselves a much more democratic constitution than anything England could show, and the effect of this, if it succeeded, was bound to be very great on other colonies and especially on Canada.

How did American Independence affect Canada? Some years ago Sir Reginald Coupland devoted his " George Watson " lectures to a study of the influence of the American Revolution on the British Empire, and the following answer is taken from the book which he made out of these lectures. Considerations of space unfortunately necessitate the summarizing of some parts of his argument. It must be remembered that, although England had had " representative government " of a sort ever since the calling of the first parliament, the further step towards true liberty of " responsible government "—aptly described by H. A. L. Fisher as " government by a Cabinet responsible to a Parliament which is in turn responsible to the electorate " was only an eighteenth-century achievement. It had been established, in principle, by Sir Robert Walpole under the first two Hanoverian kings. It had been enjoyed for only a short time, and there was naturally great opposition among the more conservative politicians to the granting of such self-government to politically immature colonies.

SIR REGINALD COUPLAND

INFLUENCE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION ON BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY

IF the Second Empire was not to repeat the failure of the First, two things were needed. First, a full recognition of *equality in principle* between the colonists and their kinsmen at home. Second, a progressive policy which conceded so much *equality in practice*, stage by stage, as the colonists in their growing and ripening communities required and desired. This does not mean that British statesmen could be expected at the outset or at most of the subsequent stages—either in 1791, or in 1839, or in 1849, or in 1859, or in 1867—to foresee the development of inter-imperial relations to its end, to follow a calculated track, to devise (so to speak) a time-table of concession. That has never been, for good or ill, the British method. The essential requirement of a progressive policy was a recognition of the fact that the political organization of the Empire was not static but dynamic, that any particular concession at any particular stage was not the last but inevitably led on to the next, and that the process of development could not be halted just because nobody knew where it would end or because somebody thought he knew and did not like it.

The statesmen of the First Empire did not recognize even the first of those two needs. Mercantilism had blinded them. Though the colonists, taking with them across the Atlantic their heritage of English freedom, had begun their new political life with the same system of self-government as England had begun it, and were steadily developing it along the same lines as England had developed it, yet it does not seem to have occurred to the men who made and lost the War of Independence that the "rebels" were in principle their equals. Still less, therefore, could they think of putting the principle into practice. All that was needed, they supposed, was to reaffirm and reinforce imperial control and colonial

" dependency ". And even Chatham and Burke, though they did recognize and loudly proclaimed the principle, took more or less the static view of its application. There would have been no trouble, they declared, if Britain had not tried to tax the colonies. There never would be any, if she would restore just that measure of control and dependency which had been in force before the Stamp Act. Deeper insight was only shown by Adam Smith, and his concrete proposals were impracticable. From nothing less, perhaps, than a Revolution could the lesson have been learned. . . .

[But there was no haste to learn, even from the Revolution. It is often said that the statesmen before Durham had learnt nothing at all from the American secession, but this is hardly true. Fox, for example, saw clearly enough that " the only means of retaining distant colonies with advantage is to enable them to govern themselves ". The trouble was that other statesmen who agreed with this also felt even more strongly that, in Lord Chancellor Thurlow's words, " If political liberty, which is the governing principle of our constitution, be established in a colony, the sovereignty . . . will also be established there, and consequently independence ". Both these opinions were given in 1791, when the Quebec Act separated Upper and Lower Canada, and gave each a form of representative government but retained executive power in nominated British hands. " We will not pretend " said Dundas " to give Canada the same constitution as we ourselves live under. All we can do is *to lay the foundation for the same constitution when increased population and time shall have made the Canadians ripe to receive it*." Simcoe, the first Lieutenant-governor of Upper Canada, adopted this idea with enthusiasm, and proceeded to devote all his energies to the reproduction of English ways of life and local government in Canada—the policy of " assimilation " as it was called. Only a year or two later the French Revolution entered on its aggressive phase, and there was a complete reshuffling of the British Government, and a great change in its official attitude to local liberties. Portland took Dundas's place, and his reply to an enthusiastic report from Simcoe ended with the crushing remark that " to assimilate a colony in all respects to its mother country is not possible, and, if possible, would not be prudent ". Reaction had taken colonial policy back to the state of mind it was in in the days before the Boston tea-party. It was not until the 1830's that further progress was made.]

The hope of maintaining a second British Empire in North America may well have seemed fainter in the "eighteen-thirties" than in 1791. The political problem was more difficult, the situation more dangerous. The difficulty and the danger were most acute in the mainly French province of Lower Canada with which, since the constitutional issue was there distorted and confused by race-antagonism, we will not now concern ourselves; but in the British provinces they were serious enough. The ardent "loyalism" kindled by the American Revolution had had fifty years to cool in. If the second generation of Loyalists were still devoted to the imperial connexion, their devotion was now flavoured with a new ingredient of personal or party interest; and, if they still tolerated the eighteenth-century system of 1791, it was largely because it enabled them to retain a dominant position in their provincial politics, to appropriate the confidence of the Governor, to monopolize appointments on the Executive and Legislative Councils. They corresponded, in fact, to those Tories in Britain who were quite content with the unreformed Parliament and the system of "habitual influence"; and until the Napoleonic Wars were over and the forces of progress began to move again on both sides of the Atlantic, the political position in Canada was still roughly "assimilated" to that in the mother country. As long as the "Family Compact" maintained their majority in the Assembly, there was little to make Canadians in general feel politically inferior to Englishmen under those forty years of Tory Government in England. But by 1830 the population had increased more than thirty-fold since 1791; many of the new immigrants were Americans from over the border, some of them were Radicals from England; and a Reform party had grown up which had secured in 1824 a small, and in 1828 a great, majority at the polls. Just at the same time the party tide was turning at last in Britain. In 1830 the Whigs came back, and, consolidating their position by the Act of 1832, set themselves to put in operation their big programme of long-overdue

reforms. For Britain it was a new era. Industrial democracy was not yet in, but the landed oligarchy was out. In Canada, on the other hand, it seemed as if the eighteenth century was still alive. For while at Westminster Wellington and Eldon and the rest had retreated to the Opposition benches, the Tories were still glued to the Government benches at Toronto; and, so far from introducing any programme of reform, the Government continued in its reactionary course in defiance of the electorate. The contrast was crudely clear. Where now was the promise of 1791? Could anyone say in 1835 that the Canadian Constitution was "a perfect image and transcript" of the British? Was not the measure of self-government conceded to Canadians manifestly less, even in the field of their own local affairs, than that enjoyed by Englishmen?

The Whig statesmen in Britain were no less convinced than their beloved and now almost "canonized" leader [Fox] had once been that the colonial problem could only be solved by an extension of self-government. Why, then, did not Lord John Russell revive Fox's "assimilating idea"? Why did he not show at least as much faith in "British liberty" as Pitt or Grenville? Because assimilation now meant more than it had in their day. There could now be no assimilation worth the name which did not add Responsible to Representative Government. And Russell, though worlds away in spirit from Thurlow, shrank from this second stage of assimilation for precisely the same reasons as Thurlow had shrunk from the first. Responsible Government seemed to him "incompatible with the relations between the mother country and the colony". If the Governor "is to follow the advice of his Council, he is no longer a subordinate officer but an independent sovereign". "Sovereignty", "independence", those were Thurlow's words, and to Russell as to Thurlow—though with far more excuse, since Russell was faced with an immediate practical dilemma which Thurlow had only vaguely foreseen—the prospect to which they pointed seemed "a grossness". He stiffened his back. Responsible Government

was refused. The deadlock was complete. And since it was not to be expected that nineteenth-century Canadians would long remain content with the representative government enjoyed by eighteenth-century Americans before the Revolution—since Russell's view of colonial status was apparently the same static view as Burke's—the Second British Empire began to drift fast towards the same tragic ending as the First. In 1837, in both Canadian provinces, the extremists broke out in armed rebellion; and, though those risings were ill-organized, feebly supported, and easily suppressed, their significance was unmistakable. Quite certainly, sooner or later, if British statesmen did not change their policy, there would be another Revolution in North America.

Russell, as we know, was right in his logic but wrong in his interpretation of it. Assimilation was the only method of keeping Canadians and Englishmen within one political society—whatever the end to which it might logically lead. The might and majesty of Britain could no longer determine the political allegiance of Britons overseas. Force had been tried in 1775 and would never be tried again. The alternative was consent. And consent was unattainable except on a basis of equality. To refuse equality, therefore, meant another schism. To concede it, as stage by stage it was required, would doubtless lead to difficulties about " sovereignty " and " independence ", but it might not necessarily end in schism. No logical disputations on the meaning of words, no text-books of political science, no Austinian theory, could ever compel the Second British Empire to break up unless it wanted to. . . .

[The crisis of the 1837 rebellions produced the right man. The Earl of Durham was sent out to govern Canada, and to report on the state of all the British North American colonies. Durham was only in Canada for five months, for his lenient treatment of some of the French rebels earned him a censure from the British Government, and he promptly resigned. But in those five months he collected the material for one of the truly epoch-making documents in the Commonwealth story—the famous Durham Report, remarkable for the force

with which it reasserted the policy of assimilation, for the courage with which it faced the logical sequel of self-government for Canada, and for the foresight which declared that such independence need not necessarily mean separation. Upper and Lower Canada were reunited, and by 1849, when Lord Elgin, Durham's son-in-law, was governor, Canada's right to self-government was recognized.]

What was the influence of the American Revolution in shaping this decisive chapter in the story of the Second British Empire? It was, unquestionably, a great influence—at least as great half a century after the Revolution as on its morrow, as great in 1839 or 1849 as in 1791. No length of time, indeed, could weaken the most immediate and most certain effect of the American tragedy, namely the determination of all Englishmen that never again would they fight a civil war on the colonial issue. Dull-witted reactionaries might still talk about "our colonies" in the nineteenth century in much the same temper as that of 1774; but they no longer thought of combating colonial aspirations with penal laws and bayonets. Pessimistic Liberals of Russell's type did not dream of enforcing their static policy. "We can give the colonies no more liberty", they said in effect. "If they must have more, we must separate and go our own ways: but we will never quarrel about it. 'Since there's no help, let us kiss and part.'" To the optimists, on the other hand, the ever-present memory of the schism of 1783 was a constant incentive to thought and deed. Inaction would be as fatal as wrong action. Only by thinking out their positive policy and whole-heartedly applying it could they hope to justify their faith.

Nor, secondly, was the Revolution only a salutary memory of the dead past. It was a living fact. It was permanently embodied in the American Republic. And the American Republic lay side by side with Canada, sharing the same continent with the "fourteenth colony", a perpetual example of successful revolt, a standing temptation to every Canadian malcontent. Almost of necessity, therefore—till Durham and Elgin had cleared the air and opened a new horizon—revolution

lurked in the background of Canadian politics, suffusing a sense of instability and insecurity, exciting dangerous hopes and unscrupulous ambitions. The idea of force had been abandoned by the Englishmen who had lost the American War, but not by the colonists who lived next door to those who had won it. It may almost be said, indeed, that the rising of the Radicals of the Left in Upper Canada in 1837 could not have occurred in any other continent. Those new rebels against the British Crown were lured into their mad adventure not only by the example of the old rebels over the border but also by the hope of winning their sympathy and support. "Disaffection exists in many other countries as well as here", wrote Elgin, twelve years later, of less excusable sedition among Tories of the Right; "but this is the only country in the world where rebellion is the resource always present to the minds of place-hunters—where to threaten the *ultima ratio* is not considered an impudence even, far less a crime." And he ascribed this "peculiarity" first and foremost to the contiguity of the United States.

There was a still graver peril to the Second British Empire in the joint effects of North American history and geography. Only the hot-heads in Canada were thinking of an open rupture in those critical days of '37 or '49. But every Canadian, however sober and however "loyal", was being subjected, year after year, to a steady strain pulling at his reason if not at his heart, dragging his eyes reluctantly southwards, forcing him to think that the destiny of his country must lie outside the British Empire. This strain was the contrast between American progress and prosperity and Canadian backwardness and poverty. Presenting itself, as Durham said, "in respect to every sign of productive industry, increasing wealth, and progressive civilization", this mortifying contrast was one of the dominant refrains that ran through the *Report*. "It is a singular and melancholy feature in the condition of these Provinces that the resources rendered of so little avail to the population of Great Britain are turned to better account by

the inhabitants of the United States." "On the American side, all is activity and bustle. . . . On the British side of the line, with the exception of a few favoured spots where some approach to American prosperity is apparent, all seems waste and desolate." Every one is bound to feel that there must be "something wrong to have caused so striking a difference in progress and wealth between Upper Canada and the neighbouring states of the Union".

Nor was the contrast economic only: it was political too. The United States had already made themselves a powerful, self-reliant, expanding nation, while British North America remained a string of disconnected provinces in which the mere thought of nationhood or a national destiny seemed hardly possible. And, of course, the contrast, economic or political, pointed straight back to the parting of the ways in 1783. Success had come to those who broke away from the Empire; failure, it seemed, to "what was left". How long, then, could Canadians be expected to resist the pull? How long could the Great Experiment endure? Must not the very foundation on which it rested, the love of British liberty, be steadily sapped and weakened? Many Canadians, reported Durham, had been induced by that grievous contrast with conditions in the South, "in despair of obtaining such benefits under their present institutions, to desire the adoption of a Republican constitution or even an incorporation with the American Union". By Elgin's time this danger had materialized. The introduction of Free Trade in Britain—reproducing in its effect on the colonies the converse of the old Mercantilism—had spread ruin among Canadian corn-merchants; and the policy of race-equality and conciliation, embodied in a Franco-British coalition ministry and favoured by Elgin, had aggravated the bitter discontent of the "anti-Gallican" minority in Lower Canada. In 1849 a manifesto was signed by several hundred leading British-Canadians at Montreal, advocating a friendly separation from the Empire as a preliminary to fusion with the United States.

In such drastic fashion the success of the Republic drove the lesson of the Revolution home. It may be that Durham and Grey and Elgin would have interpreted the lesson aright if no British colonies had survived in North America and if they had had to deal, say, with Australia alone. It may be that they would have recognized the supreme rightness of the "assimilating idea", in principle, on its own merits. But would they have embraced it with such ardent conviction, would they have applied it so quickly and boldly, would Elgin, above all, have faced so frankly all its ultimate implications, if the Revolution had not fought and triumphed on adjacent soil and if the Republic had not presented just across the border its contrast, its invitation, its alternative? It is more than doubtful. In 1849, as in 1791, British liberty was the only card which Britain could play against American liberty with any hope of winning the game; but in 1791 she had played it guardedly, without looking far ahead, without considering all it meant, whereas in 1849 it was practically forced from her hand. And why this change? Because in 1791 the United States was a young and weakly child, not expected by supercilious Englishmen to grow very big or indeed to live very long, while in 1849 it was an adult nation, fast advancing to a place among the great powers of the world. . . .

Surely it was the contrast, the rivalry, of the United States, with the memory of the Revolution for its background, that, more than all else, inspired Durham's candour in demanding real assimilation in the *form* of government—apart from the question of its *scope*—and inspired Elgin's courage in applying it. Nor was there only a fuller understanding of the card that was played in 1849; the intrinsic value of it had, as it happened, been enhanced since 1791. The rival "liberties" no longer stood on the same ground of comparison. One had changed, the other had not. In Britain a great step forward had been taken. Not only was Representative Government more truly representative, more honest, and more popular;

still more important, Responsible Government, the key to the smooth working of the British Constitution because it harmonizes legislature and executive, had now become clearly recognized and firmly established. The new American Constitutions, on the other hand, had passed through their experimental stage; they had stiffened, as it were, in their mould. And since in the States that mould was virtually a copy of the old pre-Revolution system, and since the Federal Government had been deliberately framed on the old principle of separating the executive from the legislature, separate they remained at the risk, it seemed, of constant friction or even deadlock. It was possible, therefore, for the champions of British liberty in 1849 to take higher ground, to commend their candidate not merely because it was British, still less because it retained the "influences" and "balances" of the Old World, but because it was—in their eyes at any rate—a better political instrument and one, furthermore, which suited the New World at least as well as the Old because—so at least they could assert—it enabled public opinion to control the whole field of government more quickly, more smoothly, and more continuously than its rival. Elgin, as Durham before him, respected the American nation, and he liked, and was liked by, the American people; and it was in no cavilling or jealous or resentful spirit that he proclaimed his belief in the superior merits of British constitutional practice in the nineteenth century. "The fact is" he wrote in 1850 "that the American system is our old Colonial system with, in certain cases, the principle of popular election substituted for that of nomination by the Crown. . . . There is the same absence of effective responsibility in the conduct of legislation, the same want of concurrent action between the parts of the political machine. . . . Now I feel very strongly that, when a people have been once thoroughly accustomed to the working of such a Parliamentary system as ours, they never will consent to revert to this clumsy, irresponsible mechanism." With as definite a purpose, then, as Simcoe's and with a

partiality for British ways as strong as Pitt's or Burke's, but with longer vision and surer confidence than eighteenth-century statesmen could attain, Elgin preached and practised the creed that saved the Second British Empire. "I have been possessed . . . with the idea that it is possible to maintain on this soil of North America, and in the face of Republican America, British connexion and British institutions, *if you give the latter freely and trustingly*."

It is manifest, then, that the course of the new colonial policy was largely determined by those two interwoven factors—the example of the American Revolution and the rivalry of the American Republic. To that extent the losing of the thirteen British colonies meant the saving of their successors. To that extent the Revolution prevented its own repetition.

The step from representative government to *responsible* government, which was the essential goal of Durham's *Report*, was an enormous one to take only half a century after the War of American Independence. That is why the *Report* will always rank as one of the most important documents in the Commonwealth story. Of immediate concern only to Canada, its conclusions were later to be applied to all the other dominions in turn. We need not wonder that the conclusions drawn by Durham and his colleagues, Buller and Wakefield, were applied somewhat apprehensively. To these enlightened Colonial Reformers it was a great opportunity; to most people, probably, it was the only hope of preventing another Declaration of Independence, but even Charles Buller, Durham's enthusiastic secretary, could hardly have foreseen that the consequences of the *Report* would be the laying of the foundations of the British Commonwealth of Nations. "Canada" said Sir Charles Duffy afterwards "did not get Home Rule because she was loyal and friendly, but she became loyal and friendly because she got Home Rule." Few people in 1839 had the imagination to foresee this.

How did Lord Durham justify self-government for Canada? The answer will be found in the following extract from the *Report* itself.

LORD DURHAM

REPORT ON THE AFFAIRS OF BRITISH NORTH AMERICA

IT is not by weakening, but strengthening the influence of the people on its government; by confining within much narrower bounds than those hitherto allotted to it, and not by extending the interference of the imperial authorities in the details of colonial affairs, that I believe that harmony is to be restored where dissension has so long prevailed; and a regularity and vigour, hitherto unknown, introduced into the administration of these Provinces. It needs no change in the principles of government, no invention of a new constitutional theory, to supply the remedy which would, in my opinion, completely remove the existing political disorders. It needs but to follow out consistently the principles of the British constitution, and introduce into the Government of these great Colonies those wise provisions, by which alone the working of the representative system can in any country be rendered harmonious and efficient. We are not now to consider the policy of establishing representative government in the North American Colonies. That has been irrevocably done; and the experiment of depriving the people of their present constitutional power, is not to be thought of. To conduct their Government harmoniously, in accordance with its established principles, is now the business of its rulers; and I know not how it is possible to secure that harmony in any other way than by administering the Government on those principles which have been found perfectly efficacious in Great Britain. I would not impair a single prerogative of the Crown; on the contrary, I believe that the interests of the people of these Colonies require the protection of prerogatives, which have not hitherto been exercised. But the Crown must, on the other hand, submit to the necessary consequences of representative institutions; and, if it has to carry on the Government in unison with a representative

These general principles apply, however, only to those changes in the system of government which are required in order to rectify disorders common to all the North American Colonies; but they do not in any degree go to remove those evils in the present state of Lower Canada which require the most immediate remedy. The fatal feud of origin, which is the cause of the most extensive mischief, would be aggravated at the present moment by any change which should give the majority more power than they have hitherto possessed. A plan by which it is proposed to ensure the tranquil government of Lower Canada, must include in itself the means of putting an end to the agitation of national disputes in the legislature, by settling, at once and for ever, the national character of the Province. I entertain no doubts as to the national character which must be given to Lower Canada; it must be that of the British Empire; that of the majority of the population of British America; that of the great race which must, in the lapse of no long period of time, be predominant over the whole North American Continent. Without effecting the changes so rapidly or so roughly as to shock the feelings and trample on the welfare of the existing generation, it must henceforth be the first and steady purpose of the British Government to establish an English population, with English laws and language, in this Province, and to trust its government to none but a decidedly English Legislature.

On these grounds, I believe that no permanent or efficient remedy can be devised for the disorders of Lower Canada, except a fusion of the Government in that of one or more of the surrounding Provinces; and as I am of opinion that the full establishment of responsible government can only be permanently secured by giving these Colonies an increased importance in the politics of the Empire, I find in union the only means of remedying at once and completely the two prominent causes of their present unsatisfactory condition. . . .

But while I convince myself that such desirable ends would be secured by the legislative union of the two Pro-

vinces, I am inclined to go further and inquire whether all these objects would not more surely be attained by extending this legislative union over all the British Provinces in North America; and whether the advantages which I anticipate for two of them might not, and should not in justice be extended over all. Such an union would at once decisively settle the question of races; it would enable all the Provinces to co-operate for all common purposes; and, above all, it would form a great and powerful people, possessing the means of securing good and responsible government for itself, and which, under the protection of the British Empire, might in some measure counterbalance the preponderant and increasing influence of the United States on the American continent. I do not anticipate that a Colonial Legislature thus strong and thus self-governing, would desire to abandon the connexion with Great Britain. On the contrary, I believe that the practical relief from undue interference which would be the result of such a change, would strengthen the present bond of feelings and interests; and that the connexion would only become more durable and advantageous by having more of equality, of freedom, and of local independence. But at any rate, our first duty is to secure the well-being of our colonial countrymen; and if in the hidden decrees of that wisdom by which this world is ruled, it is written that these countries are not for ever to remain portions of the Empire, we owe it to our honour to take good care that, when they separate from us, they should not be the only countries on the American continent in which the Anglo-Saxon race shall be found unfit to govern itself.

I am, in truth, so far from believing that the increased power and weight that would be given to these Colonies by union would endanger their connexion with the Empire, that I look to it as the only means of fostering such a national feeling throughout them as would effectually counterbalance whatever tendencies may now exist towards separation. No large community of free and intelligent men will long feel contented with a political system which places them, because

it places their country, in a position of inferiority to their neighbours. The colonist of Great Britain is linked, it is true, to a mighty Empire; and the glories of its history, the visible signs of its present power, and the civilization of its people, are calculated to raise and gratify his national pride. But he feels, also, that his link to that Empire is one of remote dependence; he catches but passing and inadequate glimpses of its power and prosperity; he knows that in its government he and his own countrymen have no voice. While his neighbour on the other side of the frontier assumes importance from the notion that his vote exercises some influence on the councils, and that he himself has some share in the onward progress of a mighty nation, the colonist feels the deadening influence of the narrow and subordinate community to which he belongs. In his own, and in the surrounding Colonies, he finds petty objects occupying petty, stationary, and divided societies; and it is only when the chances of an uncertain and tardy communication bring intelligence of what has passed a month before on the other side of the Atlantic, that he is reminded of the Empire with which he is connected. But the influence of the United States surrounds him on every side, and is for ever present. It extends itself as population augments and intercourse increases; it penetrates every portion of the continent into which the restless spirit of American speculation impels the settler or the trader; it is felt in all the transactions of commerce, from the important operations of the monetary system, down to the minor details of ordinary traffic; it stamps, on all the habits and opinions of the surrounding countries, the common characteristics of the thoughts, feelings, and customs of the American people. Such is necessarily the influence which a great nation exercises on the small communities which surround it. Its thoughts and manners subjugate them, even when nominally independent of its authority. If we wish to prevent the extension of this influence, it can only be done by raising up for the North American colonist some nationality of his own; by elevating these small and

unimportant communities into a society having some objects of a national importance ; and by thus giving their inhabitants a country which they will be unwilling to see absorbed even into one more powerful.

The union of Upper and Lower Canada in 1840—the first-fruits of this Report—did not work well. Each province was jealous of the other, and deadlocks occurred with discouraging frequency. Thus the first attempt at harmonizing cultures failed. It was only with the British North America Act, which in 1867 transformed Canada into the first federal union within the Empire and brought in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, that the issue was happily resolved.

What was the influence of the Colonial Office on British Imperial policy? It is one of the incongruities of Commonwealth history that whereas at this time Britain lacked any co-ordinated colonial policy the Colonial Office itself wielded enormous power. This would not have been so bad had its ideas not been usually about twenty years out of date. It is hardly surprising, then, that the Colonial Office was never on very good terms with the radical Colonial Reformers (of whom Durham, Buller, and Wakefield, Durham's confidential adviser, formed the nucleus). The Reformers were on fairly good terms with the "Office" until Buller died in 1848, but even he could not resist denouncing Sir James Stephen, permanent Under-Secretary for the Colonies since 1836, as that—in his eyes—undistinguished but all-too-powerful civil servant "Mr. Mothercountry". In answer to our question, here is an extract from Buller's famous book, *Responsible Government for the Colonies*, in which he attacks this notorious mediocrity who, the Reformers thought, was responsible for the colonial mismanagement of the times. Wakefield, who hated Stephen, relished this particular passage so highly that he reprinted it in his *Art of Colonization*, in 1849.

CHARLES BULLER

MR. MOTHERCOUNTRY OF THE COLONIAL OFFICE

THERE are two modes in which colonial legislative measures, to which the Government wishes to get the sanction of Parliament, are framed. Sometimes, though

rarely, Parliament passes an act after the usual fashion of acts of Parliament, settling by positive enactments every detail of the course on which it determines. Except, however, in the case of acts settling the form of government in a colony, this is a labour which is rarely imposed on Parliament: and experience shows us how unwise it is to trust the details of such measures to the chances of parliamentary attention. . . .

But Parliament in general disposes of the details of Colonial questions in a much more summary way. For some time past, the impossibility of determining the details of a Colonial measure in the British Parliament has been so much impressed upon the Government, that the custom has been to propose that the Colonial Acts of Parliament should be simple *delegations of legislative powers* to some Ministerial authority in this country; and they have in consequence simply enabled the Crown to legislate for the Colonies by Order in Council. It is thus that for nearly the last twenty years a great part of the legislation of the West India Islands has been carried on; and the power of making laws has been taken equally from the Colonial and Imperial legislature, and transferred to the Executive Government at home. Nor has Parliament taken, in Colonial cases, the precautions for retaining a vigilant supervision of the use made of this power, which it has always retained to itself whenever it has delegated similar authority with respect to the Mother Country. . . .

Thus, from the general indifference of Parliament on Colonial questions, it exercises, in fact, hardly the slightest efficient control over the administration or the making of laws for the Colonies. In nine cases out of ten, it merely registers the edicts of the Colonial Office in Downing Street. It is there, then, that nearly the whole public opinion which influences the conduct of affairs in the Colonies really exists. It is there that the supremacy of the Mother Country really resides: and when we speak of that supremacy, and of the responsibility of the Colony to the Mother Country, you may to all practical intents consider as the Mother Country—the

possessor of this supremacy—the centre of this responsibility—the occupants of the large house that forms the end of that *cul-de-sac* so well known by the name of Downing Street. However colonists or others may talk of the Crown, the Parliament, and the Public—of the honour of the first, the wisdom of the second, or the enlightened opinion of the last—not Queen, nor Lords, nor Commons, nor the great Public itself, exercises any power, or will, or thought on the greater part of Colonial matters: and the appeal to the Mother Country is, in fact, an appeal to "the Office".

But even this does not sufficiently concentrate the Mother Country. It may, indeed, at first sight, be supposed that the power of "the Office" must be wielded by its head; that in him at any rate we have generally one of the most eminent of our public men, whose views on the various matters which come under his cognizance, are shared by the Cabinet of which he is a member. We may fancy, therefore, that here, at least, concentrated in a somewhat despotic, but at any rate in a very responsible and dignified form, we have the real governing power of the Colonies, under the system which boasts of making their governments responsible to the Mother Country. But this is a very erroneous supposition. This great officer holds the most constantly shifting position on the shifting scene of official life. Since April 1827, ten different Secretaries of State have held the seals of the Colonial Department.

Each was brought into that office from business of a perfectly different nature, and probably with hardly any experience in Colonial affairs. The new Minister is at once called on to enter on the consideration of questions of the greatest magnitude, and at the same time of some hundreds of questions of mere detail, of no public interest, of unintelligible technicality, involving local considerations with which he is wholly unacquainted, but at the same time requiring decision, and decision at which it is not possible to arrive without considerable labour.

Perplexed with the vast variety of subjects thus presented

to him—alike appalled by the important and unimportant matters forced on his attention—every Secretary of State is obliged at the outset to rely on the aid of some better-informed member of his office. His Parliamentary Under-Secretary is generally as new to the business as himself: and even if they had not been brought in together, the tenure of office by the Under-Secretary having on the average been quite as short as that of the Secretary of State, he has never, during the period of his official career, obtained sufficient information to make him independent of the aid on which he must have been thrown at the outset. Thus we find both these marked and responsible functionaries dependent on the advice or guidance of another; and that other person must of course be one of the permanent members of the office. We do not pretend to say which of these persons it is that in fact directs the Colonial policy of Britain. It may be, as a great many persons think, the permanent Under-Secretary; it may be the chief, it may be some very subordinate clerk; it may be one of them that has most influence at one time, and another at another; it may be this gentleman as to one, and that as to another question or set of questions: for here we get beyond the region of real responsibility and are involved in the clouds of official mystery.

That Mother Country which has been narrowed from the British Isles into the Parliament, from the Parliament into the Executive Government, from the Executive Government into the Colonial Office, is not to be sought in the apartments of the Secretary of State, or his Parliamentary Under-Secretary. Where you are to look for it, it is impossible to say. In some back room—whether in the attic, or in what story we know not—you will find all the Mother Country which really exercises supremacy, and really maintains connexion with the vast and widely scattered Colonies of Britain. We know not the name, the history, or the functions of the individual, into the narrow limits of whose person we find the Mother Country shrunk. Indeed, we may call him by the name, of which we have thus

shown him to be the rightful bearer; and when we speak of Mr. MOTHERCOUNTRY, the colonist will form a much more accurate notion than heretofore of the authority by which he is in reality ruled.

Of the individual thus bodily existing, but thus dimly seen, we can of course give our readers none but the most general description. We will not flatter the pride of our colonial readers, by depicting this real arbiter of their destinies as a person of lofty rank, or of the first class among what we call statesmen. He is probably a person who owes his present position entirely to his own merits and long exertions. He has worked his way through a long and laborious career of official exertions; and his ambition is limited to the office that he holds, or to some higher grade of the permanent offices under government. Probably married at an early age, he has to support and educate a large family out of his scanty though sure income. Once or twice a year he dines with his principal; perhaps as often with some friend in Parliament or high office. But the greater part of his days are passed out of all reach of aristocratic society; he has a modest home in the outskirts of London, with an equally modest establishment; and the colonist who is on his road to "the Office", little imagines that it is the real ruler of the Colonies that he sees walking over one of the Bridges, or driving his one-horse chay, or riding cheek by jowl with him on the top of the short coach, as he comes into town of a morning. Mr. MOTHERCOUNTRY'S whole heart is in the business of his office. Not insensible to the knowledge of the charms of the power which he possesses, habit and a sense of duty are perhaps often the real motives of the unremitting exertions, by which alone he retains it. For this is the real secret of his influence. Long experience has made him thoroughly conversant with every detail of his business; and long habit has made his business the main, perhaps with the exception of his family, the sole source of his interest and enjoyment. By day and by night, at office or at home, his labour is constant. No pile of

despatches, with their multifarious enclosures, no red-taped heap of Colonial grievances or squabbles, can scare his practised eye. He handles with unfaltering hand the papers at which his superiors quail: and ere they have waded through one-half of them, he suggests the course, which the previous measures dictated by himself compel the government to adopt. He alone knows on what principles the predecessors of the noble or right honourable Secretary acted before: he alone, therefore, can point out the step which in pursuance of the previous policy it is incumbent to take: and the very advice, which it is thus rendered incumbent on the present Secretary of State to take, produces results that will give him as sure a hold on the next Secretary of State.

But with all this real power, Mr. MOTHERCOUNTRY never assumes the airs of dictation to his principal. Every change of the head of the department, though really consolidating his power, gives occasion for a kind of mutiny against it. The new Secretary enters with some purpose of independence: he has heard of Mr. MOTHERCOUNTRY'S influence; and he is determined that he will act on his own head. He goes on for a while on this plan; but it is sure to be no long time ere something comes before him for which he is obliged to refer to Mr. MOTHERCOUNTRY; he is pleased with his ready, shrewd, and unobtrusive advice; he applies to him on the next occasion with more confidence; he finds that Mr. MOTHERCOUNTRY takes a great deal of trouble off his hands—and great men are sure at last to fall under the dominion of any man that will save them trouble. By degrees, he begins to think that there are some things which it is better to leave altogether to Mr. MOTHERCOUNTRY; and as to all he soon finds it prudent to take no step until he has heard what Mr. MOTHERCOUNTRY has to say about it. If things go smooth, his confidence in Mr. MOTHERCOUNTRY rises; if they go ill, his dependence on him is only the more riveted, because it is Mr. MOTHERCOUNTRY alone who can get him through the Colonial contest or Parliamentary scrape in which he has

involved himself. The more independent he has been at first, the more of these scrapes he has probably got himself into; and the more dependent he consequently becomes in the long run. The power of Mr. MOTHERCOUNTRY goes on increasing from Secretary to Secretary, and from month to month of each Secretary's tenure of office; and the more difficult the government of the Colonies becomes, the more entirely it falls into the hands of the only men in the public service who really know anything about Colonial affairs.

This is perhaps the best result of such a system: and our experience of the follies and presumption of the only Secretary of State that ever undertook to act for himself, is a proof that, under the present system, Mr. MOTHERCOUNTRY'S management is better than that of the gentleman whom he generally gets put over his head. But the system of entrusting absolute power (for such it is) to one wholly irresponsible, is obviously most faulty. Thus, however, are our Colonies ruled: and such is the authority to which is committed that last appeal from the Colonies themselves, which is dignified with all these vague phrases about the power, the honour, the supremacy, and the wisdom of the Mother Country.

The Colonial Secretary singled out for such uncomplimentary notice in the last paragraph above was Lord Glenelg, who had the misfortune to be in office when the 1837 rebellions broke out in Canada, and whose policy, not only as regards Canada, but also towards South African and Australian colonies, proved so incompetent and unpopular that even his colleagues in Lord Melbourne's second ministry pressed for his dismissal. Lord Glenelg was not only Colonial Secretary; he was also vice-president of the Church Missionary Society, a body which had a great influence on colonial development about this time. Nowhere was this influence more important than in the settlement of New Zealand. Both Colonial Reformers and the Church Missionary Society were anxious for Great Britain to annex New Zealand, although their motives were different. The Reformers wanted to establish prosperous trading colonies; the Missionaries wanted to protect the natives from

the demoralizing effects of the unscrupulous white trader and his " fire-water ".

How did the missionaries influence early New Zealand history? In the following extract from his comprehensive book, *The British Overseas*, C. E. Carrington tells us of a culture-conflict far more devastating than that experienced in Canada, and also of the conflict of ideas between Missionaries and Reformers, and between Reformers and the Colonial Office. The name of Edward Gibbon Wakefield appears again. This brilliant man had studied the colonial problems in his youth, when it looked as though he might have to " leave his country for his country's good ", and no one had a better grasp of the position, or a clearer view of the possibilities than he did. Wakefield first publicly stated his views on the Australian problem in *A Letter from Sydney*, published in 1829, which showed the folly of free grants of land to all settlers. This simply meant that everybody owned land and had nobody to help him work. He urged that land should be sold, and the proceeds devoted to assisting workers to migrate. South Australia was founded on these principles in 1834, but Wakefield was not allowed to share in its control. Perhaps this was fortunate for the Empire, for it meant that Wakefield was free to help Lord Durham in Canada, and he played a large part in the drafting of the famous *Report*. Lord Durham said that he had " never erred except when he went contrary to Wakefield's advice ".

Wakefield's part in the foundation of New Zealand is outlined below. Later on, in 1850, he joined with C. B. Adderley in forming the Colonial Reform Society, which finally put a stop to the sending of English convicts to the colonies. So grateful were the people of Cape-town to Adderley for his part in this enterprise that they gave his name to the main street of their city.

C. E. CARRINGTON

NEW ZEALAND AND THE MISSIONARIES 1792-1848

COOK'S annexation of New Zealand, ignored by successive governments, was nullified by an Act of Parliament of 1817 which alluded to the islands as a place " not within His Majesty's Dominions ". Occasional visitors to New

Zealand noted chiefly the ferocity of the natives who, on several occasions, cut off boats' crews and devoured them. The massacre of the whole ship's company of the *Boyd* in 1809 had an alarming effect; yet white men did visit the islands and even settled there. The first recorded residents, a sealing-crew, spent the summer of 1792 ashore in the far south where no native tribes were settled.

As early as 1791 efforts were made from Sydney to develop a trade in timber for spars and in the tenacious fibre of the New Zealand flax. These shipping stores attracted the British and American sperm-whalers to the Bay of the Islands, a region broken by deep-water inlets among the forests of gigantic *Kauri* pines. Here dwelt numerous natives, children of the sun, who throve better in the sub-tropical north than in the cool, windy south. Deserters from the ships and runaway convicts from Botany Bay sometimes made their way ashore at the Bay of Islands where, if they were not quickly knocked on the head and eaten, they might hope to make themselves useful to some chief as boat-builders, blacksmiths, or interpreters. The first of these "white [*pakehà*] Maoris" was George Bruce, who married a chief's daughter in 1807. In the 'twenties and 'thirties every chief aspired to keep a tame white man, a *pakehà*, perhaps a mere pimp and bootlegger who got rum and muskets for his master in return for sending native women aboard the ships, perhaps an honest trader, or even something more. The great chiefs regarded the missionaries as their *pakehàs*, their agents with the outside world, much as a Frankish or a Saxon king regarded his bishop in the seventh century. Thus English civilization at its worst and best began to penetrate New Zealand.

But the Maoris were far too virile and intelligent to wait for civilization to come to them; many shipped before the mast to discover the world for themselves, and so came to the notice of the Apostle of New Zealand, the chaplain to the convict establishment at Sydney. The Rev. Samuel Marsden (1764-1838) of St. John's College, Cambridge, was a straight-

forward practical Christian of the old school, not an enthusiast from Clapham. Since he could not obtain the services of ordained clergy, he agreed with the Church Missionary Society to establish two respectable laymen, William Hall a carpenter and John King a rope-maker, at the Bay of Islands to prepare the way for Christianity. " Till the attention of the heathen is gained, and moral and industrious habits are induced, little or no progress can be made in teaching them the Gospel." In December 1814 Marsden conveyed his party to New Zealand under the protection of two friendly chiefs, inaugurating his mission on Christmas Day with a sermon preached, through an interpreter, upon the text : " Behold I bring you tidings of great joy ".

Since Hall and King were not sufficiently well educated to master the Maori language, Marsden's next step was to dispatch one of the two chiefs—his name was Hongi—to England. He stayed at Cambridge in the house of Samuel Lee, the Professor of Arabic, who prepared a Maori grammar and dictionary in which the language was transliterated with elegance. Until his death in 1838 Marsden supervised his missions in New Zealand, visiting the country seven times and, when sixty years old, making adventurous journeys on foot into the unknown interior. There was little evidence of progress until the arrival (1822) of Henry Williams, a naval officer turned clergyman, who impressed the savages with that quality of moral greatness (*mana*) which they instantly appreciated. " This island was a very hard stone " said a Maori chief " and Archdeacon Williams broke it." . . .

In his anxiety to find clergy, Marsden had invited the Methodists to send a mission. When it came (1823) he aimed at co-operation, with the result that spheres of influence were agreed upon, the Anglicans taking the north-east and the Methodists the north-west coasts. In London there was no such happy issue, since the two societies failed to come to terms. Those who doubt the efficacy of missionary endeavour would do well to study the change in the habits and morals

of the Maori people achieved by the influence of a handful of missionaries in a single generation (*c.* 1820-50). Tribal warfare, cannibalism and slavery gradually disappeared without the exertion of political or economic pressure. The Maoris were neither conquered nor expropriated, but converted.

Before the consummation of this change, which Marsden did not live to see, the Maoris indulged in a last orgy of bloodshed. The chief, Hongi, whose " mild manners " had made so good an impression, did not restrict his English acquaintance to Cambridge professors. He had been escorted to England by Thomas Kendall, one of Marsden's lay missionaries, who very improperly helped him to sell land-concessions to speculators for cash with which he bought guns. On his return to New Zealand he revolutionized the art of war. His raids and conquests, until his death in 1831, devastated the North Island, exterminating whole tribes, and greatly complicating for posterity the titles to tribal lands. The pressure of his campaigns affected, among others, an audacious and cunning chief named Te Rauparàha (" The Convolvulus Leaf "), who took the warpath southwards. Making his headquarters on an island in Cook Strait, he dominated all the central region of New Zealand, almost annihilating the few and scattered tribes of the South Island. Gun-running for these wars led to a greater and even more disreputable trade between Sydney and the little Alsatia at the Bay of Islands, where the missionaries competed for the attention of the natives against the worst ruffians of the South Seas.

Rumours of land sales to missionaries and *pakehà* Maoris had drawn the attention of speculators in colonization to the possibilities of New Zealand. Mr. Lambton (not yet Earl of Durham) had sent out a shipload of emigrants who were frightened away by the mere aspect of a Maori war-dance (1826). There was also a cosmopolitan adventurer called the Baron de Thierry who, as an undergraduate at Cambridge, had obtained some sort of land concession from Hongi, and

had notions of carving himself out a kingdom in New Zealand, with Dutch or French if not with English help.

Land-speculation, gun-running, escapes of convicts, increasing trade, and complaints by the missionaries about the outrageous proceedings in New Zealand at last obliged the Governor of New South Wales to intervene. The final abomination was the case of the brig *Elizabeth* which was hired by Te Rauparàha to convey his war-party on a marauding expedition in 1830. The English sailors, having decoyed a hostile chief and his family on board to be kidnapped and murdered, allowed the murderers to cook human flesh in the brig's galley and to enjoy a cannibal feast on the deck. . . . In 1831 Governor Darling decided to send James Busby as British Resident at the Bay of Islands. Since he had no more than moral authority either over whites or Maoris he could do little beyond rallying the support of the respectable inhabitants to the cause of law and order. He encouraged the formation of a confederacy of native chiefs, the United Tribes of New Zealand, for their own defence against exploitation, and especially against the pretensions of the Baron de Thierry.

In his evidence before the Parliamentary committee of 1836 Wakefield began his campaign for the colonization of New Zealand. In 1837 he formed the first New Zealand Association with a strong committee, including most of the Colonial Reformers. Their first draft of an enabling bill for colonizing New Zealand received the usual short shrift from James Stephen. He thought the project " vague and obscure " and that it would " infallibly issue in the conquest and extermination of the natives ". Here he expressed the view of the Church Missionary Society which, at last, was beginning to receive good reports from its agents in New Zealand. A sharp duel of pamphlets and addresses to the Colonial Office ensued between Wakefield and Mr. Dandeson Coates, the secretary of the Church Missionary Society. Coates refused an interview with a deputation from the Colonial Reformers, sending them word that he proposed to thwart them by every

means in his power. Nevertheless, the missionaries and their parent society did not intend that New Zealand should remain a scene of chaos and anarchy. They, too, desired annexation by the Crown in order to create a missionary paradise of meek, unworldly converts under their own spiritual direction. Both parties alike demanded that the Crown should intervene to impose law and order. . . .

As in the case of South Australia, the only terms on which the Colonial Office would approve an experiment in colonization were that they should retain absolute control while incurring none of the financial risk. And, on these terms, some encouragement was given to the New Zealand Association just before Glenelg was at last ejected from Downing Street. The Association, a philanthropic body, was accordingly replaced by a joint-stock company, to the great mortification of Wakefield who was again forced to appear, against his will, in the character, which his enemies falsely attributed to him, of a land speculator. The project, he said, had been begun by men with large minds and small purses and would be continued by men with small minds and large purses.

During the greater part of 1838 he was with Durham in Canada. The Durham Report was no sooner issued than the Reformers turned to the formation of the New Zealand Company with a nominal capital of £200,000 and Lord Durham as Governor. But alas! the new Colonial Secretary, Lord Normanby, flatly refusing to be bound by his predecessor's decision, would give no direct or indirect sanction for the formation of a colony. The Directors accordingly decided to force the issue. They had bought a ship of 400 tons, the *Tory*, and had appointed, as leader of the colony, Wakefield's younger brother William. . . . Since preparations were well advanced, the elder Wakefield posted to Plymouth, on May 4, 1839, to dispatch his brother with the *Tory* before the government could find means to prevent it. The sailing of the *Tory* on May 5 had the desired effect. Lord Normanby was now obliged to issue an instruction

"with extreme reluctance" for the annexation of New Zealand, if only to protect the natives from the British colonists. On June 13 he informed Lord Durham that he had decided to send Captain William Hobson, R.N., to negotiate with the United Tribes of New Zealand for a cession of sovereignty. The one benefit he conferred upon the infant colony was an instruction that no convicts should be sent there. . . .

As soon as Captain Hobson arrived at the Bay of Islands he commenced negotiations with the Maori chiefs for a treaty which was drawn up at Busby's house near the estuary of the Waitangi River. Williams, the Anglican missionary, as interpreter, urged the chiefs to give their assent, and on February 6, 1840, the first signatures were obtained to the Treaty of Waitangi, the method being that each chief drew on the paper a copy of the design upon his face. Duplicates of the treaty were then carried by the missionaries to several parts of the islands for the collection of further signatures. Forty-six chiefs made their mark at Waitangi and 456 others during the next few months, constituting a large majority, but by no means all, of the magnates of the Maori nation. The Treaty, to which the Maoris attached and still attach great respect, is a short document in three articles :

(1) The signatory chiefs "cede to Her Majesty the Queen [*Te Kuini Wikitoria* in the Maori version] all the rights and powers of sovereignty which the said chiefs . . . exercise or possess . . ."
(2) H.M. the Queen "confirms and guarantees to the chiefs and tribes . . . undisputed possession of their lands . . . but the chiefs yield to Her Majesty the exclusive right of pre-emption".
(3) Her Majesty extends her protection to the natives of New Zealand and "imparts to them all the rights and privileges of British subjects".

The Treaty was, in a sense, a counterblast to the action of Colonel Wakefield, who had already begun to occupy the lands

he professed to have bought, several hundred miles to the southward of the Bay of Islands. The site of a town had been selected and named Wellington, as a belated tribute to the old Duke who had helped the Colonial Reformers to steer the South Australian Bill through Parliament. The first ship-load of emigrants had arrived a fortnight before the signing of the Treaty. Hobson expressed his intention of visiting Wellington but was prevented by a paralytic stroke which left him an invalid, a dying man. But when the settlers, following the old model of the Pilgrim Fathers, held a meeting and formed a provisional government, the news alarmed him into action. He felt this to be a sort of declaration of independence and denounced it as high treason. He resolved to implement the Treaty of Waitangi by proclaiming British sovereignty over the North Island (May 21, 1840). As if this trouble were not enough, a French corvette appeared in June to protect a French emigrant ship which was then on its way to the South Island. Hobson thereupon dispatched H.M.S. *Britomart* to the South Island to proclaim British sovereignty there also (June 17, 1840). Further signatures were obtained to the Treaty of Waitangi, including that of the redoubtable Rauparàha.

Unhappily the Treaty of Waitangi did not solve anybody's problems, For the next twenty years an uneasy truce existed between settlers and natives; the white man persisted in encroaching upon the native territories, whilst the Colonial Office looked askance at him without actually doing anything to protect the Maori. After the Maori Wars (1860-71) the plight of the natives was worsened for a time and yet, although the Maoris were steadily expropriated, the settlers never adopted any definite policy of racial discrimination, so that, after 1900, a strange alliance between the former enemies gradually developed. The Maoris, left with less and less land of their own, were obliged to mingle more and more with the settlers who, for their part, began to take a new pride and interest in their fellow New Zealanders. To-day,

in spite of an unhappy beginning, there are no racial problems in New Zealand—a fact which reflects great credit on both races.

That the settler should advance into unexplored territory, at no matter what cost, seems to be an inevitable feature of all overseas expansion. " The Moving Frontier " of such pioneering movements presents one of the most colourful and significant phases in both Australian and American history. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that to understand United States history and the temper of her people we must look to the story of how successive waves of pioneers and adventurers swept across the continent from the Alleghany Mountains to the shores of the Pacific in the course of the nineteenth century. " Up to our own day " said Professor Turner in 1893, in a lecture which electrified the American Historical Association and provided a new theme for their consideration " American history has been in a large degree the history of the colonization of the Great West ". *How did the Moving Frontier influence the American way of life?* The process of westward expansion not only demanded that the country's surplus energy should be spent at home (a fact which goes far to explain American " Isolationism " in the nineteenth century) but it also created special problems and conditions of its own. " The most important effect of the frontier " says Professor Turner " has been in the promotion of democracy." Just how and why this should have been so is explained by Turner himself in the following extract from his book, *The Frontier in American History*.

FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER

THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY

THE peculiarity of American institutions is the fact that they have been compelled to adapt themselves to the changes of an expanding people—to the changes involved in crossing a continent, in winning a wilderness, and in developing at each area of this progress out of the primitive economic and political conditions of the frontier into the complexity of city life. Said Calhoun in 1817: " We are great, and rapidly—I was about to say fearfully—growing ! " So saying, he touched the distinguishing feature of American life.

All peoples show development; the germ theory of politics has been sufficiently emphasized. In the case of most nations, however, the development has occurred in a limited area; and if the nation has expanded, it has met other growing peoples whom it has conquered. But in the case of the United States we have a different phenomenon. Limiting our attention to the Atlantic coast, we have the familiar phenomenon of the evolution of institutions in a limited area, such as the rise of representative government; the differentiation of simple colonial governments into complex organs; the progress from primitive industrial society, without division of labour, up to manufacturing civilization. But we have, in addition to this, a recurrence of the process of evolution in each western area reached in the process of expansion. Thus American development has exhibited not merely advance along a single line, but a return to primitive conditions on a continually advancing frontier line, and a new development for that area. American social development has been continually beginning over again on the frontier. This perennial rebirth, this fluidity of American life, this expansion westward with its new opportunities, its continuous touch with the simplicity of primitive society, furnish the forces dominating American character. The true point of view in the history of this nation is not the Atlantic coast, it is the Great West. Even the slavery struggle, which is made so exclusive an object of attention by writers like Professor von Holst, occupies its important place in American history because of its relation to westward expansion.

In this advance, the frontier is the outer edge of the wave—the meeting-point between savagery and civilization. Much has been written about the frontier from the point of view of border warfare and the chase, but as a field for the serious study of the economist and the historian it has been neglected.

The American frontier is sharply distinguished from the European frontier—a fortified boundary line running through dense populations. The most significant thing about the

American frontier is, that it lies at the edge of free land. In the census reports it is treated as the margin of that settlement which has a density of two or more to the square mile. The term is an elastic one, and for our purposes does not need sharp definition. We shall consider the whole frontier belt, including the Indian country and the outer margin of the "settled area" of the census reports. This paper will make no attempt to treat the subject exhaustively; its aim is simply to call attention to the frontier as a fertile field for investigation, and to suggest some of the problems which arise in connexion with it.

In the settlement of America we have to observe how European life entered the continent, and how America modified and developed that life and reacted on Europe. Our early history is the study of European germs developing in an American environment. Too exclusive attention has been paid by institutional students to the Germanic origins, too little to the American factors. The frontier is the line of most rapid and effective Americanization. The wilderness masters the colonist. It finds him a European in dress, industries, tools, modes of travel, and thought. It takes him from the railroad car and puts him in the birch canoe. It strips off the garments of civilization and arrays him in the hunting shirt and the moccasin. It puts him in the log cabin of the Cherokee and Iroquois and runs an Indian palisade around him. Before long he has gone to planting Indian corn and ploughing with a sharp stick; he shouts the war-cry and takes the scalp in orthodox Indian fashion. In short, at the frontier the environment is at first too strong for the man. He must accept the conditions which it furnishes, or perish, and so he fits himself into the Indian clearings and follows the Indian trails. Little by little he transforms the wilderness, but the outcome is not the old Europe, not simply the development of Germanic germs, any more than the first phenomenon was a case of reversion to the Germanic mark. The fact is, that here is a new product that is American. At first, the frontier

was the Atlantic coast. It was the frontier of Europe in a very real sense. Moving westward, the frontier became more and more American. As successive terminal moraines result from successive glaciations, so each frontier leaves its traces behind it, and when it becomes a settled area the region still partakes of the frontier characteristics. Thus the advance of the frontier has meant a steady movement away from the influence of Europe, a steady growth of independence on American lines. And to study this advance, the men who grew up under these conditions, and the political, economic, and social results of it, is to study the really American part of our history. . . .

The West, as a phase of social organization, began with the Atlantic coast, and passed across the continent. But the colonial tide-water area was in close touch with the Old World, and soon lost its Western aspects. In the middle of the eighteenth century, the newer social conditions appeared along the upper waters of the tributaries of the Atlantic. Here it was that the West took on its distinguishing features and transmitted frontier traits and ideals to this area in later days. On the coast were the fishermen and skippers, the merchants and planters, with eyes turned towards Europe. Beyond the falls of the rivers were the pioneer farmers, largely of non-English stock, Scotch-Irish, and German. They constituted a distinct people, and may be regarded as an expansion of the social and economic life of the middle region into the back country of the South. These frontiersmen were the ancestors of Boone, Andrew Jackson, Calhoun, Clay, and Lincoln. Washington and Jefferson were profoundly affected by these frontier conditions. The forest clearings have been the seedplots of American character.

In the Revolutionary days, the settlers crossed the Alleghanies and put a barrier between them and the coast. They became, to use their phrases, " the men of the Western waters ", the heirs of the " Western world ". In this era, the backwoodsmen, all along the western slopes of the mountains,

with a keen sense of the difference between them and the dwellers on the coast, demanded organization into independent States of the Union. Self-government was their ideal. Said one of their rude, but energetic petitions for statehood: "Some of our fellow-citizens may think we are not able to conduct our affairs and consult our interests; but if our society is rude, much wisdom is not necessary to supply our wants, and a fool can sometimes put on his clothes better than a wise man can do it for him". This forest philosophy is the philosophy of American democracy. But the men of the coast were not ready to admit its implications. They apportioned the State legislatures so that the property-holding minority of the tide-water lands were able to outvote the more populous back countries. A similar system was proposed by Federalists in the constitutional convention of 1787. Gouverneur Morris, arguing in favour of basing representation on property as well as numbers, declared that he "looked forward, also, to that range of new States, which would soon be formed in the West". He thought the rule of representation ought to be so fixed, as to secure to the Atlantic States a prevalence in the national councils. "The new States" said he "will know less of the public interest than these; will have an interest in many respects different; in particular will be little scrupulous of involving the community in wars, the burdens and operations of which would fall chiefly on the maritime States. Provision ought, therefore, to be made to prevent the maritime States from being hereafter outvoted by them." He added that the Western country "would not be able to furnish men equally enlightened to share in the administration of our common interests. The busy haunts of men, not the remote wilderness, was the proper school of political talents. If the Western people get power into their hands they will ruin the Atlantic interest. The back members are always most averse to the best measures." Add to these utterances of Gouverneur Morris the impassioned protest of Josiah Quincy, of Massachusetts, in the debates in the House of Representa-

tives, on the admission of Louisiana. Referring to the discussion over the slave votes and the West in the constitutional convention, he declared, " Suppose, then, that it had been distinctly foreseen that, in addition to the effect of this weight, the whole population of a world beyond the Mississippi was to be brought into this and the other branch of the legislature to form our laws, control our rights, and decide our destiny. Sir, can it be pretended that the patriots of that day would for one moment have listened to it? . . . They had not taken degrees at the hospital of idiocy. . . . Why, sir, I have already heard of six States, and some say there will be, at no great distant time, more. I have also heard that the mouth of the Ohio will be far to the east of the centre of the contemplated empire. . . . You have no authority to throw the rights and property of this people into ' hotch pot ' with the wild men on the Missouri, nor with the mixed, though more respectable, race of Anglo-Hispano-Gallo-Americans who bask on the sands in the mouth of the Mississippi. . . . Do you suppose the people of the Northern and Atlantic States will, or ought to, look on with patience and see Representatives and Senators from the Red River and Missouri, pouring themselves upon this and the other floor, managing the concerns of a seaboard fifteen hundred miles, at least, from their residence; and having a preponderancy in councils into which, constitutionally, they could never have been admitted? "

Like an echo from the fears expressed by the East at the close of the eighteenth century come the words of an eminent Eastern man of letters at the end of the nineteenth century, in warnings against the West: " Materialized in their temper; with few ideals of an ennobling sort; little instructed in the lessons of history; safe from exposure to the direct calamities and physical horrors of war; with undeveloped imaginations and sympathies—they form a community unfortunate and dangerous from the possession of power without a due sense of its corresponding responsibilities; a community in which the passion for war may easily be excited as the fancied means

by which its greatness may be convincingly exhibited, and its ambitions gratified. . . . Some chance spark may fire the prairie."

Here, then, is the problem of the West, as it looked to New England leaders of thought in the beginning and at the end of this century. From the first it was recognized that a new type was growing up beyond the seaboard, and that the time would come when the destiny of the nation would be in Western hands. The divergence of these societies became clear in the struggle over the ratification of the federal constitution. The up-country agricultural regions, the communities that were in debt and desired paper money, with some Western exceptions, opposed the instrument; but the areas of intercourse and property carried the day.

It is important to understand, therefore, what were some of the ideals of this early Western democracy. How did the frontiersman differ from the man of the coast?

The most obvious fact regarding the man of the Western Waters is that he had placed himself under influences destructive to many of the gains of civilization. Remote from the opportunity for systematic education, substituting a log hut in the forest-clearing for the social comforts of the town, he suffered hardships and privations, and reverted in many ways to primitive conditions of life. Engaged in a struggle to subdue the forest, working as an individual, and with little specie or capital, his interests were with the debtor class. At each stage of its advance, the West has favoured an expansion of the currency. The pioneer had boundless confidence in the future of his own community, and when seasons of financial contraction and depression occurred, he, who had staked his all on confidence in Western development, and had fought the savage for his home, was inclined to reproach the conservative sections and classes. To explain this antagonism requires more than denunciation of dishonesty, ignorance, and boorishness as fundamental Western traits. Legislation in the United States has had to deal with two distinct social

conditions. In some portions of the country there was, and is, an aggregation of property, and vested rights are in the foreground ; in others, capital is lacking, more primitive conditions prevail, with different economic and social ideals, and the contentment of the average individual is placed in the foreground. That in the conflict between these two ideals an even hand has always been held by the government would be difficult to show.

The separation of the Western man from the seaboard, and his environment, made him in a large degree free from European precedents and forces. He looked at things independently and with small regard or appreciation for the best Old World experience. He had no ideal of a philosophical, eclectic nation, that should advance civilization by "intercourse with foreigners and familiarity with their point of view, and readiness to adopt whatever is best and most suitable in their ideas, manners, and customs". His was rather the ideal of conserving and developing what was original and valuable in this new country. The entrance of old society upon free lands meant to him opportunity for a new type of democracy and new popular ideals. The West was not conservative : buoyant self-confidence and self-assertion were distinguishing traits in its composition. It saw in its growth nothing less than a new order of society and state. In this conception were elements of evil and elements of good.

But the fundamental fact in regard to this new society was its relation to land. Professor Boutmy has said of the United States, "Their one primary and predominant object is to cultivate and settle these prairies, forests, and vast waste lands. The striking and peculiar characteristic of American society is that it is not so much a democracy as a huge commercial company for the discovery, cultivation, and capitalization of its enormous territory. The United States are primarily a commercial society, and only secondarily a nation." Of course this involves a serious misapprehension. By the very fact of the task here set forth, far-reaching ideals of the state

and of society have been evolved in the West, accompanied by loyalty to the nation representative of these ideals. But M. Boutmy's description hits the substantial fact, that the fundamental traits of the man of the interior were due to the free lands of the West. These turned his attention to the great task of subduing them to the purposes of civilization, and to the task of advancing his economic and social status in the new democracy which he was helping to create. Art, literature, refinement, scientific administration, all had to give way to this titanic labour. Energy, incessant activity, became the lot of this new American. Says a traveller of the time of Andrew Jackson, "America is like a vast workshop, over the door of which is printed in blazing characters, 'No admittance here, except on business'". The West of our own day reminds Mr. Bryce "of the crowd which Vathek found in the hall of Eblis, each darting hither and thither with swift steps and unquiet mien, driven to and fro by a fire in the heart. Time seems too short for what they have to do, and the result always to come short of their desire."

But free lands and the consciousness of working out their social destiny did more than turn the Westerner to material interests and devote him to a restless existence. They promoted equality among the Western settlers, and reacted as a check on the aristocratic influences of the East. Where everybody could have a farm, almost for taking it, economic equality easily resulted, and this involved political equality. Not without a struggle would the Western man abandon this ideal, and it goes far to explain the unrest in the remote West to-day.

Western democracy included individual liberty, as well as equality. The frontiersman was impatient of restraints. He knew how to preserve order, even in the absence of legal authority. If there were cattle thieves, lynch law was sudden and effective: the regulators of the Carolinas were the predecessors of the claims associations of Iowa and the vigilance committees of California. But the individual was not ready to submit to complex regulations. Population was sparse, there

was no multitude of jostling interests, as in older settlements, demanding an elaborate system of personal restraints. Society became atomic. There was a reproduction of the primitive idea of the personality of the law, a crime was more an offence against the victim than a violation of the law of the land. Substantial justice, secured in the most direct way, was the ideal of the backwoodsman. He had little patience with finely drawn distinctions or scruples of method. If the thing was one proper to be done, then the most immediate, rough and ready, effective way was the best way.

It followed from the lack of organized political life, from the atomic conditions of the backwoods society, that the individual was exalted and given free play. The West was another name for opportunity. Here were mines to be seized, fertile valleys to be pre-empted, all the natural resources open to the shrewdest and the boldest. The United States is unique in the extent to which the individual has been given an open field, unchecked by restraints of an old social order, or of scientific administration of government. The self-made man was the Western man's ideal, was the kind of man that all men might become. Out of his wilderness experience, out of the freedom of his opportunities, he fashioned a formula for social regeneration—the freedom of the individual to seek his own.

In American history there was not just one single moving frontier but several—the explorers', the fur traders', the miners', the ranchers', and the farmers'—following each other at intervals. " When the trappers scaled the Rockies " says Turner " the farmer was still near the mouth of the Missouri." Much the same thing happened in Australia. *How far can the moving-frontier theme be applied to Australia?* Professor Fred Alexander, of the University of Western Australia, dealt with this query a few years ago in his Presidential Address to the History Section of the Australian and New Zealand Association for the Advancement of Science. After pointing out that the effect of the American frontier

persisted for many years after its disappearance in the closing years of the nineteenth century, he went on to compare American conditions with Australian. Here are his conclusions, later given at greater length in his book, *Moving Frontiers*. The comparison is full of interest, although certain important details differed in the two continents. Professor Alexander is reluctant to apply the American theme too closely to Australian history, although he believes that many aspects of this history might usefully be re-examined from the Turner angle. The Western Australian, for example, like the American Middle Westerner, developed as one of his main characteristics a strong reluctance to become a member of a larger national polity, though he, too, realized eventually that he could not afford to do otherwise.

FRED ALEXANDER

THE FRONTIER THEME IN AUSTRALIAN HISTORY

AUSTRALIA has had no steadily and progressively expanding frontier in the American sense. Its history has been in the main the story of a people inhabiting relatively narrow coastal belts in the eastern and south-eastern sections of the continent and a less thickly populated strip in the remote south-west. The racial homogeneity of these people reinforced the requirements of the geography and climate of their country. An outside observer might therefore be tempted to link the political and constitutional development of Australia, if not also its social and economic progress, with the Old World rather than the New, with Europe rather than America. *Mutatis mutandis*, our political evolution has proceeded within the familiar English pattern, through representative institutions to responsible Government. . . .

But the Australian political system and the balance of forces within it are Australian, not British. Australian trade unions and what may be called the Australian way of life are also sufficiently distinctive to demand separate analysis. This

analysis reveals an expansive influence of the frontier type which makes at times a decisive if not always a continuing contribution to Australian development, economic, political, and social.

The earliest clear example of frontier influence is, of course, the pastoral frontier across the Blue Mountains. This expansion, it should be remembered, was not government-inspired. It was spontaneous and individualist; like the early American expansion westward, it was also revolutionary in its attitude to established authority, anti-social in the Frederick Turner sense. In Australia, the sheep-men on the frontier rapidly revolutionized the penal settlement, challenged the small-settler plans of Governors Bligh and Macquarie and gave the flourishing mid-nineteenth century New South Wales its dominating individualism, political as well as economic.

The opposition from within the colony was not negligible, and might in time have gained the formidable strength which W. C. Wentworth had already come to fear by 1850. In actual fact, however, when the fight to fashion Australian democracy was really joined, from the 'sixties on, the issue was determined by developments on another frontier, the mining frontiers of Victoria and New South Wales in the 'fifties and of Queensland in the 'sixties.

The gold rushes in Australia are as deserving of frontier designation as those discoveries of gold and silver on either side of the Rockies which served to bridge the gap between the Pacific Coast settlements and the more slowly moving frontier of the 'sixties on the Great Plains. It should also be remembered that Australian mining frontiers are not limited to gold. Broken Hill and Port Pirie are sufficient reminders of different and, in some respects, more continuing influences upon the Australian economy and upon Australian life. Moreover, the gold frontier, with its colourful appeal and its more readily dramatized influence, was not confined to Victoria and New South Wales.

Australian historians have worked out the political, social

and economic consequences of the gold rushes of the 'fifties, but the task is still to be done for the gold frontier of the west. There is scope here for a fusion of historical research and social analysis. For the political first-fruits of the Coolgardie and Kalgoorlie 'fields, with their " t'othersider " inhabitants, in dragging a reluctant western colony into Federation, do not exhaust the political influence of the western goldfields. This influence still continues, not only through the voting strength of the revived 'fields themselves, but also in the political colour of many farmers in the West Australian wheat-belt, whose fathers migrated from the 'fields during their decline in the first decade of the twentieth century. When the history of the Labour Party in Western Australia is written, we may expect to find that the political influence of the gold frontier in the west was considerable and continuous in its effects inside and outside the State and that this influence was comparable in some respects, however different in others from the sugar frontier of Queensland.

The close association between declining goldfields and agricultural expansion in Victoria and New South Wales as well as in Western Australia has no doubt some parallels in other countries, but the association is a distinctive feature of the political and economic history of Australia and deserves recognition as such. It helps, moreover, to provide a prima facie case for the " frontier " interpretations of Australian history. Sheep-men across the Blue Mountains and elsewhere, miners of both eastern and western colonies, and those farmers whose importance to Australia was greatly stimulated by the use of the " stripper " towards the middle of the century and of " Federation Wheat " at its end—all three together justify us in speaking of pastoral, mining, and farming frontiers in Australian as well as American history.

The analogy with Frederick Turner's interpretation of the American frontier was phrased in striking terms in the brief reference made by Professor W. K. Hancock in 1940, in the second volume of his *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs*

> "There is a famous gap in the range of the Blue Mountains, that wall of rock and scrub which for a quarter of a century hemmed in this colony of New South Wales within the coastal plains. Stand at this gap and watch the frontiers following each other westward—the squatters' frontier which filled the western plains with sheep and laid the foundations of Australia's economy, the miners' frontier which brought Australia population and made her a radical democracy, the farmers' frontier which gradually and painfully tested and proved the controls of Australian soil and climate. Stand a few hundred miles farther west of the Darling River and see what these controls have done to the frontier. The farmers have dropped out of the westward-moving procession, beaten by aridity. Only the pastoralists and prospectors pass by. In the west centre of the continent, aridity has beaten even the pastoralists. On the fringe of a dynamic society there are left only a few straggling prospectors and curious anthropologists, infrequent invaders of the aboriginal reserves."

Perhaps the most significant feature of farming and pastoral frontiers in Australia is their limits, both territorially and politically. Here the analogy with American history is seriously weakened. Large areas of the Australian continent remain, if not untouched, at least substantially unexploited by pastoralists or miner or farmer. Moreover, urban industrialization in Australia successfully challenged frontier influence even before the Australian frontiers closed.

Australian and American history must therefore each be studied in its own context. This does not mean that the frontier theme is necessarily without valuable stimulus in its application to Australian history. . . .

It is submitted that the influence of the Australian frontier has been more consolidating than sectional—a Secession Referendum and a New States Movement notwithstanding. Too close an analogy with the American frontier is here

dangerous, for we have not had the same mixture of races which might be Australianized, liberated, and fused " in the crucible of the frontier ".

More important is the way in which certain frontier regions have strengthened national movements, both before and since Federation. An obvious example is the influence of Kalgoorlie and Coolgardie in forcing Western Australia into Federation at the twelfth hour. Less generally appreciated is the support given by Western Australia to referenda proposals for increasing Commonwealth powers. This applies with special significance to those parts of the State which can still be regarded as frontier regions, such as the Goldfields and the outer Wheat Belt.

Analysis of voting by State electoral divisions in the Secession Referendum of 1933 confirms the national rather than sectional outlook of the goldfields. The virtually complete figures published in the *West Australian* of April 20, 1933, show the total State vote " Yes " (for Secession) 136,458; " No ", 69,314. The divisional grouping of mining and pastoral constituencies totalled " Yes " 6130; " No " 7577, with individual mining centres still more definitely " No ". Divisional classification of the figures on the Secession Referendum is more important than the total State vote, which is generally recognized to have been a gesture of protest rather than a deliberate vote for secession. Nor can the goldfields vote of 1933 be regarded as merely a nostalgic " t'othersider " declaration as it had been, in part, in the 'nineties.

In short, it is submitted that analysis of referenda voting from 1909 to 1944 confirms the existence of a national rather than a purely sectional viewpoint in the outlying State of Western Australia and notably so in its more distinctively " frontier " districts. Like the American Mid-westerner of the nineteenth century, the West Australian realizes—when he is forced to it—that he cannot afford a policy of isolation despite his distrust of what he regards as domination by eastern States capitals. Hence the slogan, current during the

1944 referendum campaign: "Vote 'Yes' and save Western Australia from Melbourne and Sydney!" . . .

With regard to the second application of the Turner theme of 1893, the frontier and the development of democracy, there are again some obvious entries to be made on the credit side of the frontier ledger. It is almost axiomatic nowadays that Australian democracy owes much of its force and some of its direction to the mining frontiers of the 'fifties. The influence can easily be exaggerated but it is not to be ignored. Even the mining frontier of the 'eighties and 'nineties could also be used, as Turner used the pressure from frontier regions of New York and Virginia, to help explain the broadening of the franchise in the colony of Western Australia, though this analogy should not be pressed too far.

When allowance is also made for the posthumous contribution of eastern mining frontiers to the development of urban industries in Victoria and New South Wales and the consequential growth of the Australian Labour movement, the influence of the frontier upon Australian democracy must be ranked as considerable. Nor should all the credit go to mining frontiers. The sheep-men of the 'thirties, 'forties, and early 'fifties deserve due recognition for their share in the early struggles for self-government even though the brand which the squatters would have put upon the democracy of self-governing colonies would have been very different from that by which it is recognized to-day, thanks primarily to the mining frontiers of the 'fifties.

Primarily, but not exclusively—for it is time to call a halt to appraising frontier influence on Australian democracy and to look instead for the influence of that urban industrialization which, in Australia, preceded as well as accompanied the closing of the frontier. Australians had no large-scale foreign immigration in the decade before or the decade after the first world war to help disguise the economic and social effects of urban industrial expansion. The Australian Labour movement, unlike the American, entered the political arena in its own

right and so gave an ideological or class, rather than a regional or sectional, character to Australian political divisions. The Australian Senate, moreover, soon ceased to be a States house, whereas, in the United States, sectional interests have been at times all-important in Congress.

In Australia, too, partly for physiographic reasons, the moving frontier did not throw up many large manufacturing towns in former pastoral or farming frontier areas. The concentration of manufacturing industry in coastal cities gave to Australia its distinctive concentration of industrial and political power in capital cities and particularly in those capital cities of the eastern and south-eastern seaboard which were also large industrial centres. The posthumous influence of the frontier on Australian democracy is therefore small by comparison with the influence it still wields in the United States.

The pressure which forced the American frontier westward was also felt in other directions, and " incidents " were frequent along the Canadian border. With the victory of the North in the American Civil War in 1865, Canada was left in a state of worried weakness. But the very presence of such a powerful—and sometimes aggressive—neighbour helped to bring about the confederation of the Provinces and the constitution of the Dominion of Canada under the provisions of the famous Act of 1867. This Act is a landmark not only in Canadian history but in the Commonwealth story as a whole, for Canada's example was soon to be followed by the chief colonies in the Pacific.

We are now approaching the end of that long period of non-expansionist policy which characterized the second British Empire for nearly a hundred years. *Why was Britain anxious not to increase her Empire throughout most of the nineteenth century?* The reasons for her reluctance to accept fresh commitments " at a time when opportunities, judged by the elastic moral code of imperialism, were easy and attractive " says Paul Knaplund " may be briefly summarized as the absence of foreign rivals; a lack of interest on the part of merchants and industrialists in territorial expansion; and the championing of the rights of natives by the humanitarians ". But now, with the international scramble for colonies in Africa in the 'eighties, and with the

development of industrial technique in more and more countries and the consequent need for fresh overseas markets, the mood changes to one of deliberate expansion and to a new pride and optimism in the greatness of empire. Listen to Sir George Grey as he addresses the National Australian Convention held at Sydney in 1891, and see how the new spirit manifests itself. Grey was one of the most experienced colonial administrators in the nineteenth century and he had always opposed the short-sighted policy of the " Little Englanders ". " Take one step " he said " and in taking that step let us open the road to all future steps." The first step had been the confederation of the Canadian Provinces, the last, in the eyes of the new optimists, was to be the federation of all English-speaking peoples.

SIR GEORGE GREY

TOWARDS FEDERAL UNION

IT is with feelings almost of awe that I rise to speak before an assembly gathered from all parts of Australia, upon so vast and important a subject as that which occupies our attention this day. I think that our duty proper in forming a representative constitution is to begin at the lowest body from which that constitution is to be built up—that is, the people at large. . . .

Who can tell what political inventions are yet to be made? Why, the principle of representation as we enjoy it is, comparatively speaking, a modern discovery and the principle of federation has not developed yet. We are the people for the first time to give it a new form, if we please. We can develop it to a higher point than it has ever yet reached. It is an invention; but as is the case with electricity, day by day better modes will be found for administering it—better means for making it more useful to men.

We now, as I say, take one step, and in taking that step let us open the road to all future steps. Let that be our care to lead on; let us march into the wide track of improving

all these institutions; let us lead on, and you will find that grateful nations will follow, and we shall discover that we had known nothing, although we now think we know so much—so great will be the changes which will occur—so great will be the inventions which will be made.

Then there is one thing which lies very near my mind. Let us remember this. In my youth it was said that men of different religious faiths could not sit in the same legislature together, and they were excluded—Jews, Catholics, Non-conformists. Nobody, it was thought, but members of the Church of England could form a legislative body that was of any use at all. To leaven them with other material was to spoil the whole thing. But it was found that that was a great mistake; that men of different religious faiths could sit side by side in the same legislature; that talent and ability can be drawn forth from any religious opinions whatever. The nation has progressed more than ever it has done before in so short a period of time; and its happiness and tranquillity are greater.

I think we should establish this principle in reference to federation. Let us say that if the English-speaking people choose to federate in one great body, we shall not ask what that form of government is. In the same body could sit men who hail from a republic and men who hail from a monarchy. Take the case of South Africa, where there are two republics. We might have federation in a wonderful degree if that rule were laid down; and surely, if seven or eight States there met together to consult for the common good of South Africa and to make a law which would be beneficial to the whole of them, it could matter very little whether the representatives of two States came from republics instead of from a monarchy as in the case of the other States. Equally well can they advise upon that which is good for the whole—equally well can they care for their fellow-countrymen, speaking the same language, with laws identical in all respects, equally well can they care for them, whether the head of the Government is called a president, or whether, as in our case, we rejoice to live under

so great and good a Queen. What difference can it make? We should be the first to lead on in that great improvement and to say this: "Now, the federation of all English-speaking people may take place; the United States can come in with us; all men speaking the common tongue can meet to debate upon what is necessary for the common benefit".

I think honourable gentlemen will feel, however crude these doctrines may be, that there is much in them. Remember this: that America must have a great deal to say in regard to the Pacific Ocean. The last speaker alluded very kindly to the idea, that was entertained years ago, of federating with all the islands of the South Pacific, and arrangements were made by which that might be carried out. But what was the feeling in England?

Directly it was known that we thought of common Customs duties for all the islands—all the islands, as well as these larger places—the moment that was thought of, and it was seen that it afforded the means of paying one or two European officers for the purpose of guiding and directing the natives in the line of duty which they should follow, the British Government became alarmed, and there was a peremptory order sent out which prevented that plan being continued. It was finished at once. Well, not only was that the case, but so strong was the desire then to break up the empire—and this is a good illustration of the kind of changes that you may have to meet, changes of human thought—that it was determined, if possible, to get rid of the outlying dependencies, and to reduce the dominions of Great Britain. The Orange River sovereignty was first thrown off. Then it was contemplated to throw other places off, and force them to become republics. It was said that England was too large; that what you wanted was a nation—not thinking of all these distant places—with their minds fixed upon manufacture and commerce, manufacturing for the world; it was sufficient to breed up in your great cities a population in the last depths of misery, but always ready to rush into manufactures at the lowest rate

of wages whenever an improvement of trade took place. It was said that Britain should confine herself to her manufactures and to her own immediate territories, and leave the rest of the world to itself. But what thought other people, and what thought England ? Let me just give one illustration of this.

I was arranging for the federation of South Africa—triumphantly arranging it—certainly all the States, I believe, but one would have joined, and that one would almost immediately afterwards have probably come in—but when it was heard of, the Government then in power, and the opposition at home, were alike filled with dread at such a federation as was contemplated. It was said that the man who contemplated that was a dangerous man, and he must be got rid of, and without a moment's warning I was dismissed from office as Governor and High Commissioner of the Cape.

Well, there was one person in the realm who thought differently. Afterwards, within a few days the ministry were put out in consequence of a quarrel with Lord Palmerston—I think it was within twelve days—and the first thing that was said to the new ministry was : " That man is right, you will yet long to do what he could have done, and you will be sorry that it was not done ; reinstate him in his position ".

It was the Queen who spoke, and what was her feeling towards her people at large ? As the Prince Consort explained the matter to myself, they felt the necessity of openings for the poor, for the adventurous. They thought no wrongful efforts should ever be made to extend an empire, that so long as the people of Great Britain, urged by their indomitable energy, kept pushing on themselves, winning new races, winning new countries to join the great confederation of English people, so long would it be wrong for the Sovereign to injure her people by saying they should not go to these new homes, they should not open these new places for commerce, that they must remain shut up in a small and continually decreasing empire at home, as it would have been if the policy had been acted upon, of striking off place after place.

Well, I maintain that the hearts which conceived that conception—that love for the English race—represented the true feeling of the nation, and experience has shown that such was the case. There we are in New Zealand in spite of the Government of the day. They tried to stop the foundation of the colony. There they are at the Cape of Good Hope, spreading over the whole of the country, although the earlier settlers were punished if they attempted to pass the Orange River. No further spread of territory there was to be allowed. And now you have Great Britain grasping immense territories in Africa, probably going even beyond her strength—such has been the change of public opinion upon this subject.

I ask you, therefore, whether we, in providing for the spread of the empire in the Pacific, whether we, in providing for all English-speaking races coming into the one great confederation, shall not equally now be doing our duty to the future, as I believe that our noble Queen, and those who thought with her—there were really but few—thought rightly, thought well, when they determined that the energies of the British race should spread exactly as their instincts moved them, and, provided they committed no wrong upon others, should be allowed to go in and replenish and fill up all the waste places of the earth. These are the points which appear to me so essentially necessary for our guidance—this policy of letting all English-speaking people into the confederation, of not attempting to fetter our posterity by any peculiar laws, of simply giving them power to enable them to determine what laws they would live under themselves. Holding those two main points in view, we should, I think, accomplish all we could possibly desire. . . .

I will not detain honourable gentlemen longer. I have given what I believe to be an outline of a proper plan of proceeding. I will do my best to bring the points forward in committee, as these questions arise. I entertain in my own mind a confident belief of this—that what I have asked for, whether it is done now or not, will be done in Australasia—I

will not say in my lifetime, although I have seen great changes —but I believe it will be done in Australasia in a very short period of time. If it is done, I have a confident belief, founded upon a long experience, that the nation, educated in public schools first, then educated in public life afterwards in the world, so that the thought and care of their fellow-man is continually before their minds—I believe that such a nation will attain to higher prosperity than any other people have yet attained, because in the United States still are many of those things wanting in that degree of perfection in which we may have them here. From the full exercise of the faculties of self-government, and of the management of the nation, will certainly spring prosperity and happiness of a kind hitherto unknown.

Grey did not live to see the federation of Australia, but his optimism was not unfounded, for only two years after his death and less than ten years after he delivered the above address, Joseph Chamberlain was introducing the Constitution Bill for Australia in the House of Commons. *How did the Commonwealth of Australia come into being?* The answer will be found in the following extracts from Chamberlain's speech, and with it an interesting contrast between the constitutions of Canada and Australia. Chamberlain was an enthusiastic supporter of Australian federation and, like Grey, he regarded it as a step towards the federation of the whole Empire.

JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN

THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

I HAVE no doubt there are many members of the House who will be inclined to envy me the privilege that has fallen to my lot in introducing this Bill for the federation of some of our greatest colonies—a Bill which marks an era in

the history of Australia, and is a great and important step towards the organization of the British Empire.

This Bill, which is the result of the careful and prolonged labours of the ablest statesmen in Australia, enables that great island continent to enter at once the widening circle of English-speaking nations. No longer will she be a congeries of States, each of them separate from and entirely independent of the others, a position which anyone will see might possibly in the future, through the natural consequences of competition, become a source of danger or lead, at any rate, to friction and to weakness. But, if this Bill passes, in future Australia will be, in the words of the preamble of the Bill which I am about to introduce, " an indissoluble federal Commonwealth firmly united for many of the most important functions of government ".

After it has been passed, there will be for Australia under one administration a uniform postal and telegraphic service, and provision is made making it possible hereafter for railway communication to be under similar control. In the meantime everything which has to do with the exterior relations of the six colonies concerned will be a matter for the Commonwealth, and not for the individual Governments ; a common tariff will be established for all the colonies ; there will be at the same time intercolonial free-trade, and, what is perhaps more important than all, in future there will be a common form and a common control of national defences.

Now, this is a consummation long expected and earnestly hoped for by the people of this country. We believe that it is in the interest of Australia, and that has always been with us the first consideration. But we recognize that it is also in our interest as well ; we believe the relations between ourselves and these colonies will be simplified, will be more frequent and unrestricted, and, if it be possible, though I hardly think it is, will be more cordial when we have to deal with a single central authority instead of having severally to consult six independent Governments.

Whatever is good for Australia is good for the whole British Empire. Therefore, we all of us—independently altogether of party, whether at home or in any other portion of the empire—rejoice at this proposal, welcome the new birth of which we are witnesses, and anticipate for these great, free, and progressive communities a future even more prosperous than their past, and an honourable and important position in the history of the Anglo-Saxon race. . . .

I think it is true to say that, on the whole, this new constitution, although it is in important respects unlike every other constitution at present existing, still in the main, and more than any other, follows the constitution of the United States of America. But it would be, perhaps, more interesting to us to contrast it with the constitution of our own colony of Canada. The differences between the constitution of the Dominion and the constitution of the new Commonwealth, are, I think to be explained in a certain fundamental diversity in the position of the two colonies, and also in the methods by which the constitution has been brought into existence.

In the case of Canada, the delegates came here and the constitution was settled here in conference with her Majesty's Government, and was the result, to some extent at any rate, of our advice and suggestion.

In the case of Australia, the people of Australia, through their representatives, have worked alone, without either inviting or desiring any assistance from outside. In Australia, it must also be remembered, the separate States have enjoyed for a much longer period than had the provinces of Canada complete independent self-governing existence, and, accordingly, while in Canada the people had before them at the time that the constitution was decided upon, the warning, I might almost say, afforded by the Civil War in America, of the danger of exaggerating State rights, and while the special provinces had no desire to put forward those rights in too emphatic a manner, in Australia there was no such example to fear, and the separate colonies had enjoyed for so long such great powers that they

were naturally unwilling to part with them to anything like the same extent.

Accordingly, while in Canada the result of the constitution was substantially to amalgamate the provinces into one dominion, the constitution of Australia created a federation for distinctly definite and limited objects of a number of independent States, and State rights have throughout been jealously preserved. In Canada everything that was not given expressly to the provinces went to the Central Government. In Australia the Central Government has only powers over matters which are expressly stated and defined in the constitution. In Canada the Senate was a body which represented particular provinces substantially in proportion to their population. In Australia the Senate consists of six members from all the States—that is to say, an equal number, whatever may be the size of the population ; and the mode of the election of the Senate is also different from that of Canada, and, I believe, entirely novel. In Canada the Senate was nominated for life on the advice of the ministers. In the United States, as we all know, the Senate is elected by the legislatures of the several States. In Australia the Senate is to be elected at the same election as the Lower House, but each State is to vote, not in the separate constituencies into which it is divided for the purposes of the Lower House, but as one constituency—a *scrutin de liste*, in fact, as the French call it—except in the case of Queensland, where there may be divisions.

The upper House is to serve for six years instead of three ; but those are the only differences which separate it in composition, qualification, or constitution from the composition of the Lower House. The Lower House is to be elected according to the electoral laws of the several States, but according to population, and a very ingenious device has been resorted to in order to prevent the numbers of the Lower House from ever becoming excessive. It is provided by the constitution that the members of the Lower House shall, as far as possible, be exactly double the numbers of the Upper House or Senate.

I should add, perhaps, that the members of both Houses will be paid, and paid the same salary.

There is also an example which I cannot help thinking might be wisely imitated by ourselves. Ministers on taking office do not vacate their seats. Then there is a most ingenious and complicated provision to prevent a possible deadlock between the two Houses; for although they are, as I have said, elected practically by the same constituency, I think it is evident that the differences in the manner of election may sometimes result in a diversity of opinion between the two chambers. In that case—and here, also, I cannot help thinking that hon. members who are interested in the subject may find many useful suggestions—the course of the operation is this.

Measures may be twice rejected by the Senate, as I understand, in two separate sessions of Parliament. After that the Government may dissolve both Houses. Both Houses will be re-elected at the same time. If, after that re-election, the Senate should again—a third time—reject a measure, then there is to be a joint sitting of both Houses, and a decision is to be taken by a simple majority of both Houses. That applies to the case of ordinary measures, but, if the question between the two Houses is an amendment of the constitution, then a somewhat different course is followed. The proposed amendment may be twice rejected by the Senate, and if after that the Houses do not come to an agreement, then the amendment will be settled by means of a referendum, and is to be decided by the majority of votes in a majority of the States.

Now, to this new Parliament so constituted thirty-nine distinct subjects have been expressly referred. Amongst them are the tariff, post office and telegraph services, defence, currency, bankruptcy, marriage and divorce, and old-age pensions, and also the following matters—to which I call special attention because they involve interests outside Australia as well as local—first, the fisheries in Australian waters, beyond the territorial limits of Australia; secondly, copyright; thirdly, legislation dealing with the people of any

race not being natives of any of the States (I think that has in view legislation in regard to Asiatics); fourthly, "external affairs", a phrase of great breadth and vagueness, which, unless interpreted and controlled by some other provision, might easily, it will be seen, give rise to serious difficulties; and, fifthly, the relations with the islands of the Pacific, which also involves, of course, many questions in which foreign nations are concerned.

It will be seen that almost all the points to which I have thus called special attention are matters in which the Imperial Government may have to deal with foreign countries. It is important, therefore—I say this in passing, although I shall deal with it more at length—it is important that measures of this kind, which may involve the Imperial Government in the most serious responsibility, should be interpreted by a tribunal in which all parties have confidence. . . .

Two colonies—Western Australia and New Zealand—appealed to her Majesty's Government, and were represented here by special delegates, and asked us to interfere to secure for them certain amendments in the Bill. I may say her Majesty's Government were inclined to sympathize with the desire of both these colonies. Her Majesty's Government would have been very glad indeed could their wishes have been complied with; but, as we considered that it was an entirely Australian question, as it was a difference of opinion arising between the Australian colonies, in which neither the empire nor the mother country were themselves directly concerned, we felt we were not justified in pressing these claims, or in insisting upon securing their adoption as against the majority of the colonies in Australia.

Western Australia asked for the right to come in as an original State, on terms slightly different from those provided in the constitution. The differences arose as to the question of tariffs; and undoubtedly it was admitted by the five federating colonies that, owing to the peculiar position of Western Australia, she was entitled to some period of interval before

she adopted the common tariff of the Commonwealth; and accordingly five years were allowed her for that purpose, subject to the condition that each year one-fifth of any difference that might exist between the tariff of Western Australia and the tariff of the Commonwealth should be reduced.

I confess that it seemed to me that a condition of that kind imposed, and I still think it imposes, on the financial system of Western Australia a very considerable strain. I do not envy the position of the Chancellor of the Exchequer who is beforehand tied down by a statutory and constitutional law to reduce his tariff by one-fifth in every successive year for five years to come. It is perfectly evident that that must interfere to a considerable extent with the production of his annual budget. But, as I have said, having appealed to the Premiers, and having put forward the views of Western Australia, and having received from them the statement that they did not feel justified in assenting to any amendments, we reported the result of our inquiries to Sir John Forrest, the highly respected Premier of Western Australia; and we ventured—although it was perhaps hardly our business—in the interest, as we believed, of Australia as a whole and even of Western Australia, to press upon him that his Government should now reconsider their position, and that in spite of the arrangements of which they complained they should seek to enter the federation as an original State.

I am very happy to say—as will be seen by the blue-book which I have laid upon the table—that Sir John Forrest and his Government have assented to our request to take this step. Their Parliament will be shortly called together; and I hope the result will be that the constitution will be submitted to the people of Western Australia,[1] and that her Majesty's Government will be able to proclaim the whole of the six colonies of Australia as taking part in this great scheme.

The colony of New Zealand made several requests to us. Two of these were, I think, of minor importance. . . . The

[1] This step was duly taken, and a vote in favour of the entrance of Western Australia into the Commonwealth recorded.

third proposal was that New Zealand should be allowed to enter as an original State at any time within the next seven years—I do not know that the period of seven years was a definite part of the proposition ; but, at all events, a considerable period was to be given to them to make their choice. I confess that here also I should have been very glad if the Premiers had seen their way to accept the suggestion. The delegates, however, who were representing the five federating colonies explained, very ably, the difficulties that would arise from such a state of things. They pointed out that great inconvenience might be suffered, especially with regard to the establishment of a tariff, if the federating colonies were under a sort of compulsion to accept another partner at any time during a long period. . . .

As it was exclusively a matter between New Zealand and the federating colonies, and as the Premiers again put in a *non possumus* and stated that they had no authority to consent at this period to any further amendments, we have had no course open to us but to accept, although we regret, that decision. We could not, I think, fairly press the opinion of a single colony against the unanimous opinion of five.

In point of fact New Zealand did not enter the union. Seven years later, in 1907, the Dominion of New Zealand was inaugurated independently. Chamberlain himself had long been an imperial federalist at heart, and from 1887 onwards he worked hard for a closer union of all parts of the Empire for purposes of defence and trade. Nowhere was his task more difficult, however, and nowhere was he subjected to harsher criticism than in his dealings with South Africa, where he had to negotiate on the one hand with President Kruger in the Transvaal and on the other with the Radical opposition at home. Determined to uphold the rights of British subjects in the Transvaal (the *Uitlanders*) he found in Cecil Rhodes a kindred, if somewhat impetuous, spirit. Rhodes's ambition was to " paint the map of Africa red " and, in particular, to build a railway from the Cape to Cairo. To him the essential goodness and greatness of the British Empire was

something of a faith, and he therefore felt himself morally bound to extend the Empire as far as possible. *How did Rhodes propose to federate South Africa?* The answer will be found in the following speech delivered at Cape Town in July 1899, only three months before the South African War broke out. Rhodes had never lived down his part in the Jameson Raid (1896), but by this time his popularity was again rising, thanks to his courageous and masterly handling of the Matabele Rebellion.

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CECIL RHODES

SOUTH AFRICA UNITED

I HAVE to thank you for the great reception that you have given me here to-night. I recognize what it is for; it is for the work, the idea. We must dismiss the personal. I listened to-night to the various addresses; they carry encouragement towards the completion of a great idea. When the thought came to get through the continent, it was a mad thought, it was the idea of a lunatic. That is what they said; but it has grown, and it has advanced, and you greet me here to-night because you see that it has passed from the era of imagination to practical completion.

It is now not a question, sir, of the lunacy of the project; it is merely a question of the years that it will take to complete. The only awkward thing is the progress of time. We do get older, and we do become a little hurried in our ideas because of that terrible time. You can conquer anything. You can conquer, if you will allow me to say it, even raids, but time you can never interfere with; and so we have to complete, with all the rapidity we can, the project that is before us, that is, the project of uniting the North and the South of Africa. You have been good enough to ask me how, or rather what success has been achieved. Thanks to the goodness of our people, when the politicians were rather timid I may tell you that I was fortunate enough to obtain 4 millions of money

to extend the railway from Bulawayo in the direction of Egypt. That sum will carry us to the borders of the German sphere, that is, to Tanganyika. It means four or five years of work, but during these subsequent five years one will not be bothered with pounds, shillings, and pence, because the money is subscribed. Then I hope to get the engineers to proceed with their work with the greatest rapidity possible.

Then we arrive at the borders of the German territory, and as I notice you have referred in the kindest way to the actions of the German Emperor towards myself, I can only tell you that, in my humble opinion, he is a big man. He allowed me to understand that he would be pleased to see me, and I discussed with him the question of passing through his territory by telegraph and railway, and he met me in the fairest way, and gave me, through his ministers, every assistance. There will be no difficulty with the German territory, and I can only add that I think the German people are very fortunate in having such an emperor, who spends his whole day in efforts for his people. We have the private satisfaction of knowing that he is half an Englishman. Well, sir, you can see we are getting on.

And then, sir, I had the good luck to meet Lord Kitchener in London. We met very frequently, and we rode in the morning together. I think horse exercise increases the activity of the brain. And we came to a distinct understanding, and I think you will hear before very long that funds have been provided for Lord Kitchener to proceed from Khartoum to Uganda. I had the opportunity of meeting him on several occasions. We met at Oxford. Talking of Oxford, really one sometimes feels fortunate in having done very wrong, because it brings out the affection and support of one's people. . . .

And, sir, my people have changed. I speak of the English people, with their marvellous common sense, coupled with their powers of imagination—all thoughts of a Little England are over. They are tumbling over each other, Liberals and Conservatives, to show which side are the greatest and most

enthusiastic Imperialists. The people have changed, and so do all the parties, just like the Punch and Judy show at a country fair. The people have found out that England is small and her trade is large, and they have also found out that other people are taking their share of the world and enforcing hostile tariffs. The people of England are finding out that " trade follows the flag ", and they have all become Imperialists. They are not going to part with any territory. And the bygone ideas of nebulous republics are over. The English people intend to retain every inch of land they have got, and perhaps, sir, they intend to secure a few more inches. And so the thought of my country has changed. When I began this business of annexation, both sides were most timid. They would ask one to stop at Kimberley, then they would ask one to stop at Khama's country. I remember Lord Salisbury's Chief Secretary imploring me to stop at the Zambesi. Mr. Mayor, excuse me for using the word " I ", but unfortunately I have been alone in these efforts. Now, sir, they won't stop anywhere ; they have found out that the world is not quite big enough for British trade and the British flag ; and that the operation of even conquering the planets is only something which has yet to be known. I have little doubt about the colonial people, and in saying so I cover in the colonial people the Dutch as well as the English. Notwithstanding my past little temporary difficulty, if we were all to accept equal rights, I feel convinced that we should all be united on the proposition that Africa is not, after all, big enough for us.

And, gentlemen, with that comes the development of our own country. If I look back to the time when I was Prime Minister when I was told that I only thought of things outside of one's country, I naturally said, as I say now, " Look at the statute-book, the records of colonial and local legislation, and think of the wealth, the prosperity, and the noble position to which Cape Town itself has attained, and remember now that these results have accrued from the development of the

North ". Gentlemen, this country is only just beginning, and I consider that I am only just beginning—my public life has only just begun.

I have pointed out to you that we have the money, and we have a plan arranged, and the right to go to Egypt. I think that will take from seven to eight years of one's life. Can you expect more? What we have to guard against—and I see a representative here from Port Elizabeth—is that with development we do not lose the idea of union. As we take new States, we must not have the North going from us to fresh ports and fresh outlets. We must try, if possible, to keep the continent together. It is perfectly possible. I must not touch on politics to-night, but if we could only get a united feeling, Africa would be united up to Tanganyika. That is number two we have to work for. I personally have to work for my railway to Egypt, and my telegraph to Egypt, and you have to work with me for that greater object, the union of the country. I have often stated it, but if you were to go up in a balloon, how ridiculous it would appear to you to see all these divided States, divided tariffs, divided peoples; the Almighty made them one, and it is our work also to unite them. I hope that those who are opposed to us on the existence of a temptation in the wealth of the North will pass to the thought of union. I only wish I had a Johannesburg; if only one had a Johannesburg, one could unite the country to-morrow; and in the present trouble, if some of those who have thoughts different from us would think of the great object of union, all would be right. Then you would have a great commonwealth; then you would have a union of States; then I think, apart from my mother country, there would be no place in the world that would compete with it. You have the sheep, the wine, the gold, the diamonds, and the health, and a marvellous climate. There is no place in the world to touch this; there is no place to touch it for the beauty of its climate and the variety of its products, and yet we stupid human mortals are quarrelling over the equality of

rights, instead of thinking of the great country that has been given to us. But I must not wander into politics. I have told you that I have obtained the money to go to the North—money for all work during the next five years, and I hope that from Egypt they will come down to meet us. I look upon the question of the transcontinental telegraph and railway as practically over; it is now merely a question of time.

I am supported, sir, in my work by the reception you have given me to-night. I am supported by the addresses that I have received from every part of the country. I am supported, too, by the telegrams I have received. Would you believe it? I received to-day 100 telegrams from the Paarl. There is some terrible conspiracy on. They all come from Dutch names. I should recommend *Ons Land* to inquire into it to-morrow. And, sir, I am told on referring them to a friend of mine, Mr. Faure, that they are Dutch of the very best position in the Paarl. There is something very wrong going on, and the Commissie van Toezigt will have to meet. But it is a fact, sir, that apart from the addresses that you have given me to-day, I have received these telegrams which I mention, and there is also from my own district, lying here on the table, an address signed entirely by Dutch names. That is what we are working for, not only union of the country but union of the races, and, if I may put it, that will come right once the principle of equal rights is accepted—equal rights for every civilized man south of the Zambesi.

Once the competition between us is on the basis of the best man coming to the front, be he a German, or be he a Frenchman, or be he a Russian, or be he a Dutchman, or be he an Englishman, the question is over. I remember some years ago, when I was Prime Minister, being present at a meeting at Stellenbosch, and at the college there I saw the young men with their intelligent faces, and I felt that they had nothing to fear from the question of equal rights on an equal basis. I felt that they had nothing to fear. I felt that they had nothing to fear on account of the domination, and

the vigour, and the physical energy of my race. I don't think that they have much to fear if we can only accept that programme, which covers everything. You need not then talk of this law or of that law if you can get the thought impressed into the minds of those who share this country with us that all we want is equal rights; that the Almighty has made this country one, and you cannot make divisions. You can draw imaginary lines, but we are all one, and I would say, sir, it is of no good my trying to go to Egypt or thinking out thoughts of union if we are not all one.

I speak as representing a State which is no longer the despised Rhodesia, a country, as Mr. Van der Walt once put it so well, which only produces native women and whip-sticks. It is a gold-producing country, and Africa is going to look to it with the same amount of keen desire as it looks to the Transvaal. It is with those thoughts and those feelings that I speak to-night. You have spoken of getting to Egypt. I say: Yes, that is good. But if I go to Egypt I want to leave behind me a union of States that shares in that, a union of Dutch men who can give their lives to the development of these unknown countries. They will have their liberty in that union be they of English or be they of Dutch birth. That is what we are aiming at. True, our aim is the development of the Dark Continent, but surely one should have the thought and the desire that this country, of which one thinks so much, the Cape Colony, should have a share in that development. One should think of the development of Cape Colony in the development of those new territories. Do you think there can be any satisfaction in taking those new territories knowing they will pass only to others, even to those of my race, those from my own country, England? I would like you to share in that development. And so when you congratulate me on doing this work, when you say, "We wish you well", when you say, "We wish you success", I reply, "Share with me the object and the intent that led to it, and we will make this country unite south of the Zambesi".

How are we going to do that? It all lies in the adoption of that simple sentence, that we will have equal rights for every civilized man south of the Zambesi.

" I believe " said Rhodes on another occasion " in a United States of South Africa, but as a portion of the British Empire. I believe that confederated states in a colony under responsible government would each be practically an independent Republic, but I think we should also have all the privileges of the tie with the Empire. If you want to know how it is to be done, read the constitution and the history of the United States. The Americans have solved the problem." Rhodes devoted his few remaining years with great success to the development of Rhodesia. The railroad was brought up to Bulawayo and arrangements were made for extending it as far as the southern end of Lake Tanganyika: but the Cape to Cairo line was never completed. No one can think of Rhodes without coupling his name with that of his equally determined adversary, Paul Kruger. These two fought a long and strenuous duel, beginning in 1885 with the withdrawal of a Dutch commando from the frontier of Bechuanaland; and ending only with Rhodes's death shortly before hostilities ceased in the South African War (1899-1902). The following speech, delivered at the decisive sitting of the first and second Volksraad, a few days before Kruger issued the ultimatum which precipitated this war, is typical of one of the most famous men in all South African history.

PAUL KRUGER

THE JUSTICE OF THE CAUSE

HONOURABLE sirs, to tell you what is in my mind: you know how the Lord transplanted this people to this country and led it here amid miracles; so that we should have to say, " Lord, I no longer believe in Thee ", if things came to such a pass with us that now, when thousands of enemies are assailing us, we voluntarily surrendered the

land which He gave us and not we ourselves. Let us trust in God and together offer up our prayers to the Lord. He is waiting for our entreaties and He will be with us. The decision rests with Him, and He will decide, not on lies, but on the ground of truth.

You are familiar with the course of events and how the Volksraad and the people have yielded in everything that was demanded. First it was a question of the franchise. Three times we yielded in this matter and I repeat, so that it may appear upon the minutes, that it is a lie to say that we were not willing to treat those who came from abroad as our equals.

When the Convention of 1881 was concluded there were only a few English here; and what was it that they wanted? They were quite willing to be treated on an equal footing with our burghers, but registered themselves as British subjects; they preferred to remain foreigners rather than become subjects of this State.

You know, moreover, that, under the Convention of 1884, at the time of the Blue Mountains commando, they refused to take the field with our burghers, although by so doing they would have at once received the franchise. I brought the matter three times before the Raad and begged it to pass a resolution that they must defend the country; and the Volksraad confirmed that all who took part in the war should obtain the franchise. Then Loch came here and complained that the English were not treated as the most favoured nation. I thereupon again issued another proclamation, because I thought that there might really be people to be found who wished to stand on an equal footing with our burghers; I did this, although the Convention expressly lays down that they shall possess not equal political, but equal commercial rights. Now think—we are standing before the Lord and let each of us send his prayer on high to the Lord—where can they say that, with regard to trade, they were less favoured than our own burghers? Nowhere. They were, in this respect, even more favourably placed than our burghers. They could take

gold and anything they liked out of the country and they could even obtain political rights, but they would not have them. The High Commissioner demanded that we should extend the franchise and we had already done more; we even tried, afterwards, to treat them, the Uitlanders, on an equal footing with our burghers, but they declined.

In this respect, therefore, there is no injustice on our side. We can appear frankly before our Lord. He will decide, and He decides not by virtue of lies, but according to justice and truth. Let us therefore send up our prayers to Him on high, that He may guide us, and then, if thousands come, the Lord will guide us in right and justice until, perhaps, we shall be freed once and for all from all these cares. I place myself wholly in His hands.

I will accuse no one of being a false prophet; but read Psalm 108, verse 7, which came to my mind while I was struggling in prayer. You must not read it because I say so, but because it is God's Word. It was no dream that stood before my spirit, for false dreams mislead us and I do not trouble about them: I take my stand on God's Word alone. Now read that psalm attentively and associate your prayers with that: then will the Lord guide us; and, when He is with us, who shall be against us? Therefore I say to you, go among your burghers and exhort them continually to pray in this struggle.

We so often forget what the Lord has done. I will not speak again of the War of Independence, in which the Lord so visibly and wonderfully aided us. But was it otherwise in the Jameson Raid? They aimed thousands of shells and balls at us, while we shot only with rifles; and how wonderfully was the course of the bullets ordered! Three of us fell, while the enemy had hundreds killed and wounded. And who ordered the flight of the bullets? The Lord. He spared us then, to prove to us that He rules all things. The Lord will also protect you now, even if thousands of bullets fly around you. That is my faith and also my constant prayer for myself

for the burghers and for all who fight with us. I will say once more that the Lord will guide us : He will decide and show to us that He rules and none other.

It should be noted, in passing, that the South African War came as a great shock to those who put their faith in British imperialism ; the mood of optimistic patriotism which had reached a culminating point with the coincidence of the second Colonial Conference and Queen Victoria's Diamond Jubilee, in 1897, was rudely shaken. After the Peace of Vereeniging the problems of governing four separate colonies (Cape Colony, Natal, and the former Boer Republics of the Orange Free State and Transvaal) demanded an early settlement. The first step was taken only four years after the Treaty had been signed, when the Orange Free State and the Transvaal were granted full responsible government, thanks largely to the far-sighted policy of Campbell-Bannerman, who, from the very beginning of the war, had insisted that peace must be based on the full co-operation of the two white races in South Africa. As soon as the two new governments had had time to find their feet they warmly agreed with the Cape and Natal that a national convention should be called for the purpose of formulating a plan of union. The fruit of their discussions was the Union of South Africa in May 1910—an act which, in the words of Lord Crewe, " closes one chapter in the history of South Africa and begins a new one ". *What difficulties had to be overcome in framing the Union of South Africa ?* Listen to the Marquess of Crewe as he tells the House of Lords about these and about the advantages to be gained.

MARQUESS OF CREWE

THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

MY lords, I rise to ask your lordships to give a second reading to the South Africa Bill, a Bill which closes one chapter in the history of South Africa and begins a new one. It closes a chapter which has been varied and sometimes agitated, but on the whole not inglorious or unfruitful. It opens one in turning the first pages of which we feel hopes for

the future which we believe that the circumstances fully justify. My lords, this is not the time or the place for anything like a long historical disquisition on the causes which have led up to this proposal for the Union of South Africa ; but I think it is not unsuitable that I should endeavour to trace very briefly some points in that history and some of those causes.

Of all the dominions of his Majesty the King, South Africa is the one which least of any represents a long, conscious attempt towards a white settlement and the development of a great white community. During the 400 years and more that South Africa has been known to Europe—during the greater part of those 400 years it has been treated as a stopping-place on the great highway to the East, rather as a wayside inn than as a place of permanent sojourn. Both the Portuguese and the Dutch, and finally the British, who have in turn occupied different parts of the country, have, in the main, so regarded it ; and it is from this fact that we can trace many of the vicissitudes of government through which South Africa has passed, and what may be almost called the fortuitous birth of the colonies which compose it.

Some of the colonies started simply as ports of call on the coast, and, filled up from time to time by refugees and others from Europe, they gradually pushed their way inland, often, as we know, with serious opposition and difficulty caused by the native tribes. Other colonies represent the work of pioneers who pushed their way far into the wilderness, for the most part escaping what they conceived to be an unsympathetic form of government.

From the time when the Cape became British, in the year 1814, history tells us that there has been from time to time more than one movement to escape from the somewhat uninformed control exercised for this country. The most famous of those movements was what is known as the Great Trek of 1836. I am afraid, my lords, it must be admitted that the domestic virtues of Downing Street have sometimes been imperial vices. The whole tone and trend of policy of a great

part of the nineteenth century certainly did not tend towards the union or amalgamation of the different races which by that time had found in considerable numbers their homes in South Africa. To abolish slavery was a good thing in itself, but even slavery may be abolished in a sympathetic spirit and with due regard to the losses which those who owned the slaves might sustain. But, my lords, for many years past there have been gropings in the direction of union of which I may venture briefly to remind your lordships.

The man who, I think, might be described as the father of the idea of South African union was that very distinguished colonial governor, Sir George Grey. When Sir George Grey was there in 1858 the Orange Free State made advances towards some system of federation or union—advances which he, the man on the spot, of whom we have heard so much since, was in favour of meeting. But in those days, as I have said, the idea of such union was not very palatable at home. The Colonial Secretary of that day was Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton, whom I have heard Mr. Gladstone describe as in many respects one of the best of Colonial Secretaries, and the Under-Secretary was Lord Carnarvon. Neither of these men was prepared to take this particular responsibility. Lord Carnarvon, if I remember rightly, described Sir George Grey as a very dangerous man, and the result was that nothing was done.

But later on the mind of Lord Carnarvon became affected by different influences. In 1867 he was responsible to a great extent for the British North America Bill, by which the dominion of Canada was created, and the success of that measure undoubtedly induced him to make some further attempt towards uniting the colonies of South Africa. Accordingly, in 1876 and 1877, that movement towards union took place, which unfortunately came to nothing, inspired, as it was, by high motives, but not, perhaps, carried out with complete understanding. It failed in one respect, if I may adopt a phrase used by my noble friend Lord Selborne—it failed because it was not home-made. It was suggested and was

almost attempted to be forced on the colonies from here, and consequently it was abortive.

Then, as your lordships know, in 1877 the Transvaal was annexed and in 1881 it was restored, and I need not remind your lordships of the chequered series of events which finally led up to the war between this country and the Dutch republics. I will only remind your lordships that in 1872 Cape Colony received full responsible government and that Natal received it in 1893. My lords, after the war, when peace was declared in 1902, a new section of history naturally began, and from that time the movement for union which culminates in this Bill has been progressing. . . .

Now, there were two great motive forces which propelled South Africa towards union. In the first place, there were the imperial considerations which made South African statesmen desire to form a union which could take a place in the empire beside the dominion of Canada, the commonwealth of Australia, and the dominion of New Zealand, and that was undoubtedly a strong motive. But in addition to this, there were, of course, local and practical considerations of the first importance. In the first place, there was an obvious and desirable economy in working the four colonies as one. In the second place—and this, I think, perhaps more than anything, was the immediate cause which brought practical men to see how necessary union was—there were the difficulties and complications arising out of the railway systems of the different colonies. What those difficulties were I will not trouble your lordships with at this moment; but I may, perhaps, be allowed to say that when Lord Milner was administering both the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony he did his best to diminish those difficulties and differences by amalgamating as far as possible the railway systems of those two colonies.

Then there were questions arising out of the Customs, also a complicated subject with the details of which I will not trouble the House. All these practical considerations affected the minds of practical men there, and the result was

that early in the year 1907 a communication was made first from the Cape which inspired an important and interesting memorandum on the subject prepared by Lord Selborne, with which, I dare say, some of your lordships are familiar. The year 1908 was taken up with conferences which led to the formation of the Convention, which, as your lordships know, met first at Durban, where we were glad to be able to send a squadron of the British Navy to do honour to the occasion, afterwards at Cape Town, and, lastly, at Bloemfontein. Now, the Bill having passed the respective South African Parliaments, the delegation have come here, and the result is this measure which I now submit to your lordships.

The form of this Bill, I may say in passing, follows rather the Canadian than the Australian model. The second part of the Bill, which describes the union, leads me to remark that, in my judgment, South Africa was wise to decide on a system of union rather than a system of federation. The system of federation is one which is always naturally favoured by the smaller members of a great polity. A system that makes Delaware and Nevada the equivalents, for the purposes of the constitution, of New York and of Pennsylvania is one which is naturally favoured by the former States. It was naturally in Natal that the greatest doubts arose as between federation and unification, and I should like to bear witness to the wise and steady guidance of the Natal Government in this matter, which resulted in the gratifying fact that when the Bill was submitted to a popular referendum a majority for it was obtained in every district to which it was referred. My lords, I need not dwell on the appointment of the Governor-General, who naturally replaces the existing governors, or on the formation of the Executive which follows the usual rule in such matters. But I pass to the fourth part of the Bill, which deals with the constitution of Parliament.

The Parliament, as is the invariable rule in the British Empire, will consist of two Houses. The Upper House—the Senate—consists of eight gentlemen elected from each of the

four colonies, with eight others nominated, four of whom, as I particularly beg you to observe, are to be selected owing to their acquaintance with native affairs. Provisions are made in clauses 25 and 26 of the Bill for the future election of the Senate. The House of Assembly consists of 121 members drawn in varying proportions from the different colonies, a certain preference in numbers being given to the smaller provinces, as they will become. There is a provision for increasing their number as population increases, and on that I ask your lordships to note that the quota for that increase is confined entirely to the European male adults. The country will be divided into electoral divisions, and in the 40th clause there are five considerations indicated which the commission may bear in mind in delimiting—such as physical features, means of communication, sparsity and density of population, with the possibility of allowing 15 per cent. margin on the quota either way.

When we come to the qualification for sitting in either House we approach a point which has been the subject of much discussion and as to which many protests have been made. Those who sit in either House of Parliament have to be of European descent. So far, the position is that in the Cape Colony no such restriction has hitherto existed. On the other hand, no one not of European descent has ever sat in the Cape House of Assembly. I say frankly that there does seem to me to be a strong case against the insertion of such a provision in this Act or in any Act. There are men not of European descent who are of high standing, of high character, and of high ability. They regard this provision as a slight, and we regret that any loyal subjects of the King should consider themselves slighted.

On the other hand, the difficulties which have confronted those who have prepared this Bill were no doubt considerable. In the first place, it is only in the Cape that the native has a vote ; and therefore it would seem anomalous to allow a man to sit in an Assembly for which the class to which he belongs

have not a vote in the greater part of the Union. It is also fair to point out that in the Australian Commonwealth a similar restriction exists, so that therefore this cannot be said to be without precedent. It is also true that the grievance is probably not a practical one, because, if it was the case that no coloured member was elected to the Cape Assembly in the past, it is extremely improbable, at any rate for a long time to come, that any such would be elected to the Union Parliament.

The fact which has decided us in not attempting to press this matter against the wishes of the South African delegates has been that this is undoubtedly one of those matters which represents a delicately balanced compromise between themselves. As a Government we cannot take—and personally I am not prepared to take—the responsibility for the possible wrecking of this Union measure altogether by a provision of this kind ; and I am assured that such would be the result of any attempt to insert such a provision in the Bill. The cause of those who desire this change to be made has been pressed with deep feeling and much eloquence by some of the natives themselves, and by those who specially represent their cause. But I do feel that if this change is to be made it must be made in South Africa by South Africans themselves, and that it is not possible for us, whatever we may consider to be the special merits of the case, to attempt to force it upon the great representative body which with absolute unanimity demands that it should not appear.

I pass to the question of the franchise, which is one that has also raised a consideration of some difficulty. At present in the Cape Colony any man, whatever his colour, who possesses £75 worth of property or £50 a year, and who can write his name and address, can get a vote. In Natal the provisions for obtaining a vote are somewhat similar ; but, as a matter of fact, the native has to obtain what is called a letter of exemption, with the result that very few natives indeed are on the register. In the Transvaal and in the Orange River Colony there is manhood suffrage for whites, and no native

vote at all. It is obvious from that description how difficult the problem was if there was to be any question of instituting a uniform franchise all over the Union. It was ultimately decided that Parliament was to prescribe the form of the franchise, it being, however, provided that the Cape vote should be saved to the native unless it was decided by a two-thirds majority of both Houses sitting together to abolish the native franchise there. This is said by those who desire to see the interests of the native in every way protected to involve a somewhat serious risk that the Cape franchise itself might be done away with. I think we may assume that, as far as the rest of the Union is concerned, it will be in future a white franchise.

It would require, as you see, some 106 members of both Houses sitting together to abolish the franchise at the Cape. I think it may be assumed that it would require more than this, because it is not likely that the nominated senators, especially those who are appointed for their interest in the natives, would be likely to join in a venture of that kind. Therefore, from that point of view, as far as South Africa itself is concerned, there does not seem to be much risk. It has also to be remembered that this is a matter on which we could not say that the power of disallowance which, of course, belongs to the Crown, would not be exercised. Certainly it is not too much to say that the disfranchisement of a class who had held this power of voting so long would be viewed here with very deep disappointment.

Disfranchisement is always an odious thing in itself, and if it were to be applied in this particular manner I am bound to say that it would assume a somewhat specially odious form. Consequently I myself refuse to believe that there is any probability that this particular provision will be carried into effect. Looking at it as a purely abstract question, we could wish that the safeguard might be even stronger, but such as it is I am prepared to consider it strong enough. I may remind your lordships also that there is a provision for the reservation of all constitutional Bills, and for reservation sub-

ject to instructions received from the Crown; and all Bills which desire to alter any provision in the schedule are automatically reserved. . . .

Before I sit down I should like to ask you to consider for a moment what the Union does. I have spoken of the political and economic advantages which it must bring in its train to South Africa. What may the Union be also expected to do in the less visible but not less important sphere of human relations? This union of colonies marks, as I believe, a great advance in the fusion of the races which inhabit South Africa. The inhabitants of South Africa are some of British, some of Dutch, and some of French Huguenot descent. Their ancestors through many years of history suffered and fought for freedom. They underwent forfeiture and exile and imprisonment, and on the scaffold and on many battlefields they bore witness in the cause of civil and religious liberty. It would have been one of the most tragic ironies of all history if men descended from such races as those had remained permanently estranged. Now I hope we may look forward to seeing them joined in a free union under the supremacy of the British Crown, with a guaranteed freedom, for as many years in front of us as the imagination of man can venture to look.

It has been the peculiar good fortune of this movement towards union that some of the actual work of union has been done in the process of discussion by bringing into intimate personal relations the different South African statesmen, soldiers, and lawyers who before that time may have known but little of each other. The result of union will be that the whole past history of South Africa will become the common possession for ever of all the races. The famous names of South African history will become the joint property of them all—names familiar to many of us in a different relation from that which those who bore them ever expected. We may think of the chivalrous figure of Sir Harry Smith, whose name is still extant, and of his wife, so romantically won, whose name survives still more familiarly in association with recent events

to which both races may look back with pride. Then there was Sir Benjamin D'Urban, one of the governors, who suffered from not being entirely understood at home. I have mentioned Sir George Grey, and I might mention many more. But we must not forget the names of the distinguished men who filled the office of president in the Dutch republics, and here I will say that we are particularly glad to welcome here among the delegates from South Africa Mr. Steyn, whose whole-hearted advocacy of union has been of the greatest assistance to the cause. Nor can we forget the now common property of the whole Union in the name of Cecil Rhodes, who amid all the agitations of political life always dreamed of the union of South Africa. These men lived their lives, they enjoyed their triumphs, they suffered their failures, and we now in the fullness of time are able to see that where they succeeded, and even where they failed, they often unconsciously were working towards the consummation of this great Act of Union. Therefore, without distinction of race, party, or creed, we can now say that we honour them all.

I will now say one word from the imperial standpoint. It is not necessary for us to roll up the map of the British Empire as Mr. Pitt desired to roll up the map of France, but it is tolerably safe to say that, so far as we can venture to see ahead, this Act of Union places the self-governing dominions of the King in something like their final form. There is the great American group, the great Pacific group, and the great African group. There may be some rearrangement and some modification, but it is, I think, reasonable to say that for many years to come, longer than the life of any of us here, these three great divisions will form the three main self-governing parts of the British Empire outside these islands.

This fact will enable the advisers of the Crown here and in the colonies and dominions abroad to deal with questions of imperial defence with more certainty and with greater freedom than they have been able to deal with them hitherto. That is one point of gain. I will go further. It it should ever be the

fact, as I hope it may, that it is found possible to solve the very difficult problem of co-operation all over the empire in the policy of the empire, to that achievement this Act of African Union is a necessary preliminary. I believe, therefore, that there will be no part of the empire which will not give a most hearty welcome to the new South Africa, with earnest prayers that she may both merit and enjoy the rewards of prosperity and the blessings of peace.

With the Union of South Africa following, relatively speaking, so soon after the formation of the Dominions of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, it was becoming increasingly clear that the Empire was changing very rapidly. Change is the essence of the Commonwealth story, but each change naturally involves at least one new problem. Each dominion was forming an identity, a character and a nationality of its own, and the problem now was, *How were the self-governing dominions to be held within the scheme of Empire?* The ultimate answer to this most important question was, of course, that they could *not* be held; at least they could not be held in quite the way Chamberlain and the imperial federalists would have wished. With the final recognition of this fact the second British Empire evolved at last into the British Commonwealth of Nations. It is the purpose of our last book to describe how this great change came to pass, but first of all we must look at the problem as statesmen saw it before the outbreak of war in 1914. Let us see how Chamberlain proposed to keep the Empire together in the last decade of the nineteenth century. Readers should note the tone of self-confident optimism in which Chamberlain addressed the colonial delegates at the celebrated " Diamond Jubilee " Conference in June 1897.

JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN

TIGHTENING THE TIES OF EMPIRE

NOW, gentlemen, undoubtedly the greatest, the most important, and at the same time the most difficult of all the subjects which we could consider, is the question of the

future relations, political and commercial, between the self-governing colonies and the United Kingdom. I do not think that it is necessary for me to argue at all upon the advantages of such closer union. Strong as is the bond of sentiment, and mpossible as it would be to establish any kind of relations unless that bond of sentiment existed, I believe we all feel that it would be desirable to take advantage of it, and to still further tighten the ties which bind us together.

In this country, at all events, I may truly say that the idea of federation is in the air. Whether with you it has gone as far, it is for you to say, and it is also for you to consider whether we can give any practical application to the principle. It may well be that the time is hardly ripe for anything definite in this regard. It is quite true that our own constitution and your constitutions have all been the subject of very slow growth and that they are all the stronger because they have been gradually consolidated, and so perhaps with Imperial Federation : if it is ever to be accomplished it will be only after the lapse of a considerable time and only by gradual steps.

And undoubtedly one of these steps to which we must all attach very great importance is the grouping of the colonies. We rejoice in this country that Canada has already shown the way, with results which everyone has seen have conduced greatly to her strength and to her prosperity. We observe, with the most lively interest, the proceedings which are taking place in Australia with the same view. We know that in South African politics the same idea has bulked very largely in the past, and probably will come to the front again. In regard to all these matters it is not for us to offer advice ; it is not for us to press upon you in any shape our interference or our assistance. If it be possible for us in any way to help you to give effect to your own desires, I need not say that we are entirely at your service ; but, in the meanwhile, I can assure you, on behalf, I am sure, of the people of this country, that we most heartily wish success to your efforts, believing, as I have said, that it will in your case, as it has already done in

the case of Canada, conduce to your prosperity and to your power. But as regards the larger question and anything in the nature of a federation of the empire, the subject seems to me to depend entirely upon the feeling which exists in the colonies themselves. Here you will be met half-way. The question is whether up to the present time there is such a genuine popular demand for closer union as would justify us in considering practical proposals to give it shape.

I feel that there is a real necessity for some better machinery of consultation between the self-governing colonies and the mother country, and it has sometimes struck me—I offer it now merely as a personal suggestion—that it might be feasible to create a great council of the empire to which the colonies would send representative plenipotentiaries—not mere delegates who were unable to speak in their name without further reference to their respective Governments, but persons who, by their position in the colonies, by their representative character, and by their close touch with colonial feeling, would be able, upon all subjects submitted to them, to give really effective and valuable advice. If such a council were to be created it would at once assume an immense importance, and it is perfectly evident that it might develop into something still greater. It might slowly grow to that Federal Council to which we must always look forward as our ultimate ideal.

And to a council of this kind would be committed, in the first instance, the discussion of all minor subjects of common interests, and their opinion would be taken and would weigh most materially in the balance before any decision were come to either by this country or by legislatures of the several colonies in regard to such matters.

There is only one point in reference to this which it is absolutely necessary that we all should bear in mind. It may be that the time has come, and if not I believe it will come, when the colonies will desire to substitute for the slight relationship which at present exists a true partnership, and in that case they will want their share in the management of the

empire which we like to think is as much theirs as it is ours. But, of course, with the privilege of management and of control will also come the obligation and the responsibility. There will come some form of contribution towards the expense for objects which we shall have in common. That, I say, is self-evident, but it is to be borne in mind, even in these early stages of the consideration of the subject.

Now, gentlemen, in connexion with this subject we have already made a small advance, upon which I congratulate myself, since it was accomplished during my term of office, though it was prepared by my predecessors ; and it may have in the future important results. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is the great Judicial Court of Appeal of the empire. It is the nearest approach, the closest analogy, to the Supreme Court of the United States. It is a body of almost universal and world-wide reputation and authority, and it is our desire, naturally, in pursuit of the ideas which I am venturing to put before you, to increase its authority, if that be possible, and to give it a more representative character, and with that view we have most gladly secured the appointment, as privy councillors, of distinguished judges from the courts of Canada, of Australia, and of South Africa, and they now will take their seats on equal terms with the other members of the Judicial Committee. . . .

I have said that the question to which I first directed your attention—that of closer relations—is greater than all the rest. I may say that it covers all the rest, because, of course, if Federation were established, or anything approaching to it, all these other questions to which I am now about to call your attention would be settled by whatever was the representative body of the Federation, and among them, and in the very first rank, must of necessity come the question of imperial defence. You have seen something of the military strength of the empire ; you will see on Saturday an astounding representation of its naval strength by which alone a colonial empire can be bound together. You are aware that that

representation—great, magnificent, unparalleled as it will be—is nevertheless only a part of the naval forces of the empire spread in every part of the globe. The great Mediterranean fleet is still at its full force; the fleets on the various stations are all up to their normal strength, and the fleet which you will see on Saturday next is merely the Reserve and the Home fleet, ready to go anywhere, at any time, in the interests of the colonies and of the United Kingdom.

This gigantic navy, and the military forces of the United Kingdom, are maintained, as you know, at heavy cost. I think the charge upon the Exchequer is at the present time something like 35 millions sterling per annum, and it constitutes more than one-third of the total income of the country. Now, these fleets, and this military armament, are not maintained exclusively, or even mainly, for the benefit of the United Kingdom, or for the defence of home interests. They are still more maintained as a necessity of empire, for the maintenance and protection of imperial trade and of imperial interests all over the world, and if you will for a moment consider the history of this country during, say, the present century, or, I would say, during the present reign, you will find that every war, great or small, in which we have been engaged, has had at the bottom a colonial interest, the interest, that is to say, either of a colony, or of a great dependency like India. That is absolutely true, and is likely to be true to the end of the chapter. If we had no empire, there is no doubt whatever that our military and our naval resources would not require to be maintained at anything like their present level. . . .

What, then, I want to urge upon you is, and in doing so I think I am speaking to those who are already converted, that we have a common interest in this matter, and certainly it has been a great pleasure to us, a great pride to us, that Australia, in the first instance, offered voluntarily a contribution in aid of the British Navy besides taking her full share of her own military defences. Now we have to recognize that

the Cape Colony has followed in that patriotic course. I do not know upon what conditions these gifts may be offered or continued, but, at all events, the spirit in which they have been made is most heartily reciprocated in this country. The amount, of course, is at the present time absolutely trifling, but that is not the point. We are looking to the colonies as still children, but rapidly approaching manhood. In the lifetime, perhaps, of some of us, we shall see the population doubled, and certainly in the lifetime of our descendants there will be great nations where now there are comparatively sparse populations; and to establish in the early days this principle of mutual support and of a truly imperial patriotism, is a great thing of which our colonial statesmen may well be proud.

I shall be very glad to hear the views of the Premiers in regard to this question of any contribution which they think the colonies would be willing to make in order to establish this principle in regard to the naval defence of the empire. As regards the military defence of the empire, I am bound to say that we are still behindhand, although a great deal has been done in recent years. As you know, the Colonial Defence Committee of experts has been sitting, and has accomplished already, with the assistance of the colonies, a very great improvement in the state of things which existed before; but I cannot say from the information at my disposal that with all the magnificent resources of the colonies their organizations at present are satisfactory.

This is more a matter of detail, and I do not propose to dwell upon it now, but I would remind the Premiers assembled that, if war breaks out, war will be sudden, and there will be no time for preparation then. . . .

I pass on to another question, and that is as to the future commercial relations between this country and her colonies. How far is it possible to make those relations closer and more intimate? I have said that I believe in sentiment as the greatest of all the forces in the general government of the world, but at the same time I should like to bring to the

reinforcement of sentiment the motives which are derived from material and personal interest. But undoubtedly the fiscal arrangements of the different colonies differ so much among themselves, and all differ so much from those of the mother country, that it would be a matter of the greatest complication and difficulty to arrive at any conclusion which would unite us commercially in the same sense in which the *Zollverein* united the empire of Germany. It may be borne in mind that the history of that *Zollverein* is most interesting and most instructive. It commenced entirely as a commercial convention; dealing in the first instance only partially with the trade of the empire, it was rapidly extended to include the whole trade of the empire, and it finally made possible and encouraged the ultimate union of the empire. But this is a matter upon which at the present time, rather than suggest any proposals of my own, I desire to hear the views of the gentlemen present.

In the meanwhile, however, I may say that I note a resolution which appears to have been passed unanimously at the meeting of the Premiers in Hobart in which the desire was expressed for closer commercial arrangements with the empire, and I think it was suggested that a Commission of Inquiry should be created in order to see in what way practical effect might be given to the aspiration. If that be the case, and if it were thought that at the present time you were not prepared to go beyond inquiry, if it were the wish of the other colonies, of Canada and of the South African colonies, to join in such an inquiry, her Majesty's Government would be delighted to make arrangements for the purpose, and to accept any suggestions as to the form of the reference and the character and constitution of the commission, and would very gladly take part in it.

But that brings me to another question connected with commercial relations, and of great importance. I refer to the treaties at present existing between the mother country, acting on behalf of the colonies as well as of herself, and foreign

countries. The question has been raised at various times in the shape of resolutions or suggestions from the colonies that certain treaties, notably a treaty with Germany and a treaty with Belgium, should be denounced. It should be borne in mind that that is for us a most important question. Our trade with Germany and Belgium is larger than our trade with all the colonies combined.

It is possible that if we denounced those treaties, Germany and Belgium would endeavour, I do not say whether they would succeed, but they might endeavour to retaliate, and for some time, at any rate, our commercial relations with these two countries might be disturbed. Therefore a step of that kind is one which can only be taken after the fullest consideration and in deference to very strong opinion both in this country and in the colonies. Now the question is brought to a practical issue, or may be brought to a practical issue, by the recent action of Canada. As all are aware, Canada has offered preferential terms to the mother country, and Germany and Belgium have immediately protested and claimed similar terms under these treaties. Her Majesty's Government desire to know from the colonies whether, so far as they are concerned, if it be found that the arrangements proposed by Canada are inconsistent with the conditions of those treaties, they desire that those treaties shall be denounced. If that be the unanimous wish of the colonies, after considering the effect of that denunciation upon them as well as upon us, because they also are concerned in the arrangements which are made by these treaties, then all I can say at the present time is that her Majesty's Government will most earnestly consider such a recommendation from the colonies, and will give to it the favourable regard which such a memorial deserves.

But I should add that there is another question which is still more difficult, but about which I only wish to offer a word of warning to the representatives present. Besides those two treaties which are very special in their terms, and which prevent the preferential arrangement, or which appear to

prevent the preferential arrangement contemplated by Canada, we have a most-favoured-nation clause in all our treaties to which most of the colonies are parties. I may explain that, under the terms of the Canadian resolution, if any foreign nation were to offer to Canada beneficial terms as defined in the resolution, Canada would then be bound to give to that country the same preference as is offered to Great Britain. Let me suppose, for instance, that it was a minor country like Holland, and assume for the sake of argument that Holland offered these advantages, thereupon Canada would be compelled to give the same terms to Holland that she now offers to the mother country. She would then be bound by most-favoured-nation treaties to give the same terms to practically every important commercial country in the world. It would be, I think, a matter of impossibility to denounce those treaties, because that involves the whole trade of the empire, and in some cases there is no term of denunciation in the treaties.

The next point to which I will allude very briefly in connexion with our commercial relations is the question of improved communications. That was the subject of very important resolutions at the time of the conference at Ottawa, and already I am happy to think that considerable effect has been given to those resolutions in regard to the fast mail service, which was the first, and probably the most important, of those resolutions. Arrangements are now in progress by which it will be accomplished, and I hope that in connexion with that the service between Canada and Australia will also be improved, and there will be nothing further to be desired.

The trade problems mentioned by Chamberlain rapidly grew more urgent and more important. It was made clear by the overseas Prime Ministers at the Imperial Conference of 1902 that the only way to bring about closer *political* union within the Empire was on the *economic* lines of mutually preferential commerce. But, as Chamberlain himself

said in the House of Commons " if you are to give a preference to the colonies you must put a tax on food "—heretical words at a time when Britain was still devoted to free trade. *How could tariffs promote the wealth and prosperity of the Empire?* Chamberlain argued that between the years 1872 and 1902 British trade had shown a decline compared with protectionist foreign countries such as Germany and the United States. " The colonies " he said " are prepared to meet us; in return for a very moderate preference they will give us a substantial advantage in their markets." All through his long and arduous campaign for tariff reform Chamberlain exhorted his hearers to " think imperially ". His political activities were cut short in 1906 by a stroke and he never spoke in public again, but the campaign was continued by others, including many dominion spokesmen. Not least of these was Alfred Deakin, Prime Minister of Australia in 1909, and an ardent advocate of preference in favour of Great Britain. The following speech, delivered at the Baltic Exchange in 1907, is a good example of the overseas protectionists' point of view.

ALFRED DEAKIN

IMPERIAL PREFERENCE

MY position in this country has been, from the first, one of considerable embarrassment. There were two conflicting obligations. The first was to represent the Commonwealth of Australia, and to speak its wishes without flinching. The next obligation was to steer as wide as possible from all your party strifes. With them our people have no immediate relation. We must touch the same questions at certain points, but they will not be dealt with in a party fashion if we can prevent it. Consequently, when I attempt to touch the subject which has been so practically handled by Dr. Jameson, I find myself placed under special embarrassment, since on this, the chief practical question before the recent Conference, it is not possible to touch in any way, without in some degree, and incidentally, at all events, dealing with the position in this country.

There can be no reciprocity which is one-sided. There can be no preference, mutual preference, discussed that does not imply at least a consideration of the attitude of both countries. Consequently, on this question all that is possible for me in fulfilling my mandate from my own country is to endeavour to consider it from our side only, and not from your side, except so far as that must be necessarily implied. We have undertaken to build, in part we have built, and we are quite prepared to finish, our half of the bridge of union. We are carrying it on to the centre arch. There we must wait for the building from your side. Not till you approach us, not till you join us in its centre arch, can we insert the key-stone that completes the work. But I confess that it is a little difficult to restrain oneself in economic argument here when one hears so familiarly what we consider frank fallacies in fiscal argument.

We are obliged to listen to the doctrine, without more than a mental protest, that you can have no duties imposed that are not burdens of taxation upon the consumer, though our own experience discriminates between duties most distinctly, as experience always will. We have to listen to the assertion that no preference is possible, except by taxing your raw materials—a proposition which, so far as we know, has never been submitted from our side of the water. We have to listen to the fallacy that the preference we offer you is no preference, although we have the refutation within our own knowledge.

Only in the last sessions of the Commonwealth Parliament, being subject to invasion of an industrial character by potent organizations from a foreign country aiming at the destruction of an industry associated with the manufacture of machinery, we raised our tariff excessively. What was the immediate consequence? That before I left Australia for this voyage I was informed by the competitor, leaving his own land, he was coming from oversea to establish his factories in our country, to employ our own labour instead of that of the foreigner. Then he was welcome, because he stood upon the same ground

where our own industrial manufacturers now stand. I have heard more. I have heard to-day of an instance, which appears to be absolutely established, not of what preference can do, but of what even the promise of preference can do in your own country.

I have heard of an industry, the chief product of which was electrical machinery, which was waning in the neighbourhood of London, which has recently passed into other hands, a controlling interest having been acquired by American capitalists who are now reorganizing and reconstructing those works. With a view to what? To entering upon the English market? No; they have that already. They can produce more profitably and import more profitably from New York than they hope to do here. They came here then for what purpose? Because, as far-seeing men, they see that preference is coming. Their best markets to-day are to be found in the British colonies. They sell us several millions' worth of their goods each year.

The 10 per cent. preferential tariff that we hope to see established would make all the difference. They leave New York, coming to Britain to employ British workmen, and establish a British manufacture, in order to win their entrance into the Australian and colonial markets. If the mere promise of preference would do that, what would the actuality accomplish? It would give you the opportunity of retaining that hold over our markets the recent losses in which, by the admission of the President of the Board of Trade himself, constitute a most serious feature in the returns which he had to lay before the Conference.

Gentlemen, we do not ask you, as my friend Dr. Jameson said, to accept our dicta or adopt our theory. We ask you simply to judge upon the facts before you and from your own experience, and to have the open mind which only can judge. Do not affect to meet our arguments merely, as Dr. Jameson said, by the citation of what some are pleased to term "immutable laws"—imaginary laws would be a better title for some

of them—why " immutable laws ", when they are immutably believed in only in this country, " immutable laws ", which every other foreign country without exception steadily ignores ; " immutable laws ", which every one of your colonies—men of your own blood, trained in your own school, reared in your own economic doctrines—ignore also ?

Where is the twelfth obstinate juryman ? Not in the foreign countries, and not in your unanimous colonies. You must look for him in your midst. You are told that, however good a business prospect looks, it cannot be really good because it is in conflict with " immutable law ". You are told that when it proves good, it must still be bad because " immutable law " will by and by show that you have lost something else. Yet we can challenge reference, not only to the reasoned judgment but to the deliberate action of capable statesmen, amongst the most capable the world has ever seen, peoples of capable business men, who are fighting you in your own markets and teaching you their capacity. All the people in every country in the world to-day are adopting means for the protection and development of their own trade.

No, Mr. Chairman, we do not appear before you as doctrinaires. We do not adopt protection as what Dr. Jameson calls a shibboleth or a fetish. In the Commonwealth of Australia to-day we are still one-third free-traders, because one-third of all the goods we import enter duty-free. We use free trade where it pays—and we use protection where it pays. The object is not to look for " immutable law ", but to see what is profitable. And, gentlemen of the Baltic, may I remind you, when you first came under the spell of this immutable doctrine, one of your greatest expectations lay in the development of an export of that particular belief. Your economic doctrine, then brand-new, was to awaken such enthusiasm among other nations that they were all to rush to its adoption. They did not adopt it. And why ? Perhaps because they were nations—perhaps because they intended to remain nations. Perhaps because they held

that no abstract thesis should require them to sacrifice the control of their own markets for the benefit of their own people. . . .

Now, gentlemen, it is not for me to detain you at this hour of the evening by a discussion of business methods. I only wish to allude to them because our claim is substantially this—that business knowledge and business methods should be applied to business undertakings. Our nation, in addition to being a great armed force, in addition to being a great civilizing agency, in addition to being a great school of culture, is also a gigantic business enterprise; and unless the business side of it be controlled and managed and directed on business principles it cannot be maintained. You will remember the enormous handicaps with which your rivals commenced sixty years ago. When that verbatim report of the Conference does appear, if it ever does appear—that is to say, if it appears in time to be used and criticized—even if it appears flung at you with its many different subjects mingled with each other in a gigantic blue-book calculated to appal the stoutest hearts, we hope that you will take the pains to criticize our arguments and the replies which have been made to them, for we shall be happy to be confuted by better experience and to be guided by superior light.

In the meantime we appeal to the record, and ask you to judge between us and those who have adopted a hostile view. We have maintained and will continue to maintain that to fortify and extend commerce is one of the principal ends of Government to-day. Our ancestors fought for it when they were building up this empire. From Elizabethan days onwards the commerce of England has not only been the source of its strength but the substance of many of its strifes. Our fathers thought our commerce worth fighting for with a strong hand. Do we not think it worth protecting by those means to which every other civilized people resorts? Our circumstances differ, and doctrines have to bow to circumstances. We do not bring you ready prepared any panacea of our own with a

promise of a cure ; on the contrary that has to be adapted to and by ourselves.

On that party issue—that local issue—I do not trespass. The fiscal policy of Great Britain waits upon the British people and upon the British circumstances. The conditions which profit us may fail altogether to yield you the same advantage. All we ask, therefore, is the modest request to have a business method and a business principle applied to those dealings with each other which are, or can be, made mutually profitable. We say that by those means we can do more, as Dr. Jameson said, than merely minister to self-interest. I doubt if we are really doing more than ministering to self-interest when we seek to rise for patriotic ends to the utmost term of our opportunities.

For my part I cannot dissociate the welfare and prosperity of this empire as a whole from the welfare and prosperity of each of its parts or any of its peoples. They appear to me to be indissolubly bound together. If you were to say to us as some of your representatives have said, " This proposal is wholly for your benefit and not at all for ours ", I have not made the reply, I do not propose to make it ; but I could have made it, that even if that were true, so long as it involved no injury to the United Kingdom, the benefit to us was a benefit to the empire. That argument applies with exactly the same force when we come down to business propositions.

You will include in them, no doubt, those which are of advantage to you, and some which are of no particular advantage to us, but it would then be our duty to say in a similar manner, " This makes for the well-being of the empire, and as such should be commended to all its sons ". What we have asked, and asked in vain, is that this question of commercial union should be brought to a practical stage. . . .

But, sir, I have detained you much too long, although your goodness would excuse me, because this, after all, is a matter we have much at heart. We are here to-day at the Baltic, because it has been to occasions like this that we have been

compelled to resort in order to endeavour to make ourselves understood in this country. We wished you to realize from the first that our dominions came here, no solicitors for alms, asking for nothing for which they were not prepared to give a fair and generous equivalent—inviting nothing on your part that was not approved by your judgment and for your own national interests. We met you, therefore, on a fair footing, with nothing to conceal, nothing to disguise, nothing to distrust. We are only anxious that we should be seen in that light, approaching you with outstretched hand, and keeping the hand still outstretched.

We recognize that the present polite refusal is but temporary—is due to causes over which those who have made it have now no immediate control—that, at another time, under other circumstances, we may hope that either these means of preference or those other means of preference of so much moment to you, better and swifter sea services, with cheaper freights and cheaper fares, cheaper cable communications, the lowering of dues upon shipping—British shipping—all these are necessary to be fostered by subvention, if not fed in other ways. Everything which improves these prolific agencies, everything which opens wider the channel to trade and commerce between us, everything which facilitates intercourse and multiplies the means of exchange, is a preference. That makes for the unity of the empire.

Although we met you on the footing of a business bargain, what dignifies the bargain, as Dr. Jameson said, is the aim of this particular bargain, and of all the other efforts associated with it. These efforts seek to establish on the firmest and broadest possible basis the unity of an empire which, by its mere existence, confers inestimable benefits on the meanest of its citizens—which holds on high to-day, as ever before, the torch of constitutional liberty—which has established institutions that other nations copy, though they all fail to copy your fiscal system—which keeps for you still in the world the pride of place. The last thing which we wish to see you do

is to lay aside that crown. There are men whose voices we regret to hear, who seem to believe themselves appointed to be the official assignees of the British Empire—who are chiefly concerned with winding up its estates and distributing its assets. We only desire to enlarge and enrich the old firm. We propose a closer partnership, not the dissolution of the partnership that we now enjoy. That, thank heaven, we mean to maintain.

To-day, even with our existing means, the blood which goes from the heart here in the United Kingdom to the further extremities of empire and returns again does so, not debilitated, but invigorated by hope and faith in our national stock and national life. We believe in you, even if you do not believe in yourselves. We do not doubt you, even if you should doubt your own destiny. We are assured that, in spite of ancient doctrines as to immutable laws, the strength and substance of this nation remains, and within its limbs a force greater and more readily unloosed than ever before ; and that by its means you will retain, even if it be in spite of yourselves, the splendid place which our great forefathers won for us.

The first step towards imperial preference had been taken by Canada as early as 1867, but the British public, dependent on imported food, remained opposed to Protection until the 1914-18 war revealed the fact that they had been relying far too much on Germany for one or two raw materials, and for many manufactured articles. The principle of imperial preference was embodied in the British Budget of 1919, and it found its first important application in the Safeguarding of Industries Act of 1921. However, the effect of the preferences remained small until the crisis of 1931 forced Britain to include food in the list of dutiable articles, and the Ottawa conference of 1932 produced a co-ordinated policy for the trade of the Commonwealth.

The first world war had other repercussions on the second British Empire. By 1914 the Dominions had complete control over their destinies except in the all-important matter of foreign affairs. It was this which led to the " problem of the Commonwealth ", as Lionel

Curtis dubbed it—a problem which, in his view, would lead to the disintegration of the Empire at the close of hostilities unless the relationships between Britain and her Dominions were thoroughly revised. The answer to the question, *What was the one great barrier to Dominion sovereignty in 1914?* then, was the fact that they still had no right of declaring war and peace and, therefore, Curtis argued, had no real self-government. Curtis compared the position in 1916 with that of the first British Empire during the Seven Years War. Then, as in 1916, the British overseas were fighting alongside the Mother Country in the name of liberty, but when the war was over they divided among themselves, and the first empire fell. " The moment this struggle is closed and we ask ourselves how we are to keep what we have saved, we, like our fathers in the eighteenth century, will find ourselves confronted by a problem we cannot evade. " In the following extract from his famous book, *The Problem of the Commonwealth*, Mr. Curtis expands his point and in so doing shows us how complicated imperial relationships can be. Lionel Curtis has long believed that " the prevention of war is the key to all other problems ", and that the only practical means of preventing war is federation. In a series of books beginning with *The Commonwealth of Nations*, in 1914, and going on through *Civitas Dei*, *World War : its Cause and Cure*, *War or Peace?* and *World Revolution in the Cause of Peace*, to his latest little summary in a pamphlet called *The Open Road to Freedom*, he has given vigorous expression to his views.

LIONEL CURTIS

THE PROBLEM OF THE COMMONWEALTH

IN a new country the way for a people capable of self-government to develop a fresh and distinctive character of their own is to qualify for the management and control of their common affairs. Australian nationality could scarcely develop so long as Australians were divided into six colonies each managing its domestic affairs from a colonial as opposed to an Australian standpoint. Really to develop an Australian nationhood, it was essential for the people of that great island to have a government through which they could control all

the affairs peculiar to Australia as distinct from those which Australia shares with the people of the British Commonwealth in other parts of the world. It is for this reason that Americans could never have become a nation in any real sense of the term if, after the Declaration of Independence from Britain, the several states had remained independent of each other. Georgia, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts could scarcely have become nations in any genuine sense of the word. The failure to achieve political union would have meant failure to achieve a genuine nationhood. . . .

The nationality to which new peoples aspire is a high type of character appropriate to the country in which they live and to the history which brought them there. Clearly such a character can be developed most surely by a people who control all the conditions peculiar to the country in which they live, and it is such control the people of the Dominions have already acquired. Canada does already control affairs that are strictly and exclusively Canadian: and so with Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. But the fact that all these communities are still united in one larger Commonwealth is proof of interests which they share in common with each other and the people of the British Isles. It is by their own free will that they have remained within the circle of this Commonwealth, so that an attack made upon one is an attack made upon them all. Peace and war are interests common to all and peculiar to none of them, and it is when we come to these interests, which, because they are common, are also supreme, that we find that the assumption of self-government by the people of the Dominions has not been pushed to its completion. They have asked for, and acquired, control over all their purely domestic affairs, not excluding such debatable matters as immigration and trade. But they have never as yet demanded or obtained any kind of political control of the policy which involves them in peace or war. Lords of their own ramparts, they have neither asked nor been offered a voice in the counsels whereby the main citadel of freedom must stand or fall.

In practice, the Imperial Government has left the people of the Dominions to control every one of the interests which they, through their parliaments, *have finally insisted* upon controlling; and this includes two powers, the control of commercial relations and of immigration, which, to judge from all foreign examples, might be classed as essential attributes of the central authority responsible for the issues of peace and war. The inference that the Imperial Government has conceded every demand for further powers advanced by Dominion governments is asserted so often and so loudly, that scarcely any one thinks of questioning it. Responsible government is habitually spoken of as though it were completely achieved. Facts, however, are directly at variance with that doctrine. That the Dominions have been conceded every power of self-government which they *finally insisted upon having* is true; but on several occasions they have wished and tried to assume powers which have not been conceded in the last analysis, because they did not insist on them.

In the early 'eighties Australasians observed with anxiety the increasing activities of France, Germany, and the United States of America in the Pacific. A foreign power established on the southern coast of New Guinea was clearly in a position to menace the safety of Australia, and Queensland, whose coasts were most nearly affected, implored the Imperial Government to forestall such a possibility by annexing the whole of the great island. The cost of administering these vast territories was heavier than Queensland could face, and the revenues of the Imperial Government were derived exclusively from the tax-payers of the British Isles whose interest in New Guinea was remote in comparison with that of the Australians. To the question put by the Imperial Government whether the Australian colonies would guarantee the cost involved, no certain answer was forthcoming nor indeed was possible. For its six colonial governments were just as incapable of meeting the national needs of Australia as in the previous century thirteen colonial governments had

been of meeting the national needs of America. The problem was not in practice solved by the formula of co-operation. A deadlock ensued, and in 1883 the Queensland Government cut the knot by annexing New Guinea on its own responsibility. Their action was promptly repudiated by the Imperial Government. In the same year the Parliament of New Zealand passed a Bill authorizing the New Zealand Government to annex any island in the Pacific not claimed by foreign powers. The Bill was vetoed by the Imperial Government. Another and more recent case may be noted. In 1910 the Parliament of New Zealand passed a measure which would in effect have excluded from New Zealand ports all ships but those registered in Australia and New Zealand. The territorial waters of New Zealand would, in fact, have been closed to all maritime states of Europe and America. Such a step was without precedent and was calculated to provoke a retaliation by foreign powers of which Great Britain, whose ships were also excluded under the Bill, would have had to bear the brunt. The Bill was disallowed by the Imperial Government and never became law.

Here are three cases, taken at random, in which self-governing colonies attempted to control matters which they rightly believed were of primary interest to themselves. But the necessary powers were denied by the Imperial Government and were never yielded, because the colonial governments did not persist in demanding them as they did in the case of tariffs and immigration. And we have only to imagine what must have happened if they had persisted, in order to see why they did not. The hoisting of the British flag over New Guinea and the unoccupied islands of the Pacific, and its maintenance when hoisted, meant that in two directions there were responsibilities which had to be met. In the case of New Guinea a heavy charge was involved for an indefinite time for the cost of administering those vast territories. Queensland was not in a position to meet that cost, but the British Government could not recognize the action of that

colony without rendering the tax-payers of the British Isles responsible for the consequences. And, as in the case of tariffs and immigration, the powers conceded to one colonial government must afterwards have been conceded to all. The Imperial Government, however mistaken in refusing to annex New Guinea, could scarcely endorse the action of the Queensland Government without establishing the principle that any one of a dozen colonial governments might commit the British electorate to indefinite charges. The position was one which no British Government could justify to Parliament, and no Parliament to its constituents.

But that was not all. The annexation attempted by the Queensland Government and those desired by the New Zealand Parliament had, in order to become effective, to be notified to foreign powers, and, unless or until Queensland had first secured recognition as an independent state, that notification could only be made by the British Government on its own responsibility. But it is seldom possible for one government to take something which other governments want without provoking those other governments to follow suit. When Germany took Kiaochow, Russia promptly secured Port Arthur, and Britain Weihaiwei. And so had Britain notified the seizure of New Guinea and of all the unoccupied isles of the Pacific without the previous knowledge and assent of the other world powers, Germany and France might have followed suit in Africa, and Russia on the frontiers of Turkey or India. A general scramble might have ensued which might conceivably have led to a war in which Europe, and not impossibly the United States, would have been allied against the British Commonwealth. Against such forces and in a struggle brought on by its own action the Commonwealth might easily have perished, but in any case the cost, which would have been gigantic, would have fallen upon the tax-payers of Great Britain. Here again were risks which no government could possibly have justified to the British electorate. These annexations in the Pacific were such as could only be con-

sidered in conjunction with similar questions awaiting settlement in every continent but that of America.

Had the Queensland and New Zealand governments insisted on the right to annex territories which might otherwise be occupied to their detriment by foreign powers, they could only have done so if they had been prepared to act on their own responsibility. But in order to assume that responsibility their independence of the British Commonwealth had first to be notified to foreign powers, and such notification would have meant much more than a change in the international status of colonial governments. Such a step would have affected every man, woman, and child domiciled in those colonies. Each and all of them would have lost their status as British citizens. For each individual it involved the profoundest of all political changes, and one which neither the governments nor the peoples to whom they were answerable were prepared to contemplate.

The essential difference between tariffs and immigration on the one hand, and the annexation of vacant territories on the other, was thus revealed by attempts on the part of Colonial or Dominion governments to handle them. They demanded the right to control tariffs and immigration. In England there were some who believed that the exercise of those rights must lead to their separation from the Commonwealth. It could not be argued, however, that the exercise of these rights necessarily and immediately created new burdens and responsibilities for which the Imperial Government would have to answer to the British electorate. There was no insuperable reason for refusing these powers, and, as subsequent experience proved, they have been exercised without creating a deadlock. They have been shown by trial to belong to that order of national interests which each self-governing nation in the Commonwealth can, and therefore ought to, control for itself. But with questions of annexation it was different. Such powers could not be conceded without producing consequences for which the Imperial Government would be

answerable at once to the British tax-payers and to foreign powers. For the full consequences were such as the colonial governments were not prepared to assume. The mere attempt on their part to handle such interests revealed the fact that these were matters common to the British Commonwealth as a whole, and such as must be dealt with as a whole.

It was not urged, nor indeed can it be urged that the Australasian communities had no real interest in these matters. Their interest in New Guinea and the Pacific Isles was a very real one, though none the less inseparable from interests common to the British Commonwealth as a whole so long as its colonies remained a part of the Commonwealth. Yet not only were the Australasian colonies unable to control these matters, but such was the system that they could not even share in the control. The whole disposal of the matter had finally to be left in the hands of a Government responsible only to the people of the British Isles, with results which were far from satisfying the hopes and indeed the reasonable demands of the colonies.

BOOK III

FROM EMPIRE TO COMMONWEALTH

FROM EMPIRE TO COMMONWEALTH

THAT the " Problem of Commonwealth " would eventually threaten the stability of the Empire was apparent some years before the war. Thus as early as 1912 Sir Robert Borden, when speaking on matters of defence and foreign affairs had uttered these words of warning : " It has been declared in the past " he said " and even during recent years, that responsibility for foreign policy would not be shared by Great Britain with the Dominions. In my humble opinion adherence to such a position would have but one, and that a most disastrous result." *What were the effects of the Great War upon the British Empire?* At first they were seen in an intense loyalty and patriotism, but later, as the emotional outburst subsided, the Dominions felt that they had become grown-up nations and had earned recognition as such. In the following lecture delivered at Columbia University Sir Alfred Zimmern reminds us that " war is the most forcible of teachers ".

SIR ALFRED ZIMMERN

THE THIRD BRITISH EMPIRE

THE questions to which we shall be seeking answers in these lectures are three in number. Firstly, *why* has the British Empire survived at a time when these other empires have dissolved and disappeared? Secondly, *how* has it survived? In what form has it survived? Thirdly, *what* must it do to justify its survival in an age which seems destined to dissolve empires.

Why has it survived? I might give you an easy answer. I might say that it is because it had as its associate in the war the power of the United States, because it was fighting on the side that was bound to win. But that is only to push the inquiry a stage farther back. The true answer to our first question is more fundamental. The British Empire survived the war because it had in it a principle of vitality which the

other empires lacked. And that principle, that seed of continuing life, is the spirit of liberty. The British Empire lives to-day because its institutions are free institutions. It survives as one of the world's guardians of liberty.

But liberty is not a dead possession. It is an active power, a developing power, and at times like the present a transforming power. If the storm which broke over the world and swept the other empires away left the British Empire in being, it did not leave it unchanged. It has in fact transformed it. The British Empire of to-day is not the British Empire of 1914. It is something new—how new neither the outside world nor even its own citizens have yet adequately realized.

Future historians, looking back on the history of the British Empire overseas, will note three periods in its life and growth. They will point to the first Empire, taking its rise in the early settlements on this Atlantic coast, a colonial empire of the older type common to Spain, Portugal, France, and other states of Continental Europe. That Empire was abruptly extinguished or, at least, summarily curtailed by your predecessors in 1776 or thereabouts. And it failed precisely because it followed too closely the prevailing imperial model. Why is it that we shall soon be celebrating the one hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the Declaration of Independence, whereas only a hundred years divide us from the decisive battle in the struggle of the South American empire-breaker Bolivar? The answer is simple. It is to be found in the transforming principle of liberty which caused the subjects of the British Crown to grow restless and finally to shake off the irksome yoke two generations before the same infectious spirit had spread to the subjects of Spain and Portugal.

After the disruption of 1776, however, the British Empire was given a second chance. Out of the remnants of its old dominion, in Canada, the West Indies and elsewhere, and out of the pioneering work of nineteenth-century explorers, traders, and administrators, a new and second British Empire came into existence. That Empire was based on British sea-power,

the silent and undisputed supremacy of the British navy throughout the oceans of the world. Its development was stimulated by the immense and rapid growth of international commerce, first in Britain and then in other manufacturing countries; for as an open-door empire it provided a market for all comers. And its maintenance was ensured by the fact that place was found in its institutions for the planting of the seed of liberty.

This second British Empire reached the culmination of its power and of its development in the Great War.

And now a third British Empire has come into existence, new in its form, new in the conditions which it has to face within and without its borders, new even in its name. For *The British Empire* of 1914 has now become *The British Commonwealth of Nations*. The new designation, put forward in print shortly before 1914 and popularized by General Smuts in a series of war speeches, was consecrated by its use in the Irish Treaty of 1921 and has now passed into current use. It is with this third Empire, this Commonwealth of Nations, that we are concerned in these lectures.

What is this third British Empire? I was asked this question not long ago by the Dean of the Law Faculty of a celebrated university in Central Europe. "Can you tell me" he said "whether the British Empire is a single state or a group of states?" Conscious of the effective retorts that his legal mind might have in store for me if I gave a direct answer either way, I told him that I would prefer not to define the existing constitutional position, but that I would be happy to explain to him how it had arisen. "I can exhibit the present phase" I said "as a moment in a long development, but I would rather leave the juridical characterization of it to you." An equal caution, not to say ambiguity, marks the definition recently offered by one of the men who have been most closely associated with the passing of the second Empire into the third. "*Our Commonwealth*" said Sir Robert Borden, the Conservative ex-Premier of Canada, in his address

at his installation as Chancellor of Queen's University, Ontario "*may be regarded as a League of Nations owing a single allegiance and possessing international relations that are still in a state of development*". The loopholes in this formula leap at once to the legal eye. "At once a Commonwealth and a League", I can hear my continental friend interposing; "surely that is a contradiction in terms. And the single allegiance—to what or to whom is it due? If to the Crown, in what capacity?" Sir Robert Borden knows as well as any European jurist that his definition is not watertight, but to all such implied questionings he has an answer in a later sentence of his address. "We may be confident that the practical genius of the British people, which has never failed in any need, will find some satisfactory method of meeting this difficulty."

Our object here, however, is not to meet the difficulty but to state it; but the task of mere statement is hard enough when the problem is so elusive. In attempting to describe the third British Empire, I am reminded of the old Greek philosopher, Heraclitus, whose cardinal maxim was that "everything flows", or in other words, all life is flux. "No one" he said "has ever crossed the same river twice." "No, nor even once" said one of his pupils, "for it has become a different river by the time you have crossed it." . . .

Constitutionally speaking, the British Empire can, perhaps, best be described as a procession. It consists of a large variety of communities at a number of different stages in their advance towards complete self-government. It is by observing the movement of this procession and comparing the constitutional position of the various British communities to-day with what it was in 1914 that we shall best realize what is meant by the passing of the Second Empire.

In 1914 the British Empire consisted of three governmental groups. The first consisted of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. It was the electorate (then still a male electorate) of those two islands which chose the Imperial Parliament to which the Imperial Government was responsible.

Next in the second group of the procession, there were the self-governing colonies, or, as most, though not all of them, were called, the Dominions. These were communities which had been, by law and custom, granted by the Imperial Government complete independence in dealing with their own internal affairs. But they did not claim a similar independence in respect to external affairs. Still less did they claim to be sovereign states. This class included in 1914 Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and Newfoundland.

In the third and most numerous stage of the procession, there were communities which were dependent upon the Imperial Government, both as regards external and internal affairs. That is to say, they were governed by officials receiving their instructions from London, either from the Colonial Office, or, in certain cases, the Foreign Office, or, in the case of India, the India Office, or, in respect of important issues of policy, as a result of a decision by the Imperial Cabinet itself. . . .

What reaction did the war exercise upon this heterogeneous community? It produced two effects, both equally unexpected by the superficial observer. The first was a spontaneous and practically universal outburst of loyalty and enthusiasm. In Germany and elsewhere it was widely believed that the British Empire would fall to pieces in the moment of danger, or, at the very least, that its more distant communities would remain uninterested and impassive when its European centre was exposed to attack. Had not John Morley, in a famous review of Seeley's *Expansion of England*, declared it unthinkable that Australia could ever interest herself in the neutrality of Belgium? The response from the overseas Empire, however, white and non-white alike, not only gave the lie to the pessimists but outdid the expectations of the optimists. All parts of the Empire—the Dominions, India, and the widely scattered colonies—vied with one another in sending troops, labour-battalions, money contributions and gifts of every kind. Indian troops not only took part in the war in Western Europe

but also in the Dardanelles, Palestine, and Mesopotamia, where the Moslems among them were pitted against their own co-religionists.

This spontaneous response of the peoples of the Empire to the call of the war was a fine justification of the work of generations of British administrators. It vindicated, and will always vindicate, the record of the second British Empire. But at the same time, little as it was realized in the flush of excitement in 1914, it ushered in its close. For war, as the Greek historian said long ago, is the most forcible of teachers, and the experience to which it exposed men, in the British Empire no less than in Russia, set up questionings to which, whether soon or late, there could be only one reply. A struggle whose watchword was freedom must bring greater freedom to those who waged it.

Thus the war, which began by an unexpected manifestation of the unity of the Empire, ended by an equally unexpected assertion of the claims of its various peoples.

Yet this phenomenon should not have surprised any attentive student of British history. I remember, some time about the middle of the war, listening to a conversation in which Sir Robert Borden, at that time Premier of Canada, took part. Someone had remarked to him that this impressive demonstration of the loyalty of the Dominions to the Empire would surely pave the way for a project of Imperial Federation. I well recall the Canadian Premier's reflective reply. " I am not so sure " he said. " The result may be exactly the opposite of what you are imagining. It may be that the spirit of national pride which the war is evolving will create psychological conditions unanticipated by you in Great Britain and favour processes of decentralization rather than of centralization." . . .

What were the constitutional developments of the war period ?

The most striking was undoubtedly the admission of Dominion representatives to what was called the Imperial

War Cabinet. During the latter part of the war, from 1917 onwards, Dominion statesmen sat side by side with members of the London government on the small executive which was in supreme control of Britain's war effort. Moreover, by a curious development, which shows what can happen under an unwritten and flexible constitution, one of these Dominion statesmen, General Smuts, who remained in England for some time, became almost an ordinary member of the Cabinet and was even on occasion asked to deal with specifically domestic matters. But, in fact, the Imperial War Cabinet was not a true constitutional development and its title was a misnomer. It was simply a standing War Conference, consisting of members of several independent governments, similar to the inter-allied conferences which grew up at the same time, but, of course, more continuous and more intimate.

More permanently important was the Imperial Conference held simultaneously with it, which passed a resolution definitely extending the principle of equality to foreign affairs, and favoured the summoning of a special constitutional conference after the war. The resolution is important enough to be quoted textually. It laid down that " any readjustment " of constitutional relations,

> " while thoroughly preserving all existing powers of self-government and complete control of domestic affairs, should be based upon a full recognition of the Dominions as autonomous nations of an Imperial Commonwealth, and of India as an important portion of the same, should recognize the right of the Dominions and India to an adequate voice in foreign policy and in foreign relations, and should provide effective arrangements for continuous consultation in all important matters of common imperial concern, and for such necessary concerted action, founded on consultation, as the several governments may determine."

The words " Imperial Commonwealth " may appear to you somewhat paradoxical. There may seem to be a little

difference of philosophy between the adjective and the noun; but that very fact marks the transitional stage at which Britain had arrived at that moment.

Had the Englishman's conception of Empire not advanced since the days of Burke and Chatham, this transitional stage would almost certainly have culminated in another disastrous period of disruption—but fortunately the lessons of the past had at last been learned. Nor was this all, for any tendency towards disunity within the Empire was compensated for by new bonds of friendship which the war had forged between Britain and the United States. *What effect did the war have upon Anglo-American relationships?* Throughout the nineteenth century, animosity, the child of the War of Independence, had persisted between the two great English-speaking countries, and had found expression in the war of 1812 and in several "incidents" during the American Civil War. Although a change of feeling was discernible in British sympathy for the United States during the Spanish-American War of 1898, it was not until German conduct during the first world war hardened American feeling against the Central Powers that this new friendship began to ripen. Then, in 1917, America joined forces with the Allies. In a speech given at Plymouth in August of that year the American Ambassador, Walter Hines Page, suggested that nternational relationships depend not merely upon the words of diplomats but also on what ordinary people in one country think, and *know*, about ordinary people in another.

WALTER HINES PAGE

THE UNION OF TWO GREAT PEOPLES

I THINK it will be proper to speak, in this place of sacred historical associations, of one great by-product of the war—the best of it—I mean the closer coming together of the two great English-speaking parts of the world. No American can come to Plymouth without thinking of the going of the English from these shores to the new land where

they set up a new freedom and laid the foundations of the most prosperous and hopeful community on the earth.

In the course of time these new communities fell apart from political allegiance to the old land, but they fell apart only in political allegiance. If we had need to discuss this political divergence I should then maintain that that political separation was just as well for you as it was necessary for us. That by reason of it human freedom has been further advanced and a new chapter in free men's growth opened throughout the English-speaking world.

The American Revolution was a civil war fought on each side by men of the same race. And this civil war was fought in the colonial assemblies and in your Parliament as well as on the battlefields in America, and it was won in the colonial assemblies and in your Parliament as well as on the battlefields of America, for, from that day on, you have regarded colonies as free and equal communities to the mother country, and you have had the happiness to see them giving of their best for their help.

Now this civil war naturally left a trail of distrust, the greater because of the long distance between us by sail. But when the first steamship came over the ocean, and still more when the cable bound us together, a new union began to come about, because these eliminations of distance set the tide of feeling in the natural course laid out by kinship and common aims.

But in the meantime the American community had developed in its own way, and our life had become more and more different from life in this kingdom. We became so fixed and so different in our conventions and ways of life that we could not easily come back to your conventions of life if we would. In fact there is no other test that the British people have had—no test that any people has ever had—which proved its great qualities so well as the British settlement and management of America. Here were men in a new land, cut off from close contact with their kinsmen at home, who took their

political affairs in their own management, and thereafter were without guidance or support from their more numerous community left behind. How did the race stand such a test? No other migrating race has stood such a test so well, and those first English colonists have now grown, by natural increase and by numerous adoptions, into a people who to-day include more English-speaking white men than the whole British Empire.

They have not only outgrown in numbers all the British elsewhere, but they have kept what may be called the faith of the race. They have kept the racial and national characteristics. They have kept British law, British freedom, British Parliaments, British character, and these are reared on English literature. I am not boasting of my own land, I am only reciting how your race has endured and survived separation from you and your land. Our foundations were British, our political structure is British with variations, our social structure is British, also with important variations; more important still, our standards of character and of honour and of duty are your standards, and life and freedom have the same meaning to us that they have to you.

These are the essential things, and in these we have always been one. Our admixture of races to make a richer American stock is similar to the admixture of race that went, in an earlier time, to the making of a richer British stock in these islands. In most of our steps forward in human advancement we have but repeated in a larger land and under new conditions the steps that you took in these islands in the struggling days of the making of our race and in the beginnings of its institutions. During the long period of sailing craft and before the telegraph we lost no racial characteristics. We lost only close personal contact. We lost personal acquaintance. We even had sharp differences of opinion, which, in fact, is a quality of our race.

But if you review our history carefully you will discover that no difference that ever arose between us was ever half so important as it got credit for being at the time. Most of them

were superficial differences. Such as were more serious found settlement—once again by war and many times by thorough study that led to understanding. And when they were settled they were settled. That has always been our way with one another, and it will always be. We were, under the influence of swift communication and travel, already losing our long isolation, and you were relaxing your misjudgments, when our Civil War again proved we were made of the same stuff that you were made of, and we swung into a period of even closer understanding.

And now, the day of our supreme test and of the heroic mood is come. There is now a race reason why we should have a complete understanding, and such a complete understanding has come. I hope you will pardon me for alluding to these old differences, for they are now long-forgotten, far-off things. I allude to them only to clear the way, for it is not the going of the Pilgrims nor the falling away of the colonies that we are met to celebrate to-night, but rather the coming of American warships which symbolizes our new union. Politically two peoples, in all high aims and in the love of freedom we are one and must remain one for ever. Not only have our warships come, but our troopships have landed an army on the soil of our brave Ally across the Channel, where the enemy yet keeps the wavering line of an invader. And more warships will come and more troopships—million-laden if you need them—till that line is for ever driven back, until the submarines are withdrawn or for ever submerged.

There is coming the greatest victory for free government that was ever won, and the day of this victory which we are both fighting for may turn out the most important date in history. The necessity to win it has cleared the air as no other event in modern times has done, and but for the millions of brave lives it has cost, this clearing of the air would richly repay all the treasure the war has cost. For it has revealed the future of the world to us, not as its conquerors, but as its necessary preservers of peace.

Free peace-loving nations will have no more of this colossal armed and ordered pillage, and no combination of peace-loving nations can be made effective without both branches of our race. This empire and the great republic must then be the main guardians of civilization in the future—the conscious and leagued guardians of the world.

It is this that the war is revealing to us. It is not a task of our seeking; but it is a task that we will, with other free peoples of the earth, under God, gladly undertake. To undertake it our comradeship must be perpetual and our task is to see to it that it be not broken nor even strained. That is our task and our children's task and their children's task after them; for we are laying new foundations of human freedom. Of course, it is the function of Governments to keep friendly nations in proper relations to one another, and both our nations fortunately can and do trust both our Governments to do that. Through all the difficulties and differences that arose between our two Governments during the early stages of the war there was no rupture of friendly dealing. When the full story of these years of delicate relations comes to be told, it will be seen that mutual toleration and forbearance played a far larger part than a rigid insistence on disputed points. Such differences as we had were differences between friends.

While fortunately our two governments may be fully trusted to bind us together in every possible way, governments come and governments go. In free countries they are as a rule short-lived; and they are always and properly, even in the conduct of foreign relations, the servants of public opinion if public opinion strongly asserts itself. Far more important, then, than any particular government is the temper and action of public opinion in every country such as ours, and permanent union in our large aims of our two nations, generation after generation, for ever, must therefore rest on the broad basis of a friendly and informed public opinion in both countries. If this argument be sound, it leads every one of us to a high duty. The lasting friendship of two democratic countries must rest

on the sympathetic knowledge that the people of each country have of the other, even upon the personal friendship of large numbers of people one with another.

Personal friendships make for a friendly public opinion. It is therefore the highest political duty of British citizens and American citizens to build up political friendship by personal knowledge and personal friendship. It is your duty to learn all you can about the United States, about the country, about its people, their institutions, their occupations, their aims, and to make acquaintance with as many Americans as you can. It may be you will not like them all. It may be you don't like all your own countrymen. But you will, I think, like most Americans. Certainly most of them like you. Most of all, make an opportunity to come and see them and see their country, and get a sympathetic knowledge of their methods and ways of life. Make a proper appraisal of their character and aim . . . .

I venture to put together a few definite suggestions. Put in your schools an elementary book about the United States —not a dull text-book, but a book written by a sympathetic man of accurate knowledge, which shall tell every child in Britain about the country, about the people, how they work, how they live, what results they achieve, what they aim at; about the United States Government, about our greatest men, about our social structure—a book that shall make the large facts plain to any child—and require that every child shall read it. . . .

Another suggestion I make is to encourage the giving of popular lectures by well-informed Americans about our country and our people. If you show that you wish to hear them they will come. There is at this moment a considerable number of well-informed countrymen of yours lecturing in the United States on some phases of British life and activity. I think they labour under the delusion that they need to wake us up. No matter, we are glad to hear them. And a large and well-informed group of my countrymen are in this kingdom

lecturing on phases of American life, perhaps also under the delusion that they need to wake you up. I heartily hope that this popular form of instruction will continue and grow long after the war.

It is a commonplace to say there is no other land so full of pleasant and useful information for Americans as your land, and no people so well worth our intimate acquaintance as your people, and it is equally true that no other land and no other people are so well worth your sympathetic study as the United States and those that dwell there, for they have the spirit of the modern world as no others have it. I hope you will pardon me if I say that a visit to America and to your great colonies is an excursion into the future of human society.

We ought, too, to welcome and encourage all sorts of popular instruction, even moving-pictures, if they show the right pictures. Another useful piece of the machinery of popular education—perhaps the most useful of all—is the press. Many of the most energetic editors of each country, of course, frequently visited the other, but if visits of groups of them were arranged and definite programmes were made for them to touch the real spirit of the other country, better results would follow than casual visits. Then, if either country or government seems to do anything contrary to a proper understanding with the other, if, then, instead of making judgments, newspaper judgments at a distance, a group of journalists who control the chief organs of opinion in each country would themselves visit the other country and make personal first-hand investigations of what had gone wrong, many of our mistakes would be corrected instantly, and well-nigh all our misunderstandings would disappear before they arise. This is the thing to do first to achieve right understanding, and then it will be hard for a wrong understanding to arise.

The development of cordial relations between Britain and the United States has been one of the most outstanding features of the

twentieth century. Another and even more significant feature has been the increasing importance of America in international affairs. Until the " Frontier " had reached the Pacific seaboard, Americans were primarily concerned with their own form of expansion, but once the whole continent had been settled it was only natural that the United States, a new, undeveloped, and vigorous country should turn her attention—and her power—to those wider worlds beyond the Atlantic and the Pacific. It is perhaps hard for us to-day to think of the United States as a " debtor " nation, for we in Europe and in the Commonwealth appear to owe her so much, but this has not always been the case. On the contrary, until the first world war began to break up the old order, Americans were in almost every sense, from language to banking methods, the borrowers. This is one of the themes upon which Professor Perry Miller so delightfully enlarged in the following commentary given at the conclusion of a series of talks over the B.B.C. in 1949-50 on the influence of the United States upon Europe to-day. The question, *How is America influencing the Western world?*, may at first seem to bear little relation to the Commonwealth story, but, as our Sponsor says, and as later lectures will bear out, it is to the United States and to her relationships with the wider world that we must turn if we wish to see wherein the future of the Commonwealth most probably lies.

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PERRY MILLER

THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE

I AM honoured beyond my merits in being asked to comment on the Third Programme series, " The United States and Europe ". As the only American participant, I start under the grave handicap imposed by Bertrand Russell in the first of the talks, wherein he declared the American vocabulary to be insufficient, and our pronunciation blurred. I am bound to assume, therefore, that the very sound of my voice is unpleasant to you. Of course, I might retort that certain British manners of speech, not all, and never the Scottish or the Welsh, but a few others, do fall upon American

ears with something less than felicity. On this score mutual recrimination could continue and no impact whatsoever in either direction would be registered. Fortunately, Bertrand Russell does concede one, although only one, good thing to the American language—its slang. Perhaps if I fall back from time to time on this, my native argot, I may be found just tolerable.

First, I am struck by the way the five papers testify to the immensity of the American impact; I am the more fascinated because here and there the acknowledgment is made by those whose disposition towards America may be called friendly, in what to my American sense is a noticeably grudging tone. I certainly do not wish to affect a cleverness I do not possess, but to my apprehension, coming to the discussion with an array of frankly American sensitivities, the papers reveal more than they explicitly say. They seem, in short, to be skirting the subject, and fumbling for critical devices to minimize what inwardly they confess is gigantic.

I hope I may be allowed to say this not out of Chauvinism or out of 100 per cent. Americanism. No one, more than I, deplores some aspects of the American effect upon Europe, or of the American behaviour in Europe. No one is more eager to rally Europe to stand on its own venerable feet. All I ask is whether these discussions are directed towards what America actually is exporting in the form of cultural influence, and not towards fantasies of wholly European construction. Which perhaps is another way of asking whether there really does exist a Europe that can any longer be rallied against the more terrifying of American influences, or that can profit by the more liberating. For example, I heartily agree with Mr. Martin Cooper that a revolution in æsthetic taste was enacted in the nineteenth century, and that to-day that revolution is carried farther in America than in Europe.

However, when he insists that in American broadcasts the sound track is artificially sweetened in just the same way as feminine beauty is standardized, I must turn to the lingo

sanctioned by Bertrand Russell and cry " Boloney ! " When he argues that the machines in American cafés exist only for what Satie calls " furnishing music ", that is, the sort one hears without listening to, let me assure him that he has failed to grasp the vital rôle of the juke-box in American culture. You don't put your nickel in, mister, until you've made up your mind what you want to hear. Mr. Cooper finds all this illustrative of the American preference for make-believe, and of a refusal to face facts.

I am compelled at this point to lament the truly baneful influence of the American movies. It is not what they do to the American mind, which forgets the film five minutes after leaving the theatre, but the effect they have upon the liberal-minded European who has not yet appreciated how the Americans take even their fairy stories in a highly Pickwickian sense.

What these papers do reveal—as much in what I hold their misconceptions of America as in their penetrating recognitions, and above all in their generous expectancy of the still-to-be-realized possibilities—is the astonishing fact that America exerts, and for a long time will exert, upon Europe an influence that must be called revolutionary. This fact would be clear enough were it not that language itself confuses the picture. There is only the one word " revolutionary " to describe both the challenge directed against the order of Western Europe by socialism or Marxian communism, and that implied at every point by the ordinary way of living in America.

Because in Europe " left wing " now means, as Bertrand Russell says, communism, America becomes, on the plane of economic theory of social ideology, the citadel of conservatism. Leaving aside for the moment the problem of the real sources of the American obsession with the peril of communism, of what I regret to state often does approach a hysteria, but which may also be interpreted as the American way of manifesting a determination to extend the revolution that began with the Declaration of Independence—leaving aside, I say,

the abstractions supposedly aligned in the cold war, I think it evident from these papers that on the simple day-to-day level of life as it is lived, America continues to disturb and frighten and prod Europe. It excites simultaneously both revulsion and envy. It is still the land that gives or is ready to give the common man what he wants, be that good or bad. All too often European criticism of America is a transparent effort to deny to the common man in Europe what he, transported to America, believes he has achieved or can achieve.

America is a perpetual declaration that Western European society can become open-ended if it tries. Men can be mobile and career be open to talents. Violence and vulgarity, improvised jazz, philosophical pragmatism and decent bathrooms are so many declarations of man's mastery of his resources. And this mastery—here is the American contention—is as possible in Europe as in America. It is as possible because America is Europe working out, still in the process of working out, far as yet from attaining, ambitions that were conceived and cradled in Europe. For this reason I am enormously cheered by the sane words of Bertrand Russell on the subject of American bathroom civilization. Let it be said, once and for all, that for Americans good plumbing is like good health. It is a wonderful thing to have, but something you talk about only when you don't have it. Repeated visits to Great Britain have long since persuaded me that the man who invented the geyser should be pilloried in every history of the nineteenth century as the arch betrayer of modern civilization. He gave to what in this country are sometimes called the lower middle classes the fatal illusion that they possessed a modern convenience, with the result that Europe was cheated of the revolution it should have had, the revolution in which the ordinary citizen would have demanded of an industrial order that he share in the benefits of industrialism. Hence communism and all its woes.

By the same token I am not at all cheered, but rather deeply depressed, by Mr. Morpurgo's adoption of the facile

distinction between the America of Thomas Jefferson, which he says, and I agree, Europe has need of, and the comfort and luxury of American life for which, he declares, you are not to envy the Americans. I object to this disjunction, not for the sake of America so much as for the sake of the Western tradition which is yours and America's. It is a false antinomy. America may indeed pose the problem of whether man is to conquer the gadget or be conquered by it, but America only poses most precisely what is the inescapable problem. In America it is still a fifty-fifty proposition: what Britisher wants better fighting odds? In what do we believe—in abundance or in scarcity? Or shall it be recorded that England, in the rigours of austerity out of annoyance with Hollywood, so lost its historical perspective as to forget that Thomas Jefferson himself was a copious inventor of gadgets, including the comfortable and luxurious one of the swivel chair.

Let me at any rate assure Mr. Morpurgo and my British friends that American democracy has not become, as he so categorically asserts, orthodoxy and complacency. To say this is utterly to misunderstand the meaning of Franklin Roosevelt, or the election of 1948, or the New York election last November, or the turmoil of American politics at this moment. It is to forget, as does Mr. O'Faolain in his talk on the Irish immigrant, the yeoman service done by the Irish machine politician in the New Deal. Or indeed the part that the Irish political bosses have in fact played in teaching American Anglo-Saxons the responsibilities of a democracy towards the poor and bewildered new-comer in a teeming city. Somebody had to look after him. I do not mean that the boss was the ideal solution. The point is that the framework of urban government we inherited from England—the mayor and the city council—proved upon so severe a testing to be inadequate. Someone had to do the job, and, up to a degree, the boss did. The lesson is as important for Europe as for America.

I am trying to say, in other words, that America has mainly

been occupied for two or three hundred years with working out the consequences of problems given by Europe. We have had, it is true, one other integer added from non-European sources: the Negro. But Europe of the seventeenth century was already fascinated by the Negro—witness the drawings of Rembrandt. The line, from Rembrandt's sketches to the crowded Rotterdam auditorium that last October listened with intensity to Louis Armstrong, is direct. Mr. Cooper finds that Negro bands appeal to the tired palates of European connoisseurs. One can report only one's experience and may be deceived by it. Still, in the last few months in Europe I have found an appreciation of Louis Armstrong that does not strike me as limited to tired palates. But indeed the Negro and his music make a special case.

Otherwise it may be suggested that the materials we have had to work with were given us by Europe, chiefly by England, but also by all Europe: the people themselves, the Common Law, the King James Bible, Shakespeare, Puritanism, Condé and idealism, Darwin and naturalism, and then, two world wars. What we give back, whether it be a movie or a tank, or pragmatism, or T. S. Eliot, is what we have been able to make out of what was sent us in the first place. For that reason I say that America does press upon Europe, quite apart from what it may now be attempting in the form of a pact or a policy, as a revolutionary force, as a force which Europe cannot deny and cannot evade because America is, as Mr. Lehmann has suggested, the pupil of Europe.

It is in fact more than pupil—it is bone of the European bone, blood of the European blood. Its demands would not excite such disturbed and divided responses as the discourses in this series have exemplified were it not that Europe recognizes, however warily, the voice as its own. Mr. Lehmann remembers that in his youth the works of Hawthorne, Emerson and Poe were assumed to have their roots deep in English literature and that their sunflower faces were ever turned towards Europe. Of course they were. But at the same time

from the American perspective the line is as straight as straight can be from Poe to Faulkner, from Hawthorne to Lewis, from Emerson to Hemingway. Between the first three and the second lies a revolution, says Mr. Lehmann. Yes, in a sense. And yet, in another sense, no revolution at all but an unfolding of implicit meanings.

" Whoso would be a man " said Emerson " must be a non-conformist." And again he said : " If I am the Devil's child I shall live from the Devil ". Surely it takes no great penetration to move with the evolving conditions of American society from these propositions to the corollary that the sun also rises, that the non-conforming man will assert by saying " Farewell to arms ", that what is devilish is of the Devil. If Hemingway and Faulkner now exert, upon the literature of Western Europe, and even upon cheap paper books in soldiers' barracks and seamen's bunks, a pervasive influence, the reason is not that they are novelties from Mars but a comment of this civilization upon itself which Europe, even if obliquely and reluctantly, recognizes as a comment upon Europe.

Mr. Lehmann notes, as have others, that throughout this modern American literature runs an astonishing prevalence of a hatred for, a revulsion against, their own civilization. To this observation, delivered in such a tone, the puzzled American at first responds, " What else are we here for ? Look at all there is yet to be done." Then he hears Mr. Lehmann continue that this revulsion produces cynicism and despair ; that this spiritual emptiness is the corrupting influence of American literature. Whereupon the American once again must patiently explain that Sinclair Lewis has castigated George Babbitt, not out of contempt but out of love and charity. Must we always, before every *Grapes of Wrath*, every *Winesburg, Ohio*, every *An American Tragedy*, serve notice that Ben Jonson did not exactly view Bartholomew Fair with cynicism and despair, nor did Fielding find the sensual failures of Tom Jones a sign of spiritual emptiness ?

The real point at issue, which seems to me to lurk obscurely

through these discussions, is not one of cynicism or despair, but what I have tried to convey by asking, " What else beside to scrutinize our society are we here for ? " In this respect I think it may be said that the American product, although manufactured out of European raw materials, may upon being reshipped to Europe legitimately be submitted to a highly critical impulse.

Whether the American judgment upon society be, as with most movies—not, even in Hollywood, with all—that everything is wonderful ; or with pragmatism that all can be made wonderful ; or with the recent American literature that, in the words of Hemingway : " Whiskey is better than sex because after finishing the bottle you can always throw it at somebody ". Whatever the answer, the American mind is committed, to the point, if you will, of monomania, to a preoccupation with the issue of man and society, not, as Bertrand Russell has remarked, man and God, or man and the stars, and possibly not even with man and himself. This obsession, with all its narrowness and its stridency, with its exclusion of all other modes of speculation, with its contempt for everything that Veblen called " idle curiosity ", may justifiably be taken for what America has made out of the cultural heritage. It has utilized what it received from Europe—Calvinism of the seventeenth century and the naturalism of the twentieth—almost entirely for the immediate purpose of constructing and analysing the social order. The least valuable because the most perfunctory part of Emerson's thinking was his metaphysics. The Emerson that still speaks to America is the Emerson who restlessly probed the problem of society and solitude. Allowing for fugitive exceptions, the same theme is the insistent concern of our recent literature. European authors like Graham Green, Kafka, Elizabeth Bowen owe much of their popularity in America to the fact that they give to American readers a chance to take a momentary holiday from worrying about how man and his society can get on together.

Much of this may be regrettable, but then wherein does the basic problem of the age reside? There are ways of thinking in which a previous determination of man's relation to God is held the first requirement to any ordering of social and international statutes. Perhaps; but America doubts it. America came into being after 2000 years of majestic speculations, often pursued under fantastic hardships, had not quite resolved such transcendental inquiries. Meanwhile it seems patent that man must live, and it seems even more evident that man cannot live, if the word means anything, as in Europe they survived from 1914 to 1918, and from 1939 to 1945, or as in Europe they struggle to endure to-day. I can comprehend, though from afar, Bertrand Russell's complaint that Europeans being lectured to by optimistic Americans feel like a suffering patient helpless before the doctor with a bouncing bedside manner. Still more can I comprehend his complaint about the difficulties of presenting a new philosophy to the University of Oxford. Still, there must come a time, if we are yet to live in time, when Europe understands that neither the so-called despair of American novelists nor the smugness of American businessmen means wholly what appears on the surface; but that both alike mean that America without Europe is a forlorn being. The failures of Europe—I mean specifically the two wars that have all but destroyed it—have meant reversals to every force in America which the speakers on this programme have praised, and have strengthened every tendency they abhor.

No American asks of Europe that uniformity which supposedly constrains Americans into orthodoxy and complacency, even though in America I have known thousands neither orthodox nor complacent. Too many of us treasure as an experience too delicious to be sacrificed to any theorem of a united Europe such a breakfast as I once had with a Scottish couple, who read in the morning newspaper of a horrible murder in Wales, who descanted at length upon the depravity of the Welsh, and who then cheerfully agreed, " All the same, I'd rather be Welsh than English ". Americans are most

solicitous that this comedy endure. We merely point out that meanwhile there has come into being Great Britain. In America Scots, Welsh, and English, along with Poles, Italians, Hungarians, Germans, and Italians, do make an order—at least of sorts. Shall mankind for ever be cheated of his heritage because man cannot speak to his fellow across artificially drawn frontiers? Even in America can man ever lift his eyes past the gadgets to the stars, if he must constantly devise gadgets for Europe's conflicts?

In one of the most profound fables of our time, André Gide (who, incidentally, comprehends as well as any in Europe the significance of the recent American literature) enacts a conversation between Œdipus and Theseus which I might, with apologies, vulgarize into a dialogue between Europe and America. "In tearing out my eyes" says Œdipus "in this cruel act I was driven by some secret need of pushing my fortune to the limit, and of accomplishing a heroic destiny." Theseus replies that he cannot really praise this sort of superhuman wisdom, although he honours the nobility of Œdipus. As for himself, he will leave behind him the city of Athens, and it is his happiness to think that after him, and because of him, men may be more happy, better and more free. "I am the child of this earth" says Theseus "and I believe that man, whatever he may be, ought to play with what courage he has."

Some of us believe that in the last generation we in America have met Apollyon on the slopes of the hill Difficulty, and though we may not have slain him outright we have battered and bruised him and forced him to speak his real name. He is properly called Isolationism. Perhaps those theologies of the past which have insisted that sin is ineradicable are more nearly true, if Bertrand Russell will permit an American to use the word, than pragmatism. And maybe the amount of isolationism among the western communities must somehow remain constant. Perhaps, then, if the quantity in America has temporarily diminished, the level in Europe must perforce rise. I will confess that, after some months in Europe, I am

terrified at the amount of it I find in several nations of the west, and especially in England. I find it fantastic that the speakers on this programme assume as axiomatic that Europe is exhausted, that it is in decay, that it is tired and disillusioned. No doubt it has, like Gide's Œdipus, affirmed the grandeur of man by horribly mutilating itself, and, like him, may thus have won a kind of celestial recognition. But in every theme, conception, melody, or vision which America took from Europe, which she had re-worked and which it now exports, the fundamental proposition is re-stated—misbehaviour may be all very heroic, but it is highly unnecessary. The temptations to despair are many, plentiful enough in America, let alone in Europe ; but it is not necessary either there or here that we destroy ourselves.

Not least or last among the peoples to welcome the cementing of the new friendship between Britain and America were the Canadians. For years Canada had been looked upon as the bridge between Britain and the United States—now, it has been suggested, the United States is the bridge between Britain and Canada ! Aware of Canada's peculiar position, sandwiched, not always very happily, between the two great Powers, it was decided in 1920 to appoint a Canadian Minister to Washington. " The constantly increasing importance of Canadian interests in the United States " Mr. Bonar Law explained " has made it apparent that Canada should be represented there in some distinctive manner. . . . It is confidently expected as well that this new step will have the very desirable result of maintaining and strengthening friendly relations and co-operation between the British Empire and the United States." But it was also another step forward in the direction of complete Dominion autonomy in foreign affairs ; and four years later the Irish Free State followed Canada's example. But the question, *How could the Empire be truly democratic?*, still remained unsolved. The secret of the Commonwealth lies in the reconciliation of these two apparently incompatible concepts. On this subject there could be no better guide than the well-known authority on constitutional law, Dr. Berriedale Keith who, in an address which he gave on this subject to the students of Edinburgh University, explained the " problem of Commonwealth " as he saw it in 1920.

ARTHUR BERRIEDALE KEITH

THE EMPIRE AND DEMOCRACY

WE stand now unquestionably at the parting of the ways; we have emerged from the war with our prestige enormously enhanced, and the Empire has evinced in time of stress a cohesion and solidarity which few of us even suspected it to possess, and the possibility of which foreign States contemptuously denied. Success in the war would have been impossible but for the amazing efforts made by the Dominions and India, but in the moment of our triumph the doubt must intrude itself whether it is practicable that territories which have shown thus brilliantly their possession of distinctive personalities can consent indefinitely to remain in union with the United Kingdom. We are in fact compelled to face in a very real form an issue which we were wont before 1914 to discuss with academic detachment, the question whether an Empire can co-exist with the development throughout the territories of which it consists, of the spirit of democracy.

One assumption, of course, we make in this discussion, that democracy is in itself desirable as a political system. We have of late witnessed a remarkable revival of the cult of the dictator; unfavourable comparison has been drawn between the inefficiency of the imperfectly co-ordinated efforts of the British Empire and the extraordinary strength derived by Germany from the operation of the principles of discipline and autocracy; democracy, we have been reminded, is far from universally accepted as an enduring system; Russia has rejected it, Spain and Italy have found by painful experience that it cannot supply them with effective administration or internal harmony. The issue is too large for discussion here, and in Scotland at least we are too deeply imbued with the conviction that freedom " makes man to have liking " to doubt the validity of the ideal of democracy; our religion teaches us the infinite possibility and value of personality, our educational system aims at the development of character, and, while we are far

from dupes of the maxim, " the voice of the people is the voice of God ", we remain convinced that democracy accords best with human dignity and human progress. If at times democracy causes dispersion of effort, yet, as the war has shown us, the accord of the wills of great democracies is capable of generating efforts more continuous and more effective than even the most highly developed systems of autocracy. . . .

But, if we believe in democracy, we are confronted at the outset of our inquiry with the objection, at first sight fatal, that Empire, in its nature and historically, negates democracy. The most famous of all Empires immediately presents itself as affirming this principle ; the most Roman of poets has depicted with his matchless felicity of phrase the destiny of his people :

> " Remember, Roman, to rule the peoples with authority, to spare the vanquished and the proud to tame."

Dominion, wise and just, Virgil demanded, and in our own day we are familiar with the conception in the homelier, more modest, form of " the white man's burden ".

But Virgil knew nothing of democracy ; Rome had known tyranny, had flourished under oligarchy, so long as it was inspired by a high sense of public duty, and, when private interest had undermined public spirit, had suffered so bitterly from warring factions that she was content to accept the rule of Augustus, whose gift of peace to a generation weary of civil strife blinded the poet to the loss of liberty which accompanied it. The early Empire brought peace, external and internal, and the reign of law to its subjects, but it ended by stifling all free life under the weight of an official hierarchy in central and local government alike, and the nations under its sway, enervated and devitalized, proved unable to resist the onslaughts of the free tribes of Germany. Associations of this kind have, not unnaturally, provoked a movement which would banish from our terminology the expression " British Empire ", and replace it by some phrase such as " British Commonwealth of Nations ". Despite the attraction of a style which

reminds us at once of the grandeur of a polity whose units can justly assert their rights to the title of nation, and of that glorious period in British history when the sovereignty of the people and its power in Europe were asserted by the genius of Cromwell, it would be a pity to discard a name which, as history shows, in its application to Britain, conveys no implication of selfish dominion. The Crown of England assumed the style of " imperial ", not in order to assert powers over others, but as an emblem of its own freedom from external domination, and the true meaning of the term " British Empire " is an assertion that the nations and territories under the British Crown own no political superior outside the circle of the Empire. Moreover, as is but right, these nations are advancing swiftly to the yet higher position in which to freedom from foreign superiority will be added equality of status among the component parts of the Empire itself.

It is to Greece that we must look for the inspiration in the ultimate issue of our new conception of Empire. To Athens in the fifth century B.C. a concatenation of events afforded the opportunity of constructing an Empire based on democratic Governments in its component parts. Its achievements were of a high order, and the cause of its failure was significant. Athens would gladly enough have permitted the cities which were her allies to enjoy self-government without intervention on her part; but circumstances helped her to engross the power of conducting the foreign relations of the alliance, and gradually the necessity in her opinion of securing the full co-operation of her allies in her external policy led to her interference in local politics in order to maintain in each city of the League a party pledged to support Athenian views. By this action gradually she undermined the loyalty originally felt by the cities of the League and finally stood out merely as a tyrant city, whose subjects rejoiced when ill-fortune in war gave them the chance of revolt, leading to her final overthrow. The fate of Athens has often afforded a seemingly conclusive example of the impossibility of combining democracy with

Empire, but the illustration is obviously without cogent force. Apart from the fact that Athens extended democracy only to a comparatively limited circle of citizens to the exclusion of slaves, it was her essential defect that she denied self-determination to her allies ; what her case proves is that liberty at home and dominion abroad are an unstable base for the maintenance of empire.

The teachings of history, however, are seldom appreciated, and the fate of the first British Empire presents a painful similarity to that of Athens. Those communities which settled in America enjoyed in the eighteenth century a large measure of effective self-government parallel to that which existed in the mother country, though in the ruder civilization of the new world democratic principles were more effectively asserted than in the complex conditions of England. Unhappily the wars with France extended to the oversea territories, and involved the difficult issues of the burden of defence and payment for the armies sent from England, on whom naturally the bulk of the serious fighting fell. Much may be said for the justice of the British claim to legislative sovereignty over the colonies, much even for the efforts to induce them to pay an adequate proportion of the cost of their defence. But against such technical and equitable contentions must be set the fact that territories with a true personality expressed through the medium of democratic forms of government were not fit subjects for the rude weapon of coercion. Gradually the breach between the United Kingdom and the colonies became too wide to be closed, and the first empire ended in a ruin which came perilously near being as complete as that of Athens. Happily from the evil of the effort to coerce the colonies there came the recognition of the imperfection of the democracy of the British Constitution itself. Long delayed by war on the Continent, the Reform Act of 1832 at last definitely assured to the United Kingdom the prospect of steady advance on the path of true democracy.

In the meantime the mere idea of the reappearance of

democracies in oversea possessions had been abhorrent to the governing classes in the United Kingdom. A definite breach with the older tradition, which favoured the grant to Englishmen settled abroad of the privileges of Englishmen at home, had been made on the eve of the fatal rupture with the American colonies. In the desire to assert British control the promise of representative government made to the newly ceded colony of Quebec in 1763 had been revoked by the Quebec Act of 1774 in favour of a Crown Colony régime. Force of circumstances, including the pressure of the United Empire Loyalists who left the United States on the concession of independence, compelled the grant of a representative legislature in 1791; but there was no longer any readiness on the part of the British Government to relax control of the executive, which in its struggles with the legislature was assured of the steady support of the authorities at home.

In the same spirit the utmost reluctance was shown to open to free settlement the newly discovered continent of Australia. It required the rebellions of 1837 in Upper and Lower Canada to convince the United Kingdom of the folly of refusing to Englishmen abroad the rights which they enjoyed at home, and, simple as the remedy of responsible government in the Dominions seems to us now, it is right that due recognition should be accorded to the courage and insight of Lord Durham, whose insistence compelled the adoption of his policy by Ministers who regarded it with suspicion.

Progress since then has been rapid, and at the present day, if in strictness there is not complete accuracy in the assertion of the absolute autonomy of the Dominions in internal affairs, yet for all practical purposes this result has been achieved. The inability of Canada to amend her Constitution without the intervention of the Imperial Parliament, the restriction on her power of extra-territorial legislation, the application to her enactments of the doctrine of the paramount character of Imperial legislation on the same topic, and the right of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council to hear appeals from

Dominion courts, are indeed relics of a colonial status, now outgrown, but they continue to exist because the Dominion has not yet decided that it desires to see them abolished. But internal affairs are not decisive in themselves; it was external issues which precipitated the controversies which cost Britain her first empire, and we have still to face a fundamental problem, the control of the foreign affairs of the Empire.

The issue has been eagerly canvassed of late years, but we must admit that the solution is still to be sought. There is, indeed, one famous plan, which in 1916 was energetically revived and propagated by a devoted band of votaries in this country [*i.e.* Curtis and his friends], the adoption of Imperial Federation, a scheme declared to combine within itself the principles of autonomy in all local affairs and a just measure of influence in the decision of all external matters. In England itself, however, the scheme never went beyond a narrow circle, and in the Dominions it passed all but unnoticed. Experience in the late war shows plainly how fatal it would have been for any federal legislature to seek to deal with the most vital issues of all, those raised by the war; nothing but disaster would have awaited any effort by such a body to impose on the Dominions either compulsory service or a proportionate share in the crushing pecuniary burdens of the war. Bitter as was the struggle against conscription in Australia and Canada, it would have been infinitely more grave had the proposal emanated from a federal Government and not from the Dominion Governments themselves.

Less heroic remedies must, therefore, be sought for a situation which is indeed full of perilous possibilities. The Dominions and India were accorded separate representation in the League of Nations, and their actions in all matters dealt with by the League are unfettered by the control of the British Government. To some thinkers in the Dominions the idea has, naturally enough, presented itself that the future of the Dominions lies in the development of their individuality as

members of the League, ignoring the narrower tie of membership of the British Empire. Yet we may safely say that this is a short-sighted view, that even the greatest Dominion, if it counted merely as a member of the League, would be of far less consequence in the world than when regarded as a part of the Empire, and that in prestige, in economics, and in matters of defence each Dominion derives real and lasting benefits from its connexion with the Empire. Yet national feeling often rises superior to mere considerations of prestige or profit, and it cannot be denied that the United Kingdom is in law no less than in fact the predominant partner in the Empire as regards foreign relations. Granted that the Dominions are now represented at International Conferences by their own delegates, and that Canada has been given the right to maintain, if she desires, a Minister plenipotentiary at Washington, none the less the final control of all negotiations and the ratification of all treaties rest with the British Government.

Moreover, and this is of fundamental importance, it rests still with the British Government to decide the issues of war and peace ; if it decides on war, the whole Empire automatically becomes a belligerent, however little the ends of the war approve themselves to the Dominions, however slight the degree of consultation which has taken place on the issues at stake.

While these factors must be recognized, their importance should not be exaggerated. It is open to the Dominions to conclude, free from Imperial intervention, agreements with Foreign Powers which may serve all the purposes of treaties ; you will remember the Canadian reciprocity agreement with the United States in 1911, which on reference to the people was rejected by them because they regarded the step as of too far-reaching economic and political importance to be safely undertaken. Even in the case of formal treaties, Imperial intervention merely serves to secure that the different parts of the Empire do not enter into obligations which might prejudice other parts through oversight or inadvertence, and you will

remember that it was made a ground of attack in Canada on the reciprocity arrangement that in negotiating it its authors had not paid sufficient attention to the interests of the United Kingdom. Even as regards war and peace, it must be borne in mind that, if the final voice rests with the United Kingdom, it is that part of the Empire which maintains the military, air, and naval forces essential to make good its aims, and that the forces of the Dominions are sufficient merely for home defence on the assumption that the British Navy retains control of the high seas.

These contentions are valid, but not conclusive. In the long run the permanency of the Empire must rest on the willingness of its component parts to accept the extension of the principle of democracy to the decisions to be taken by its several Governments in the realm of foreign affairs. This principle demands that these questions should form the subject of constant discussion between the Governments of the Empire, and that policy should be based on the accord of views thus achieved. The difficulties of this process are undeniable; they call for the highest qualities in the Governments concerned; above all, the courage to acquiesce in a decision approved by a majority, recognizing that give and take is the essence of democratic rule. But beyond Governments stand the people, and there remains to be accomplished the task of bringing home to the Parliaments and electorates of the Dominions those great issues of foreign politics on which the elector of the United Kingdom has learned to form definite opinions. The plan has already been carried into effect on some vital issues, as when the treaty of peace with Germany was formally submitted to the Dominion Parliaments and received their endorsement.

The precedent forbids discouragement before the dangers of complicating the conduct of foreign affairs by permitting them to become the subject of discussion in the Dominions; but it is well to recognize that here we are confronted by real difficulties and that a more severe test than ever is being

imposed on the capacity and intelligence of Parliaments and electorates alike. There is, however, one constitutional principle which renders the position far less difficult than at first sight it seems to be. Dissent on the part of one or more portions of the Empire need not involve either secession or the paralysis of the rest of the Empire. As has been shown in the case of the proposed treaty of 1919 between the United Kingdom and France for the security of France, while no part of the Empire can be relieved from implication in a condition of belligerency by a declaration of war by the British Government, still it remains with its Government and Parliament to decide freely whether it will take any active part in hostilities, so long as it is not itself attacked. This affords an honourable means by which a Dominion, which cannot accept active participation in some decision of the Empire, may yet remain within it, and be free from the grave choice between taking a share in carrying out a policy of which it cannot approve and severing its connexion with a body with whose views generally it is in accord.

There are, no doubt, cases in which immediate action may be called for on the part of the British Government, preventing preliminary discussion with Dominion Governments; but, if the practice of constant exchange of views both of questions which have arisen and on difficulties which may arise is adopted, such emergencies should diminish in number. Consultation by post and telegraph can be supplemented by periodical meetings of the Imperial Conference, and closer relations between the Governments may be fostered by making more extended use of the High Commissioners of the Dominions in London or other representatives as means of conveying information and exchanging views. But it is not Governments alone that require information, and a preliminary step towards full co-operation must be the development in the Parliaments of the Dominions of a keener interest in foreign affairs. Already the participation of the Dominions in the work of the League of Nations has opened up fresh vistas and new spheres of interest

to the peoples of the Dominions, and it cannot be doubted that in course of time they will realize more and more the importance of the part which they are fitted to play in promoting the solidarity of human relations, and will be increasingly reluctant to stand aside from participation in movements aiming at the promotion of interests not immediately touching their own.

Complex as is this problem of the joint control of foreign policy by autonomous democratic communities, it is not more difficult than the issue with which the United Kingdom is now struggling, the extension of democracy to her Indian Empire. We may at once confess that for too long we have been content to govern India, in the main wisely and disinterestedly, but oblivious of the paramount obligation of encouraging India to learn to govern herself, an aim recognized as essential by some of the most distinguished of early Indian administrators, but later largely forgotten under the influence of the doubtless well founded fear that by the transfer of the administration to popular control the high efficiency of the bureaucratic régime might for a time at least suffer serious diminution. Even now, as my experience as a member of the Governmental Committee on the Home Administration of Indian Affairs has shown me, there is hesitation to recognize that responsibility can be learned only by its exercise, and the reform scheme has been hedged round by safeguards so numerous as to render it in my opinion but an ineffective instrument to achieve the end which it seeks to effect. But matters of detail are of minor concern ; what is essential is that the British Government and Parliament have definitely pledged themselves to a course of action which will ultimately leave the people of India free to determine their own fate and to profit to the full by the place in the League of Nations which has been assigned to them in anticipation of the period when they will be autonomous within the Empire. The period of transition may be difficult, the administration may lose and never regain the perfection which in some departments it has manifested in the past ; but in due course responsible Ministries will be able, with the support of legislators popularly

elected, to deal with those complex issues, economic, social, and religious, which have perforce been left alone by an administration stranger to the land and to its peoples, however well-meaning, however fully animated by benevolence and anxiety for the interests of the governed.

Moreover the case of India does not stand alone. The promises of constitutional advance made to Ceylon, the introduction of elective elements into the legislative councils of West Africa, are signs of the changed outlook in regard to the affairs of the colonies and protectorates. They assure us that there is no longer any conception of the Empire as sharply divided between democratic autonomous States and dependent territories ; they show that the duty of political education with a view to ultimate self-government is at last realized, however distant in many cases such a consummation may be. How far and in what manner democracy may prove to be adapted to the conditions of the eastern colonies, the West Indies, or the African territories of the Crown, it is wholly premature to say ; the time at any rate is past when to deny to a people on colour grounds all chance of developing political capacity can any longer be deemed to be justified.

The emergence of democracy in territories of non-European race must of course raise a vital issue, that of the possibility of co-operation on terms of equality between men of different races within a common Empire. Is it true, as politicians of note have asserted, that political equality and co-operation must be limited to the United Kingdom and the Dominions as peopled by white races capable of a fraternity which cannot be extended to a non-European nation ? If the doctrine is true, then ultimately the Empire must suffer the gravest of losses in the secession of India, for no people will or should consent, when it has attained political maturity, to permanent connexion with peoples which decline to accept it as of equal status, still less the peoples which base the refusal on grounds of colour. In any event, the exclusion of Indians from immigration into he Dominions on economic and racial grounds interposes at

grave difficulty in the way of the creation of solidarity of interest and feeling throughout the Empire, far more serious than the obstacles arising from the existence in Canada of the French-Canadian, in South Africa of the Dutch, elements of the population.

Such, in briefest outline, are the complexities which the advance of democracy has introduced into the political frame-work of the British Empire. To minimize their importance is as idle as to seek to oppose the spread of democratic principles on the score of the inconvenience thence resulting. But the new situation makes the highest demand on our capacities, it calls for gifts of imaginative sympathy, for calm and dis-passionate judgment, above all it demands that we should cease to evaluate all issues from the point of view of the advantage of our own particular country, that we should place the interests of the Empire as a whole above the immediate gain of any part, and thus more worthily fulfil our share in the duty of the service of humanity.

What was the Government's official policy towards India at this time? In the words of the Montagu-Chelmsford *Report* published during the war it was " that of increasing the association of Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire." . . . India's war effort, both in men and materials, had been prodigious, but with the return of peace many Indians began to feel once more that this " development " was too gradual, and so a new period of nationalist agitation began. Bitterness was increased by the publication of the Rowlatt Bill in 1919, which proposed to invest the governor-general with emergency powers in order to quash any revolutionary movements, concerning which a good deal of evidence had been collected. Fearing a fresh period of reaction, Nationalist attacks on the British Raj became increasingly violent. It was about this time that that now almost legendary personality, Mahatma Gandhi, first came to the fore in Indian politics. Hailed in Bombay as a holy

man, he initiated his famous passive resistance movement, believing that victory could be won only through *Satyagraha*, that is to say, by means of an insistence upon truth and a reliance upon " soul force ". The answer to our next question, *How did Gandhi hope to achieve Indian independence?*, is vividly indicated in this extract from his autobiographical writings. When the account begins, we find him pondering over the problem of how best to answer the Rowlatt Bill with his friend Rajagopalachari.

MAHATMA GANDHI

CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND NON-VIOLENCE

WE daily discussed together plans of the coming fight, but besides the holding of public meetings I could not then think of any other programme. I was at a loss to discover how to offer civil disobedience against the Rowlatt Bill if it was finally passed into law. One could disobey it only if the Government gave the opportunity. Failing that, could we civilly disobey other laws ? And if so, where was the line to be drawn ? These and a host of similar questions formed the theme of these discussions of ours. While these cogitations were still going on, news was received that the Rowlatt Bill had been published as an Act. That night I fell asleep while thinking over the question. Towards the small hours of the morning I woke up somewhat earlier than usual. I was still in that twilight condition between sleep and consciousness when suddenly the idea broke upon me—it was as if in a dream. Early in the morning I related the whole story to Rajagopalachari.

" The idea came to me last night in a dream " I said " that we should call upon the country to observe a general *hartal* [a closing of all shops and places of business as a sign of mourning]. *Satyagraha* [soul force] is a process of self-purification, and ours is a sacred fight, and it seems to me to

be in the fitness of things that it should be commenced with an act of self-purification. Let all the people of India, therefore, suspend their business on that day, and observe the day as one of fasting and prayer. The Mussulmans may not fast for more than one day, so the duration of the fast should be twenty-four hours. It is very difficult to say whether all the provinces will respond to this appeal of ours or not, but I feel fairly sure of Bombay, Madras, Bihar, and Sindh. I think we should have every reason to feel satisfied even if all these places observe the *hartal* fittingly."

Rajagopalachari was at once attracted by my suggestion. Other friends, too, welcomed it when it was communicated to them later. I drafted a brief appeal. The date of the *hartal* was fixed for March 30, but was subsequently changed to April 6. The people thus had only a short notice of it. As the work had to be started at once there was hardly any time to give a longer notice. But who knows how it all came about? The whole of India from one end to the other, towns as well as villages, observed a complete *hartal* on that day. It was a most wonderful scene. . . .

Needless to say the *hartal* in Bombay was a complete success. Full preparation had been made for starting civil disobedience. Two or three things had been discussed in this connexion. It was decided that civil disobedience might be offered in respect of such laws only as easily lent themselves to being disobeyed by the masses. The salt tax was extremely unpopular, and a powerful movement had been for some time past going on to secure its repeal. I therefore suggested that the people might prepare salt from sea-water in their own houses in disregard of the salt laws. My other suggestion was about the sale of proscribed literature. Two of my books, *Hind Swaraj* [" Indian Home Rule "] and *Sarvodaya* [a translation of Ruskin's *Unto this Last*] which had been already proscribed, came in handy for this purpose. To print and sell them openly seemed to be the easiest way of offering civil disobedience. Copies of the books were therefore printed

and it was arranged to sell them at the end of the monster meeting that was to be held that evening after the breaking of the fast.

On the evening of April 6 an army of volunteers issued forth with this prohibited literature to sell it among the people. Both Shrimati Naidu and I went out in cars. All the copies were soon sold out. The proceeds of the sale were to be utilized for furthering the civil disobedience campaign. Both of these books were priced at four annas per copy, but I hardly remember anyone having purchased them from me at their face value. Quite a large number of people poured out all the cash that was in their pockets. Five- and ten-rupee notes flew out to cover the price of a single copy, while in one case I remember having sold a copy for fifty rupees ! It was duly explained to the people that they were liable to be arrested and imprisoned for purchasing the proscribed literature. But for the moment they had shed all fear of going to jail. . . .

On the night of April 7 I started for Delhi and Amritsar. On reaching Muttra on April 8 I first heard echoes about my probable arrest. Before the train had reached Palwal station I was served with a written order to the effect that I was prohibited from entering the boundary of the Punjab, as my presence there was likely to result in a disturbance of the peace. I was asked by the police to get down from the train, but refused to do so, saying, " I want to go to the Punjab in response to a pressing invitation ; not to foment unrest, but to allay it. I am therefore sorry that it is not possible for me to comply with this order."

At last the train reached Palwal. Mahadev Desai [Gandhi's secretary] accompanying me. I asked him to proceed to Delhi to convey to Swami Shraddhanand [leader of a Hindu reforming sect] the news about what had happened, and to ask the people to remain calm. He was to explain why I had decided to disobey the order served upon me and to suffer the penalty for disobeying it, and also why it would spell victory for our side if we could maintain perfect peace

in spite of any punishment that might be inflicted upon me.

At Palwal station I was taken out of the train and put under police custody. A train from Delhi came in a short time. I was made to enter a third-class carriage, the police party accompanying me. On reaching Muttra I was taken to the police barracks, but no police official could tell me as to what they proposed to do with me or where I was to be taken next. Early at four o'clock the next morning I was roused from sleep and put in a goods train that was going towards Bombay. At noon I was again made to get down at Sawai Madhupur. Mr. Bowring, Inspector of Police, who arrived by the mail train from Lahore, now took charge of me. I was put in a first-class compartment with him. From an ordinary prisoner I became a " gentleman " prisoner. The officer commenced with a long panegyric of Sir Michael O'Dwyer. Sir Michael had nothing against me personally, but he apprehended a disturbance of the peace if I entered the Punjab, and so on. In the end he requested me to return to Bombay of my own accord, and agree not to cross the frontier of the Punjab. I replied that I could not possibly comply with the order, and that I was not prepared of my own accord to go back. Whereupon the officer, seeing no other help, told me that he would have to enforce the law against me. " But what do you want to do with me ? " I asked him. He replied that he himself did not know, but was awaiting further orders. " For the present " he said " I am taking you to Bombay."

Thus we reached Surat. Here I was made over to the charge of another police officer. " You are now free ", the officer told me when we had reached Bombay. " It would, however, be better " he added " if you got down near the Marine Lines, where I shall get the train stopped for you. At Colaba there is likely to be a big crowd." I told him that I would be glad to follow his wish. He was pleased, and thanked me for it. Accordingly I alighted at the Marine

Lines. The carriage of a friend just happened to be passing by. It took me and left me at Revashankar Jhaveri's place. The friend told me that the news of my arrest had incensed the people, aud roused them to a pitch of mad frenzy. " An outbreak is apprehended every minute near Pydhuni. The Magistrate and the police have already arrived there ", he added.

Scarcely had I reached my destination when Umar Sobani and Anasuyaben arrived and asked me to motor to Pydhuni at once. " The people have become impatient and are very much excited ", they said. " We cannot pacify them. Your presence alone can do it."

I got into the car. Near Pydhuni I saw that a huge crowd had gathered. On seeing me the people went mad with joy. A procession was immediately formed, and the sky was rent with shouts of " Bande Mataram " [" Hail Motherland "] and " Allaho Akbar " [" God is Great "]. As the procession issued out of Abdur Rahman Street and was about to proceed towards the Crawford Market, it suddenly found itself confronted by a body of the mounted police, who had arrived there to prevent them from proceeding further in the direction of the Fort. The crowd was densely packed. It had almost broken through the police cordon. There was hardly any chance of my voice being heard in that vast concourse. Just then the officer in charge gave the order to disperse the crowd, and at once the mounted police charged upon the crowd, brandishing their lances as they went.

For a moment I felt that I would be hurt. But my apprehension was groundless ; the lances just grazed the car as the lancers swiftly passed by. The ranks of the people were soon broken, and they were thrown into utter confusion, which was soon converted into a rout. Some got trampled under foot ; others were badly mauled and crushed. In that seething mass of humanity there was hardly any room for the horses to pass, nor was there any exit by which the people could disperse. So the lancers blindly cut their way through the crowd. I

hardly imagine that they could see what they were doing. The whole thing presented a most dreadful spectacle. The horsemen and the people were mixed together in mad confusion.

Thus the crowd was dispersed and its progress checked. Our motor was allowed to proceed. I had it stopped before the Commissioner's office. All about the staircase leading to the Commissioner's office I saw soldiers armed as though for military action. The verandah was all astir. When I was admitted to the office I saw Mr. Bowring sitting with Mr. Griffith. I described to the Commissioner the scenes I had witnessed. He replied briefly: "I did not want the procession to proceed to the Fort, as a disturbance was inevitable there. And as I saw that the people would not listen to persuasion I could not help ordering the mounted police to charge through the crowd." . . .

[Mr. Gandhi then argued with Mr. Griffith, protesting that the people were non-violent by nature. Griffith, however, pointed out that there had been a good deal of violence at Ahmedabad and Amritsar; he went on to claim that Gandhi's teaching was lost on the people. Mr. Gandhi replied that he would suspend Civil Disobedience only if he were convinced this was so, and he resolved to go at once to Ahmedabad.]

So I proceeded to Ahmedabad. On the way I learnt that an attempt had been made to pull up the rails near Nadiad station, that a Government officer had been murdered in Viramgam, and that Ahmedabad was under martial law. The people were terror-stricken. They had indulged in acts of violence and were being made to pay for them with interest.

A police officer was waiting at the station to escort me to Mr. Pratt, the Commissioner. I found him in a state of rage. I spoke to him gently and expressed my regret for the disturbances. I suggested that martial law was unnecessary and declared my readiness to co-operate in all efforts to restore peace. I asked for permission to hold a public meeting on the grounds of the Sabarmati Ashram. The proposal appealed to him, and the meeting was held, I think, on Sunday, April 14.

Martial law was withdrawn the same day or the day after. Addressing the meeting, I tried to bring home to the people the sense of their wrong, declared a penitential fast of three days for myself, and appealed to the people to go on a similar fast for a day, and suggested to those who had been guilty of acts of violence to confess their guilt.

I saw my duty as clear as daylight. It was unbearable for me to find that the labourers amongst whom I had spent a good deal of my time, whom I had served, and whom I had trusted, had taken part in the riots; I felt I was a sharer in their guilt. Just as I had suggested to the people to confess their guilt, so I suggested to the Government to condone the crimes. Neither accepted my suggestion. The late Sir Ramanbhai and other citizens of Ahmedabad came to me with an appeal to suspend *Satyagraha*. The appeal was needless, for I had already made up my mind to suspend *Satyagraha* so long as the people had not learnt the lesson of peace. The friends went away happy. There were, however, others who were unhappy over the decision. They felt that if I were to expect peace everywhere, and regard it as a condition precedent to launching *Satyagraha*, then mass *Satyagraha* would be an impossibility. I was sorry to disagree with them. If those amongst whom I worked, and whom I expected to be prepared for non-violence and self-suffering, could not be non-violent, *Satyagraha* was certainly impossible. I was firmly of opinion that those who want to lead the people to *Satyagraha* ought to be able to keep the people within the limited non-violence expected of them. I hold the same opinion even to-day.

Almost immediately after the Ahmedabad meeting I went to Nadiad. It was here that I first used the expression "Himalayan miscalculation" with regard to my failure to see what would happen. Even at Ahmedabad I had begun to have a dim perception of my mistake. But on reaching Nadiad, when I saw the actual state of things there, and heard reports about a large number of people from Khaira district

having been arrested, it suddenly dawned upon me that I had committed a grave error in calling upon the people in the Khaira district and elsewhere to launch upon civil disobedience prematurely. I was then addressing a public meeting. This confession of mine to have made a " Himalayan miscalculation " has since called down upon me no small amount of ridicule. But I have never regretted it ; for I have always held that it is only when one sees one's own mistakes with a convex lens and does just the reverse in the case of others, that one is able to arrive at a just estimate of the two. I further believe that a scrupulous and conscientious observance of this rule is necessary for one who wants to be a *Satyagrahi*.

Let us now see what that " Himalayan miscalculation " was. Before one can be fit for the practice of civil disobedience one must have rendered a willing and respectful obedience to the State laws. For the most part we obey such laws for the fear of the penalty for their breach ; and this holds good particularly in respect of such laws as do not involve a moral principle. A *Satyagrahi* obeys the laws of society intelligently because he considers it to be his sacred duty to do so. It is only when a person has thus obeyed the laws of society scrupulously that he is in a position to judge as to which particular rules are good and just, and which unjust and iniquitous. Only then does the right accrue to him to undertake civil disobedience of certain laws in well-defined circumstances. My error lay in my failure to observe this necessary limitation. I had called upon the people to launch upon civil disobedience before they had thus qualified themselves for it ; and this mistake of mine seemed to me to be of a Himalayan magnitude. As soon as I entered the Khaira district all the old recollections of the *Satyagraha* struggle came back to me, and I wondered how I could have failed to perceive what was so obvious. I realized that before a people could be fit for offering civil disobedience they should thoroughly understand its deeper implications.

Gandhi had already had some years' experience of Civil Disobedience —and of Government gaols—in South Africa. Smuts always found Gandhi a difficult opponent, for it is impossible to bear any ill-will against a man who never gets ruffled in an argument. On one occasion Gandhi presented Smuts with a pair of sandals which he had made in the prison to which the general had sent him! Shortly after leaving Nadiad, Gandhi went on to the Punjab. "The scene that I witnessed on my arrival at Lahore" he said "can never be effaced from my memory. The railway station was from end to end one seething mass of humanity. The entire population had turned out of doors in eager expectation as if to meet a dear relation after a long separation, and was delirious with joy."

It is easier to pose the question, *Has British rule brought more harm than good to India?*, than to answer it. And yet it is a question which demands an answer in the interests of the future relationships of both peoples. It may be impossible, as Sir Reginald Coupland says, to answer it with the impartiality it deserves so soon after the British withdrawal from India, but there can be few fairer answers to this problem than Sir Reginald's own. It first appeared in his admirable book, entitled *India: a Re-statement*.

SIR REGINALD COUPLAND

A VERDICT ON BRITISH RULE IN INDIA

THE connexion between Britain and India has been much more than a matter of politics and economics. It has furnished an example of "culture contact" on a vast scale; and, though the influence of British political ideas on Indian minds can be easily detected and defined, the same cannot be said about the impact on Indian life of all that is meant by Western civilization or the counter-reaction of Indian on British thought or the effect of the personal relations between innumerable Britons and Indians. A scientific attempt, indeed, to assess the worth of the British Raj to each of the two countries would involve so many imponderable factors that it might well daunt the most self-confident investigator.

The whole subject, moreover, is nowadays highly controversial. For a long time to come no two verdicts, especially if one is British and the other Indian, are likely to be the same. However objective they may try to be, British and Indian patriots must view the picture from different angles and be affected in some degree by an inescapable, if unconscious, bias. Yet some judgment, however rough and cursory and limited in scope, must needs be ventured here: for no one can understand the theme of the process of India's liberation unless he has formed some opinion as to the nature and results of India's subjection and the gains and losses it has involved for both the countries concerned.

The British balance sheet is the easier to compile. Nearly all the main items are on the credit side, and their value is indisputable. First, the British occupation of India has provided a strategic base, protecting the " life-line " of the Empire, by sea and air, across the Indian Ocean from Aden to Singapore and on to Australia and New Zealand. Secondly, India has been one of the safest fields of British overseas investment and trade. Thirdly, though, as has just been said, the effect of the connexion between Britain and India on the culture of each country cannot be precisely measured, and though it has clearly been much stronger and more pervasive in India, yet it has been by no means negligible in Britain. The modern sciences of comparative philology and comparative religion were founded on the study of the Hindu classics. British archæologists and historians have quarried in Indian soil; and British literature and art have been more influenced than is generally realized by Indian poetry, painting and sculpture. Fourthly, the Raj has offered to successive generations of young Englishmen an attractive, honourable and well-paid career in the Indian civil and military services. Against that last item must be set the loss which British life has suffered, in administration and politics, in the professions and business, through the exile of so much ability and integrity and capacity for leadership. But otherwise there is nothing substantial to

put on the debit side. The Raj has certainly fulfilled the first of the two purposes which Pitt assigned to it in 1784—" to confirm and enlarge the advantages derived by this country from its connexion with India ". And in so far as it has also fulfilled the second purpose—" to render that connexion a blessing to the native Indians "—there has been moral as well as material gain. Since the days when Burke told them that they had a duty to do in India, the British people have certainly tried to do it. " Few governments " wrote J. S. Mill, who was no chauvinist " have attempted so much for the good of their subjects "; and much more has been attempted since Mill's day than was conceivable before it. There have been shortcomings, of course, and blunders; but it is the general British belief, and it has become part of the British national tradition, that the record of the Raj, though it has one or two black pages, is on the whole a record of which the British people have sober reason to be proud. Whatever may be said in the dust and heat of recent controversy, they need not fear the eventual verdict of cold history.

The major benefits which the Raj has bestowed on India are also plain. First and foremost, it has not only safeguarded India, as never before, from recurrent attack from without; it has also given her that internal unity, political and economic, which is the natural response to her physical unity, but which for centuries past she had never attained for any length of time. Secondly, British rule has been the rule of law. It has protected the rights of individuals and communities more fully and impartially than any previous régime, and fostered a sense of allegiance to the sovereignty of law. Thirdly, it has brought the economic life of India out of its almost mediæval isolation into the network of modern world-economy; and the material profit of this revolution, though much of it has been taken by British business and though it has not much relieved the poverty of the great rural majority of the Indian people, has been increasingly shared by all other classes of Indian society.

Fourthly, the closer connexion with the West involved in British rule has made it easier for the Indian intelligentsia to draw, for what it was worth to them, on the storehouse of Western culture, the science, philosophy, art, and literature of all the Western world.

So much for the credit side of the account. On the debit side stand all the disadvantages inherent in the one hard fact that British rule has been foreign rule.

It is only in relatively recent times that India's political subjection has come to be regarded by most Indian politicians as completely upsetting the balance of gain and loss to India resulting from the British Raj. Till some sixty years ago the drawbacks of foreign rule seemed outweighed by the benefits it brought with it, and not least the opportunity it gave to Indians to outgrow it and dispense with it by providing the framework and the training needed for self-government. At one time, indeed, educated Indian opinion may be said to have been too pro-British. It was not only in politics that the British way of doing things was accepted as the obvious model for an inexperienced India: there was a tendency to decry the whole historic tradition of Indian life and thought, and to hold that India could only recover her place in the world by turning her back on her past and acquiring to the fullest possible extent the practical virtues of the West.

This soon provoked a healthy reaction, but there were other reasons for the growth of a more critical appraisement of the British Raj. In the first place, the value of its greatest gifts—external security and internal unity—was apt to be forgotten or underestimated as the conditions of Indian life before the British took control faded from living memory. The peril of invasion was no more thought about in India than in Britain till the catastrophes of 1940 and 1942 brought it so sensationally near. It needed, similarly, the widening of the communal gulf after 1937, the raising of the banner of Pakistan, the sombre talk of civil war, to recall the disruption and anarchy which preceded the British Raj. The *Pax Britannica*,

in fact, external and internal, was taken for granted, and it was not recognized that united India, since the Mutiny at any rate, had escaped the fate of disunited Europe, smitten by constant war and exposed in peace to the assaults of economic nationalism.

The second reason for a change of attitude towards the British Raj went deeper. It was not so much forgetfulness of what it had given to India as a new awareness of what it had not given. With the growth of Indian nationalism—itself made possible by the Raj—there was bound to grow a feeling of impatience with the notion of training for self-government. Quickened by the gathering strength of nationalism all over the world and particularly by its struggles and successes in other Asiatic countries in the opening decades of the twentieth century, this impatience soon became the dominant emotion in the hearts of most educated Indians. Freedom as a far-off goal was no longer enough. They wanted it not only for their sons but for themselves. And it was not so much with the backward state of India that they felt impatient now : it was with the British Raj. Once regarded as the means of attaining self-government, it seemed now the only obstacle that barred the way to it.

This intensification of nationalist feeling unhappily gave a new importance to what has been the most regrettable feature of the Raj. It is one of the major problems of world society, not by any means confined to India, that white men often find it hard not to feel and to betray a sense of superiority to coloured men. It is particularly hard where the white men are the rulers and the coloured men are subject to their rule. And it stands to the credit of those Englishmen who, holding the higher posts in the administration, have been the actual rulers in India that, with few exceptions, in their personal relations with Indians they have—to use a phrase that has not yet lost its meaning—behaved like gentlemen. If, being British, they have been stiff and undemonstrative and have tended to keep themselves to themselves, there have been

many cases of close and equal friendship between them and their Indian colleagues. Outside official circles, too, strong personal ties have been knit—between officers of the Indian Army and their subordinates, between teachers and pupils, between partners in work or play. Nor have these good traditions been seriously impaired by the growth of Indian nationalism and the bitter hostility with which its spokesmen have from time to time assailed the British record. Often, indeed, those Englishmen who have least sympathized with Indian aspirations have been most considerate of Indian feelings.

Unfortunately, however, Englishmen in India have not all been gentlemen, whether by upbringing or nature; too many of them—and of Englishwomen also—have claimed from Indians, whatever their respective stations in life, a deference inconceivable on any grounds but those of race and, worse still, have sometimes enforced the claim with unpardonable insolence. Such conduct, it need hardly be said, has always been sternly reprobated by the authorities; but public opinion in the British community at large has failed to make it impossible for such things to happen; and there was one notorious occasion on which the lesson in race-relations taught by those petty individual incidents was driven home collectively. In 1883, when the liberal-minded Governor-General Ripon sponsored a bill which made it possible for a British resident in India to be tried by an Indian for a criminal offence, the storm raised by the unofficial British community was so violent that Ripon was constrained to bow to it and amend the bill. No doubt, in all the circumstances, some such agitation was inevitable—there have been similar reactions to similar situations in other parts of the world—but few of those who took part in it seem to have realized or cared what conclusions educated Indians were bound to draw.

Such demonstrations of a claim to racial superiority became more intolerable as nationalism strengthened its hold on Indian minds. For the principle of equal status for all

nations, great and small, is the cardinal doctrine of nationalism in revolt; and the main reason why an Indian patriot longs for India's freedom is that he resents the inferior position which, despite her ancient civilization and historic past, she now occupies in the society of nations. If this is natural, so also is the patriot's tendency to shy away from the plain fact that that inferior position must needs have been the result, in some degree at any rate, of Indian weaknesses. Naturally, too, a sense of wounded pride may carry him farther. He may persuade himself that India was enjoying a millennium before the British came, and that her failure to take her due place in the modern world as a free, united, prosperous nation has been Britain's fault.

It is this attitude of mind, more emotional than realistic, that accounts for the transformation of the old ideas about the British Raj in the course of the last fifty years. The balance sheet was re-audited; and now the items on the credit side seemed not only dwarfed by the one great debit item of subjection, their intrinsic value was questioned and written down. India, no doubt, had been protected from invasion, but at an unbearable cost. The British, no doubt, united India, but this was the almost automatic result of the development of modern transport which synchronized with the growth of British rule. That communal peace had been imposed by a neutral British administration was an illusion. The Hindu-Moslem gulf, in particular, had grown wider; the British indeed, it was ultimately asserted, had deliberately widened it on the principle of "divide and rule". If the economic development of India was mainly Britain's work, its profits had gone mainly into British pockets; and India had been impoverished by the steady "drain" of wealth to Britain—the salaries and pensions of British civilians and officers, the debt charges, the proceeds of British business—and by what was called "the 'City's' stranglehold on high finance". Embittered patriots came to believe that it would have been better that India's natural resources should have lain un-

touched and undeveloped until Indians had acquired the capacity to exploit them entirely by themselves. And the reaction penetrated finally into the realm of culture. Contact with Western materialism had soiled the spiritual texture of Indian thought and life. Even the English language had been no boon. It was as harmful as it was degrading for a country which had been civilized ages before Europe to adopt a foreign *lingua franca* for its multilingual people. To cool-headed observers there seemed to be a good deal of exaggeration and make-believe in this revaluation of the British Raj. But not all Indian nationalists were cool-headed. Some of them, indeed, came to feel in the end so acute a sense of humiliation and impotence that any fate for India—disruption, civil war, chaos—seemed preferable to the continuation of the Raj.

The reaction could go no farther, but it must not be supposed that all Indian patriots went so far. Many of them, while desiring no less ardently that India should be free, regarded her subjection as not insufferable because it was not to be permanent. Their attitude to the British Raj would doubtless have been the same as that of the more militant nationalists if Britain had not been true to her liberal tradition and set on foot a gradual process of constitutional advance which, sooner or later, would lead to full self-government. As it was, they saw the process moving, slowly at first, but presently with gathering momentum, till at last only one short stretch lay between them and their goal. Plainly, it seemed to them, the revolutionists' cry that Britain was tightening her "imperial grip" on India was false: plainly she was loosening it.

To grant a politically immature country responsible government was a step which Britain felt she could not, under any circumstances, take, and it was not until 1947 that India and Pakistan were granted full Dominion status. What is the meaning of the expression "Dominion

status "? Political definition came with the Balfour Report on the Imperial Conference of 1926, when the Dominions were described as "*autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any respect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations*". Now this definition was an enormous step forward and it had, as our Sponsor puts it, "a valuable soothing influence"—but it still distinguished between "status" and "function" (that is to say, between theory and practice) and was not, therefore, a complete answer to the "problem of Commonwealth". *Why were the Dominions not granted absolute equality in fact as well as in name?* Once again foreign policy was the stumbling block. Britain had certain commitments and obligations which only she could fulfil, notably in Europe, and in these circumstances it was felt that in some respects Britain's voice, backed by Britain's navy, must still bear more weight than the voices of the Dominions. But let us ask Lord Balfour himself to comment upon the important distinction between "status" and "function".

LORD BALFOUR

THE REPORT OF THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1926

DO not let us allow any exposition of possible difficulties and possible objections to divert our minds, even for an instant, from the great issue which is really before us. What is that great issue? If you want a system in which there shall be no new difficulties, in which no problems hitherto unknown to international or national law shall arise, it is quite easily done—by dissolving the British Empire. That would put an end to all those problems. You would then have a collection of enlightened self-governing communities, in friendly relation with each other, having some memory of a common ancestry and common institutions, but in no way bound together by those ties which it is easy to criticize. That was the solution of the Radical Party fifty or sixty years

ago. John Bright would have had no hesitation in saying that was the proper solution.

Well, I do not say that is a stupid solution, but I emphatically say that it is not a solution which, if things are managed properly, any self-governing part of the Empire will ever support. If that be so, then you have to solve a problem which had never yet, I will not say been solved, but had never yet been presented to civilized mankind. Nobody has ever tried to do what we are explicitly and emphatically trying to do, which is to have a great Empire in which the self-governing constituent parts shall each feel it is master of its own development and its own faith, and that it is bound not by law but by sentiment far deeper than law and far more fruitful of good results. It is bound to work together with the other constituent elements on a footing of equality, on a footing of mutual comprehension with a desire to further the mutual interests, and to form in themselves a great league of civilization and peace for the whole world.

One of the most fundamental considerations in the Report is the distinction drawn between " status " and " function ". Status is immutable. It is fixed, so far as my hopes go, for ever. Function is mutable. It depends upon circumstances. At present it is not an exaggeration to say that the whole defensive power of the Empire depends upon the British Fleet, for which the British taxpayer pays. That is the particular function which falls upon Great Britain for historic, economic, geographical, and other reasons.

That is not the only one. One of the speakers had discussed the question of foreign affairs. It is perfectly true that if your Empire consists of self-governing elements scattered over the whole globe, it is a difficulty that we cannot put Melbourne, Sydney, and the other great cities of Australia in the same relation to Downing Street as Downing Street is to Birmingham, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Manchester, and the rest of the English cities. Some of our difficulties are commentaries upon the facts of geography. Well, I am not going to defend

geography; I did not arrange the world and I am not prepared to defend the arrangement I find. All we can do is to make the best of it, and I do not think we can make the best of it in any other way than the way which we have chosen. Foreign policy must, on the whole, depend upon European considerations and, therefore, upon that part of the Empire which is the most intimately connected with Europe. I do not think there is any alternative to that. It follows that the function of those who live in the United Kingdom must inevitably be somewhat different from those of the other parts of the Empire of equal status with themselves in carrying out the common purposes of the whole.

If anybody can suggest a better method for carrying out that object there is nothing in this document to prevent its being adopted. One of the speakers seemed to think that by the arrangement of intercourse between the Government at home and Governments of equal status elsewhere something was cut off, but I can assure you that was not the intention of any of those who met in conference last year. Whatever is done in the future, believe me, the personal intercourse never can be and never will be cut off between those who are responsible for the Government of these islands and those who are responsible for the Government of India, Australia, Canada, and the rest of the Empire. I do not think we need have any of these imaginary alarms if the good-will, patriotism, and determination to carry out our great mission in the world remains unchanged. That is the essential point.

I am an optimist. I am a believer in the future of this marvellous organization, or want of organization, whichever you like to call it, which constitutes the British Empire; but in my most sanguine and wildest moments it never occurred to me to say or to think that the Imperial task before us was an easy one. There are forces in all communities which tend to segregation. There is always the leaning towards provincialism. Distance must produce, and will produce, its effects. Small differences of manners, customs, or language may create a

wholly illusory feeling of separation far greater and far more difficult to deal with than those produced by oceans and mountains. It is for every citizen of the British Empire to try to feel himself, and try to instil into his children, the fact that he is not only responsible for the section of the Empire in which he lives and in which he votes ; but the responsibility rests upon him to cultivate that larger patriotism which for the first time in history is avowedly, explicitly, and consciously thrust upon those in whose hands the fortunes of fate and the British Empire really rest.

Speaking of the Statute of Westminster which followed the Balfour Declaration five years later, the Irish statesman, Mr. P. McGilligan, said " the system which it took centuries to build has been brought to an end by four years of assiduous concentrated collaboration between the lawyers and the statesmen of the Commonwealth ". In a sense he was right, for by 1931 the second British Empire was a thing of the past, but if by this remark he meant that the Commonwealth was nothing save a name, he was, as many Dominion citizens to-day would affirm, quite wrong. In freeing the Dominion Parliaments from all dependence upon London the Statute of Westminster had *not* destroyed the family of nations. As the clouds of war gathered in the 'thirties the pessimists once more imagined they saw the writing on the wall, but in spite of some talk of Dominion neutrality they too were proved wrong by subsequent events. Perhaps the strength of the post-1931 Commonwealth is most eloquently shown by the fact that any member could secede from the association without upsetting the remainder—and here the Irish Free State was a case in point. *What was the relationship of the Irish Free State to the Commonwealth after 1931 ?* Ever since the Anglo-Irish treaty of 1921, which gave Ireland Dominion status, the country had fought continually for the ending of all connexion with the Crown. Although the Irish Republic was not declared until 1948, with the Repeal of the External Relations Act, the battle was virtually won when the Constitution of Eire came into effect on December 29, 1937. " We propose " Mr. de Valera had said shortly before " to bring in a constitution as if there were no relationship with the states of the British Commonwealth." It is perhaps a pity that Britain

did not recognize the inevitable sooner, for the existence of an Irish Republic has, if anything, improved the hitherto impossible relationship between the ancient enemies; and besides, as a citizen of Cork is said to have told an English officer, "If England was to be giving Ireland what she wants, she wouldn't be wanting it". But the essential thing to note is this: Irish secession has not unbalanced the rest of the Commonwealth. It was not, however, until the echoes of the explosion had died away that it was fully realized that the house was still standing and quite unharmed. It is hardly surprising then that, as the following statements by the Secretary of State for the Dominions given in the House of Commons towards the end of 1933 show, every effort was made to prevent the bomb going off in the first place.

JAMES HENRY THOMAS

THE POSITION OF THE IRISH FREE STATE IN THE COMMONWEALTH

[On November 14, 1933, J. H. Thomas, the Secretary of State for the Dominions, made the following statement in the House of Commons.]

I THINK it will be convenient . . . to state the position of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom with regard to the most recent developments in the Irish Free State and in particular to the three Bills, now before the Irish Free State Parliament, for the amendment of the Irish Free State Constitution. . . .

We are advised that the legislation conflicts in important respects with the Treaty of 1921, and its passage therefore involves a further repudiation of the obligations entered into by the Irish Free State under that Treaty. We have already made perfectly clear the view which we take of action of this kind. Quite apart from any question of legality, we look upon it as a repudiation of an honourable settlement. No modification of the Treaty can properly be made except by agreement between the two countries. But that is not the only aspect of the matter.

The real significance of the Bills is that they clearly indicate an intention gradually to eliminate the Crown from the Constitution of the Irish Free State. Mr. de Valera has told us . . . that his ultimate aim is the recognition of a United Ireland as a Republic with some form of association with the British Commonwealth in some circumstances and for some reasons and the recognition of the King as the head of the association. Any such proposals would be totally unacceptable to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

Our view can be clearly stated. The Declaration of the Imperial Conference of 1926 as to the relationship of Great Britain and the Dominions under the Crown must be accepted as the basis of the constitutional position of the Irish Free State within the Empire. That Declaration is clearly inconsistent with a state of things under which the Irish Free State would be a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations for some purposes and not for all, and would cease to be united with Great Britain and the Dominions by a common allegiance to the Crown.

Our conception of membership of the British Commonwealth is something entirely different. The Irish Free State as a member of that Commonwealth is, as Mr. de Valera himself must now have learned, completely free to order her own affairs. Membership of the Commonwealth confers great advantages, which by her own action the Irish Free State is tending to lose ; the privileges of common citizenship, economic advantages in trading with the rest of the Empire, and the opportunity of powerful influence in international affairs, in concert with the other members of the Commonwealth, in the cause of world peace.

Those privileges carry with them responsibilities, respect for the Crown, loyal observance of engagements, the spirit of friendship and co-operation with the other members of the British Commonwealth. It is our desire to see the Irish Free State taking her full part as a member of the Commonwealth, not grudgingly, but of her own free will, accepting the

responsibilities and enjoying the privileges. If she renounce the one, she cannot hope to enjoy the other.

[This statement was followed by an exchange of letters between Mr. Thomas and Mr. de Valera which Mr. Thomas read to the House on December 5. Mr. Thomas spoke as follows.]

On November 30 I received from Mr. de Valera a dispatch arising out of my statement in the House on November 14. The dispatch was as follows :

" Sir—I have the honour to refer to the statement made by you in the House of Commons on the 14th instant in reply to a question relating to the dispute between the British Government and the Government of the Irish Free State.

" On that occasion, having stated that the British Government were advised that the Bills to amend the Constitution of the Irish Free State, then before the Oireachtas, conflicted in important respects with the Treaty of 1921, you declared that the Irish Free State as a member of the Commonwealth was completely free to order her own affairs. You also said that it was the desire of the British Government to see the Irish Free State taking her full share as a member of the Commonwealth, not grudgingly but of her own free will, accepting the responsibilities and enjoying the privileges. You added that if the Irish Free State renounced the responsibilities she could not hope to enjoy the privileges of membership.

" Following this statement the Government of the Irish Free State feel obliged to make clear beyond any possibility of doubt the attitude of the Irish people towards the British Commonwealth. The Irish people have never sought membership of the Commonwealth. Their association with Great Britain and the Commonwealth has never on their side been a voluntary association. In every generation they have striven with such means as were at their disposal to maintain their right to exist as a distinct and independent nation, and whenever they yielded to British rule in any

form they did so only under the pressure of overwhelming material force.

"The Treaty of 1921 involved no fundamental change in their attitude. They submitted to the Treaty because they were presented with the alternative of immediate war. They did not accept it as a final settlement of their relations with Great Britain. Still less did they regard the Treaty in the sense in which the British Government seek to interpret it—as giving Great Britain a permanent right to interfere in their constitutional development.

"The experience of the last 12 years has made it abundantly evident that lasting friendship cannot be attained on the basis of the present relationship. The Government of the Irish Free State infer from your statement of the 14th instant that the British Government also now realize the evils of a forced association and have decided not to treat as a cause of war or other aggressive action a decision of the Irish people to sever their connexion with the Commonwealth. This attitude of the British Government appears to the Government of the Irish Free State to be of such fundamental importance that it should be formulated in a direct and unequivocal statement. The Government of the Irish Free State would sincerely welcome such a statement. They believe that it would be the first step towards that free and friendly co-operation in matters of agreed common concern between Great Britain and Ireland which ought to exist between them.

That was signed by Mr. de Valera. I have to-day sent the following reply :

"SIR—I have the honour to state that your dispatch of the 29th November has received our careful consideration.

"His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom cannot accept the description of the relations between the two countries set out in paragraphs 3 and 4 of your dispatch. They have stated their view as to the 1921 Settlement in my dispatch of the 9th April, 1932, in the following words.

"His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom entered into the 1921 Settlement with the single desire that it should end the long period of bitterness between the two countries and it is their belief that the Settlement has brought a measure of peace and contentment which could not have been reached by any other means. Further, as the direct result of that Settlement, the Irish Free State has participated in and contributed to the notable constitutional developments of the last few years, whereby the position of the Dominions as equal members with the United Kingdom of the British Commonwealth of Nations under the Crown has been defined and made clear to the world.

"His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would point out that the Treaty Settlement was duly accepted by the elected representatives of the people of the Irish Free State, and that its acceptance was subsequently confirmed at succeeding General Elections in the Irish Free State. The period which elapsed between 1921 and 1932 was marked by the progressive development of friendly relations and co-operation between the two countries.

"Since His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are thus unable to accept the assumption in paragraph 5 of your dispatch, namely, that lasting friendship cannot be attained on the basis of the present relationship, they do not see any grounds for answering a question which is founded on that assumption. They cannot believe that the Irish Free State Government contemplate the final repudiation of their Treaty obligations in the manner suggested, and consequently they do not feel called upon to say what attitude they would adopt in circumstances which they regard as purely hypothetical.

"In conclusion I would state that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom feel that the free intercourse on equal terms with the other members of the British Commonwealth which the Irish Free State have enjoyed under the Treaty Settlement, culminating in the Statute of

Westminster, is the surest proof of their freedom to work out their own destiny within the Commonwealth. We believe that the natural associations between the two countries are such that a close and friendly relationship between them is essential to their full prosperity, and I would once again emphasize what I have previously stated on many occasions, that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are, and always have been, most sincerely anxious to work in friendly co-operation with the Irish Free State as a member of the British Commonwealth."

The story of the English in Ireland has been one of unmitigated failure. Perhaps the reason for this lies in the simple geographical fact that Ireland is too close to England, too close, that is, for " colonization ". Can it be that the farther away a colony or a dominion is from the Mother Country the happier the relations between the two will be ? This theory is given weight by the fact that whilst the nearest dominion (Ireland) was struggling to break away from the Commonwealth, the farthest (New Zealand) was doing everything in her power to strengthen the bonds of unity. The most isolated of the dominions—13,000 miles from Britain, 7000 from San Francisco, and 1200 from Australia—New Zealand is surrounded by vast expanses of ocean ; perhaps these figures alone are enough to explain New Zealand's sense of dependence upon Britain in the years before the second world war. *How has geography affected New Zealand's attitude towards the Commonwealth ?* A more complete answer to this question is to be found in Walter Nash's book, *New Zealand : a Working Democracy*, from which our next extract is taken.

WALTER NASH

NEW ZEALAND: THE LAND AND ITS PEOPLE

ON Sunday, September 3, 1939, New Zealand's declaration of war followed that of Great Britain by only a few hours. And so began a chapter in the distant dominion's

history that was to bring her into the closest touch with Europe, North Africa, America, the Pacific Islands, Asia—with people in all quarters of the earth hitherto almost wholly unconcerned with New Zealand. If, however, the world was not particularly conscious of New Zealand, New Zealand was much concerned with developments beyond her own shores, although the majority of the New Zealand people were largely preoccupied with domestic affairs.

This was probably true, at least until 1935, when the spread of aggression both in Europe and the Far East compelled us to look farther afield and to take heed of world forces which many saw as an imminent threat to the security and freedom of even so isolated and remote a country as their own. Until then, however, the price of wool and next season's pay-out for butter-fat, the cost of living, and the forty-hour week had loomed much more importantly in the minds of the overwhelming mass of New Zealanders than the diplomatic rumblings of Europe or of Asia. Preoccupation with local affairs had, until comparatively recent years, absorbed their energies and their interest. After all, this is understandable in a small country isolated by long ocean distances from the centres of world diplomacy, whose people in a brief century of settlement have been literally pioneers wrestling with nature in a new and virgin land, building roads and cities and giving of necessity much time to the means of acquiring food and shelter. It is understandable, too, when one appreciates the circumstances under which New Zealand was settled and the economic and political forces which have shaped her development. As a New Zealand author has expressed it, the story of New Zealand "is a unique story politically, first because it was a colonization conducted to a previously worked-out plan and, in the second place, because the colonists, although they soon scrapped the plan, remained so faithful to the spirit of it that the third and fourth generations will speak of a country they have never seen as 'Home'".

The ties of sentiment which have characterized New

Zealand's attachment for Britain were, from the outset, very close ones. These ties, moreover, have been powerfully reinforced over the years by considerations of economic self-interest. The prosperity which New Zealand has enjoyed and the high standard of living it has achieved have been largely built up upon the basis of an indefinitely expanding market in the United Kingdom for her primary exports. The development of the dominion's resources, her roads and railways, hydro-electric schemes, and public works were largely financed in the earlier years by British capital. New Zealand's isolation and her dependence upon the protection which the British Navy afforded, both to her own security and to the security of her vital sea-lanes and of her communications, further strengthened the bonds of sentiment and self-interest which have linked New Zealand inseparably with the mother country.

Unlike her sister dominions, New Zealand showed little concern for forms of autonomy and status. In fact, it is only within the lifetime of the present generation that New Zealand has emerged to a sense of nationhood and to a formulation of what might be termed specifically New Zealand's views and attitudes on matters of imperial and foreign affairs. The historian, it is true, might justifiably point out that in the very early days of colonization New Zealand did possess very definite views on imperial and foreign policy. The unique and unchallenged position which Britain occupied during this period did permit an independence of spirit. But this independence was badly shaken during the Russian scares of the 'eighties and died away in the tension which preceded the outbreak of the first world war. New Zealand's participation in the 1914-18 world war, although it did not lead to any immediate break in the New Zealand tradition of non-involvement in international affairs, did hasten the emergence of a more distinctively New Zealand outlook on the world. Before the war New Zealanders were an untried—perhaps an insular—people. After the war New Zealand could claim to be a nation.

The war gave rise to a new and growing national spirit and awakened pride in the dominion's achievements, a realization of the dominion's own strength and capabilities, a fuller national consciousness.

In the post-war years, nevertheless, New Zealand did not share the impatience shown by some of the older dominions in their demands for dominion status and complete freedom in foreign affairs. If she did not actively oppose these demands, at least she made clear her displeasure at any move which might be construed as tending to weaken the imperial connexion as an organic reality. New Zealand, however, was obliged by force of circumstance to follow the other dominions in their march to nationhood. She acquired the same full authority in the field of foreign affairs, the same autonomous rights and privileges, even though at times they may have been accepted with reluctance and even with serious concern for the future of the empire.

But it has not been until very recent years, not in fact until 1936, that New Zealand has chosen to exercise the powers she has acquired, and not until 1944 has her Government proceeded to ratify the Statute of Westminster (1931). Unlike Canada and South Africa, New Zealand did not welcome as a progressive constitutional development the Balfour declaration of 1926 to the effect that the dominions were equal in status with and in no way subordinate to the United Kingdom. At successive imperial conferences New Zealand resisted all moves to weaken the common status of British subjects by the adoption of separate nationality acts by the dominions. Appeals to the judicial committee of the Privy Council in London have not been restricted, in deference to a strong feeling that exists in the dominion that the judicial committee should be retained as a court of last resort.

In the years preceding the outbreak of the second world war, however, a significant change in the New Zealand attitude was clearly to be discerned. During the first year of war the dominion celebrated the hundredth anniversary of

the arrival of the first white settlers who came from England in 1840 to found a new nation. Associated with the idea of the centenary was the feeling that New Zealand had established an identity and attained a culture of her own; not for the purpose of self-containment but with a view to making some distinctive contribution to the greater family of nations. For one hundred years the people of New Zealand had been in the process of adapting an old and unbroken culture—that of the mother country—to a new land and different circumstances. Much of this first century was directed towards the exploitation of the country's resources without too much regard for either the past or the future. If one type of thinking was particularly characteristic of New Zealand during this period of the frontier economy, it was that the way of progress lay in ever greater and greater production and export of foodstuffs and agricultural raw materials. Attend to those things, it was thought, and all else would look after itself. It was, therefore, a period of ruthless expansion—ruthless in man's attack on nature—a period that seemed to be marked by almost automatic prosperity.

It is the same story that might be told about American economic development during those colourful and exciting years of westward expansion. But as the country was opened up and trade began to flourish, the immediate problem of providing the necessities of life was solved and the crucial problem gradually changed from one of producing enough to one of distributing all that was produced, so that not merely would some have sufficient but all should have some. The first lesson that a pioneer in a new country learns is the need for self-reliance. The second, paradoxically, is that the individual can thrive only if all join in helping one another. Thus, New Zealanders have learned, in the hard school of experience, that against the hazards incidental to the competitive struggle for private gain must be set the need for collectively ensuring the welfare and security of the individual and the nation. They have learned, in other words, that the

modern problem among pioneers who are coming of age is one of knowing how to distribute and how to consume properly the gifts of nature and the fruits of productive labour.

And it is true to say that, as a result of their successful application of this lesson, men like Grey, Reeves, Ballance, McKenzie, and Seddon have had a significant influence not only on the affairs of New Zealand, but on the social progress and general evolution of the whole British Commonwealth of Nations. It was these men who were mainly responsible for the social and labour legislation of the 'nineties and early twentieth century which set the pattern for New Zealand's political tradition and served as a model for the rest of the world. New Zealand, consequently, in her rôle of a young and progressive democracy, has had an influence quite out of proportion to the size of her population. For New Zealand, if not one of the smallest in area, is undoubtedly one of the most isolated countries on the face of the globe. . . .

Occupying New Zealand's sixty-six million acres are some 1,641,000 persons, 94 per cent. of whom are of English, Scottish, Welsh, or Irish extraction. Of the balance, 5 per cent. are Maoris, New Zealand's native Polynesian inhabitants. Less than 1 per cent. of New Zealanders are foreign-born. New Zealand must, therefore, rank on any comparative basis as one of the under-populated countries of the world. Although her absorptive capacity can easily be exaggerated, it cannot be denied that the resources and present stage of development are such as to enable a considerably larger population to be maintained without endangering the standards of living that have been built up. At the present time, New Zealand's population is little more than one-thirtieth that of the United Kingdom, or approximately equal to that of the cities of Liverpool and Manchester combined. Although New Zealand is predominantly a farming country, about 57 per cent. of its people are living in urban areas, the majority in the four main centres—Auckland (221,500), Wellington (158,000), Christchurch (136,000), and Dunedin (83,000).

Immigration, mainly from the United Kingdom, was actively fostered during the country's earlier years of development, but the policy of governmental assistance to immigrants, which had been in force in varying degrees since 1871, has been restricted since 1927. New Zealand has fortunately been free from racial problems. There is no colour bar in New Zealand and no discrimination. The Maori enjoys full and equal civil rights and liberties along with all other New Zealand citizens. The Maori himself realizes he is an important and respected part of the dominion's life.

This has not always been the case. Not so many years ago, the Maori people, in common with the Polynesian race generally, seemed doomed to perish. It was the same sad story that has occurred again and again when simple self-reliant native peoples have been introduced to the doubtful blessings of western civilization. The record of the European nations among the Polynesian peoples is not a record of which they have cause to be particularly proud. It is a tragic story of a fine, intelligent, free, and healthy people easily corrupted by many of the worst features of the white man's civilization—forsaking reluctantly many of the best features of their own communal society ; a tragic story of a happy, carefree people with immense potentialities, with inherent capacities for contributing richly to the cultural and intellectual life of the Pacific, decimated and in many cases almost annihilated by the ravages of war, disease, and sordid commercialism which followed the white man's footsteps in those early years of exploration and settlement.

For a number of years, however, in New Zealand and in other islands of the Pacific, the white man has been endeavouring with considerable success to make amends for the injustices and the crimes committed against the Polynesians in those earlier days. It is, perhaps, partly due to this fact, but mainly to the delightful qualities of the Maori himself, that he is now accepted as a full equal, socially and politically, is trusted, respected, and admired, by his fellow (white) New Zealanders.

Thus in spite of the strain of fatalism in the Maori race which once made him regard extinction as his inevitable lot, the population is no longer a dwindling one. The Maoris, on the contrary, are increasing in numbers more rapidly than are the *Pakehas* (white New Zealanders). This rebirth of the Maori race has been due to the efforts of successive Governments, and of the Maori people themselves, under the guidance and direction of some of the most able men and women that New Zealand has produced—men and women of Maori blood who have had a tremendous influence in shaping not only the destinies of their own people but the destinies of New Zealand itself. The value of a policy of complete co-operation and equality was already manifesting itself in pre-war years with the revival of Maori economy, particularly where it was centred round the co-operative farms established in many native districts. As in 1914, so in 1939, when war came again, the spontaneous response made by the Maori people was convincing proof that such mutual confidence and respect can bring results of the greatest benefit to the strength and morale of the nation. . . .

A fact to be constantly borne in mind in any general appraisal of New Zealand, her people, and their accomplishments is that she is a very young country as countries go. It is barely more than a hundred years since organized settlement first began. Yet in that short space of time—short, that is, in the history of nations—New Zealand has been transformed from a rugged wilderness into one of the most productive and prosperous areas on the face of the globe. Contrast the New Zealand of to-day—with its mechanized farms, its thousands of miles of railways, of bitumen and concrete highways, its well-equipped ports and aerodromes, its modern industrial enterprises, its rich mineral and forestry resources, its high standard of living—with the savage land of one hundred years ago.

Placed in a particular environment and uncontaminated by outside influence, a particular kind of person will eventually become the " type ". This is why settlers placed in a new country develop a fresh and distinctive character. This is how, provided the settlers are allowed to look after their own affairs, new nations are born. Readers of General Smuts's speech on the Commonwealth will remember his pointing out that one of the fundamental things about the British Commonwealth was that " it stands for a fuller, a richer, and more various life among all the nations that compose it ". It does not stand for any loss of individuality, and it is this fact, that the Commonwealth is *not* just an extension of one nation, but is an association of *new* nations, that makes the Commonwealth such a remarkable experiment in international co-operation. *Have Australians, for example, evolved a nationality of their own?* In his address, delivered at the annual meeting of the Australian Historical Society in 1932, Dr. Cole discusses this important question—and remember that Australia has moved a long way since then.

PERCIVAL R. COLE

THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN AUSTRALIAN SOCIAL TYPE

MANY may doubt whether there is such a thing as a distinctive Australian social type. Being a young people, the Australians have not yet led a national life of long enough duration to enable them to have evolved national characteristics of as definite a kind as those which are attributed to the older nations of the world.

Some of the characteristics of these nations have definitely crystallized into accepted forms. Rightly or wrongly, an Englishman has come to be regarded as a sportsman, a German as a scholar or perhaps a pedant, an Italian as a music-lover, a Frenchman as a gallant, an American as an enthusiast. That such terms cannot be applied indiscriminately to every member of any given community may be sufficiently obvious ; but there can be little doubt that they bear some kind of crude and general relation to the habits and outlook of the nationalities

indicated. They designate typical tendencies which have had time and opportunity to find their natural levels.

If there is any outstanding quality for which the Australian is celebrated, that quality is what may be termed insouciance or nonchalance. The development of this quality is related to the fact that although Australians have had to endure their share of natural and social trial, of drought, flood, depression, and war, they have seldom found it difficult to procure the essentials of livelihood or even of entertainment. Under these conditions the minor vicissitudes of fortune can be tolerated with impassive stoicism or borne with ironical indifference. Thus it is not surprising to find that Australians frequently tend to adopt a somewhat negligent, *laissez-faire* attitude towards current problems. Although the foreign idea that they spend much of their time in leaning against lamp-posts is certainly erroneous, it merely represents a caricature of a less heinous social trait. Australians are somewhat inclined to be casual ; they tend to carry *sang froid* to an extreme.

This at least was the position before the Great War. But one is tempted to remark that the war has changed all that. The modern Australian does not lean against a lamp-post ; not so much because there are fewer lamp-posts, but because there is less time for chewing the cud of reflection than of yore. Life has become keener, more competitive. Listlessness has given place to earnestness, fickleness to serious purpose, negligence to smartness, indifference to zeal, apathy to devotion. The old reproach of negligence or slackness is no longer justified. In rural districts, indeed, it was always very hard for a new chum to keep pace with an Australian worker in fencing, wood-cutting, or other arduous pursuits. The influence of so many trained soldiers, and of such weighty problems as have been thronging in recent years upon the attention of the Australian public, has gone far to remedy a failing that once was wont to bulk large in the national character. In the face of great events and imperative crises, none know better than Australians how to pull themselves together.

The apparent transience of the trait of insouciance suggests that the Australian social type is not yet fixed. Support is lent to this view by the disagreement of its critics among themselves. Only in a few directions are the characteristics of the Australian type known, in others they are indeterminate. By the term " Australian type ", is not meant a mere average of the traits or characteristics of the Australian people, but rather what is known to mathematicians as a *mode*. The *mode* denotes a case about which the greatest number of cases cluster. In this sense of the word, the typical Australian is the one whose traits are found most frequently in the community, but these common traits are less conspicuous than those of the typical Irishman, or Scot, or Frenchman, or Italian. The Australian type is still in the making.

Yet, although it remains in many respects indeterminate, the Australian social type is indisputably endowed with certain characteristics, physical, mental, and moral, for most of which there is reason to be thankful. It might be unreasonable to compare the Australian Imperial Forces with the armies of most of the combatant parties to the Great War, for the Australians were volunteers. But there can be no doubt that on the physical side the Australians tend to be big, strong, and athletic. Perhaps the most striking evidence of the truth of this statement is to be found in the statistical records of school medical departments. Measurements of pupils, taken on a convincing scale, show that Australian school children are both taller and heavier than the school children of European countries. They also grow taller and heavier than their parents. What sight is more common than that of a small immigrant couple surrounded by a group of stalwart sons and daughters, born and bred in Australia ? Prominent among the conditions of Australian life are those that favour growth. Even in the cities the general health of the people is good ; and the low mortality may be illustrated by the fact that, taken over a period of years, Sydney has the lowest death-rate of all the large cities of the world.

On the mental and moral side the Australian is almost equally well equipped. In general, and without denying the existence of innumerable exceptions to the rule, a positive correlation has been found to exist between mental and physical efficiency. Those who are best off physically tend to be best off mentally ; to him that hath is given. The typical Australian is alert, resourceful, adaptable, patient, practical, and genial. His humour, very frequently in evidence, has a special quality of its own, that of inversion, just as American humour has a special quality, that of exaggeration. The Australian humorist regularly says the opposite of what he means. Owing to the possession of this quality, since he often speaks dryly and without a smile, in a foreign country he is only too liable to be misunderstood. But in Australia, where, for example, workmen are engaged in building a house, one is often surprised by the quality as well as by the freedom and fluency of the banter which passes between them.

On the moral side, according to people of other countries, it was the war that put Australia on the map. Before the war, Englishmen, who already had some information, however erroneous, as to the conditions of Australian life, were commonly aware that Australians are kindly and hospitable, and that this fine quality increases in direct ratio to the sparseness of population in any locality. But the inhabitants of other countries than England could not be expected to know this. Only as the Great War progressed, as it was seen that the Australian troops never lost a position that they were told to hold, and never failed to win a position that they were instructed to attain, did it become clear to a waiting and watching world that for courage, resolution, perseverance, and initiative the Australian troops could have had few equals anywhere, or at any time. During inaction they were not docile ; but in action they were indispensable to the standard of liberty and to the light of civilization and justice.

Thus in the short space of a few years some of the characteristics of the Australian stock became world-famous. These

and other characteristics were fashioned of necessity by the twin sources of heredity and environment. Let us regard each of these formative influences separately. In the hereditary endowment of the Australian people two salient qualities may be readily distinguished. In the first place, Australians come almost exclusively of British stock, 95 per cent. being of this extraction. In the second place, they come of a stock which was itself highly selected for the qualities of enterprise and adventure. The pioneer farmers, hunters, soldiers, sailors, gold-diggers, police, and even convicts of the early days were all of them highly endowed with these racially desirable traits. Australians have indeed, biologically speaking, an excellent ancestry. Being more British than the British, who on account of the ready influx of foreigners from Europe cannot keep their race equally pure, they cannot fail to be highly gifted with the qualities that are recognized as Britain's own, whatever these may be. And who, regarding the glorious history of England, Scotland, and Ireland, can doubt that such qualities are equal to the finest that can fall to human society? Nor may it be doubted that, by and large, Australians have lived up to the traditions of their ancestors. One has only to look around at the marvellous cities and the equally wonderful countryside of Australia in order to realize that in such a short space of time as has elapsed since white men first settled within this continent no such record of progress has ever been written in the history of the world. . . .

Fortunate in respect of their racial inheritance, are Australians equally so in the natural conditions by which they are surrounded? Anyone who does not know the country intimately, and possibly anyone who has lived in such remote parts as to know its limitations too well, may hesitate to answer in the affirmative. There are no doubt parts of Australia, generally far inland, where few people live by choice, and not many even by necessity. Here the seasons are frequently disappointing and tantalizing, one good season being experienced for several bad. Even in coastal districts, the outstanding

characteristics of the natural environment were not such as to captivate many of the early visitors to Australian shores. William Dampier was repelled by the aspect of the north and west; and long after the first phases of effective settlement had passed, such regretful or remorseful exiles from England as the dashing but melancholic Adam Lindsay Gordon failed to appreciate the sunny beauty of their surroundings. Even the light, graceful, and varied glories of the prevailing eucalyptus were interpreted by those unused to them as grotesque and bizarre, as if they touched some Freudian complex on the raw. Probably none but an Australian-born people can be expected to revel sincerely in the blue skies, clear air, transparent waters, and unique flora and fauna of their native land. Yet to their credit it must be remembered that Captain Cook and the botanists who accompanied him on the *Endeavour* took a favourable view of Botany Bay; and if it be true that the habitable qualities of a country depend first and foremost on its climate, their good opinion stands amply justified.

Apart from but not unrelated to climate, the Australian environment exercises a powerful and peculiar influence upon the national character in respect of its qualities of remoteness, insularity, and (over great areas) sparseness of population. Favourable climatic conditions are largely responsible for the kindly, genial, and hospitable attitude of the mass of the people towards their fellow-men. The love of outdoor life and the fondness for sport for which Australians are renowned and criticized are also closely related to this cause, as is the tendency of the people towards an easy-going attitude to life and a certain negligence in respect of mere formalities. Sparseness of population, while by no means favourable to intellectual and æsthetic interests or to conventional and superficial urbanities, tends towards the development of resourcefulness, initiative, and self-reliance, to such an extent that Australian inventiveness is fast becoming a byword. Undoubtedly the greatest danger to the development of the Australian social type lies in the fact of insularity and especially

in the remoteness of the people from the older and larger nations of the world. Only an enlightened system of education, supplemented by the encouragement of travel and the facilitation of other means of international intercourse can preserve the Australian community from the adoption of a narrow and provincial outlook towards large international issues and the development of the serious malady of social blindness. . . .

" By the soul
Only, the nations shall be great and free."

The development of an Australian nationality has been a relatively simple and natural process, for the natives have never presented any serious problems to the white man (as was the case in New Zealand) and there has been no conflict between different European peoples (as was the case in Canada). South Africa, on the other hand, has had to face both problems at once, and throughout most of the nineteenth century no less than three parties struggled for supremacy—Dutch, British, and Bantu. The Great Trek, which began in 1836, aggravated the problem, for it tended to emphasize the differences between the white races—differences which were to be tragically sharpened by war later on. Thus, with the union of South Africa in 1910, one of the problems facing Dutch and British alike was whether the European races in South Africa could be united. As early as 1904 Botha had declared, " Let us learn English, let the English learn Dutch, that will increase the chances of our forming a great nation ". There were others, however, who aimed at keeping the two white races distinct. The leader of this movement was General Hertzog, whose " Two-stream Policy " had this object in view—because it was feared that too close a relationship between Briton and Boer would result in the Boer losing his special identity and that South Africa's jealously protected Dutch culture would be swamped. When Hertzog became Prime Minister in 1924 the " Two-stream Policy " was given fresh impetus, the force of which, however, was in some respects diminished when Smuts took on the rôle of deputy leader. *Can the white races in South Africa be united?* This question is still being asked, and, at the unveiling of the Voortrekker Monument in December 1949, Dr. Malan, Mr. Havenga,

and Justice Newton Thompson all urged the two white races to remember those things which they have in common rather than their differences, and to look for agreement rather than disagreement. The address by Mr. Havenga, the astute Minister of Finance, is a good example of this attitude of mind.

NICOLAAS CHRISTIAAN HAVENGA

THE IDEALS OF THE VOORTREKKERS

WE are to-day experiencing a great and solemn moment in the life of our nation. This huge monument, built by grateful descendants as a sign of tribute, prompts us to meditate. We see in the Voortrekker Monument, with its sturdy and striking lines, a symbol of the life of the Voortrekkers and their immortal pioneering work. The monument prompts us to ask ourselves what the Voortrekkers achieved for us and why we wish to see their deeds, sufferings, and sacrifices immortalized in a monument.

The ideal of the Voortrekkers can briefly and pithily be expressed by the following: their love for freedom. Their urge for freedom was so strong within them that material possessions could not be weighed against it. They left their farms, and full of faith trekked into an unknown world full of dangers:

> " DIE TREKKER MET SY OS, SY WA, SY BOEK
> WAT IN DIE BINNELAND SY DURE VRYHEID SOEK ".[1]

One does not easily forgo one's earthly possessions for an uncertain future. It has been alleged that the Trek farmers were only after new and better grazing and that they trekked out of the Cape purely for economic reasons. But those who know history, know that this statement is one-sided and untrue.

In the days of Jan van Riebeeck already a spirit of independence began to develop among the first colonists, and it

[1] " The Trekker with his ox, his waggon, his Book,
Who sought his dear freedom in the Interior."

gradually grew into a love for this country which became the basis of the formation of a new nation. They cast their fate with this country, and this new lie of the land, together with the legacy of independence of the Dutch and the Huguenot, helped to create a new nation, the Afrikaner nation. It could not have been otherwise: The "free farmers" soon came into conflict with overseas interests, and the revolt which arose against Willem Adriaan van der Stel was not only aimed against his tyranny. It was the active side of revolt by dissatisfied citizens. It sprang from a strong spirit of independence in which the descendants of Hollander, Frenchman, and German were united in a new national feeling. Willem Adriaan van der Stel spoke disdainfully of "Die Boere" who came into conflict with him, but the Colonists proudly assumed the designation of "Die Boere" or "Die Boerenasie" and by doing so laid the foundations for a new national unfolding in South Africa. Afrikanerdom was in the making. It was to have its roots in a sound national feeling, and that sound national feeling remained the sheet anchor in our history.

This was the driving force which was responsible for the acknowledgment of our language, it was the main cause of the Great Trek, which resulted in the foundation of two independent republics. It remained the incentive when the republics were conquered and a defeated people were inspired to carry on and to demand their natural rights of independence. Eventually, after all the vicissitudes of fate throughout our history, it resulted in the acknowledgment before the whole world of ourselves as a sovereign independent nation. For this we have to thank that personal urge for independence which was so strong within our forebears and which was absorbed in a wider urge for national independence.

We know that it has at times been alleged that this desire for independence would degenerate into lawlessness. The Voortrekkers were even called nomads! But the Voortrekkers were a deeply religious people and, therefore, they were law-abiding. They did not want to fall into a state of indiscipline,

but they sought justice and a fair administration. They did not wish to molest anyone or rob anyone of his freedom. Hence the moving chapter in history when Piet Retief, as an honourable man, sought to enter into an honest agreement with the treacherous Dingaan. They went to the tyrant with thoughts of peace. The Voortrekkers sought to keep their names clean in the eyes of the world.

That is why Piet Retief in his famous manifesto clearly stated: "We despair of saving the Colony from the evils which are disrupting it in all parts. We see no prospect of peace and happiness. We have suffered heavy losses. We are being plundered. We are being slandered and blamed undeservedly. We are trekking to preserve the true freedom. We are trekking so that we can live more peacefully, and live in peace and friendship with all people." No wonder that the English-speaking fellow-citizens of Jacobus Uys, father of Pieter Uys, presented him with a Bible as a memento, because they too suffered just as much under an administration which did not understand their problems. They were on a good footing with the Afrikaner and suffered just as much under a wrong policy from overseas. It is noteworthy that a large number of Coloured people also cast their fate with the Voortrekkers, and hundreds of them were murdered with the Europeans by barbarians in Natal. From this it is clear that the Voortrekkers carried the torch of Civilization into Africa and that they left a rich legacy of freedom for the whole of South Africa. Barbarism was cleaned up by them. They relieved the native population of the terrible tyranny of the bloodthirsty Dingaan and Moselekatse, who, with their plundering raids and extermination policy, were both annihilating peaceful tribes.

The Voortrekkers were, therefore, the founders of a tradition of freedom, civilization, and the maintenance of moral law where formerly only the law of the jungle existed. How strong the urge for order and authority was among them was clearly proved by the fact that the same people who were

branded as "lawless" established the first freely elected legislative council south of the equator within a year of the beginning of the Voortrekker movement!

As a religious people with a moral conscience, as descendants of a great western tradition of democratic freedom, they did not want to lapse into or live in a state of anarchy, but they sought refuge in the power of a Constitution. They did not blindly follow a self-appointed leader, as happens only too frequently in such circumstances. Their leaders were properly elected and the highest authority remained in the hands of the people themselves who had the right to elect their lawful representatives.

Andries Pretorius on his death-bed did not nominate his son as his successor on the war council. "Choose whom you wish to choose" was his wise counsel. On this sound basis it was possible subsequently to build up a united people, because both the English-speaking and the Afrikaans-speaking people share this great irreplaceable western tradition. Much blood was shed before it was acknowledged. Both sections of the population have a high regard for lawful authority, and both want to see law and order maintained. Both have a deep disapproval of tyranny, abuse of authority and unfair administration. To us it is a sacred birthright, and the fact that the Voortrekkers so faithfully maintained this deep moral principle is in itself of sufficient importance for us to perpetuate their memory in this monument.

But what they achieved is to-day our birthright. Also the large non-European population, relieved of tyranny, learned to look to the white man as its guardian and learned how great and powerful was Justice of the law, and how respect for it brings peace and quiet and unanimity. We do not require any unsolicited advice from outside South Africa about our duty in regard to the non-Europeans. We know our duty. History has taught us hard lessons. As they were saved from an uncertain existence under bloodthirsty tyrants, our task, therefore, is as Christian guardians to guide those who look

to us, to act as their protectors of human rights so that their confidence in us can be maintained. Confidence will strengthen immeasurably their faith in us, because the under-developed, particularly as he is so often defenceless, has a deep feeling for fairness and justice. The privileges which he possesses he appreciates highly and cherishes them in an almost child-like way. If he feels that his guardian is just and fair, peace prevails in his mind, and he maintains his respect for the authority placed over him.

With all the power at my disposal I wish to emphasize this great moral principle. Those in authority, and the European must continue to be in authority, have in their hands a powerful weapon, but they must always wield that power justly and fairly. They must be guided by strict fairness, and then confidence in him will never be lost. The great non-European population will then feel safe and will not seek refuge in unhealthy directions. They want to be assured that the European guardian placed over them will see to them and their rights, where they themselves are not in a position to do so. They are also attached to this soil and united with us in their love for it. The Voortrekkers created this principle of guardianship and we must show, even in the complicated circumstances in which we live to-day, that we are capable of maintaining it with dignity.

The other great moral principle which they handed down to us is the principle of equality and unity. Piet Retief, Andries Pretorius, and Paul Kruger continuously uttered this very message : Be United ! Even in his last letter to the war council Andries Pretorius wrote : " Guard and pray that no seed of discord takes root among you ; eradicate it in time. Be faithful to one another in everything you undertake."

In South Africa there is not a single leader who is not striving for unity between the two European sections of the community. We cannot do otherwise, because it is vitally necessary. In Natal representatives of both groups fought against Dingaan's treachery and were united in death. This

monument and everything of which it is the symbol, is, therefore, their common property. In the maintenance of South Africa's hard-won freedom, they must stand shoulder to shoulder in the future. By the acknowledgment of the great achievement of freedom of the Voortrekkers, we are already united as we are to-day, and the farther we go the stronger will the spirit of our country bind us together in a common tradition of freedom founded on open-hearted acknowledgment of even-handed justice. This principle of equality is not new, but it is the key to the whole of our future happiness and it flows forth from the whole of our past.

The late General Hertzog, who did so much towards the erection of this imposing monument—he was at the head of the Government in which, together with General Smuts, myself, and others, the financial responsibility for its erection was undertaken on behalf of the whole nation—put it as follows : " Give me equality and equity, viewed in the spirit of mutual respect, and the sources of discord and division between the two brother races will immediately dry up. This is no new message. It merely contains the underlying principles on which everything that is great and noble in the history of the Afrikaner, everything which is constructive and creative in our community, everything which can be lasting in the continued existence of our people, are founded. Without this foundation no nation can be built, neither can any nation even exist."

This pithy conclusion by General Hertzog reflects the core of our mutual relationship towards one another on which the future happiness of our country, based on our national tradition, will have to be built. To me this is the significance of the whole of our history.

In this hour of tribute to the Voortrekkers we can do nothing greater than, in accordance with the circumstances of our time, to continue to build on the foundations which they laid so well, so solidly, and as human beings steadfastly to preserve our traditions by living honestly and with dignity

and to consecrate and to sacrifice ourselves unselfishly to the highest interests of our people.

Few words can have been more freely abused or more frequently misinterpreted than that little word " race ". Few of our problems to-day present greater difficulties or arouse stronger feelings than our racial problems. It follows, then, that our next question, *Can the racial problems in the Commonwealth be solved?*, is one of the utmost urgency and delicacy. It is a question to which there is no simple or straightforward answer, but it is one to which a satisfactory answer *must* somehow be found if the Commonwealth is to remain a healthy organism. Indeed, without an answer, the Commonwealth may not long survive. It has been emphasized throughout this volume that the theme of the Commonwealth story is *unity amid diversity*, but it is a theme which must be applied not only to the political relationships of the Commonwealth but to its social and racial relationships as well. In the following talk, broadcast in January 1951, the editor of the *Sunday Times* suggests some ways of unravelling the Gordian knot. Mr. Hodson believes that in certain cases the racial conundrum could perhaps be answered by the application of the federal formula on Swiss lines, where power is divided not only between the centre and the regions, but also at the centre among all main groups no matter whether they be majority or minority groups.

HENRY VINCENT HODSON

RACIAL PROBLEMS IN THE COMMONWEALTH

THE idea of race, so simple and obvious to the ordinary man, is in fact one of the most elusive and confused in all contemporary affairs. In itself, it is hard to define with any scientific exactness ; more baffling still is its cat's cradle entanglement with other phenomena, like nationalism, imperialism, and economic class.

One day, race may turn out to be an even greater problem than communism. At present it threatens chiefly because of its connexion with other political and economic relationships, including the conflict between communism and democracy. In the struggle in the Far East, for instance, the motive of racial consciousness in Asia, of seeking to "turn out the white man", undoubtedly plays its part. But can we be sure that even this motive is strictly racial, that the white man is to be evicted because he is of different race? Or is it because he represents a certain relationship of economic or political domination, which Asian nationalism (as distinct from race consciousness) is determined to end? A famous British-Indian administrator said to me the other day: "In my experience there was no race problem in India under our rule". You may think that an exaggeration, but you see what he meant. It was not because the British were white and the Indians were brown that there was sometimes tension between them, but because politically the British were, in the last resort, the masters. When that imperial relationship was ended, racial differences, such as they were, fell into a very insignificant place.

So even politically, and not only scientifically in the narrow sense, we may well ask, "Is race real?" I have heard it argued that there is no such thing as race, since it can neither be defined nor isolated; that it is only a political myth. Unfortunately, to call race a myth does not in the least dispose of the matter. Myths have great power for good or evil in human affairs, often greater power than tangible, calculable causes. In political and social affairs, it is not so much race itself and actual race difference that count, as awareness of them; and here colour is more often than not the determining factor, for no better reason than that it is obvious to the eye. When I talk about race problems in the Commonwealth I mean problems which arise from consciousness of race differences or race solidarity, whether or not that consciousness is based on scientific fact. I am not therefore using the term

" race " as a strict biological concept ; on the other hand, I do not use it loosely as it is used, for example, in immigration regulations in North America, where you have to declare whether you are of English or Irish or Scots or Welsh race. You might almost as well treat Presbyterians as of different race from Episcopalians.

The essence of race is that it is inherent in the man or woman from birth, cannot be escaped or changed, and must be passed on to his or her offspring, with or without mixture through intermarriage. Of course, other differences besides race conform to the same broad description. Religion or caste, for instance, often has this same immutable and hereditary character, where it is intimately bound up with the social structure, and marriage is only within the group. Differences such as these give rise to problems in the Commonwealth and elsewhere essentially similar to that of race differences, and I call them para-racial.

It seems to me important to get all this straight, because otherwise we may be tempted to think that race problems can be dealt with by general formulæ or short cuts which really bear little relation to their true nature. For example, to treat all races as equal politically, in regard to voting and so forth, where they regard each other as separate, does not solve the political problem of race ; it merely transfers it to a different plane. The question, " How is the subordinate race to share in the authority of the governing race ? ", is translated into " How is the minority race to share in the authority of the majority race ? " In a society like that of South Africa, to extend the vote to more and more Africans, however desirable it may be in the short run, only postpones the inner problem ; so long as the Europeans and the Africans continue to regard themselves as of different race, and their race differences as vital, sooner or later the question must arise, which of them is to hold the decisive power ?

From a long-term point of view, if you are to make a direct attack on race problems by trying to annihilate them, the

economic barriers between the races are more important than the political ones. Whether or not it is the case that there are no inherently superior or inferior races, certainly with equality of education and economic opportunity the races will tend to become more and more equal culturally. Only thus can we expect them to become ready to treat each other as equal politically. The economic colour bar, which keeps people of certain races from particular trades or professions or ranks, seems to me the point at which the liberal attack on race prejudice should first be launched. Both the marital colour bar and the political colour bar (if I may for the moment identify race with colour) are incidental to certain conditions of race consciousness, and they may, indeed, continue to be desirable on their merits when cultural equality has been obtained.

I say that deliberately. If race-consciousness could be eliminated, the political problem of race would virtually disappear. In tackling that political problem, therefore, we must assume that race consciousness continues, and must decline solutions which ignore it. Liberalism (with a small l) needs, it seems to me, to find some new ideas in this field and to discard some old prejudices. For instance, in the conditions of those countries of Southern and East Africa where white, black, and brown communities live side by side, I find it easier to conceive a long-term solution in terms of a liberal form of *Apartheid* than in terms of gradually extending the general vote to Africans and Indians and enlarging their representation until it is proportionate to their numbers. To imagine that that process could be completed without explosive conflicts is surely to shut our eyes to reality. But *Apartheid*, as conceived so far, even in its most liberal form, has not yet found the key to the problem of political inter-relationship of the communities whose separateness it assumes and approves.

This is one of the great unsolved problems of democracy, and we must go back to first principles to try to solve it. One almost forgotten first principle is that the essence of true

democracy does not lie in the supremacy of the majority, but in the supremacy of the general good, in which the rights of numerical minorities are just as important as the rights of numerical majorities. Here in the west we have been able to reconcile that principle with majority voting because we enjoy exceptional conditions of racial and cultural homogeneity. Here, the minority of one period can become the majority of the next by conversions to its point of view, or by alliances with other minorities, or by shifts of opinion from one generation to another; minorities and majorities are not doomed to perpetual continuance in that relative station by unsurpassable barriers of heredity between them.

Wherever in the west such barriers have existed, or have seemed to exist—for instance, between the Catholic French and Protestant English in Canada—the solution has been found in federalism. Federalism was the last great constructive political idea conceived by democracy, with one exception, to which I shall come back in a moment: democracy has not yet brought to birth the ideas that will solve the political problem of societies where different races, or para-races, usually at different cultural levels, co-exist within a given nation or religion. Communism, on the other hand, does purport to have the simple answer, with its doctrine that race is an illusion of class interest and imperialism, to be swallowed up in the dictatorship of the proletariat. . . .

I said just now there was one exception to the statement that federalism was the last great constructive political idea of democracy. That exception is the idea of the Commonwealth itself—a free association of equals—equal, that is to say, in status and fundamental rights, though unequal in size and power. The equal nations of the Commonwealth, though independent each in its own sphere, have certain things in common which they amend only by agreement: the Crown, as Head of the community; the common personal status known as British subjecthood or Commonwealth citizenship, and certain other things which derive historically from the

common Crown. The Commonwealth thus differs from bodies like the United Nations, which are also concerts of independent and equal nations, in that it is organic as contrasted with contractual. It is a living political organism.

Now let us try to apply this idea of status-equality within a common organism to the context of race relations. Consider the example of a country or region where three or more distinct self-conscious races or para-racial communities live intermingled. There are many such cases ; I mention Malaya as a sample, with its Malays, Chinese, and Indians. The races or groups may be grossly unequal in numbers, and certainly unequal in economic power or cultural advancement ; but within an organic whole they may be conceived as equal in status, as well as independent in such measure of communal self-government as it may be possible to accord ; at the same time they share certain common rights and duties, implicit, for instance, in common citizenship, which should not be open to amendment save by mutual assent. Status may be every whit as important in such matters as actual power.

Yet clearly the analogy with the Commonwealth itself breaks down at several points when the units are not sovereign nations but racial groups living side by side in one area. It seems to me applicable there only within the limits of two provisos : first, that the contents of government are so distributed as to give the maximum autonomy to each racial community in what may be conceived as its own sphere ; and, secondly, that there exists at the top some form of supreme " court of appeal ", so to speak, which can decide—as conciliator or arbitrator rather than dictatorial authority—what is to be done when something has to be done and when the method of conference and compromise fails. . . .

As to the first condition . . . the ideal pattern of government in a multi-racial society would surely include a maximum decentralization of powers, both to localities and to communities, in such matters as education, welfare, and housing ; further off-loading of other functions like railways and

irrigation to non-political, technical commissions, with all communities participating ; perhaps at the centre, a combination of straight federalism with some new system of representation of minorities, as such and as equals, both in legislature and in executive ; together with a form of independent chairmanship designed to assist agreement and prevent obstruction, rather than to diminish responsibility or override self-government.

That brings me back to the second proviso suggested for applying the Commonwealth idea to racial-group relations—namely, that there should be some outside authority to guide and, if necessary, to decide, where the method of conference among equals fails. It is a point of great importance that within the Commonwealth, and by virtue of the great respect enjoyed by British leadership, exercised in the name of the Crown, it is possible to work towards solutions which would be out of the question otherwise. This, however, is a wasting asset, which could disappear if racial frictions were allowed to grow to the point where the dissatisfied rebelled against the Commonwealth and abandoned their respect for British justice and impartiality.

In the Commonwealth we have, somewhere or other, almost every main type of racial problem : from Central Africa to Malaya ; from Kenya to the West Indies. This gives room for experiment and for drawing lessons for one case from the trials, errors, and successes of other cases. In making such experiments and attempting such advances, we in the Commonwealth have other great advantages. Our constitutional principles and practices, deriving from the idea of supremacy of a democratically controlled Crown, are highly flexible and adaptable. Moreover, we start with the advantage that the Commonwealth itself is to-day a multi-racial society, already numbering both Asian and racially European nations on a footing of full equality, and open to the accession of other member-nations of African or other races in the fullness of time. This confers upon it great prestige in the racial field.

We may well reflect that if the political and economic problems of race cannot be solved peaceably in the Commonwealth they are unlikely to be solved peaceably anywhere else.

Some areas, like the Low Countries or the Middle East, seem destined by their geographical nature to be the cockpits of world war. In the world war for mastery of the minds of men, may not a similar destiny belong to race, and to areas like Africa where racial problems are largest? It is always the weakness of democracies in regard to war that they leave their preparations until too late. That can be just as true in the political and ideological fields as in the military. If the Commonwealth cannot progressively set about solving its racial problems, using careful study as the basis of bold action, then racial problems are capable of destroying the Commonwealth itself.

Sympathetic appreciation of the size and complexity of our racial problems may help to bring about some solution to this question. Akin to the problem of race is the problem of how best to serve the interests of the coloured populations of those colonies, notably in East and West Africa, which have not yet attained Dominion status. Britain still governs an enormous Colonial Empire, and the question is frequently asked, *Is it right that Britain should have colonies?* Is there any justification for our ruling millions of coloured or backward peoples? These questions are not, perhaps, heard quite so often nowadays because it seems at last clear that London is genuinely glad to raise the status of the colonies whenever possible—more than that, our colonial *policy* is to advance the backward territories as quickly and as surely as possible. In the words of Sir Hilton Poynton, "Territories are not backward because they are colonies but colonies because they are backward". It is dangerous to generalize about the colonies because each is at a different stage of development, but they are all alike in so far as they are all striving for the same goal—Dominion status; evidence of such forward movement is dramatically shown in the case of the Gold Coast, which enjoyed its first general election, that is to say, its first taste of *responsible* government, in February 1951. Our only justification for colonies lies in this—that we are there to help others. Our

Empire may have been won because we had power, but the only good reason why we still " keep " parts of our Empire is because that power is now being transformed into service. This is the theme of our next talk which was given by Miss Margery Perham, Fellow of Nuffield College and Reader in Colonial Administration at Oxford, at a time when the Commonwealth was fighting for liberty and freedom.

MARGERY PERHAM

FROM POWER TO SERVICE

ONE day, just before the war, I found myself sitting on the side of a steep hill. I was in a very remote part of tropical Africa. I could see a village below me, with its little round huts of sticks and mud, with grass roofs, dark inside, full of smoke and vermin and stinking of goats. I could see a line of women. They were naked, except for some leaves round their waists ; they were bringing great pitchers of water on their heads from a well about half a mile away. Some others were pounding grain in big wooden bowls, a most exhausting business. They had babies slung on their backs in goatskins, and the babies' eyes were all clotted with flies. Just underneath me a little boy stood on a platform, scaring birds off a little patch of grain. But he had not been able to scare the elephants who had come the night before and trampled down half the crop. Close to me some other boys were herding cattle, very skinny-looking beasts they were. The children sounded happy enough, yet they had the reedy limbs and football-stomachs that go with semi-starvation. And even from where I was sitting, I could see that some had chronic red sores on their legs. I had been seeing this sort of thing for years, but somehow that day it just hit me : the utter poverty of these people, their miserable tools for tackling life. Their productive capacity, their minds, their spiritual powers, all were half asleep. They had been like this, I suppose, for hundreds, perhaps thousands of years. And I wondered what

would happen to them, how soon the influences, the services, that are breaking into this backwardness in other and less isolated parts of Africa, would come to them. These people had not the least idea that their lives were now linked with those of another people living four thousand miles away, or that when and how they became members of the civilized world depended very largely on how far those other distant people had the knowledge and the will to help them.

Well, how much knowledge and will have we? I could answer that question better if I could look into your minds when I say, " British Colonial Empire ". For your automatic reaction to those three words deeply affects the future lives of millions of people. Probably most people do not get any very positive reaction at all. The most definite views, I think, come at the opposite extremes. In some of us, the words " Empire " and " Colonies " raise a vague sense of pride, and the picture of a map with a lot of very pleasing pink on it. In others at the other extreme the words make us feel ashamed ; we see the whole story of the Empire as one of bloodshed and oppression and capitalist exploitation. I think that people who hold either of these extreme views do not generally study the facts. After all, the facts are people—sixty million of them —and it always seems to me equally, shall I say, impertinent, to shout, " We possess them and we're darned well going to go on possessing them " as to say " We object to colonies on principle. Cut them adrift. Give them up." And I must say, I think of the two, the anti-imperial critics are more useful. They do at least keep us on the alert. They remind us that there has been some exploitation and oppression, that there are mistakes being made even to-day. We have heard a good deal lately about the achievements of Empire. There have been great achievements, and also many important reforms in the last few years. But that is not what I'm going to talk about here. I would rather ask : " Isn't there something in what our American critics say—that Empire's not something to take for granted, but something abnormal, terribly difficult to

run ? " How could it be otherwise ? Here are we, forty-five million busy, self-absorbed, rather ill-informed people trying to settle their destiny for sixty million other people scattered all over the world. I should sometimes like to hear a speech in which we were given a list not of our achievements but of our mistakes. And a list of our biggest problems—for example, the great conflict between the British principle of racial equality and the colour bar, which is coming to a head and very soon too, I think, in Africa. And here's another : the circle of disease, poverty, and ignorance, their own ancient circle, that we have got to help them to break, not slowly, either, in three hundred years, but in the shortest time in which modern science and economics can break it.

But why do we have to go on doing the helping ? Why not relinquish some of our lion's share ? How ? By internationalizing them ? I'm all for co-operation, even supervision, applied to all empires, but—international administration ? It's asking these people to take a pretty risky leap in the dark. And one that most of them, I think, would regard as a step back, not forward. Don't forget that the relationship between a ruling nation and a colony is, or can be, a rich and intimate thing. Backward peoples need, and take, a great deal from their rulers : our social conventions, our laws, language, literature. Africans, you know, quote Shakespeare and Burke in their speeches ; they talk of their historic right of Habeas Corpus and the freedom of the press. Not easy to wrench all this away, replace it with a sort of esperanto of culture as well as of language. But co-operation's another matter : the more the better. There's much, I think, that we can learn, are learning indeed, from the Americans. The Dutch can teach us a lot about colonial economics, the French about liberal race relations. Then there's that great empire of the Russians in Asia, a vast experiment in civilization ; I wish we knew a little more about it. And there are things that we British can very confidently add to the pool.

But you may say, there's another alternative to Empire.

One the Americans are pressing upon us: self-government. That is very true. We have never forgotten it since the Americans first brought it to our notice in 1776. It's deep, I think, in the whole instinct of all we do. Perhaps too deep. Perhaps we ought to bring it out much more into the open, discuss and plan and experiment. Of course, I know that governments are growing and changing all over the Empire every year, every month even. Ceylon and Jamaica are not so far now from full self-government, and the rest are strung out at different points in the race. That's all right, but in these days it is not enough to do things. We have also to explain that we are doing them.

But at the same time, we must not forget that political backwardness is a real thing. When you give a slice of the earth's surface a name, you don't make a nation. Take a motor car in, shall we say, Nigeria, and drive straight north from Lagos, the capital. What would you see? First, a modern city. Among the crowds, African bank clerks, mechanics, African doctors, town councillors, newspaper editors, bishops. Then, farther north, country towns with a few more African clerks and merchants; then villages with intelligent but illiterate cocoa farmers. Then very poor peasants, living on their own crops and earning perhaps a few shillings, perhaps a pound a year. People who don't know or care about Lagos, one tribe after another, each talking a different language, building a different sort of hut, wearing different clothes or skins or it may be a string of beads; pagan people living absolutely naked, on the hills, or in the forests. Then farther north—four hundred miles now—something quite different: another race, another religion and culture: Moslem people with mosques and walled cities and flowing robes. People who do not feel, never have felt, any common nationality with those naked pagans; they were raiding and enslaving them not so long ago; or with the Christians in the schools and churches of Lagos. What sort of self-government is going to fit all these different people, this utterly uneven development?

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We imposed unified government from above. A capital, government departments, the whole centralized European state system. Now we are having to work from the bottom up, turning clans into district councils and tribes into county councils, helping them to group and to federate. We are training their loyalties, not only upwards to us but outwards into a network of ties with neighbours that they were fighting yesterday, encouraging leaders with something more than a tribal patriotism. There are such leaders already, of course, and we need more of them. But leaders (especially the young men) want self-government to-morrow. They can't wait. They won't recognize the backwardness, the disunity, of the vast majority of their people. I have often argued with them. They listen to me with their heads, but I know that in their hearts they resent their dependence on foreign rulers, however well-intentioned we may be. That's human and young, but it's none the less a problem. It's an intensely difficult job we have taken on to transform autocratic power gradually into self-government. We have learned all about that in India. Couldn't we, in the Colonies at least, carry through this difficult change-over without friction and misunderstanding and even bloodshed? We could. But it will take all our—all your—sympathy and knowledge to do it.

Then there is something else; something it has taken us about a century to learn in Britain. Political freedom is a very hollow prize if alongside it you have economic chaos or economic subjection or economic oligarchy. I think we are mostly agreed here that after the war we have got to have more State control and more planning. How much more in the Colonies. There people are much more helpless, much less organized. I have seen how great European mining and plantation companies have sprung up in the bush almost overnight and sucked thousands of simple tribesmen into their labour lines. Of course we want this capital and development in the Colonies; we want much more of it. But we have got to learn how to control it in the interests of people who cannot

yet say or cannot even know what it is going to do to them.

What does all this add up to? I think that we have still got a job to do in the Colonies. Whatever they become some day, for a good many years they are going to need help and help that only we can give them. But help in a new spirit. I think we ought to face the fact that our power is not what it was. Great nations have lately come forward into world affairs: some of them are enemies who are covetous, some of them are friends who are critical. We have got to reckon with both as well as with the Colonial peoples themselves because they are reaching forward for more political rights. I assure you it is no cant phrase but plain realism to say that we have to shift the basis of our Empire still more from power to service, change it from a distant half-forgotten affair that we leave to professionals, to officials. Make it much more a direct contact between them and us—between all the branches of their community life and ours. Do you realize that they want almost everything that we have to give, if we can give it in the right spirit? Parliamentary and local government, trade unions, universities, rural colleges, co-operative systems, penal reform, ideas about architecture, or midwifery, or football. They want to know what we have and use it for their own needs, in their way. Now you cannot leave all this to officials, not even to the best officials, not even to ours, not to the Colonial Secretary himself, not to Parliament. You cannot, because unless we take an interest, unless we let the Colonies share in that new life that we can feel running through this country under the iron surface of war, like a river under the ice, well—our Colonial Empire will go stale and dead.

And yet, how are ordinary men and women going to understand all about this widespread ever-changing Empire? It is a very real difficulty and I am not going to give you some easy answer. There are a dozen ways of tackling it. I am just going to suggest one. Don't think that people can be made interested in other people by lessons and books or by all the

speeches in the world. They have got to see each other, speak, shake hands. Obviously in this case it is not easy. But is it impossible? Let us decide, and if we really wanted to we could do it, to have after the war a Colonial fortnight, or a month if you like. We will invite delegations from all the Colonies to visit us, chiefs and educated men and women; some who can talk English and some who cannot—our guests. They shall split up and visit the provinces, go into big towns, small towns, and little country places. Don't you think that that might help us to realize that the Empire is not a list of names of places or crops or statistics but that it is made up of persons? And that in the next ten or twenty years there is a constructive absorbing job that we can do for them or, better still, with them?

Yes, the key to so many of our problems, whether they be problems of trusteeship, political relationships, or race, is greater knowledge, and the will to learn and understand. "They are going to need help" says Miss Perham when speaking of the African colonies "and what is more, they are going to need help for a number of years." But unfortunately the problem does not end there, for although our help is needed—as many Africans will agree—it is often *resented* at the same time. Africans appreciate the need for hospitals and schools, they value the services rendered by British lawyers and administrators, but at the same time they value their freedom and independence even more highly, and they resent the presence in their countries of the men who have served them. We saw the same thing happening in the case of India, and the same results will occur in Nigeria and the Gold Coast and elsewhere unless we are prepared to give our colonial populations political freedom too. There is always a danger, of course, of giving independence prematurely. There are those who say this has been the case in the Gold Coast, where many of those who are entitled to a vote are still illiterate, but only time can tell who is right. This is one of the fascinations of the Commonwealth story; it is going on around us, adding chapter to chapter all the time. There are all kinds of possibilities and many things to be done. Sometimes independence

also means the inauguration of a new country, as in Pakistan, but rarely are the prognostications of the pessimists fulfilled.

It is quite likely, indeed, that future generations will look back to the past few years of rapid evolution as the period in which the Commonwealth achieved its real purpose. *What is the contribution of the Commonwealth to the destiny of mankind?* Surely it is that of proving the possibility of a federation of the nations, linked by ties of friendship and tolerance and mutual understanding. Mr. H. V. Hodson answers the question more fully in the following extract from his *Twentieth Century Empire*, and he shows that the theme of our final volume, *The Unity of Mankind*, is not just a vain ideal.

HENRY VINCENT HODSON

THE COMMONWEALTH IN A WIDER WORLD

THE British Commonwealth or Empire is a thing-in-itself. It has a life and character of its own; its unity is "organic" in the proper sense in which a living organism has a unity, not the academic and misleading sense of "constitutional". But it exists only in the wider world, and lives or dies by its relationship with the rest of the society of nations.

It is often claimed that the great contribution which the Commonwealth has to make to world society is the example of its own loose yet effective organization. But that example is not readily followed by countries lacking the peculiar historical association out of which the fourth British Empire has grown, nor indeed does it always seem to them very impressive, or likely to be serviceable to the varied host of states members of the United Nations. The more valuable immediate example is simply that of the attitude of mind which makes the Commonwealth system work: the attitude of tolerance. Without tolerance there can be no lasting peace, nor any effective organization for the maintenance of peace.

Looking around at the squabbling and intolerant world

to-day, we may well be tempted to conclude that war is thus inevitable, and that the wisest statesman or country is the one that prepares for war most urgently and vigorously. But that conclusion of despair is the certain road to catastrophe. Once war is thought of as inevitable it becomes inevitable, if only because tolerance must founder between the Scylla of coercion and the Charybdis of appeasement. Neither coercion nor appeasement is in the vocabulary of British Commonwealth relations: they are absent because war is not only formally "unthinkable" but actually never thought of. Hence there can be compromise without weakness, and plain speaking without conflict.

The condition that war is held unthinkable may seem beyond the grasp of the nations at large. But history shows that it can emerge very quickly, granted the right leadership. Possible war between the United States and Britain was mooted up to the end of the nineteenth century. After 1914, war between France and Britain became "unthinkable", though only a decade earlier they had seemed on the brink of war. How lately has war between the United States and Mexico or other Latin-American Powers become unthinkable? It is only when we consider the widening range of the "unthinkability of war" that we realize that there has been anything but deterioration in international relations during the twentieth century.

Nevertheless, there remains a vast area where war is "thinkable" and tolerance is at a discount. What are the right rôle and policy of the nations of the Commonwealth in this dangerous world? Manifestly their first duty is to contribute their maximum strength to the task of their own defence and to the international aggregate of power which might overawe and deter a would-be war-maker. For so long as war is not thought of as inevitable, to prepare for its possibility is an indispensable foundation for the sense of confidence which toleration requires and the eventual "unthinkability" of war presupposes. This presents the British Commonwealth

countries with a double duty: to be strong individually, and to be strong together. Much has been said of the needs of collective security within and beyond the Commonwealth, and it need not be repeated. There is another aspect of policy equally important, in which the British Commonwealth may have an even larger, and certainly more difficult, rôle to play in the avoidance of world war.

The great danger of world war at the present time, and for some time to come, obviously arises from the conflict between Communist Russia and the Western democratic world led by the United States. It is not the only danger, by any means, but it dwarfs all others. That conflict is different from the other international differences which have caused great wars in the past, though it is often exemplified in the same way—in struggles for territorial advantage, diplomatic and economic pressure on third parties, rising abuse and distrust on both sides. These are symptoms rather than causes. The underlying conflict is different because it derives, at root, from a mechanical and materialist theory of history, attributed—not entirely justly—to Karl Marx and adopted by the leaders of Russian Communist thought. According to this neo-Marxist ideology, competitive capitalism is bound to destroy itself, and to give way either to Fascism (the dictatorship of the capitalist State) or to Communism (the dictatorship of the proletariat). War may well be an incident of this metamorphosis, and certainly war between Fascist and Communist States, once established, is certain. From the neo-Marxist point of view there is no escaping this dichotomous unfolding of history. Thus the inevitability of war, with the Soviet Union and her Communist associates as one of its principals, is qualified only by the chance that Communism may forestall Fascism in the metamorphosis of the capitalist democracies. Either way, it behoves the Soviet Union to carry on a ceaseless effort to strengthen the tactical position both of itself as a nation State and of the Communist parties everywhere. For the front-line of the ideological war may become at any moment the vital

fifth column in a world-wide Armageddon, the domestic front becoming the international front and vice versa.

The clashes and frictions to which this policy gives rise, wherever the Soviet Union and non-Communist nations meet, inevitably provoke an equal and opposite reaction. Charges of " aggression ", " war-mongering ", " fascism ", " sabotage of the United Nations ", are flung to and fro until the real issue is entirely obscured and forgotten. The real issue is simply whether or not the Communist theory of the future fate of capitalist democracy is right. If it is right, that is to say, if capitalism and democracy are in a state of unstable equilibrium bound to give way eventually either to Communism or to Fascism, perhaps pulling down the world about their ears in war in the process, then Mr. Molotov is wise in his generation, and so is the most militaristic anti-Communist in the United States. But if it is wrong, and can be proved wrong, then eventually its falseness will appear even to the Kremlin, and the whole face of world affairs will slowly but surely change.

In proving that it is wrong, the nations of the Commonwealth can be a light in a dark world. The proof involves two themes : that differences in economic and political systems between two nations or groups of nations need not imply conflict between them on the diplomatic and military plane ; and secondly, that capitalist democracy is not moving inexorably towards either Fascism or Communism, but is a lively, durable, and excellent order of society. The first of these themes incorporates the idea that the way to fight Communism is not on the military and international front, but on the domestic and ideological front—by showing, not that the democratic nations can outdo the communistic nations in preparations for war, let alone in the conduct of war, but simply that democracy is better than Communism. This is the static form of the second theme, that democracy has a live future independent of the rival totalitarianisms. But the dynamic form has an importance of its own ; for democracy might conceivably be better than totalitarianism while it lasted, yet

doomed to give way before long to one extreme of totalitarianism or the other.

In demonstrating those basic themes, the British Commonwealth has a special opportunity, for several reasons. Within its own community, it certainly exemplifies the truth that internal political and social differences need not prejudice friendly and co-operative external relations. That Socialist parties are in power or out of it in Australia, New Zealand, or the United Kingdom makes no calculable difference to the character of relations among the member States of the Commonwealth. Nevertheless, such party changes and contrasts, within the democratic parliamentary system, are of a different order from those between democracy and Communism or Fascism. Our domestic Socialist parties, for one thing, have not been serious missionaries abroad; they are essentially nationalist, and their external policies, when in power, have been based no less on appreciations of national interest than have those of their Conservative or Liberal counterparts. The contrast between Social-democracy and Communism is of a different order. Communism is a religion rather than a political programme; its ideals, its tests of right and wrong, are different from those of democracy; it is intolerant, and zealous in converting the unbeliever everywhere. That Communist and Democratic States can work together permanently in amity requires a more fundamental proof than the object-lesson of British Commonwealth relations, though we have the highest contemporary authority for believing that it is so.

What needs to be demonstrated—and can be demonstrated only by practical experience—is how far Communist intolerance and proselytizing zeal are themselves a by-product of the neo-Marxist doctrine that Social-democracy's manifest and ineluctable destiny is to give way either to Communism or to militant, totalitarian anti-Communism. It is in disproving that doctrine by their example and progress that the nations of the British Commonwealth have their greatest task and

opportunity in these dark days. They share the task with many other countries, but their opportunity is unique for a number of reasons.

The first reason is the exceptional social and political advantages enjoyed, at least by the European nations of the Commonwealth. They have flexible and adaptable constitutions. They have a great inheritance of political wisdom, experience, and maturity. They are committed to no economic or political shibboleths which might fatally prejudice their adjustment to changing circumstances or eventually wreck their national solidarity. Their parties of the Left are not incurably doctrinaire, being heirs of the liberal parliamentary tradition ; and Communism has so far made slight headway among their people. They have escaped the terrible social disruption of enemy occupation during the late war. They possess a wide variety of voluntary professional, charitable, and other institutions to reinforce democracy and resist the supremacy of the State as such. Their people possess both common sense and a sense of history. The ideal of a Christian family life is ever present to them. Though not all these things are true, or true in the same degree or the same way, of the new Asiatic, African, and West Indian nations or nations-to-be in the British Commonwealth, they too have absorbed and adapted many of the most valuable advantages of the British tradition, and, as will be suggested below, they have a special part of their own to play.

All these rich bequests of history might nevertheless be thrown away if democracy in the Commonwealth drifted into wrong courses, until it found itself uncontrollably racing, as the neo-Marxists predict, towards the cataract of Right or Left totalitarianism. That danger is present, whichever side may be in power in any particular country, and to guard against it requires constant vigilance among all parties and all sections of society. At the present time, the danger is most apparent on the Socialist side, and the non-Socialist parties appear as the chief defenders of freedom against the drift to totali-

tarianism; but there is no gainsaying that in different circumstances the rôles might be reversed. . . .

There is no cause for believing that the nations of the British Commonwealth will fail to find means of saving the freedom of the individual from state supremacy, and the true function of the state from class domination, even as they have overcome other troubles in their political development in the past. But to find such means is their crucial problem in the twentieth century; for unless they can solve it—unless methods can be devised and practised for applying community control over community economic life without admitting totalitarianism and class rule—then they will have failed in the task of disproving the Communist view of democracy's fate, and will thus have opened the road to world war.

They can learn much from each other's mistakes and successes. We make too little use of our mutual experience. Moreover the very existence of the Commonwealth is a check to state-idolatry. The citizens of the Commonwealth find it just so much more repugnant to believe that government is everything because, while government is bounded by the nation, their loyalties and their concepts of community rights and duties are not.

But there is another reason why the British Commonwealth has a unique opportunity in this world-wide struggle for the life of social democracy. It is now a community of nations of different continents, colours, and creeds. It bears the main burden of disproving that part of the neo-Marxist case which alleges that capitalist democracy, in its restless search for markets and materials, must be imperialist in the sense of coercive oppression of subject peoples, and must eventually be destroyed by their revolt or by the wars between rival imperialisms. The new nations themselves, with all the world before them, have the vital rôle, in what is in truth the battle for the soul of man, of demonstrating that the ideal of a free democratic society is for them as righteous and as attainable as it is for the nations of the West. They have to show that

their peculiar handicaps of differing races, castes, and religions, as well as the difficulties of the forced marches in economic advance that they have planned for themselves can be overcome without yielding to the temptations of state dictatorship.

Finally, the British Commonwealth has the unique advantage and opportunity of its own corporate existence. The wars, and the post-war economic crisis, have shown in their own ways how much stronger is the group than its members. It is so in all spheres, and not least in the sphere of ideological conflict and consequent international heat. It is much easier for the nations of the Commonwealth to keep their heads in each other's company than in isolation. Moreover the value of their example to the rest of the world is vastly greater for their being, together, a great bloc of peoples and power. To leave the hegemony of the world to the rivalry of two great unions—the American and the Soviet—is to depreciate the currency of their own influence. To stand together as a third Great Power may well be the only way for them to avert another terrible holocaust.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

FREDERICK ALEXANDER (1899-), Professor of History and Director of Adult Education in the University of Western Australia, studied at Trinity College, University of Melbourne, and at Balliol College, Oxford, where he took the Herbertson Prize in History in 1924. He has travelled widely to study social and political trends, and was Personal Assistant to the Australian Minister at Washington in 1940, and Officer in Charge of the Australian Army Education Service from 1941 to 1945. His publications include: *From Paris to Locarno and After*; a chapter on "Australia since the War" in the *Cambridge History of the British Empire* (1933); *Australia and the United States*; and *Moving Frontiers: an American Theme and its Application to Australian History*.

ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR (1848-1930), first Earl of Balfour, was educated at Eton and Cambridge, and entered Parliament in 1874. Four years later he became private secretary to his uncle, the Marquess of Salisbury, when the latter was appointed Foreign Secretary. In 1887 he was made Chief Secretary for Ireland and was faced with the difficult task of restoring order after the first Liberal Home Rule Bill had stirred up the Irish Nationalists to the wildest extravagances of riotous hope. By the time Salisbury resigned in 1902 he had gained sufficient experience to become Prime Minister, and to attempt to shore up and sustain a house divided against itself, for this was the era of tariff reform, and the Unionist Party sheltered every point of view from the most rabid protectionist to the most confirmed free-trader. Balfour's Government fell in 1906 and he continued his career as Leader of the Opposition during the struggle over the Parliament Bill, which limited the power of the Lords. In 1911 Balfour found the strain too much for him and resigned the leadership of the party in favour of Bonar Law, but he returned to public life during the first world war, first in charge of the Admiralty and then of the Foreign Office, where he promised to give the Jews a "national home" in Palestine after the war. He represented Great Britain at the first Assembly of the League of Nations and at the Washington Conference of 1921-22. On his return he was created a Knight of the Garter, and shortly afterwards Earl Balfour.

SIR ROBERT LAIRD BORDEN (1854-1937), the Canadian statesman, had a wide reputation as a barrister before entering the Canadian House

of Commons in 1896. Five years later he became Leader of the Opposition to Sir Wilfrid Laurier's Liberal Government. He was a strong supporter of imperial unity, and an opponent of policies that tended to bring Canada too much under the influence of the United States. Sir Robert became Premier in 1912, was created a K.C.M.G. in 1914, and remained at the head of the Canadian Government throughout the first world war. He retired from office in 1920 and published his *Canadian Constitutional Studies* two years later.

CHARLES BULLER (1806-48), the parliamentary reformer and private secretary to Lord Durham (*q.v.*) during the latter's tenure of office in Canada, was educated at Harrow and Cambridge, entering Parliament in 1830. He assisted Lord Durham to prepare the materials for his famous *Report*, and was by many thought to be the author of it. In 1846 Buller became Judge-Advocate-General, and a year later was appointed Chief Commissioner of the Poor Law, a post which he held for only a year before his early death. Buller was described by Carlyle as " The genialest radical I have ever met ".

CHARLES EDMUND CARRINGTON (1897-), educational manager of the Cambridge University Press, was educated in New Zealand and at Christ Church, Oxford, teaching at Haileybury College and lecturing at Oxford before he joined the Cambridge University Press. He served in both world wars, winning the M.C. in the first, and reaching the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel on the General Staff in the Second. His publications include : *A Subaltern's War* ; *T. E. Lawrence* ; *An Exposition of Empire* ; and *The British Overseas*.

JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN (1836-1914) made a name for himself in Birmingham municipal politics before entering the House of Commons in 1876. He became President of the Board of Trade four years later, and when Lord Salisbury took over the premiership Chamberlain accepted the post of Secretary of State for the Colonies, where he pursued the policy of " Tightening the Ties " between the colonies and the Mother Country. After the South African War he turned his attention to tariff reform and colonial preference, but ill-health caused his retirement from public life in 1906.

PERCIVAL COLE (1880-1948), the distinguished Australian scholar, devoted his wide knowledge to furthering the cause of peace and understanding among the nations bordering the Pacific. He was Visiting Carnegie Professor of International Relations at the Uni-

versities of Hawaii and Washington in 1929, and later became the Australian representative of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Professor Cole also lectured in the University of Sydney and was Vice-Principal of the Teacher's College there. Among his books are: *A History of Educational Thought*; *The Teaching of History in Secondary Schools*; *First Stories in English History*; *Great Australians*; and *Pioneers of Australian Industry*.

SIR REGINALD COUPLAND (1884-1952), a graduate of Durham University, was Beit Professor of the History of the British Empire at Oxford from 1920 to 1948. In 1923 he was a member of the Royal Commission on Superior Civil Services in India, and in 1942 served on Sir Stafford Cripps's Mission to India. He was also a member of the Palestine Royal Commission in 1936. His publications include: *The Quebec Act*; *The American Revolution and the British Empire*; *The Exploitation of East Africa*; *The Cripps Mission*; *The Future of India*; *Livingstone's Last Journey*; *India, a Re-statement*; and *Zulu Battle-Piece*. In 1944 Sir Reginald became a K.C.M.G.

ROBERT OFFLEY ASHBURTON CREWE-MILNES (1858-1945), the first Marquess of Crewe, served his apprenticeship to politics as private secretary to Lord Granville, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in 1883-4, and in the Liberal Government of 1892 he became Lord-Lieutenant for Ireland. In 1895 he was created first Earl of Crewe, and in 1905 became Lord President of the Council. Under Mr. Asquith in 1908 he became Secretary of State for the Colonies, and in 1910 he went to the India Office, accompanying the King and Queen on their State visit to India the following year. At King George V's coronation he was created a marquess. He served as Lord President of the Council in the first coalition government of the war period, but, like Asquith, preferred not to hold office under Lloyd George, and for six years was leader of the Independent Liberal Opposition in the Lords. In 1922 he was appointed Ambassador to France, where his tact and skill prevented any open breach of the entente during the difficult days of the French occupation of the Ruhr. He retired in 1928, but came back to public life for a short time in 1931 as Secretary of State for War.

LIONEL GEORGE CURTIS (1872-) was educated at Haileybury College and Oxford before being called to the Bar. He served in the South African War and became Town Clerk of Johannesburg and a Member of the Transvaal Legislative Council. He was later Beit

Lecturer in Colonial History at Oxford and has published a number of books, which include: *The Commonwealth of Nations*; *The Prevention of War*; *Civitas Dei* (*The Commonwealth of God*); *World War, its Cause and Cure*; *War or Peace?* and *World Revolution in the Cause of Peace.* In 1949 he was appointed a Companion of Honour.

ALFRED DEAKIN (1856-1919), three times Prime Minister of Australia, played a leading part in the Federal Conventions which led to the formation of the Commonwealth. He was born at Melbourne and educated at the grammar school and university of his native city. Called to the bar, he entered the Victorian parliament as member for West Bourke in 1879, and soon came to the forefront as a keen debater and good organizer. He held a number of ministerial positions, and worked hard for the federation of the Australian states, and for the unity of the Empire. He was Attorney-General in the first Federal Ministry, that of Sir Edmund Barton (1901-3), taking over the Premiership in 1903.

England found an opportunity to honour this great Imperialist when he visited London for the Imperial Conference of 1907. He was given the freedom of the cities of London, Manchester, and Edinburgh. He was an expert on irrigation, and published many books on the subject, while his later years were devoted to the cause of Imperial preference.

JOHN GEORGE LAMBTON (1792-1840), the first Earl of Durham, entered Parliament in 1813. He belonged to the Radical wing of the Whig Party, and, in fact, soon won for himself the nickname of "Radical Jack". He was a staunch supporter of parliamentary reform, and was chairman of the committee that drew up the scheme presented to Parliament by Lord John Russell. When the House of Lords blocked the passage of the 1832 Reform Bill it was Durham who urged on the Prime Minister the necessity for creating new peers to ensure the passage of the Bill. In 1837 he became Governor-General and Lord High Commissioner of Canada, with almost dictatorial powers. His creation of a new executive council and almost universal amnesty to those involved in Papineau's rebellion caused a great deal of opposition in the Cabinet, and Durham resigned his post, returning to England to place his famous *Report on the Affairs of British North America* before Parliament. Charles Buller, Edward Gibbon Wakefield, and others had helped to prepare the materials for the *Report*, but there is no doubt that the credit for the statesmanship it exhibited is Durham's. The *Report*, although this was not recognized at the time, lays down the principles on which subsequent British colonial policy has been based.

As an immediate practical step Durham advocated the union of Upper and Lower Canada, the creation of a responsible executive council, the building of a railway, and state-aided immigration. Durham also interested himself in Wakefield's emigration schemes and became chairman of the New Zealand Company. He died the year after British sovereignty had been asserted over New Zealand and a few days after the Bill for the union of Upper and Lower Canada had been approved.

SIR ROBERT ANTHONY EDEN (1897-) was educated at Eton and Oxford, where he graduated in 1922, his studies having been interrupted by five years' war service during which he gained the M.C. In 1923 he entered Parliament, and in 1935 became the youngest Foreign Secretary since Lord Granville was appointed in 1851. In 1938, however, he resigned over the question of relations with Italy. He believed that a genuine acceptance of the pact of non-intervention in Spain by the totalitarian powers should have preceded Neville Chamberlain's adopting a more friendly attitude towards Italy in accordance with his " appeasement " policy. On the outbreak of war Mr. Eden became Dominion Secretary, and when Mr. Churchill became Premier he took over the War Office, returning, however, to the Foreign Office in December 1940, and serving there until the Conservative defeat of 1945. Mr. Eden is generally regarded as Winston Churchill's first lieutenant and as a future leader of the Conservative Party.

H. A. L. FISHER (1865-1940) was awarded the Order of Merit in 1937 " in recognition of his eminent position as an historian and of his services to Literature ". His work as Minister of Education in bringing in the Act of 1918 might also have been included in the tribute. As an historian his position would be secure by virtue of his *History of Europe* alone, although he has written many other books, more especially on Napoleon Bonaparte and his times. His Education Act of 1918 made " a national system of public education available for all persons capable of profiting thereby " an established aim of our social legislation. Fisher was educated at Winchester and at New College, Oxford, where he became a Fellow. He was appointed Vice-Chancellor of Sheffield University in 1912, and entered Parliament in 1916. He was Member for the Combined Universities from 1918 to 1926, when he was elected Warden of New College and retired from active politics.

MOHANDAS KARAMCHAND GANDHI (1869-1948), the Hindu national leader and ascetic, finished his education in Great Britain and was called to the Bar. After his return to Bombay, business took him to

South Africa, where he devoted himself to the Indian cause in that country. It was here that he developed his idea of passive resistance, and in the long struggle he was imprisoned more than once. In the South African War, however, he raised and commanded a Red Cross unit, and in the Natal revolt of 1908 he led a stretcher-bearer party. In 1914 a commission of inquiry into Indian grievances recommended the removal of some of the most serious disabilities, and Gandhi returned to India, associating himself with the Home Rule movement and trying to attain independence by passive resistance and non-co-operation. In 1920 he called for a general campaign on these lines, his programme being the boycott of all Government services, including the law courts, the withdrawal of children from Government schools, and the resignation of all Indians in the Civil Service. Later he also appealed for the boycott of foreign goods and the adoption of the spinning-wheel as India's national emblem. Thereafter he spent a considerable time in prison, retired from the world for a year, and his incursions into active politics were sporadic. In 1941 he announced that the Congress Party had temporarily abandoned its aim of independence, but he himself reaffirmed his policy of passive resistance. He served another term in prison, and in 1947 he undertook a walking tour in Bengal in the hope of improving Hindu-Mohammedan relations. He also fasted as a protest against the fighting between the two parties, and in 1948 he was assassinated by a Hindu extremist.

Sir George Grey (1812-98), a great Empire statesman, was commissioned in the army in 1829, and explored unknown regions in West Australia in 1837 and 1838, before being appointed Governor of Albany the following year. In 1840 he was promoted to the governorship of South Australia, a colony which was then suffering from the depression caused by mismanagement and wild speculation. Grey's marked success in dealing with the situation led to his transfer to New Zealand in 1845, where his efforts finally brought about peace between the colonists and the Maoris. Eight years later he was transferred to the Cape Colony, but he was in advance of his generation in urging a federated South Africa, and in 1861 he again undertook the governorship of New Zealand. A contest with the home government on a question of land confiscation, however, led to his resignation, and in 1875 he entered the New Zealand House of Representatives, where his policy brought him the leadership of the Radicals and, in 1877, the premiership. It is of interest to note that the leading points in his policy—adult suffrage, triennial Parliaments, and a land tax—all became law in his lifetime.

NICOLAAS CHRISTIAAN HAVENGA (1882-) South African Minister of Finance, was born in the Orange Free State and educated at Grey College, Bloemfontein. He studied law, but quickly turned to politics as his chosen career, first as a member of the provincial council of the Orange Free State, and then as a Member of Parliament for Fauresmith, O.F.S. From 1924 until 1939 he was Minister of Finance, but in the latter year he and General Hertzog disagreed with General Smuts over the declaration of war with Germany, and the Government fell. In 1941 Havenga became the leader of a new Afrikaner party, and when the United Party of General Smuts lost the elections of 1948 and Dr. Malan's Nationalist party took office, he once again became Minister of Finance. His political outlook on important problems has not always harmonized with that of the Nationalists, but his long experience and his great shrewdness made him indispensable.

HENRY VINCENT HODSON (1906-), editor of the *Sunday Times*, was educated at Gresham's School and Balliol College, Oxford. He was a Fellow of All Souls, Oxford, from 1928 to 1935, editor of the *Round Table* from 1934 to 1939, and during the war he joined the Ministry of Information before being appointed Reforms Commissioner to the Government of India in 1941. The following year he went to the Non-Munitions Division of the Ministry of Production as Principal Assistant Secretary, later becoming head of the division. After the war he joined the *Sunday Times*, assuming the editorship in 1950. His publications include: *Economics of a Changing World*; *Slump and Recovery, 1929-37*; and *Twentieth-Century Empire*.

ARTHUR BERRIEDALE KEITH (1879-1944) was one of the most brilliant scholars of his day. His academic career was one long story of amazing success, beginning with his first degree, with first-class honours in Classics, at the early age of 17. He worked in the Colonial Office from 1901 to 1914, when he was appointed to the Chair of Sanskrit and Comparative Philology in Edinburgh University. From 1927 he was also Lecturer on the Constitution of the British Empire. He published many books on each subject. Keith helped us with earlier editions of the I.U.S. Course, and was for many years our Sponsor on Sociology.

FREDERICK ALEXANDER KIRKPATRICK (1861-) was University Extension Lecturer at Cambridge, where he himself had graduated, until he became Reader in Spanish there from 1919 until 1933. His publications include: *Imperial Defence and Trade*; *A History of Argentine*; *The Spanish Conquistadores*; and *Latin-America, a Brief History*.

STEPHANUS JOHANNES PAULUS KRUGER (1825-1904) trekked from the Cape with his parents at the age of 10. He fought in many engagements against the natives at a very early age, continuing to take part in expeditions and hunting trips after his parents had settled in the Transvaal, and in 1864 he became Commandant-General. In 1881 he was, with Pretorius and Joubert, responsible for drafting the terms of the Pretoria Convention which followed the British defeat at Majuba. In 1883 he became President, a position he held until the defeat of the Boer Republics in the South African War. Kruger's franchise laws caused a great deal of discontent among the *uitlanders*, those who had flocked into the Transvaal after the discovery of gold, and the resultant Jameson Raid greatly strengthened his position. In 1900 he went to Europe in the hope of gaining support in his struggle against Britain, and after the defeat of the Republic he died in exile, but was buried at Pretoria on Dingaan's Day in 1904—the anniversary of the defeat of the Zulu chief, Dingaan, in which engagement Kruger had himself taken part as a boy of 13.

LORD MACAULAY (1800-1859) had a very successful career, but he might have risen to even greater heights if he had had to struggle against adversity and opposition. He was educated at Trinity College, Cambridge, and entered public life as a Member of Parliament in 1830, thenceforth dividing his time and energies between public affairs and literature. He was a member of the Supreme Council of India for a time, and on his return home served twice in the Cabinet. Admired as no other English essayist and historian had ever been, commanding unprecedented prices for his work, listened to with respect in the Cabinet and with rapt attention in the Commons, surrounded at home by well-loved books, whose contents he assimilated without an effort, devoted to his work in literature, and full of broad sympathies with progress, he certainly found life good. He never married. He was raised to the peerage as Baron Macaulay of Rothley in 1857. His *Lays of Ancient Rome* still attract the schoolboy, and his *Essays* and his *History of England from the Accession of James II* can still be read with pleasure by the more mature mind.

ROBERT GORDON MENZIES (1894-), Prime Minister of Australia, had a brilliant law career, but gave up one of Australia's biggest legal practices to devote himself to politics. He became Premier of Victoria in 1934 and then entered the Commonwealth Parliament, serving as Attorney-General and Minister for Industry. In 1939 he resigned as a result of his disagreement with the Government over its decision to

abandon its national insurance scheme, but on the death of Mr. J. A. Lyons in the same year he assumed the premiership. He laid the foundations of the Australian war effort in the first two years of the war, but, failing to induce the Labour Party to join an all-party Government he resigned in August 1941. On the defeat of the Labour Government in 1949 he again became Prime Minister in a coalition Government of the Liberals and the Country Party, and his position was confirmed by the 1951 elections. Mr. Menzies is outstanding in debate and is one of the most polished public speakers Australia has ever produced. He says of himself: " I hold the Prime Ministership not as an occasion for foolish vanity, but as a responsibility so great it might well deter a much better man than I can ever hope to be ".

PERRY MILLER, Professor of American Literature at Harvard University, is an authority on the early days of the American settlements. He is the author of *The New England Mind : the Seventeenth Century* and *Orthodoxy in Massachusetts*, and his vigorous style is illustrated by the broadcast speech printed in this volume.

RAMSAY MUIR (1872-1941), the distinguished historian, held Chairs at the Universities of Liverpool and Manchester before turning his attention to politics. He was a prominent member of the Liberal Party and was at one time a Member of Parliament. Among his numerous publications are : *An Atlas of Modern History* ; *The History of the British Commonwealth* ; *Politics and Progress* ; *Political Consequences of the Great War* ; and *Civilization and Liberty*.

WALTER NASH (1882-), Deputy Prime Minister of New Zealand from 1940 until 1949, became Secretary of the New Zealand Labour Party in 1922. In 1929 he entered Parliament, becoming Minister of Social Security in 1938. From 1942 to 1944 he served as New Zealand Minister in the United States and as a member of the Pacific War Council in Washington. Mr. Nash also led the New Zealand delegation to the conference of Commonwealth Finance Ministers in 1949. He is the author of *New Zealand : a Working Democracy*.

WALTER HINES PAGE (1855-1918), American Ambassador in London from 1913 until 1918, worked untiringly for friendship between Britain and the United States. In the early years of the first world war he strove with all his might to make President Wilson see the struggle in its true perspective as " a life-and-death struggle between autocracy and democracy ". When the United States did declare war in April 1917

the arguments used by President Wilson in Congress were those that Page had been placing before him since the beginning of hostilities. Page was a graduate of Randolph-Macon College, Virginia, and was one of the first twenty fellows of the newly founded Johns Hopkins University in 1876. He had a most distinguished career as a journalist and was one of the founders of the publishing firm of Doubleday, Page & Company. One of Wilson's first acts as President was to appoint him Ambassador in London, where he did much for Anglo-American friendship. Worn out by the strain of the war years, Page retired in August 1918, living just long enough to hear of the Armistice and the triumph of the cause for which he had given so much.

MARGERY PERHAM (1896-), a noted specialist in the study of native races and the impact on them of modern ideas of colonial government, travelled in Somaliland in 1922-3 before becoming Fellow and Tutor in St. Hugh's College, Oxford. In 1929 a Rhodes Travelling Fellowship took her to North America, Polynesia, Australia, and Africa, and she was later awarded a research fellowship at St. Hugh's and a university research lectureship in Colonial Administration. She was a member of the Advisory Committee on Education for the Colonies in 1939 and of the Higher Education Commission in 1944. In 1939 she was also appointed Reader in Colonial Administration at Oxford, and in 1947 she became Fellow in Imperial Government at Nuffield College. The following year she was created a C.B.E. Her publications include : *Native Administration in Nigeria* ; *Africans and British Rule* ; *Race and Politics in Kenya* (with E. Huxley) ; and *The Government of Ethiopia*.

WILLIAM PITT, EARL OF CHATHAM (1708-78), was "The Great Commoner" until his acceptance of a title sacrificed much of his popularity with the people. He entered parliament in 1735, and right from the first stood out for an integrity of conduct in public and private affairs which seemed very strange to most of the politicians of that era. When the Seven Years War broke out, the incompetence of the Newcastle government forced it to arrange a coalition with Pitt. In this "Newcastle said what he liked and Pitt did what he liked" and as a result Great Britain emerged from the war as the greatest power in the world. Sea power was built up to an unprecedented degree, and her colonies in North America and in India were safe against the attacks of any other European power, but only a few years later the folly of George III and his ministers forced the New England colonies to break away. Pitt sympathized with their claim that there should be no taxation without representation, but he did not want to see them leave

the Empire, and he made his famous last speech in protest against a peace treaty which would allow this.

CECIL JOHN RHODES (1853-1902) went to South Africa for health reasons at the age of 16. Three years later he had made a fortune on the Kimberley diamond fields, and the South African climate had restored his health. Rhodes was a visionary, and his vision was of a powerful and united South Africa as a self-governing state in the British Empire. To the fulfilment of that vision he devoted all his energies and his great practical ability. He entered the Cape Assembly in 1881, and it was his influence that led to the annexation of southern Bechuanaland and to the formation of the British South Africa Company to develop Matabeleland under charter. As Prime Minister he added some 450,000 square miles of land, which we now know as Rhodesia, to the Empire. Rhode's premiership came to a sudden end as a consequence of the Jameson Raid, for which he accepted responsibility although he had not authorized Jameson's final movement, and he then turned his attention to the development of Rhodesia. He succeeded in pacifying the African inhabitants and pushed on with his scheme for the Cape to Cairo railway and telegraph. Then in 1899 the South African War broke out, and Rhodes played an active part in the defence of Kimberley, but the hardships of active service proved too great and he died shortly before the end of the war. His life's work did not end with his death, however, for the bulk of his fortune went to found the Rhodes scholarships at Oxford, enjoyed by selected students from all the Dominions and important colonies, from the United States and from Germany.

JOHN SANKEY (1866-1948), first Viscount Sankey, was educated at Lancing and Oxford, being called to the Bar in 1892. He became a judge of the King's Bench division in 1914 and presided over the Aliens Advisory Committee in the first world war. After the war he was appointed chairman of the Royal Commission on the coal industry and gave his casting vote in favour of nationalization, although the recommendation was not then carried out. In 1928 he became a Lord Justice of the Court of Appeal, and in the following year Lord Chancellor. He retired in 1935.

SIR JOHN ROBERT SEELEY (1834-95) will be remembered as the author of two books, important in widely different fields. The first was *Ecce Homo*, and the other was his *Expansion of England*. *Ecce Homo*, which deals with Christ as a man and makes no attempt to consider His

divinity, was misconstrued as an attack on Christianity, which it was not. Not that Seeley was an orthodox Christian. He might be considered one if he were writing now, but when he tried to reconcile science and religion in his *Natural Religion* he satisfied neither scientists nor theologians. He held that modern science tends to purify rather than destroy the Christian faith, a conclusion to which many leaders of thought have come to-day. As an historian Seeley preferred to look at events in a proper perspective and draw his conclusions from the rise and decay of states and empires. His *Introduction to Political Science* was published posthumously. In 1863 Seeley became Professor of Latin at University College, London, and six years later he was appointed to the Chair of Modern History at Cambridge. He was also honoured by being made a K.C.M.G.

JAN CHRISTIAAN SMUTS (1870-1950) distinguished himself as a barrister, statesman, soldier, and philosopher. In the South African War he carried on a daring guerrilla campaign against the British forces. By 1917 he was a Privy Councillor, a Companion of Honour, and a prominent member of the Imperial War Conference, and in 1941 he became the first man born in a Dominion to reach the rank of Field-Marshal. His greatest work, however, was done in the years following the South African War. To him and to General Botha must go the credit for South Africa's rapid progress to Dominion status, and for the amelioration of relations between the two white races—an object for which General Smuts never ceased to strive. Born in what was then Cape Colony, he graduated at Stellenbosch and then took a double first in the law tripos at Cambridge. On the outbreak of the South African War he found ample employment in legal and administrative duties, but after the fall of Pretoria he proved himself a daring and skilful commander in the field. The years between the wars were devoted to the rebuilding of South Africa, and in the first world war, with Botha, he conquered German South-West Africa before coming to London to join the Imperial War Conference. On Botha's death in 1919 he became Prime Minister until 1924, later joining General Hertzog's coalition government as Minister of Justice and Deputy Prime Minister. In 1939 his war policy brought him the premiership again, and he remained in office through the difficult war years and until the defeat of the United Party in 1948. General Smuts, in spite of his public activities, also found time to devote to science and philosophy. In 1926 he published *Holism and Evolution*, an explanation of his philosophical conceptions, while *Plans for a Better World* contains his best political speeches.

DAVID CHURCHILL SOMERVELL (1885-) was educated at Harrow and Magdalen College, Oxford. Thereafter he taught history at Repton School from 1909 to 1918 and at Tonbridge School from 1919 to 1950. His publications include : *English Thought in the Nineteenth Century* ; *The British Empire* ; *A History of the United States* ; *British Politics since 1900* ; and a one-volume summary of A. J. Toynbee's famous masterpiece, *A Study of History*.

JAMES HENRY THOMAS (1874-1949), Trade Union Leader and Labour politician, started work at the age of 9 as an errand boy, and later graduated through cleaner and fireman to be an engine driver on the Great Western Railway. At Swindon he soon became a power both in trade-union circles and in local government. Thomas believed in the big trade union, covering a number of allied crafts or trades, and the National Union of Railwaymen owed its formation very largely to his " drive ". He was General Secretary of the N.U.R. for many years, resigning only in 1931 when, with Ramsay Macdonald, he joined the National Government. His influence was always on the side of moderation and conciliation rather than " direct action ". He represented Derby in Parliament, and was Secretary for the Colonies in the 1924 Labour Government, and for the Dominions from 1930 to 1935, when he returned to the Colonial Office again. He resigned his office and his seat in Parliament in 1936 following the leakage of budget secrets.

FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER (1861-1932), the historian, was the first to demonstrate the importance of the moving frontier, the " hither edge of free land " in the history of the United States, not only from the material standpoint, but for its influence on national character and politics. He was born in Wisconsin and spent his boyhood near the route followed by the explorers and early travellers between the valleys of the St. Lawrence and the Mississippi. He graduated in the University of Wisconsin in 1884 and took his M.A. four years later after research work on early American history. He was appointed Assistant Professor of American History in 1892. He held this Chair until 1910, when he was invited to hold a similar position at Harvard. He was President of the American Historical Association in 1909-10. " The Significance of the Frontier in American History " was first given as a brief paper before the American Historical Association in 1893, and the importance of this new interpretation of American history was quickly recognized. The original essay was reprinted with a dozen others in *The Frontier in American History*. Other books by Turner were : *The*

Significance of Sections in American History; *The Rise of the New West*; and *The United States, 1830-1850.*

ERIC ANDERSON WALKER (1886-) lectured at Bristol University from 1908 until 1911, when he was appointed King George V Professor of History at the University of Capetown. There he remained until 1936, when he became a Fellow of St. John's College and Vere Harmsworth Professor of Imperial and Naval History at Cambridge. Among Professor Walker's publications are: *The Frontier Tradition in South Africa*; *The Great Trek*; *Britain and South Africa*; *The British Empire, its Structure and Spirit*; and *Colonies.*

BASIL HUGH GARNONS WILLIAMS (1906-) was educated at Winchester and Oxford. He has pursued a teaching career, being associated with Sedbergh School and Marlborough College until his appointment as Headmaster of Plymouth College in 1945. He has contributed to *Greece and Rome*; *Classical Quarterly*; and to *The History of the World*, edited by W. N. Weech.

SIR ALFRED ZIMMERN (1879-) is noted for his work on international relations, and is now Director of the Hartford Study Centre for World Affairs. He has taught at Cornell University and was Montague Burton Professor of International Relations at Oxford from 1930 to 1944. Sir Alfred was Deputy-Director of the League of Nations Institute of Intellectual Co-operation from 1926 to 1930, Secretary-General of the Constituent Conference of Unesco in 1945, and Executive Secretary of the Unesco Preparatory Commission. From 1925 until the outbreak of war he was Director of the Geneva School of International Studies. His publications include: *The Greek Commonwealth*; *The Third British Empire*; *The League of Nations and the Rule of Law*; and *Spiritual Values and World Affairs.*

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W. K. Hancock. *The Wealth of Colonies.*
W. K. Hancock. *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs.*
K. C. Wheare. *The Statute of Westminster and Dominion Status.*

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